


PERRY CENTER OCCASIONAL PAPER

APRIL 2020

Social Media Use in the Venezuelan Defense and Security Sectors:

Testing and Refining a Conceptual Framework

William H. Godnick and David Guenni



**WILLIAM J. PERRY CENTER
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National Defense University

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Introduction

The global crisis produced by and the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic continue to highlight the importance of modern information technologies and messaging to the general public. Central to both the tools and the content is the generation of trust in message and messenger. Social media tools and usage are vital to both national security and public health in such contexts. Defense and security institutions are a key component of these frameworks whether the task at hand be communicating restrictions to mobility, receiving information from localities about shortages in supplies in order to respond with logistic capabilities or countering false information or propaganda disseminated by adversaries to sow disorder in already challenging environments.

This exploratory research begins with an overview of social media usage and norms in the defense and security sectors drawing on an existing typology previously developed for general governmental purposes that categorizes social media use in four basic categories: push, pull, collaboration and self-presentation.¹ It then takes this framework and applies it to the specific case of the defense and security sectors of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

The overall objectives of this paper are:

- a. Develop and test a conceptual drawing on existing academic framework and apply to a specific case context;
- b. Create a template for future research and open-source analysis focused on the social media content analysis of defense and security institutions; and
- c. Facilitate dialogue between academic scholars and applied policy practitioners on the evolution of social media use by defense and security institutions.

To meet these objectives, this paper employs a mixed methodology of social media content analysis and qualitative explanatory research. The former is undertaken by monitoring the Spanish-language social media of the case under study by objectively identifying specific characteristics in the text of the

¹Nic de Paula, Ersin Dincelli and Teresa M. Harrison, 'Toward a typology of government social media communication: Democratic Goals, symbolic acts and self-presentation,' *Government Information Quarterly*, 35, 2018. pp 98–108.

posts on different social media platforms.² The latter utilizes the existing typology, outlined above, to further describe and classify the posts identified through social media monitoring.³ In essence, while the final research product may be of use to multiple disciplines it strives to fit within the field of comparative politics of the defense sector.

Social media are omnipresent on our computers, tablets, and phones as well as in our personal, professional, and commercial consumer lives. The Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines social media as “forms of electronic communication (such as websites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos)”⁴

In the geopolitical sphere, much reporting has taken place on the actions of Russian-sponsored troll farms that manipulated and magnified politically-charged posts on social media sites and applications – including Facebook and Instagram.⁵ U.S. President Donald Trump has made communication via Twitter a hallmark of his governing philosophy for ‘Making America Great Again.’ The Zetas, the once infamous Mexican drug cartel, made the use of social media part of their business model for intimidating and extorting communities, competitors, and government officials.⁶ The Islamic State has notoriously used video posts on YouTube to disseminate propaganda and broadcast the beheadings of those they consider to be enemies and infidels.⁷

In their recent book on the weaponization of social media, Singer and Brooking argue that the internet and social media -in particular- are changing the nature of war, conflict, and politics.⁸ They also draw attention to the grim reality that actions and information campaigns that begin on computers and smartphones can lead to death and injury in the physical world, including the battlefield, threaten the governance of cities and countries, and motivate a whole range of criminal activity. The recent decision by Twitter to suspend all political advertising is evidence that even some in the private sector are assessing the costs and benefits of the status quo in the social media ecosystem.⁹

² Jim MacNamara, ‘Media Content Analysis: Its uses, benefits, and best practice methodology,’ *Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal*, (6):1, 2005, pp. 1-34.

³ Colin Elman, ‘Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics,’ *International Organization*, Vol. 59: 2, 2005, pp. 293-326.

⁴ See <<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media>> Accessed on 14 November 2019.

⁵ Dave Lee, ‘The tactics of a Russian troll farm,’ *BBC News*, 16 February 2018. <<https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43093390>> Accessed on 15 November 2019.

⁶ Priscila Mosqueda, ‘Mexican Drug Cartels are Using Social Media Apps to Commit Virtual Kidnappings: Facebook and Whatsapp are being used to trick people to pony up cash for safe relative,’ *Vice*, 17 September 2014. <https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/jmbkek/mexican-cartels-are-using-social-media-apps-to-commit-virtual-kidnappings-917> Accessed on 15 November 2019.

⁷ Luna Shamieh and Zoltan Szenes, ‘The Propaganda of ISIS/DAESH through the Virtual Space.’ *Defense Against Terrorism Review*, Vol 7:1, Summer 2015, p. 7-31.

⁸ P.W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, *Like War: The Weaponization of Social Media*, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, October 2018.

⁹ Jefferson Graham and Savannah Behrmann, ‘Twitter CEO says company will stop accepting political ads,’ *USA Today*, 30 October 2019, <<https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2019/10/30/twitter-announces-ban-political-advertisements/4101824002/>> Accessed on 15 November 2019.

Police use of social media

However, the overwhelming focus on the controversial, criminal, and nefarious use of social media by criminal actors in much of the literature does not address the use of social media by governments, much less defense and security agencies, for legitimate purposes related to the exercise of national power and statecraft or their rough equivalents in the domestic sphere as related to the implementation of public security policies and the maintenance of internal order.

Researchers in the US have divided police force use of social media between community relations and problem-solving.¹⁰ Similarly, and along the same lines, scholars in the United Kingdom have placed police use of social media into two broad categories: communication (or engagement) and investigation (operational use).¹¹ In regards to the second, and more sensitive, category of social media use for active criminal investigations the National Open Source Working Group of the UK's National Police Chiefs' Council has developed a five-level model to govern the operational use of social media by officers. The basic contours of this model are:¹²

Level 1 - overt investigatory work such as searching social media sites to view profiles, secure evidence or intelligence.

Levels 2 and 3 – covert investigations including the use of fake profiles and non-attributable computers without any contact or interaction with the subject of the investigation. Any profiles used and information obtained must be registered in an intelligence information system.

Levels 4 and 5 – includes covert online interactions using masked computers and IPs. Level 4 entails the use of passive profiles and limited interaction whereas Level 5 involves developing a personal online relationship with the subject of the investigation. For Level 5 officers require additional training and must be formally authorized by superiors. As with Levels 2 and 3, all information obtained and profiles used must be registered.

