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Welcome to Volume 15 of the Security and Defense Studies Review (SDSR). In addition to the SDSR, we also publish a host of other reports and online journals. Visit our webpage at http://chds.dodlive.mil to see all the Center’s publications. Volume 15 of the SDSR covers a mosaic of important perspectives including democratic consolidation, human rights, cyber security, transnational criminal organizations, and foreign actors in Latin America.

We begin with two articles focused on Mexico. In the first article, José Medina González Dávila, a professor at the Center for Graduate Naval Studies (CESNAV) of the Mexican Navy (SEMAR) provides an in-depth analysis of the multi-faceted nature of international security. By examining drug trafficking organizations in Mexico, he contends that the one-size-fits-all approach to these threats is an anachronism. Rather, one must assess security from a multi-directional and multi-level perspective to design an effective strategy against transnational threats.

Dwight Wilson, political science professor from the University of North Georgia, provides our second article on Mexico. According to the author, Mexico is facing an uphill battle to consolidate democracy in the country because of illiberal cultural policies within the country. In his opinion, Mexican leaders need to embrace cultural reforms in order to propel the country into a more progressive liberal democracy.

Perry Center Professor Kevin Newmeyer provides one of two articles in SDSR 15 on the important topic of cybersecurity. In the first, Professor Newmeyer examines the challenges of cybersecurity for Caribbean nations. In general, Caribbean nations have been slow to develop strategies to protect their critical infrastructure and business interests. In his article, the author provides recommendations and best practices that he has garnered after teaching and researching cyber security at the Perry Center.

Gills Lopes, a Perry Center graduate and professor of international relations at the Universidade Federal da Paraíba in Paraíba, Brazil, provides our second article on cyber security, a comparative analysis of cyber security strategies in Brazil, Canada, and the U.S. In contrast to cyber strategies in Caribbean nations, the cyber doctrines of Brazil, Canada, and the U.S. represent more-developed strategies. Professor Lopes uses a quantitative assessment to support his thorough analysis.

In the next article, the Perry Center’s Dr. Evan Ellis provides an illuminating perspective on how Latin America has dealt with the presence of China in the region. Tracing the historical development of Chinese relations with Latin American nations, he identifies key issues and problems of having foreign actors on the ground in Latin America. His analysis provides an important assessment of what promises
to be a continuing story as the region moves toward the middle of the 21st century.

Another article from a Perry Center professor, Celina Realuyo, addresses a
different threat in the Hemisphere: transnational criminal organizations (TOCs).
TOCs consist of criminal groups, such as drug traffickers, which most nations of
the Americas consider their greatest national security threat. In her article, she
examines the characteristics, strategies, and strengths of these illicit groups. She
also provides a number of examples of interagency and international collabora-
tion in the Americas that, she contends, complements the political will, institu-
tional capacity, and resources that countries need to adapt to combat TCOs in the
Hemisphere.

Perry Center Professor Pat Paterson adds to the thematic diversity of SDSR
15 by teaming up with Professor Richard J. Wilson of the Washington College of
Law. Wilson, a frequent lecturer at the Perry Center, is a renowned expert on the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. In the article, Professors Wilson and Paterson examine some of
the cases that have been the most influential and important in the history of the
two institutions

We also highlight two important Hemispheric Forum events hosted at the
Perry Center in 2013. The first, a discussion of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin
America, was held in September. The second, a panel conference on the impact of
recent elections in the region, was held in December. Both included senior schol-
ars and practitioners versed in political and foreign policy issues in the Western
Hemisphere. We are confident you will find the summaries of the discussions
stimulating.

The journal finishes with an important review of a recently published book
by David Pion-Berlin and José Manuel Ugarte. The reviewer, Professor John T.
Fishel of the University of Oklahoma, dissects the book chapter by chapter. Fish-
el, a former CHDS professor and an expert on civil-military relations, finds com-
mon deficiencies among most of the Latin American case studies examined in the
book: a lack of civilian expertise in matters of security and gradual improvement
in the quality of civilian ministers of defense.

Thank you for reading SDSR 15. I trust you will find the articles well writ-
ten and thought provoking. Future editions will cover thematic issues such as the
2014 Conference of the Defense Ministers of the Americas and the 2015 Summit
of the Americas. We invite your comments on these articles and contributions to
future editions of the Security and Defense Studies Review. On our website you
will find a Publications Handbook and a Writing Guide for authors interested in
publishing their works. We invite you to submit your research and articles for
publication to our editorial team by sending them to chdsejournal@ndu.edu.

With best regards,
Kenneth LaPlante
Acting Director, Perry Center
Toward an Integral Counter–Organized Crime Strategy in Mexico: Complexities, Asymmetries, and Approaches to an International Security Matter

José Medina González Dávila

Abstract

Two of the greatest threats in the Northern Hemisphere are terrorism and drug trafficking. However, drug trafficking–related violence, cartel criminal diversification in national and transnational fronts, and terrorist-style displays of force are just the visible elements of a deeper, more complex social dynamics in the country. Drug trafficking, like international terrorism, is not a one-sided problem. It is a multi-level, multi-dimensional issue that must include different measures to effectively engage it. It is, by definition, a complex social phenomenon that does not hold definition. Mexico has its share of these problems. Among the major cartels operating in Mexico, the Zetas are the ones that have displayed a relatively high level of mobility, adaptability, and aggressiveness over the last few years. Other complicating factors are the transnational criminal organization development dynamics and adaptation to the environment. Consequently, military and law enforcement must constantly adapt to the new operating conditions they encounter as they regain control of public spaces in the country.