The Boston Police Department has utilized social media both to successfully inform and engage the public in the wake of the 2013 Marathon bombing, as well as to conduct criminal investigations.¹³ It is important to note that, in the case of the use of Twitter, the Boston Police Commissioner's individual account is considered the most formidable and authoritative by the general public over and above the

¹⁰ Michael Beshears, 'Effectiveness of Police Use of Social Media.' *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, Vol. 42, 2017, pp. 489 – 501.

¹¹ Elena Egawhary, 'The Surveillance Dimensions of the Use of Social Media by UK Police Forces,' *Surveillance and Society*, 17 (1/2), 2019, pp, 89 – 104.

¹² *Ibid*, pp. 92 – 93.

¹³ Katherine Bindley, 'Boston Police Twitter: How Cop Team Tweets Led City from Terror to Joy.' *Huffington Post*, 26 April 2012, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/26/boston-police-twitter-marathon_n>3157472.html> Accessed on 3 January 2020.

institution's own Twitter feed.¹⁴ The study of the Boston case, also assessed some of the norms and parameters for the department's use of social media differentiating between use by the high command, supervisors and line staff.¹⁵ Additionally, the Boston internal and coordination control system recommended the importance of a communications department and manager in dealing with social media and the need to silence accounts temporarily during specific moments in time and/or on certain issues.

The New York Police Department under Commissioner Ray Kelly established guidelines for institutional use of social media to include no posting of crime scene images, no witness testimony and no befriending of minors met while on duty.¹⁶ The rules also required the departmental approval of social media posts by precinct commanders and a disciplinary process for violations though it is not clear what time and resources are allocated to actual oversight of police use of social media for official use.

In 2015, the Seattle, Washington Police Department adopted relatively detailed social media guidelines that also set out some parameters for private use of social media by police officers.¹⁷ In addition to guidance on official departmental use of social media the policy sets out rules for police officers use of social media while off duty to include: no posting of content that reflects negatively on the department, no sharing of privileged information, no representing the department nor using official email addresses from personal accounts.

Defense and military use of social media

In recent years the body of research and writing on the use of social media in hybrid warfare undertaken by military organizations has grown substantially.¹⁸ Additionally, scholarship has also begun to question the use, parameters and boundaries of social media for covert intelligence purposes in the national security and military realms.¹⁹ However, this paper does not look at these aspects of military use of social media, but rather the more mainstream uses of social media as an institutional tool for strategic communication and digital presence. The authors understand that the mere nature of hybrid warfare, and the use of kinetic and non-kinetic tools against adversaries and targets, makes it difficult to draw hard lines between regular and weaponized use of social media. However, on the covert intelligence side of the equation, similar to the covert use of social media by police forces described above it is clear that different levels of authorization and clearance are required by the operators involved.

¹⁴ Edward F. Davis, Alejandro A. Alvez and David Sklansky, *Social Media and Police Leadership: Lessons from Boston*. New Perspectives on Policing Bulletin, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice/National Institute of Justice, 2014. 15 Ibid, p.15.

¹⁶ J. David Goodman and Wendy Ruderman, 'Police Department Sets Rule for Officers' Use of Social Media,' *New York Times*, 28 March 2013. <<https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/nyregion/new-york-police-dept-issues-guidelines-for-social-media.html>> Accessed on 27 January 2020.

¹⁷ Seattle Police Department Manual, Section 5.124 (Social Media), <<https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-5---employee-conduct/5125---social-media>> Accessed on 28 January 2020.

¹⁸ See for example Michael Erbschloe, *Social Media Warfare: Equal Weapons for All*, New York, Taylor and Francis, 2017.

¹⁹ See for example Nicole A. Softness, 'Social Media and Intelligence: The Precedent and Future for Regulations,' *American Intelligence Journal*, Vol. 34:1, 2017, p. 32-37.

The U.S. government has an overarching policy on social media that is applicable to all departments and agencies.²⁰ This policy addresses official use and non-official use of social media platforms and calls for all agencies to designate a unique point of contact for social media issues. Government accounts are divided into primary institutional accounts referred to as ‘branded’ and program-specific accounts subject to the same norms and rules. While the guidance is mostly general it does refer to the rules for the following areas: criminal conduct, conflicts of interest, misuse of position, use of government time and property, non-public information, partisan political activity, lobbying, discrimination/harassment and the protection of minors. So in practical terms, all of these prescriptions would apply to Department of Defense and military use of social media platforms as well.

The U.S. Army Social Media Handbook, only one of a myriad of regulations and resources that govern social media use within that institution, is primarily focused on guiding users on how best to use these platforms, with a focus on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.²¹ The handbook covers a wide range of issues including how to establish an official social media account, using social media for crisis communications, identifying fake accounts and scams, and in particular operational security considerations. Additionally, the handbook addresses social media use by organizational leaders, soldiers and their families while deployed. In terms of messaging, both when being used on official duty and while off duty, the guidance is that posts should be consistent with “U.S. Army values” and “demonstrate[s] dignity and respect for self and others.”²²

More recent social media guidance that has been issued by the U.S. Navy covers much of the same ground described above, but adds a few additional elements including content on the detection of bots and use of the You Tube platform in addition to the others covered by the Army. The Navy handbook starts off by asking if social media are right for a specific command or not, suggesting that it is better to never start a social media presence than it is to establish a poor one and/or abandon it altogether.²³ The resource also recommends employing institutional social media presence for social listening as well as employing freely available analytics tools to measure audience engagement. Additionally, the U.S. Navy makes suggestions on how to use social media presence to correct the record of erroneous posts or inaccurate information reported in the media.²⁴ Importantly, the Navy handbook also locates the use of social media within the framework of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the consequences for using these tools for child exploitation, hacking, cyber stalking, electronic harassment and threats and obscenity.²⁵ Abuse and violations of institutional norms for social media carried out by individual

²⁰ United States Office of Personnel Management, *Social Media Policy*, July 2017. <<https://www.opm.gov/news/social-media-presence/social-media-policy.pdf>> Accessed on 12 December 2019.