International Threats in a Changing World: The Reflection of Complex Social Manifestations

Social manifestations in the 21st century can be seen as a set of very complex and interconnected relations developed at a local level and with a global reach. This level of complexity cannot focus on just one level of analysis but on a multi-level, multi-dimensional, integrated field. International security is a complex system that must be approached from an integral analytic perspective, where local issues can potentially have a global reach. Terrorism, international crime, transnational cooperation, and regional stabilization are key elements to address in the consolidation of an international security system.

Two of the greatest threats to international security in North America are terrorism and drug trafficking. Both phenomena, present in several Latin American countries in one form or another, have always been considered a risk to each country’s national security and/or public safety. Since the beginning of the 21st century the situation has changed and a different approach has been taken with consideration to organized transnational crime and terrorism as international security
issues. In the search for a regional security more focused to neutralizing threats rather than just containment, nations have employed law enforcement, military forces, and transnational and interagency efforts at a regional and international level.

Over the last six years Mexico has displayed several social phenomena that threaten the security of North America. Drug trafficking–related violence, cartels’ criminal diversification both nationally and transnationally, and terrorist-style displays of force are just the visible tip of the iceberg of the complex social dynamics in the country. It would be inadequate and unfair to consider all of the population and the country’s institutions to be part of these phenomena. However, it is undeniable that the actions of a few thousand individuals operating under the banner of a cartel or a criminal organization have created lasting repercussions for the general Mexican society and all the social and ethnic groups that constitute it. These matters are subjects of national security for Mexico and international security for the United States.

Starting with an integral and brief analysis of the dynamics of one of Mexico’s most important drug trafficking cartels, the Zetas, I will cover some of the social and cultural impacts this organization has had over the last few years in the country, and on a transnational level. I will also present a series of reflections and recommendations on an integral approach to this international problem. This document is based on anthropological studies conducted in Mexico and the American Southwest for a period of five years (2008–2013), as well as an analytical comparison of ethnographic, documental, and historical data, the goal being to develop an inclusive analysis that yields information beyond the traditional situational or intelligence studies.

Mexico is actually several Mexicos: a conglomerate of different regions that include a number of ethnic groups, which in turn have their own social dynamics based on their historical developments and traditions. Therefore, the impacts on the social groups by criminal organizations have different manifestations in each region. These situations move to the development of region-specific considerations in the analytical and public policy designs, as well as the inclusion of specialized strategies for the creation of international policies and programs to eliminate the threats that these organizations represent.

The one-size-fits-all approach to these threats is no longer a viable or efficient alternative for policy making, and the inclusion of integral and complex studies to the International Security development plans in North America is necessary for multi-directional and multi-level efforts to neutralize and eventually eliminate transnational threats. The starting point is to recognize who the “enemy” is.

The Zetas: From Servants to Masters

While there are a few major cartels operating in Mexico (the Sinaola, the Juárez, the Gulf, and the Zetas are the largest and most organized) and many other smaller criminal organizations in the country, the Zetas are the ones that have displayed a relatively higher level of mobility, adaptation, and aggressiveness over the last few years. Discussing in detail the structures and modus operandi of all the cartels
in the country is beyond the scope of this article, and those organizations have been discussed extensively in other documents. However, a brief synthesis of the historical and current development of one of these transnational criminal organizations will provide context for later analysis.

There is a decades-long adage in the military special operations community that the best terrorist is a counterterrorist, because he not only understands the methodology and tactics of several terrorist groups, but also knows in detail the procedures and tactics of the law enforcement or military organizations tasked with counteracting them. The Zetas started as “enforcers” of the Gulf Cartel in Mexico, whose area of influence was the coastal region of the Gulf of Mexico. It is undeniable that the Gulf Cartel was (and is) a transnational criminal organization with assets in Central America and the Southwest of the United States. However, like most drug cartels in Mexico, they followed certain rules in the execution of their organizational practices: the territories of other cartels were “respected”; violence was used only as a response to imminent risks to their organization; internal “moral and ethical” codes were enforced within the cartel; rites of initiation were held; and the “purchase” of local law enforcement and certain political figures was a common procedure to ensure the safety and protection of their operations. Sicarios, or “enforcers,” were required to uphold their illicit activities and to sustain the operational effectiveness. While most drug cartels recruited their “soldiers” from the local population, sometimes relatives of organization members, the Gulf Cartel has engaged in recruiting actual soldiers from the Mexican Army since 1999.

Not just satisfied with regular defectors or soldiers who were already discharged and had knowledge of weapons handling and conventional military tactics, the Gulf Cartel recruited the best Mexican soldiers available: members of the elite Airmobile Special Forces Group (Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales, GAFE) and members of the now-decommissioned Amphibious Special Forces Group (Grupo Anfibio de Fuerzas Especiales, GANFE). These groups were, at the time, the elite special operations organizations of the Mexican military, trained in direct action; counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; special weapons and tactics; secure communications; intelligence; airborne and airmobile operations; and reconnaissance. Not only were they trained in Mexico and by allied countries, they were also seasoned special operators who had been in charge of counter-drug operations in urban and rural settings since the group’s creation in the mid-1980s.

With this level of expertise, their skills were in high demand, and because of their training, indoctrination, and mentality the Gulf Cartel considered them to be the best choice as “enforcers.” Initially motivated by the economic income that the cartel could provide them, GAFE and GANFE operatives defected from the Mexican Army and became the “elite soldiers” of the cartel, recruiting other special operators from Mexico and Guatemala. Recruiting members of the Kaisibles, the most renowned special operators of the Guatemalan Army, known for the toughness and brutality of their training and for their effectiveness in combat, these new “elite enforcers” trained other members of the cartel in special military
tactics and strategies. Known as the Escorpiones, they became the bodyguards and the “elite” armed component of the Gulf Cartel. With these soldiers, the Gulf Cartel expanded its area of operations and influence and ruthlessly suppressed competing cartels in the eastern coast of Mexico. However, within a few years these former special operators decided to take the initiative and separate from the Gulf Cartel to form their own criminal organization. Supported by other drug lords at the time, the new cartel assumed the name of Zetas and began targeting their former bosses in the Gulf Cartel. As a response, the Gulf Cartel leadership decided to execute all their Escorpion bodyguards, considering them a threat because they were trained by the now-Zetas. These fratricidal acts were the first in a long series of internal reconfigurations of the Gulf Cartel.

Acting like an independent special operations military unit, the Zetas targeted the leadership and logistical support personnel of other cartels, systematically eliminating their competition. With efficient, yet brutal, tactics the new cartel expanded their area of influence. Under the philosophy of “surrender, subdue to us, or die,” the Zetas developed a new type of criminal organization that has now become one of the most dangerous and daring cartels in Mexico. The Zetas operated under the principle of “anyone can be bought, because everyone has a price,” their sole mission to control all regions of Mexico with impunity. Their intention was not to overtake the government but to control by any means necessary the government officials and political leaders so they could continue their illegal activities without fear of prosecution. The other remaining cartels followed this model of operation, to the point where organizations like the Sinaloa Cartel also recruited former military personnel and established “military training camps.” Most cartels defended their members, territories, and illegal activities against the Zetas, setting the ground for future confrontations among criminal organizations in the country.

Because of their military training and indoctrination, the Zetas developed a hierarchical, strictly vertical, and compartmentalized command and control structure. Enforcement of internal rules was instituted, and military style discipline was enforced within the ranks of their membership. Due to their special operations background in intelligence, the Zetas developed independent cell-based units that operate with no real knowledge of the activities of other cells. Known as “plazas,” each region of the country was divided into sectors, and specific teams of Zetas were sent to exploit the region in which they were placed in any way they could. The structure of each team consists of a “chief of the plaza” and that person’s operatives. The entire structure is commanded by regional leaders, who themselves are led by the veteran Zetas who were previously working for the Gulf Cartel.

President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa declared a zero-tolerance policy with regard to the illegal drug trade in December 2006. The federal police, along with the Mexican Army and the Mexican Navy (including the Naval Infantry or Marines) as support elements, was deployed to different areas of the country to close down the areas of operation of the cartels and restore public order and law. As the result
of these measures, all the cartels entered a new stage of development in which they diversified their criminal activities to ensure their survival as organizations. The Zeta modus operandi became simpler: the chiefs were informed of their new plaza, and how much time they would have to seize the region. Murder, torture, bribes, or the use of public terror were acceptable means to seize control and to eliminate competitors and opposition. No measure would be off-limits to keep their designated timeframe, to provide determined amounts of money or profits to the higher echelons of the organization, and to terminate any opposition they encountered.12

The Zetas apparently have no moral or ethical standards or rules. The total disregard for human life is seen as an operational necessity, and the value of the individual is measured only in terms of the influence he or she can represent for the operation. In this regard, the Zetas consider any person expendable: a subject of no value for their operation, who represents a threat, or who could influence others must be ruthlessly terminated. Furthermore, if an authority figure (governmental or not) cannot be bribed or has not shown the expected results, the Zetas consider that an execution-style murder of the individual or group of individuals is required. The use of torture, executions, and other means of instigating public terror are tools that the Zetas use to enforce their presence in the regions and to intimidate other cartels and government authorities.13

Because of the intense military presence in most regions of Mexico since early 2007, the Zetas, as well as other cartels, could no longer obtain their regular profit from the standard drug trade, and were required to diversify their actions to pay their personnel and survive as an organization. This forced cartel leaders to motivate their cells to engage in other criminal activities like kidnapping for ransom, “charging” civilian population for their safety and operation of their businesses, taxing traders and agricultural workers, extorting public servants and civilian authorities, and seizing whatever goods they could as a way of payment for their work to the cartel.14 To enforce such actions, public displays of brutality have been employed by the Zetas as a means of social control. Hand grenades thrown into crowds at social gatherings; public shootings and hangings; disposal of tortured or mutilated bodies in public areas such as schools and churches; car bombs used against public buildings; and internet videos depicting the torture of military, law enforcement, and political officials or their families are now means of intimidation used by Zetas.