²¹ Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, *The United States Army Social Media Handbook*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Army, April 2016.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²³ United States Navy, *U.S. Navy Social Media Handbook for Navy leaders, communicators, Sailors, families, ombudsmen and civilians*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Navy, March 2019, p. 7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

members of the Marine Corps several years ago led the Commandant to create both a task force to address related problems and various victim support mechanisms depending on the nature of the offense.²⁶

In the Western Hemisphere, a number of governments have general rules, manuals and/or guidelines on social media use by government officials including Chile, Colombia and Mexico.²⁷ In theory, as is the case in the US, these would apply to defense, military, security and policing institutions as well. At least two countries in Latin America and the Caribbean identified by the authors do have rules and restrictions on the use of social media in the military. In 2016, the Bolivian Ministry of Defense under president Evo Morales prohibited the armed forces from using social media, including in their personal time, ostensibly to prevent the politicization of soldiers.²⁸ Similarly, the General Command of the Dominican Republic Army issued a ministerial directive prohibiting military officials and soldiers from posting on social media with the threat of military justice for those who violate the guidance.²⁹ In both the Bolivian and Dominican cases, it is unclear how this is monitored and enforced in practice.

Research approach, objectives and case selection

The exploratory research presented her attempts to build upon and further develop an existing typology or conceptual framework for assessing government use of social media by defense and security institutions as a tool for institutional communication and public diplomacy for both domestic and international stakeholders. Constance Duncombe of Monash University (Australia) argues that it is important to not limit analysis only to analyzing networks and algorithms, but rather to also look to the ideational and emotional components of social media strategies and interactions.³⁰ In this spirit, the authors draw on an existing typology developed by scholars at the State University of New York at Albany for general governmental purposes that categorizes social media use in four basic categories: push, pull, collaboration and self-presentation.³¹ Table 1 below summarizes the general typology and the types of social media uses that will allow the authors to code observed cases in each category. It is anticipated that

²⁶ Lieutenant General Mark Brilakis, *Statement to the Housed Armed Services Committee Concerning Social Media Policies of the Military Services*, 21 March 2017.

²⁷ See Ministerio de Educación, *Manual de Gestión de la Comunicación en Redes Sociales del Gobierno de Colombia*, Bogota, MINEDU, 2017. < https://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1759/articulos-322548_Manual_de_Gestion_de_la_Comunicacion_en_redes_Sociales_Gobierno_de_Colombia_.pdf>; Unidad de Comunicación Digital, *Decálogo de comunicación en redes sociales para cuentas gubernamentales*, Santiago, Gobierno de Chile, 2018. < https://tienda.digital/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Decalogo_comunicacion_rrss-v02.pdf>; and Josue Cisneros, 'Publica Presidencia reglas sobre uso de Twitter para todos los funcionarios,' *Animal Politico*, 3 October 2012. <<https://www.sdpnoticias.com/nacional/funcionarios-presidencia-twitter-publica-reglas.html>> Accessed 24 February 2020.

²⁸ Jesus Alanoca, Restringen a efectivos de las FFAA uso de las redes, Santa Cruz, Bolivia. *El Deber*, 24 February 2016. < https://eldeber.com.bo/67876_restringen-a-efectivos-de-las-ffaa-uso-de-las-redes> Accessed 24 February 2020.

²⁹ Hola Perez, 'Ejército prohíbe a militares expresarse en medios y redes,' Santo Domingo, *Diario Libre*, 2 March, 2017. < <https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/ejercito-prohibe-a-militares-expresarse-en-medios-y-redes-CB6254253> > Accessed on 24 February 2020.

³⁰ Constance Duncombe, 'Feeling digital diplomacy: Soft power, emotion, and the future of public diplomacy,' *Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power – 2019*, Portland and the University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy, 2019.

³¹ Nic de Paula et al, op. cit.

social media posts will sometimes correspond to more than one category simultaneously.

Table 1 – Typology of government social media usage³²

Social media communication category	Coding guidance
Push (information provision)	Public service announcements – safety/public health Operations and events – dates and times Social sharing – raising awareness on issues/policies
Pull (input seeking)	Citizen information – polls, survey and denunciations Fundraising – request for donations
Collaboration (online dialogue/ offline interaction)	Online dialogue – responses to user comments on posts Offline discussion – invitation to offline meetings/discussions Offline collaboration – volunteering
Self-presentation (including symbolic)	Favorable presentation – reports of positive activities Political positioning – taking stance on public issues Symbolic act – celebrations, condolences, gratitude Marketing – presentation of items or services

In each of these categories, social media posts from defense and security institutions can be potentially observed with greater specificity. In terms of *push or information provision* the types of posts that might be observed could include public service announcements about preparation for a hurricane or the establishment of a curfew in a district impacted by high levels of crime; a military recruitment or military conscription campaign or the mobilization of military reserve components with specific dates and times (operations/events); and general social sharing of broad topics such as new technologies.

In relation to *input seeking or pull*, the defense sector might poll the population about issues related to the impact of the construction of a new military base while the police might ask for citizens to provide information on street corners used for micro-drug trafficking (citizen information); and the defense or public security institutions could ask citizens to make financial donations to support families of fallen soldiers or police officers (fundraising).

The use of social media by the defense and security sectors for *collaboration (online dialogue/ offline interaction)* can be identified in a number of activities. Online dialogue is a broad and relatively self-explanatory term and can include fully open chat/posts or closed interactions with access control. Sometimes online dialogues might lead to offline interactions such as cases where women soldiers or police officers share ideas and later decide to meet in person to create professional mentoring support groups (offline discussion). In relation to policing, this category might include the use of social media to inform people about community policing and neighborhood watch groups that provides the public

³² De Paula et al, *Toward a typology of government social media communication*, 2019, pp. 102.

with a general orientation, but where they later can implement the programs on a volunteer basis in consultation with local police officers (offline collaboration). Here, the authors note that it may be a challenge to draw a line between offline discussion and offline collaboration, but that the overall importance here is the focus on collaborations motivated by social media postings that lead to some form of in-person interactions.

Self-presentation or symbolic presentation is perhaps one of the more interesting categories to observe as it potentially includes the use of social media for propaganda and myth-making in addition to less ominous forms of usage. Here military commanders might share information about terrorist attacks prevented, the number of enemy combatants killed or captured in battle while police leadership might highlight the arrest of high-profile criminals or the quantity of drugs confiscated, weapons taken off the streets, etcetera (favorable presentation). Examples from the more political/policy arena, defense sector leadership might express an opinion on the use of soldiers in anti-crime efforts while a police commissioner might come out in support of the acquisition of non-lethal weapons for police officers (political positioning). Symbolic acts are also relatively self-explanatory and may include posts venerating military heroes, expressing thanks to troops or relaying condolences to families of fallen police officers. Perhaps the most difficult to visualize in the defense and security sectors of government is the marketing of items or services, but could potentially include the sale of clothing and memorabilia with institutional logos and messaging.