For legal and political reasons, these actions in Mexico are still considered just local or federal criminal activities. However, the true repercussions of the Zetas Cartel in Mexico must be considered a form of focalized terrorism, particularly when such actions are focused on influencing government authorities. Defining terrorism15 as an act of an individual or group of individuals to influence the behavior or dynamic patterns of a society or its leadership toward a specific goal or direction, the Zetas have certainly displayed a terrorist-style behavior that cannot be ignored or its effects minimized. Over the last couple of years, there have also been strong indications that the Zetas are at least considering an incursion in international terrorism. Not motivated by ideological, religious, or political views
but by purely economic reasons, the Zetas have developed the logistical support, knowledge, and ambition to move to the international arena as operators or supporters of international terrorist activities.\textsuperscript{16}

The presence of the Zetas is widely known officially and unofficially near the international border in Texas and Arizona. While in the past the main issues in this region were illegal immigration, and to some extent drugs and weapons trade, over the last few years the threat level has increased to the point that it can now be considered a national security matter for the United States. Because of the transnational dimension of criminal organizations like the Zetas, the need exists for international and integral studies on the effects and dynamics of these groups for the development of response plans that can effectively engage them as a threat to society in the entire region. At the same time, adequate prospective scenarios must be analyzed from an international perspective in order to develop strategies that allow local and federal law enforcement in Mexico and the United States to engage these criminal organizations effectively.

\textbf{The Social Effect of the Transnational Criminal Organizations: Toward a Comprehensive Strategic Development and Response Plan}

Drug trafficking, as well as international terrorism, is not a one-sided problem. As a general rule, it is a multilevel, multidimensional issue that must include different measures to engage it effectively. It is, by definition, a complex social phenomenon that does not follow a definitive or linear dynamic process. In this regard, the escalation of these phenomena can only be measured or determined by the different expansion levels and forms that their specific context allows them. By these premises, the possibility that drug cartels or other transnational criminal organizations could engage in international terrorism is a very possible alternative of their developmental dynamics.

The organizational dynamics displayed by the Mexican drug cartels over the last five years have had a sociopathic influence on society. By definition, any individual or organization that engages in criminal activities—that disrupts or challenges the laws and normative grounds that regulate the social relationships of individuals, organizations, and government institutions—is in essence sociopathic—opposed to a life in society and its fundaments.\textsuperscript{17} However, drug cartels like the Zetas have taken a step forward from the basic sociopathic behavior and have advanced into the psychopathic displays of force. In order to send a message to civilian and military authorities in Mexico, some cartels have resorted to extreme cruelty to their victims such as the use of torture and/or cannibalism.\textsuperscript{18} These psychopathic actions have three main intentions: to dissuade federal or military officers from entering their territories; to dissuade other cartels from entering their plazas; and to create fear in the population to make them vulnerable to their demands of money, goods, or supplies.\textsuperscript{19}

Fear is a primal motivating force for almost any animal, and the human being is not an exception. However, in our species, fear can also be understood and developed at a rational level, and its use has been one of the primary tools of psychological warfare. U.S. Army Colonel (Ret.) David Grossman has labeled
appropriately the fear that every human possesses as the “Universal Human Phobia”: the fear of violent confrontation with another member of our species. Capitalization or control over this phobia is the basis for effective negotiation through human conflict, either at a personal or organizational level. However, the manipulation of human fear to accomplish a goal is not only beyond the ethical and moral boundaries of our society, it is also a challenge to modern laws and human rights.

Evidence suggests that the open displays of extreme violence, either physical or psychological, by the drug cartels in Mexico are strategies designed to manipulate local population and to intimidate other cartels and federal forces. By displaying public use of force (an attribute restricted exclusively to the State in any legal system in the world), they intend to intimidate the population to push the government authorities out of specific regions and to desist in their attempts to control and suppress their criminal organization. In other words, they use force in order to pursue impunity. But at the same time, violence and terror is being used as a means to dissuade other cartels from entering the few available areas of operation and to force them into submission. This process is responsible for the vast majority of deaths in Mexico, a visible result of the internal war among cartels.

However, these confrontations among the cartels and with the federal forces have had deep repercussions in the civilian population. Because of their presence and activities, several communities and towns in Mexico have been almost completely abandoned by their inhabitants, and the economic stability of certain regions is slowly, but continuously, collapsing. Regular agricultural workers face a difficult decision in some regions of the country: either work for the cartels or leave their home towns. Intense migratory movements from the rural areas to urban areas, including to the United States, are driving the economic workforce out of productive regions, and those who remain there become beholden to the cartels. A testimony recorded by the author in 2011 illustrates this phenomenon. Ramón is an agricultural worker who has four children. His entire life has been, like many other peasants in Mexico, around his home town. He lives modestly, and his average income has been around $8,000 per year. When asked about the drug cartel presence in his region, he said:

All my life I have tried to be a good man. I am a Catholic, I go to church every Sunday, and try to be good to my neighbors. My father raised me and my brothers like that, just to live close to the land, and to be kind. Very few times I have gone beyond [the town], to sell corn and chilies that I grow in my land. I don’t ask for much. But one day I was in town, black trocas [SUVs] drove down the street. They were eight or nine of them. Then they stopped right outside the ayuntamiento [City Hall], and men with cuernos de chivo [AK-47s] stepped out. They went into the building. I don’t know what happened in there. Then a few days later they found near the church ten decapitated bodies. They just found the torsos, with no arms or legs, or heads. They were naked, and the bodies looked like they were
cut badly. Some almost looked burned with oil or something. But they were not just men, there were women’s bodies too! Some of them were small, like kids. We were all horrified. The Federales [Federal Police] showed up, but I did not want to know or get involved. They said a sheet of paper signed by the Zetas was there, saying they owned the town now. Then a few days later we woke up to find several bodies hung from the bridge. Then more killing, then shootings during the day. Then at night time. Then, one day, a guy in sunglasses and that is not from [this town] showed up in the stores in the town. Just told them that if they did not pay up, they would be killed along with their families. They asked for money that they did not have, so many of them just left town. Then one day they showed up in my house, and gave me a beating. Just like that! They said that I should pay them, or that they would kill my children. Just to show me they killed my son…. I was so scared, that I felt we were all going to die. I could not even bury my son, we just left. Now I have no home, no town, I can’t go back and don’t know where to go. Maybe I will go to [the United States]; I don’t know what to do.

The case of this peasant is not an isolated case. His testimony demonstrated the social impact that the drug cartels and their enforcers have on civilian populations in large regions in Mexico. However, the diversification of their criminal activity in the search for more permissive environments for their illegal operations has also pushed them into the transnational arena. The border region of the United States has been their first, but not only, choice to move their operations. Alfred is a 54-year-old resident of South Texas who is a retired law enforcement officer. He lives on a small ranch near the Mexican border and near a medium-sized urban center. His testimony in mid-2010 is revealing:

Well, I thought I had seen a lot of things while I was a [cop] around here, but the situation with the Mexican drug cartels here is getting worse. We had seen murders, drug-trafficking and illegal immigrants all the time, and we had the Border Patrol to back us up. But now people are getting scared. We see in the news about the violence in Mexico, and over here too! People are just leaving out of fear. I mean, you did not see this a few years ago! People are scared of the Mexican cartels here. Not even near the police do some people feel safe. Now kids are getting shot by other bands, near schools because of drug deals that went south. We see all the time Mexicans crossing over [to Texas] scared to death. I have heard from some friends at the Border Patrol that they beg them not to send them back to Mexico. I mean, I understand they want to move up here to improve their lives, but they are terrified of going back. They say that the Zetas will kill them if they come back. And guess what? That fear is spreading around here. No good, no good at all.
The presence of the drug cartels in the border region between Mexico and the United States has been known for a long time. However, the increments in the violence are affecting local population. These disruptions in the social structure on the Mexican and American sides of the border add pressure to local, state, and federal authorities to face this challenge in an integral and comprehensive manner. Traditional relational rules that influenced the economic, political, and social structures and dynamics in Mexico and the American Southwest are being reconfigured as a predictable response to the insertion of these criminal organizations. However, these adaptations come with a cost, one that usually disrupts the social structure away from the traditional behavioral social patterns.

For instance, one of these manifestations is the inclusion of new religious practices by large segments of the population in Mexico and in the international border region. While Catholicism or Protestantism have been the traditional religions of the vast majority of the population in the country, relatively new devotions have flourished as the direct result of the presence of the cartels. Devotion to the “Holy Death,” “Saint Malverde,” Santería,” or various types of “witchcraft” has expanded among large segments of the Mexican population seeking “protection” from the cartels and the violence they generate. The expansion of these practices as a result of the presence of the criminal organizations has pushed traditional religion to the margins in some areas of the country, and in some communities in Mexico where historically the local population had been strictly Catholic, even 16th century churches have been reconfigured and adapted to these new religious practices.

Religion, as one of the primary characteristics of the social structure of any community, is a primary indicator of the dynamics of any social group. The inclusion of other practices while pushing aside traditional religion is a clear indication of the deep social impact that drug trafficking–related violence has created in several regions of Mexico. As a senior Mexican military intelligence officer pointed out:

This has now become a social problem. This problem with the cartels is affecting people in ways no one could have conceived. [People] used to work for the cartels because they had no other jobs. Now they do it for some dope, some money, or just because they did not have any other thing better to do. Others really believe the cartels will win this fight, and just choose to go to the winning side. This is insane! How can we fight this problem? It is hard in a real war to fight the enemy as it is, but we don’t have a war in its true extent here. The real problem is that we cannot even fully identify the bad-guys. They are just like you or me, just average people. If we can’t identify them, how can we fight them? And if [military and law enforcement] can’t identify them, how can the civilians tell who is who? This causes fear and confusion, you know? This is a social problem now. We need another approach here.
Asymmetric Conflict and Regional Stabilization Efforts in the “War against Drugs”

As the previous testimony pointed out, there is no “declared war” in Mexico. In strict accordance with the Mexican Constitution and legal standards, a “war” cannot be undertaken unless the Mexican Congress declares it. At the same time, it is a contradiction in terms to consider a “war” inside the country itself. While there might be an armed confrontation against organizations or forces that are against the government or the law, it cannot be considered a full-blown war. Criminal organizations, being considered a public safety subject, are under the jurisdiction and area of competence of law enforcement organizations. While, theoretically, local and state law enforcement should have the means to combat crime in their jurisdictional areas, several police departments and officials at municipal and state levels in Mexico are unfortunately compromised.