The overall objectives and potential benefits of this paper are:

1. Develop and test a conceptual drawing on existing academic frameworks and applying it to a specific case context;
2. Create a template for future research and open-source intelligence focused on the social media content analysis of defense and security institutions; and
3. Facilitate dialogue between academic scholars and applied policy practitioners on the evolution of social media use by defense and security institutions.

To meet these objectives, this paper employs a mixed methodology of social media content analysis and qualitative explanatory research. The former is undertaken by monitoring the Spanish-language social media of the case under study by objectively identifying specific characteristics in the text of the posts on different social media platforms.³³ The latter utilizes the existing typology, outlined above, to further describe and classify the posts identified through social media monitoring.³⁴ In essence, while the final research product may be of use to multiple disciplines it strives to fit within the field of comparative politics of the defense sector.

³³ Jim MacNamara, 'Media Content Analysis: Its uses, benefits, and best practice methodology,' *Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal*, (6):1, 2005, pp. 1-34.

³⁴ Colin Elman, 'Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics,' *International Organization*, Vol. 59: 2, 2005, pp. 293-326.

The case selected for testing the typology is the defense/security sector of the contemporary Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. This case was chosen for two reasons. First, one of the authors is a Latin Americanist focused on security and defense issues in the Western Hemisphere. Second, the second author is a graduate student from Venezuela studying in the United States. Both authors are bilingual and can examine the Venezuelan government's posts in the original Spanish language. The purpose of the effort is not to vilify, ratify nor make any specific case against that regime per se. Rather, as some readers will note, the natural eccentricities of the Venezuela case speak for themselves and make for interesting reading.

Case study: Venezuela and the Defense Sector

Anyone who has studied Latin America or global geo-politics in recent years know that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela finds itself in the middle of an ongoing political, economic, social and humanitarian crisis. By the end of 2019, 4.6 million Venezuelans had migrated from the country comprising approximately 16 per cent of the total population.³⁵ There is insufficient space here to go into all the complexities of how the current Venezuelan situation came into being. In a nutshell, the late President Hugo Chavez, with the support of Cuba, came into power via legitimate elections running on a populist platform and began consolidating power by weakening institutional checks and balances, nationalizing important sectors in the economy, persecuting political opponents, closing off avenues of political opposition and using the country's oil wealth to build constituencies for a 21st Century Socialism in the Western Hemisphere. This was sustainable for a number of years. However, upon his death in 2013, his successor Nicolas Maduro took over under much less favorable economic conditions due to a drop in world oil prices, corruption and economic mismanagement.

At present, power is disputed between President Maduro and the president of the National Assembly/interim President Juan Guaido, though real control over territory and resources remains with Maduro through the armed forces and a combination of financial and political support from countries such as China, Russia, Iran and Turkey, not to mention revenues that come from illicit narcotic trafficking and illegal gold sales. Power is maintained through a combination of economic clientelism for supporters including the leadership of the armed forces, military and police intimidation and intelligence operations against citizens. Different global indices categorize the Maduro regime as a hardline "autocracy," "authoritarian," "not free" and as an "electoral autocracy."³⁶ The primary external threats identified by the Maduro regime are economic warfare by the US and the potential for an external military intervention supported, at least implicitly, by the neighboring Colombian government.³⁷

³⁵ Dany Bahar and Meagan Dooley, *Up Front: Venezuelan Refugee Crisis to become the largest and most underfunded in modern history*, Brookings, Washington, D.C., 9 December 2019.

³⁶ Carla Davis-Castro, *Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Compilation of Selected Indices*, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 20 November 2019, p. 12.

³⁷ Gerardo Lissardy, 'Crisis en Venezuela: tras las últimas amenazas, ¿cuán cerca está Estados Unidos de una intervención militar en el país sudamericano?' *BBC Mundo*, 2 May 2019. Available at: <<https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-48129508>> Accessed on 20 January 2020.

The Bolivarian Armed Forces include the traditional Army, Navy and Air Force. They also include the Bolivarian National Guard, a gendarme type organization that enters into action when the police are unable to guarantee public order in addition to controlling most customs posts, points of entry, highways and other transportation-related infrastructure. Additionally, the late president Hugo Chavez created the Bolivarian National Militia for national mobilization in case of a foreign invasion or other national crisis. There are also several quasi-military institutions such as the Presidential Honor Guard, Military Intelligence Directorate, Military Counterintelligence Directorate and the Military Police. Outside of the military space there are numerous civilian security agencies under the Ministry of Interior including the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, the Bolivarian National Police and the Criminal Investigative Police. The police forces mentioned here do not include sub-national forces at the state and municipal levels in Venezuela which are too numerous and disparate to include in this space, some of which are under opposition control at the local level. Some reports document the size of the combined branches of the Venezuelan armed force at approximately 365,000 with the National Guard having almost equal numbers.³⁸ The size of the National Police is estimated at 26,000 suggesting that the country has at least 750,000 people officially in arms within the current regime. This figure does not include the Chavista Collectives, an extralegal paramilitary-style group connected to the regime.³⁹

Table 2 below documents the social media platforms used by the main defense and security institutions in Venezuela, including the individual accounts utilized by the current ministers of Defense and Interior, General Vladimir Padrino and Nestor Reverol respectively. The use of individual accounts by ministers is consistent with the comparative practices identified in the introduction by both military and police commanders in order to stress the importance of the messages being relayed from the highest levels of the institutions. Annex 1 contains a list of the social media accounts identified by the authors of this report. As one might expect, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are the platforms of choice across the Venezuelan defense and security enterprise, with Instagram not being far behind. The use of Google + was documented in the National Guard, although this platform is partially obsolete as of this writing.⁴⁰

³⁸ Marcela Donadio, Ed., 'Venezuela,' *Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa en América Latina y el Caribe, Edición 2016*, Buenos Aires, Red de Seguridad y Defensa en América Latina, 2016, pp. 210 -215.

³⁹ Deutsche Welle, 'Todo sobre las fuerzas de seguridad en Venezuela,' *Deutsche Welle*, 18 April 2017. <<https://www.dw.com/es/todo-sobre-las-fuerzas-de-seguridad-en-venezuela/a-38477887>> Accessed on 20 January 2020.