A major challenge several government institutions experience (at municipal, state, and even federal levels) is penetration by the criminal organizations. Corruption of government, police, and military officials compromises the Mexican government’s efforts, since this not only weakens any efforts to develop an integral and effective strategy against the drug cartels (both in the containment and the suppression phase), but it also creates an adverse public opinion—inside and outside the country—on Mexican national security and public safety institutions. Corruption of government and law enforcement officials represents a challenge to an integral strategic approach to the counter–drug trafficking efforts in Mexico, since it creates “areas of vulnerability” that the cartels can (and have) exploited.

Such vulnerabilities of the Mexican State can be addressed and corrected by government institutions that develop more in-depth interagency coordination, strict adherence and development of control and confidentiality measures among government and law enforcement personnel, and a constant professional development and performance evaluation of all public servants. Recognizing that any State is as strong as its weakest institution, the Mexican government faces the challenge to strengthen and consolidate strong institutions, agencies, and organizations by the depuration of corruption and of any possible security breaches (either present of future) that could potentially yield an area of opportunity for transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to exploit. From this point of view, while it is possible to see a compromise of contemporary Mexican government and law enforcement institutions and organizations, it can also be seen as an opportunity to consolidate and strengthen the integrity and efficiency of the Mexican State in its efforts to eliminate TCOs.

President Calderón ordered the deployment of the federal police and of the Attorney General’s staff (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR) to close down the areas of operation of the drug cartels. Furthermore, the President ordered the armed forces (the army and the navy) to support such operations with the objective of regaining control over and stabilizing several regions of the country. However, it must be noted that under the present legal system in Mexico, neither the army nor the navy have faculties, jurisdiction, or competence in law enforcement. Although they officially play only a supporting role, major opera-
tions against the drug cartels and their leadership have been compromised because of the legal restrictions that military personnel have had while operating in the country.

After five years of continuous engagement with criminal organizations in Mexico, and considering the developments of the situation, this factor must be considered in the development of an integral approach to the multilevel and multidimensional scope of the social problems that the cartels have created in challenging the government and the law in the country. Without adequate legislation, the effectiveness of military operations against the cartels (either as support elements or as leading figures in the State’s policy and strategy) is severely compromised and limited. This also creates a vacuum of power in an integral strategy toward regional and interregional stability and security. Another factor to consider is the adaptation of the criminal organizations to the measures taken by the government. For each measure the Mexican federal government implements to close areas of influence of the criminal organizations, the former adapt to counteract them. Before the drug cartels are able to adapt and implement, however, there is a considerable period of vulnerability.

These are opportunities that the intelligence communities in Mexico and the United States should examine for exploitation. Mexican federal forces, as well as American law enforcement agencies, should use these windows of opportunity—during which the drug cartels try to reorganize, consolidate, and adapt to government actions—to obtain valuable intelligence on the dynamics, organization, and reconfiguration efforts of the cartels’ leadership. At the same time, such intelligence should be used accordingly in surgical operations to further weaken the TCOs, to remove additional members of the cartels hierarchy and operational structure, and to obtain more intelligence.

Adequate legislation and effective enforcement of such normative scope must be developed to fully exploit the times of vulnerability of the cartels. At the same time, effective punitive action toward corruption and convicted cartel leaders must be undertaken. Eventually, these measures will weaken the cartels and force them to divide into smaller groups that can be engaged more effectively by military and law enforcement special operations. Instead of saturating an area with conventional troops—a strategy that was used by the Mexican federal government in the first few years of President Calderón’s mandate to regain control of several areas of the country—future operations should be of a surgical nature, more focused and directed toward the fragmentation and exploitation of vulnerabilities of the cartels in their reconfiguration efforts.

Surgical operations not only have proven to be more efficient, but also offer fewer potential collateral damage risks, help to support public opinion on the Mexican intelligence organizations and federal forces, and, if executed correctly and with a solid intelligence support and foundation, can dissuade criminal organizations of further reconfigurations that can challenge the State’s authority. By systematically developing intelligence during the time the cartels are vulnerable, and exploiting them with additional surgical/special operations, they can severely affect the TCOs’ efforts to reorganize, dissuading them from further ef-
forts to present a challenge to government authority and forcing them to divide into smaller, more restricted and more manageable groups without a hierarchical command structure. In essence, fragmenting the cartels into smaller groups and eliminating their leadership and coordination structures could potentially yield valuable results in the efforts to suppress the major TCOs in Mexico.

Other factors to consider in the engagement of the transnational criminal organizations are their developmental dynamics and adaptation to their environment. Military and law enforcement must constantly adapt to the new operating conditions they encounter as they regain control of public spaces in the country. Clothing, equipment, medication, services, and food of the armed forces and federal police personnel deployed in Forward Operating Bases or in their operational garrisons are constant requirements to consider in the logistical support system to sustain the operations against the cartels. Such adaptations are usually undertaken with considerable financial and logistical costs. Smaller, less-structured, and more-mobile organizations such as the cartels and other criminal organizations do not have these restraints, granting them a relative force multiplier\(^3\) in a specific context. In this regard, the efforts against the drug cartels in Mexico are an asymmetric conflict, and as such must be addressed.