⁴⁰ Johan Moreno, 'After Its Public Shutdown Google+ Users Continue to Mourn,' *Forbes*, 26 May 2019, <<https://www.forbes.com/sites/johanmoreno/2019/05/26/after-its-public-shutdown-google-users-continue-to-mourn/#d7293ec1c761>> Accessed on 20 January 2020.

Table 2: Social Media Use By the Venezuelan Defense and Security Institutions⁴¹

Fuerza/Cuerpo	Facebook	Twitter	Instagram	YouTube	Google+
Minister of Defense	X	X		X	
Ministry of Defense	X			X	
Armed Forces	X	X	X	X	
Army	X	X	X	X	
Navy	X	X	X	X	
Air Force	X	X	X	X	
National Guard	X	X		X	X
Militia		X			
Military Police		X			
Minister of Interior	X				
Ministry of Interior	X	X			
Intelligence (civilian)	X				
National Police	X		X		
Criminal Investigative Police	X	X			

In contrast to authoritarian regimes like Cuba, Venezuela is not an island closed off from the outside world and the infrastructure for cell phones and the internet was already well established before Hugo Chavez came into power in the late 1990s. However, government control over internet service combined with electricity shortages have made free use of the internet and social media a greater challenge for the Venezuelan population in recent years, in particular for the opposition to the Maduro regime.⁴² Since the dispute for power between the Maduro government and interim President Juan Guaido came to the fore the regime in Caracas has temporarily blocked access to the main social media platforms during military disputes, public protests and the transmission of official speeches.⁴³ In late 2019 and early 2020, Twitter suspended more than a dozen accounts associated with the Venezuelan government, including the oil ministry and the armed forces operational command due to possible links to the Russian Internet Research Agency and potential platform manipulation by a domestic entity in Caracas.⁴⁴ Some of the accounts were later restored.


⁴¹ Source: Internet search by authors.

⁴² Scott Smith, Fabiola Sanchez and Christopher Torchia, ‘Venezuela buckles under massive power, communications outage,’ *Associated Press*, 8 March 2019, <<https://apnews.com/6ba2f69b77e2457da64593a7b8eced16>> Accessed on 20 January 2020.

⁴³ Samuel Woodhams, ‘Maduro’s hidden censorship apparatus,’ *Global Americans*, 14 March 2019, <<https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/03/maduros-hidden-censorship-apparatus/>> Accessed on 20 January 2020.

⁴⁴ Luc Cohen, ‘Twitter suspends over a dozen Venezuelan government, military accounts.’ *Reuters*, 8 January 2020, <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-twitter/twitter-suspends-over-a-dozen-venezuelan-government-military-accounts-idUSKBN1Z72SG>> Accessed on 20 January 2020.

Figure 1



Example of Twitter's suspension of the Venezuelan Armed Forces account.

Source: <[https://twitter.com/Ejercit FANB](https://twitter.com/EjercitFANB)> Accessed on 20 February 2020.

The authors were unable to identify any official guidance in Venezuela on the use of social media by the armed forces or police. A bill of law proposed by the Maduro regime covering the cyber domain in 2019 does make definitional references to social media, but does not address civil servant use of these tools.⁴⁵ The state-owned oil company PDVSA does make vague references to social media use in an institutional code of conduct asking its employees not to make denigrating or belittling remarks about the company and its stakeholders.⁴⁶

Applying the methodology to the Venezuelan defense and security sectors

The following sub-sections will identify and present the use of social media by the Venezuelan defense and security sectors in each of the four categories presented in Table 1: *Push* (information provision), *Pull* (input seeking), *Collaboration* (online dialogue/offline interaction) and *Self-presentation* (including symbolic). In each sample the original Spanish post is included with a translation to English and a brief analysis.

Push (information provision)

Figure 2 is an example of pushing information out to the public in a form of public service announcement encouraging youth to enlist in the national police force or crime scene investigation unit and providing additional information on how to go about it.

⁴⁵ El Nacional, 'Ley del Ciberespacio podría impulsar la censura en internet,' Caracas, *El Nacional*, 15 January 2019, <https://www.elnacional.com/gobierno/ley-del-ciberespacio-podria-impulsar-censura-internet_266633/> Accessed on 20 January 2020.

⁴⁶ PDVSA, *Código de Conducta/Ética Socialista*, Caracas, Ministerio del Poder Popular del Petróleo, September 2017, p. 15.

Figure 2

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UNES **DISPONIBILIDAD POR ESTADOS**
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ESTADOS	DISPONIBLE	ESTADOS	DISPONIBLE
AMAZONAS	DISPONIBLE	GUARENAS-GUATIRE	DISPONIBLE
ANZOATEGUI	DISPONIBLE	GUÁRICO	DISPONIBLE
APURE	DISPONIBLE	HELICOIDE	NO DISPONIBLE
ARAGUA	DISPONIBLE	JUNQUITO	DISPONIBLE
ALTOS MIRANDINOS	DISPONIBLE	LARA	DISPONIBLE
ÁREA METROPOLITANA	DISPONIBLE	MÉRIDA	DISPONIBLE
BARINAS	DISPONIBLE	MONAGAS	DISPONIBLE
BARLOVENTO	DISPONIBLE	NUEVA ESPARTA	DISPONIBLE
BOLÍVAR	DISPONIBLE	PORTUGUESA	DISPONIBLE
CAFETAL	DISPONIBLE	SUCRE	DISPONIBLE
CARABOBO	DISPONIBLE	TÁCHIRA	DISPONIBLE
COJEDOS	DISPONIBLE	TRUJILLO	DISPONIBLE
DELTA AMACURO	DISPONIBLE	VALLES DEL TUY	DISPONIBLE
DISTRITO CAPITAL	DISPONIBLE	VARGAS	DISPONIBLE
EL LLANITO	DISPONIBLE	YARACUY	DISPONIBLE
FALCÓN	DISPONIBLE	ZULIA	DISPONIBLE

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UNES **DISPONIBILIDAD POR ESTADOS**
Proceso Básico II-2020