Asymmetric Warfare\(^2\) is the term used in contemporary military strategic studies to designate a situation when the structure, strategies, planning, or relative force of two opposing parties in conflict is not placed on equivalent terms. It is used for counterinsurgency operations and other forms of internal domestic conflict around the world, extending to antiterrorism and the suppression of transnational organized crime.\(^3\) An effective asymmetric conflict-resolution management plan must take into account several factors, including the social effects of the confrontations and prospective dynamics of the conflicting parties. There are several asymmetrical relations to consider for an integral approach to the suppression of transnational criminal organizations in Mexico. For purposes of this article only two will be briefly discussed.

The first axis to consider is the amount of resources employed against the opposing party. While the military and law enforcement officers have more sophisticated equipment and logistical support than most cartels, their employees must adhere to strict regulations and maintenance needs. While international cooperation has been extremely valuable, the resources at hand of the federal government against an elusive and not so clearly defined adversary have been stretched to the limit in some areas of the country. Employing the local population and resources as assets, criminal organizations in Mexico require far fewer resources to operate in specific regions. As a naval infantry (marine) officer commented to the author during a conversation:

We take a lot of time and effort in making infantrymen or specialists to operate against the *narcos*. Just feeding and providing adequate weapons and clothing to the average trooper is expensive, and it's a constant thing we need to do. Besides that, we need transportation of personnel and equipment, pay their salaries, give them medical coverage, and other services
to them and their families. That is just to operate in one region. The *narcos* don’t need any of that. They don’t require all those logistics to function. It’s just one or two men, traveling by bus or car, and all they need to get in business is a butcher’s knife that costs about $2.00.

In addition to the obvious asymmetries in this regard, another variable to consider is that most drug cartels have hidden caches of weapons and ammunition in quantities and locations undetermined by the intelligence community and supplied mostly by the black market. Not only do they have access to sophisticated high-power military-grade weapons, ammunitions, and explosives, but also to high-tech components that for the most part federal forces are unaware of. For example, in 2011 in the state of Tamaulipas, military personnel identified and confiscated sophisticated military secure telecommunication equipment that the Zetas were using to transmit and intercept communications of the military forces in the northeast region of Mexico.

The second axis of asymmetry, and the most important for purposes of this analysis, is the social effect that either or both parties can create in the local civilian population. On one end, the military has maintained, to a greater or smaller extent, a continuous presence in all the territories of the country. For historical and political reasons, garrisons of the Mexican Army have been located all across the country since the end of the Mexican Revolution in the 1920s. As of the last third of the 20th century, the army and the navy have maintained an important presence across the country in social support and civilian protection programs as a response to natural disasters. Operational support plans like DN-III-E and MARINA have provided support to thousands, if not millions, of people when their residence areas have been affected by natural disasters. This has promoted a high degree of trust and respect of the armed forces among the general population over the years, as has been constantly demonstrated by independent civilian public opinion surveys among the Mexican population.

On the other hand, the presence of drug cartels and other forms of organized crime have been visible in many regions of Mexico for more than 30 or 40 years. However, for most of that time they were perceived by the general population not as an imminent threat to their lives or property. Most of the country was considered safe, and violence—although it has always been present in many areas of the country—was not considered a major problem. While in the past there was a sense of tranquility, now there is a tense and disruptive atmosphere where fear is a constant. In addition to these and other factors previously discussed, the mass media of Mexico has promoted these feelings of uncertainty, distrust in the federal and military authorities, and fear of the cartels. Their informative actions, in many cases, almost exclusively address the drug-related violence, increasing the perception of violence and fear of the population.

While in the past many things were considered normal, now an aura of suspicion and confusion is present in almost every action the people undertake. This type of social interactive disruption has profound effects in the social, economic, and political dynamics of major regions of Mexico. While these changes can be
seen as an advantage in certain contexts toward regional security in the short term (it makes people more watchful and encourages them to pay additional attention to suspicious acts), in the long run this social behavior is, at the best, unhealthy. Considering that social, mental, relational, and integral health is a standard to be observed in the development of regional stability as means of security and cohesion, the presence of these types of reactions to violence and to foreign sociopathic influences creates a negative influence on the population’s morale and collective integration.

In order to develop an adequate level of stability for the regions of Mexico during and after this confrontation against the criminal organizations in the country, and also to ensure the moral and public support to the government in the continuous engagement against the transnational and regional criminal organizations, the social effects of these confrontations must not be overlooked or diminished. To the contrary, understanding that the drug cartels draw their resources and manpower from the local population, this must become a primary subject of attention for the development of integral strategic plans to fight criminal organizations and to promote security and stability. This goes beyond the conventional psychological operations to encourage civilian personnel to support the federal forces; it should be an integral and dedicated effort to promote a different perception and reconceptualization of social values that rejects the presence of the cartels and the methods they employ in their attempts to control areas of Mexico and their inhabitants.