PNF en Criminalística UNES Ven y Sé

ESTADOS	DISPONIBLE	ESTADOS	DISPONIBLE
AMAZONAS	NO DISPONIBLE	GUARENAS-GUATIRE	NO DISPONIBLE
ANZOATEGUI	DISPONIBLE	GUÁRICO	DISPONIBLE
APURE	NO DISPONIBLE	HELICOIDE	NO DISPONIBLE
ARAGUA	NO DISPONIBLE	JUNQUITO	NO DISPONIBLE
ALTOS MIRANDINOS	NO DISPONIBLE	LARA	DISPONIBLE
ÁREA METROPOLITANA	NO DISPONIBLE	MÉRIDA	NO DISPONIBLE
BARINAS	NO DISPONIBLE	MONAGAS	NO DISPONIBLE
BARLOVENTO	NO DISPONIBLE	NUEVA ESPARTA	DISPONIBLE
BOLÍVAR	NO DISPONIBLE	PORTUGUESA	DISPONIBLE
CAFETAL	NO DISPONIBLE	SUCRE	NO DISPONIBLE
CARABOBO	DISPONIBLE	TÁCHIRA	DISPONIBLE
COJEDOS	DISPONIBLE	TRUJILLO	DISPONIBLE
DELTA AMACURO	NO DISPONIBLE	VALLES DEL TUY	NO DISPONIBLE
DISTRITO CAPITAL	NO DISPONIBLE	VARGAS	NO DISPONIBLE
EL LLANITO	NO DISPONIBLE	YARACUY	NO DISPONIBLE
FALCÓN	DISPONIBLE	ZULIA	NO DISPONIBLE

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
www.unes.edu.ve @UUniversidad @UniversidadUNES @unesoficial
www.mpprijp.gob.ve @mijpvenezuela @mijpvenezuela @mijpvenezuela

Translation: Bolivarian National Police Corps – Hey You! Do you want to be part of the National Experimental Security University? Pre-register at our website <http://unes.edu.ve>

Source: <https://www.facebook.com/pg/Cuerpo-de-Polic%C3%ADa-Nacional-Bolivariana-231509720527789/posts/?ref=page_internal> Accessed on 20 February 2020.

Figure 3, below, from the Bolivarian Intelligence Service's Facebook page is a social sharing of sorts explaining the specific way the organization functions in contrast to other defense and security forces.

Figure 3



Translation: The sole security agency in Venezuela that never engages directly with the public. SEBIN does not patrol the streets, arrest civilians, carry out law enforcement actions, participate in police raids, joint task forces or criminal justice related activities. It is an agency that is a fusion of what in the US are the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, US Marshall Service carrying out counter-terrorism, intelligence, counter-intelligence investigations, background checks and protecting government officials. These officials are rarely seen in public donning their full black uniforms.

Source: <https://www.facebook.com/pg/SebinOficial/posts/?ref=page_internal> Accessed 20 February 2020

Pull (input seeking)

Figure 4, below, from the Interior ministry's Twitter account is an example of input seeking whereas the authorities are asking the public to contact them if they come across an individual suspect accused of homicide.

Figure 4




Translation: WANTED! CIPC Director @ douglaricovzla informs the public about the search for Yorman Jose Gonzalez Martinez, 19 years old and goes by the nickname Peluquin, he is a dangerous murderer that operates in Pueblo Nuevo, Ocumare Parish, State of Miranda. If you have information call 0800 24 72 24 or call 911.

Source: <https://twitter.com/MIJPVenezuela?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Eembeddedtimeline%7Ctwtterm%5Eprofile%3AMIJPVenezuela&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mpprijp.gob.ve%2F%3Fpage_id%3D113> Accessed 20 February 2020.

While other forms of pulling information from the public were not found on the military and police social media accounts, Figure 5 demonstrates that the Ministry of Interior’s website is also used for this purpose. In this particular case, the institution is making a call for bids on a project benefitting police personnel and their families.

Figure 5




Translation: Public Bid: ‘Contracting for a Vacation Program for the Children of Uniformed Personnel of the Bolivarian National Police Corps.

Source: <http://www.mpprijp.gob.ve/?page_id=113> Accessed on 20 February 2020.

Collaboration (online dialogue/offline interaction)

Figure 6 is a thread of replies to a Tweet by the Minister of Defense making statements against the Government of the United States. It can be considered an online dialogue in that while most entries are from supporters of the regime to official positions of the Maduro regime there are also posts from critics that have been left in the thread.



Translation: Chaly4F – General we need Russia and China in Venezuela because what the USA is doing to our country is a crime. Juan Guaido needs to be in jail, we cannot allow such impunity any longer. THIS SCUM HAS TO PAY FOR ALL THE DAMAGE DONE TO THE VENEZUELAN PEOPLE. NO MORE IMPUNITY!; Lotus – Vlad, you are a sucker for Putin now?; Gia Reyna – It amazes me that there are so many comments about the lack of electricity and food in Venezuela, but everyone has a full charge on their smartphone and internet; Wow! Scare Jhon MEXICO - That is how the Venezuelan fascist right operates!; Blanca Vazquez – Long live my General, to the lovely Homeland that our heroes dreamed of, among them the late Commander Chavez; Luis Castillo P. – That is how it should be. That is the only way to stop USA. That is deterrence.

Source: <<https://twitter.com/vladimirpadrino/status/1111760855937572864?lang=en>> Accessed on 20 February 2020.

Figure 7 is an Instagram post by the communications office of the Venezuelan Air Force from February 2020. It is an example of collaboration that begins online and moves to offline in the form of a voluntary poster drawing contest to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the service.

Figure 7



Translation: Major General Alberto Juliac Lartiguez, Commanding General of the Bolivarian Air Force cordially invites all military and non-military personnel to participate in the contest for a Poster Commemorating the 100th Anniversary of Bolivarian Military Aviation. Submissions will be received until 14:00 20 March 2020 in the Directorate for Strategic Planning. Consult the Contest Criteria on our Website www.aviacion.mil.ve. Write us at afichecentenarioambo@gmail.com. BE PART OF OUR HISTORICAL FIRST CENTENNIAL!

Source: <<https://www.instagram.com/p/B8RDXC3BGiF/>> Accessed on 20 February 2020

Figure 8

Self-presentation

Below in Figure 8 the Minister of Defense Vladimir Padrino makes a favorable presentation of the results of a military exercise to demonstrate the capability and cohesion in the armed forces.



Translation: Rebellious February! Today is the second day of the Military Exercise #BolivarianShield2020. Tremendous results up to this point, we have achieved, together with the Militia, an increase in the cohesion of the Armed Forces. Congratulations to the entire Armed Forces. #InDefenseOfTheHomeland. We will be Victorious!

Source: <https://www.facebook.com/PadrinoVladimir/?ref=py_C> Accessed 20 February 2020

The screenshot of the Twitter retweet emanating from the account of the Venezuelan Navy in Figure 9 is an example of political positioning in support of a new law, presented as a constitutional reform, that governs the armed forces.

Figure 9




Translation: Continuing our #CampaignOfLawsOftheArmedForces, the #CEPOFANB invites you to learn more about the new Constitutional Law of the #FANB, which in its Article 6 establishes the roles and missions of the #FANB #20FEB.

Source: <<https://twitter.com/ArmadaFANB>> Accessed 20 February 2020

Figure 10 below illustrates a standard, symbolic act celebrating the country’s independence on a YouTube video within the parameters of self-presentation. While the video and post does emphasize Venezuela’s independence as of the election of Hugo Chavez and 21st Century Socialism in the late 1990s, there is nothing particularly remarkable about the posts as such.

Figure 10



Source: <<https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=Kp1F8ugRKQk>> Accessed 20 February 2020

Translation: #ArmedForcesAreVenezuela, Independence, the most valuable achievement that we have reconquered after 200 years. The Bolivarian National Armed Forces work every day to defend, expand and consolidate this achievement of National Independence.

Other uses

One type of social media post frequently put forth by the defense and security institutions of Venezuela addresses geopolitics. While these could be rightfully considered as political positioning these posts deserve their own space in this paper. Additionally, extreme loyalty displays to the governing regime also deserve specific treatment.

Figure 11 is a tweet from the press office of the Venezuelan Armed Forces virtue signaling the diplomatic, military and commercial relationships with the Russian Federation as one key ally of the Maduro regimes.

Figure 11



Translation: Above and beyond technical military cooperation, Venezuela and Russia continue strengthening bonds of solidarity, brotherhood and mutual respect, as a means of integration and development. The Homeland of Bolivar continues betting on New International Geopolitics. #IHaveADream.

Source: <<https://twitter.com/prensafanb/status/981527595169861637>> Accessed on 20 February 2020

Figure 12 from the Twitter account of Major General Juan Texeira, commander of the air/space command of the Venezuelan Armed Forces calls out the actions of the United States in the region as part of ongoing conflict over the disputed presidency and the perceived risk of a military intervention.

Figure 12



Translation: ALERT! USA with its EP3 airplane insists on creating the conditions for operational risk, upon entering into the region with flight information details that do not meet internationally agreed protocols. This is irresponsible aggression [by the US] seeks to create an incident. #CEOFANB.

Source: <https://twitter.com/cmdtecodai/status/1156921491822432256?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwtterm%5E1156921491822432256&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fperu21.pe%2Fmundo%2Fvenezuela-denuncia-nueva-incurcion-aerea-estados-unidos-nicolas-maduro-donald-trump-nndc-493698-noticia%2F> Accessed on 20 February 2020.

Figure 13 contains a picture posted to the Twitter feed of a local air force unit in the region of Baragua, Venezuela. This post can be considered an example of an extreme loyalty display. The soldiers

are demonstrating loyalty to the figures of the late Hugo Chavez and the current leader of the Chavista regime Nicolas Maduro rather than to the institution they serve or the constitution they are charged with upholding. While it is common to revere historical figures, in democratic societies it is not common practice to place current leadership on such pedestals.

Figure 13



Translation: The Bolivarian Air Force is FOREVER LOYAL. NEVER TREASONOUS!

Source: <https://twitter.com/baragua_amb> Accessed 24 February 2020.

Conclusions

While by no means a representative sample, this paper demonstrates that the defense and security sectors of the current Venezuelan regime make active and dynamic use of a variety of social media platforms, in many ways similar to what one would expect of any Latin American government. In contrast to social media use observed in the United States and other developed countries, the authors take note of a lack of differentiation between the use of social media platform use by Venezuelan defense and security leadership and the institutions themselves diluting the power of messaging, and over-relying on re-posts and re-tweets. Also, the content of posts is frequently emotional in nature, thus providing some insights into the mindset of the institutions and their leaders.

Although multiple platforms are utilized (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and YouTube), the highest quality posts in terms of message and language are generally found on the Twitter platform despite the fact that the company has suspended numerous individual and institutional accounts in recent months and years. On the other platforms, the quality of the posts diminished in particular the further removed they were from the capital and the institutional hierarchy. Perhaps the biggest takeaway from the process of monitoring the Venezuelan defense and security sectors use of social media is how narrowly

focused communication strategies are on the most loyal followers and how little these platforms are used to build trust and generate broader social and political goodwill.

Below, the authors examine the interaction of the Venezuelan case with the overarching typology and make a couple of subtle recommendations to enhance its utility.

Push

The social media posts examined included public service announcements, information on operations and events and different forms of social sharing. What is notable about information on operations and events is that the authors were only able to identify operations and events that had already taken place and were reported on as a means to communicate what the government is doing in terms of national security and public order. Given the polarized nature of the country's politics and the different forms of political, criminal and social violence frequently observed in the public square, it could be that there is a conscious decision by social media managers and contributors to not publicly identify events beforehand out of caution. It could also be that other more discreet medium, such as Whatsapp, are utilized to communicate the dates and times of events organized by the defense and security sectors, but this is just speculation on the part of the authors.

Pull

In this area, the only two of this type of social media posts encountered by the authors were calls for citizens to report criminals and invitations to bid on military solicitations for products and services. Invisible from the social media monitoring in this area were calls for open public input into polls or surveys. Again, given the political polarization and fortress mentality of the regime it is not surprising that they would not want to expose themselves overtly to public criticism, even if constructive.

Collaboration

As documented above, some forms of online dialogue/offline interaction were encountered on Venezuelan defense sector social media posts. While most of the dialogue documented was in the form of replies to social media posts from sympathizers of the Maduro regime, there were ample examples of critics participating in responses to posts. Notably, many of these 'negative' replies were not taken down, even when they utilized vulgar and offensive language, and indeed have remained on the internet for several years without removal.

Self-presentation

Perhaps the most visible, and definitely the most interesting, category of social media communication utilized by the Venezuelan defense and security sectors is self-presentation whether that be favorable presentation of military exercises or anti-crime operations, supporting laws and decrees issued by the Maduro regime to symbolic public acts and posts recognizing figures ranging from Hugo Chavez to

Simon Bolivar. No examples of marketing of products and services to the general public were identified by the authors.

Given the richness of content in this area, the authors suggest adding some additional coding guidance to the typology, along the lines of the examples included in section 4.5, to include geo-political positioning via allies and adversaries as well as ‘extreme’ loyalty displays. Differentiating such cases enhance the conceptual framework, in particular for scholars of strategic studies and comparative politics.

Final thoughts and the way forward

This exploratory effort to document defense and security sector use of social media suggests that the methodology employed is a solid conceptual framework and is useful for two purposes. First, the methodology helps strategists and social communicators from these sectors to organize and leverage their use of social media by providing a clear conceptual organization tool. Second, the framework can also help analysts and intelligence officers by shaping how they look at the use of social media by adversaries and allies alike, given the nature of the world we live in today there is no reason that this framework could not also be applied to non-state actors.

Two areas that were not covered sufficiently in the Venezuelan case study are oversight and alternative social media platforms. One of the rules of government regulation, in particular when no resources are allocated, is that you can do whatever you want until you do something wrong. This is clearly the case in the U.S. where it took a major scandal in the Marine Corps to get oversight and response mechanisms in place. The knee-jerk reaction is visible in at least two countries of the Western Hemisphere decisions to prohibit outright the use of social media by soldiers. This is not a realistic or enforceable policy in today’s environment. In this paper, the authors looked primarily at the big four in social media (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Instagram). This may be a productive research strategy, but it most certainly excludes encrypted networks such as Whatsapp and Signal, and does not take into account tools increasingly used by the new generations such as Snapchat and Tik Tok.

Finally, the authors conclude with two recommendations for the way ahead both in terms of policy and scholarship. First, it would be useful to convene a regional meeting of military and/or police social media officers to review lessons learned and challenges faced in managing a digital presence in national security institutions. Second, future research might further focus on one or more categories of the research methodology used in this paper and apply to the social media posts of Ministers of Defense as the public voice of the defense sector.

Annex 1 - Select Venezuelan official defense and security-related social media accounts

Fuerza Armada Bolivariana -Bolivarian Armed Forces - (FANB)

FANB (main) Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/SomosFANB/?ref=py_c

FANB (main) YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCPW82IMZFB1ERlhiDq6QV0g>

FANB CEO (Operational Strategic Command) Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Ceofanbvzla/?ref=py_c

FANB CEO YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC3SZJLDrPK4IPbhRmyWEfaw>

FANB Facebook (alternate): <https://www.facebook.com/InfoFANB/>

FANB press Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/PrensaFANB/?ref=br_rs

FANB press Instagram: <https://www.instagram.com/prensafanb.1/?hl=es-la>

FANB press Twitter: <https://twitter.com/PrensaFANB>

FANB radio [Tiuna FM] site (contains social media links): <http://www.tiunafm.com.ve/>

FANB TV Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/TVFANBOFICIAL/?ref=py_c

Minister of Defense YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCAzNqrqaR6gGthEJhXz7aGQ>

Ministry of Defense YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCgB8hOgGXMf3pesrefmk40Q>

Defense Minister Padrino Lopez's Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/PadrinoVladimir/?ref=py_c

Defense Minister Padrino Lopez's Twitter: <https://twitter.com/vladimirpadrino>

REDIOR (Integral Defense Strategic Region - Orient) Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/REDIOR/?ref=py_c

CEO Twitter: <https://twitter.com/ceofanb>

Cyber Defense Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/CiberDefensaVE/>

Ejército Nacional Bolivariano - Bolivarian National Army

Army (semi-official) Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/FanpageEjercitoBolivariano/?ref=py_c

Army Instagram: <https://www.instagram.com/ejercitofanb/>

Army Twitter: <https://twitter.com/EjercitoFANB>

Army YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCN-uu5_BVRhIR2kU5cM1Q5w

Armada Nacional Bolivariana – Bolivarian National Navy

Navy Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ArmadaFANBve/?ref=py_c

Navy Instagram: <https://www.instagram.com/armadabolivariana/>

Navy Twitter: <https://twitter.com/ArmadaFANB>

Navy YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCh-K6i1qhBgqobGFwXm66Jw>

Aviación Militar Bolivariana – Bolivarian Air Force

Air Force Directorate of Technology Twitter: https://twitter.com/DIRTIC_AMB

Air Force Facebook: <https://es-la.facebook.com/AVIACION-MILITAR-BOLIVARIANA-233249656735672/>

Air Force Instagram: <https://www.instagram.com/aviacionmilitarbolivariana/>

Air Force Twitter: <https://twitter.com/AviacionFANB>

Air Force YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCYqDUH08a3ls3R7xgld4Zfw>

Guardia Nacional Bolivariana – Bolivarian National Guard

National Guard Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/GNBoficial/>

National Guard Google+: <https://plus.google.com/u/0/100374677167838193926/about>

National Guard Twitter: <https://twitter.com/GNBoficial>

National Guard YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCP6N3qJkqn9_uh7T043NGwA

Milicia Nacional Bolivariana – Bolivarian National Militia

MNB Twitter: <https://twitter.com/MiliciaFANB>

Policía Militar - Military Police

Military Police (35th Brigade) Twitter: https://twitter.com/EJB_35BRIG

Minister of Interior Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/reverolnestor/>

Ministry of Interior Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/MPPRIJP/>

Ministry of Interior Twitter: <https://twitter.com/MIJPVenezuela>

Vice-Ministry of Integrated Police System Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Visipol_MIJP-

[487467824927193/?ref=py_c](https://www.facebook.com/SebinOficial/487467824927193/?ref=py_c)

Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional - Bolivarian National Intelligence Service

SEBIN Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/SebinOficial/>

Policía Nacional Bolivariana - Bolivarian National Police

National Police Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Cuerpo-de-Polic%C3%ADa-Nacional-Bolivariana-231509720527789/?ref=py_c

National Police Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/CPNB_VE/

Fuerza de Acción Especial - Police Special Forces

FAES Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/FAESVNZLA/>

FAES Instagram: <https://www.instagram.com/faespnb/?hl=es>

Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas - Judicial Police

Judicial Police Special Action Brigade Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/GRUPOBAECCS/?ref=py_c

Judicial Police press Twitter: <https://twitter.com/PRENSACICPC>



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