Toward Integral and Focus-Oriented Strategic Studies: The Future of Regional, National, and International Security Efforts

Throughout human history, a common constant of warfare has been the damage to the civilian population and the long-lasting effects of armed conflict on the inhabitants of a region where violence has taken place on a massive scale. Mexico is no exception, with a five-year-long conflict with no visible resolution in sight. While intelligence and operational studies demonstrate that the criminal organizations are reducing their numbers and areas of influence, the long-lasting effects on the civilian population are also undeniable.

As this article and several more studies have demonstrated over the years, the proper management of an asymmetric conflict cannot be undertaken under the assumption that one single strategy will result in successful long-term effects. Armed conflict cannot be measured anymore in terms of casualties, advance in a given terrain, or tactical attrition. The conflicts of the 21st century have demonstrated to us as a civilization the complexities and multitude of factors that must be considered to successfully engage the threats to international security and stability.

The early section of this article has provided some suggestions toward the integration of a national and international strategy in order to neutralize the effects and activities of the transnational criminal organizations in Mexico; however, the social factor still needs to be addressed. Understanding the effects on the civilian population in the country and the deep reconfigurations that have been undertaken
to adapt to the cartels and their activities, a comprehensive strategy must be developed to support and consolidate the society against the sociopathic influence of the cartels and other criminal organizations.

The premise for such strategies must be that in their implementation by the federal forces, these measures should not be obtrusive to the traditional social dynamics or historic development of a region, or force them into new interactive and relational patterns that are foreign to the area. The desired effect of a strategic plan of this nature is to ensure a centrifugal effect of the society that repels the negative influence of the criminal organizations and discourages the proliferation or strengthening of their structures and activities by denying spaces, resources, or personnel to their illegal activities. But at the same time it must promote a centripetal effect that promotes the cohesion and inter-community, interregional cooperation to face common social challenges.

An adequate starting point is to promote the reconceptualization and reappropriation of public spaces by the society. After the military and/or law enforcement forces have weakened the regional presence of a cartel, there is a void in the public spaces in urban or semi-urban areas that needs to be filled. Social programs focused to motivate the population to take over the areas that the cartels have abandoned must be developed. Commercial, recreational, or social services facilities should be developed to promote social integration, as well as a social strategy to fight crime. Civilian responsibilities and values must be enforced, therefore creating an environment of zero tolerance toward corruption and as a response to criminal activities. Regional and national programs to encourage the civilian population to report illegal activities or suspicious acts must be developed, focused on the particularities of each region. Furthermore, development of regional legislation must be considered for the enforcement of these and other measures.

While some of these strategies are already being applied in some urban areas in Mexico, a national policy must be drawn to create specific programs adapted to the characteristic of each region. For example, in the communities or areas where the majority of the population belongs to a certain indigenous or native-speaking ethnicity, law enforcement officers trained in the language and who can adequately interact with the customs and relational rules of those communities must be designated as first responders. In addition, regional security and stabilization strategies must be designed under a single strategic security plan.

According to a Mexican naval officer’s comment to the author, “The Mexico we knew from a few years ago will never be again.” The recent social developments in the fight against transnational crime organizations prove that this statement is true now more than ever. By the same token, this also opens the option as to what “type” of Mexico we want for the future. The challenge for strategic planners on national security is the consolidation of stability and public safety in the several regions that make up Mexico and the development of a set of conditions where organized crime can no longer influence the social dynamics of the Mexican communities. In order for this reconfiguration to be successful, locally informed decisions focused on the global benefit must be the standard for national and international security policies to effectively combat terrorism and transnational crime.
At the same time that regional, interregional, and national strategies and plans are developed to close areas of operation for criminal organizations and an effective legislative frame is created to support the military and law enforcement forces to engage the cartels on different levels, international cooperation must not be overlooked. Recognizing that these are transnational threats that can have an impact on international security, Mexico and other countries like the United States, Canada, and countries of Central and South America should design integral and multilevel programs for cooperation and the eradication of these threats. Social, political, economic, and joint-action considerations must be addressed in order to create a multidimensional blanket that prevents the development of transnational crime and the adequate identification of security threats. However, in order to accomplish this goal, regional considerations must be studied and understood by each State and by other governments.

This scope is fundamental for the achievement of regional and interregional stability, prosperity, and international cooperation. Its focus should be on developing a future where the threats of the present are but reminders of the diversity and complexity of human capabilities in their interaction with other social groups around the world. When this objective is accomplished, a true strategic global security plan will be at hand, and the international community will move from the containment of threats like transnational crime and terrorism to their final elimination.

Notes

1 Luis Astorga, Seguridad, narcotraficantes y militares (Mexico: Tusquets, 2007), pp. 163–177.
3 Information derived from the author’s field research and supported by Diego Enrique Osorno, La Guerra de los Zetas (Mexico: Grijalbo Editorial Group, 2012), among other sources.
4 Osorno, La Guerra de los Zetas.
5 Apparently this name was taken because when these defectors were active-duty Mexican army officers they used the Blue-Z dress uniform, hence the name making a reference to their past and as a distinction to other cartels. Author’s conclusion based on field research.
6 Information derived from the author’s field research.
7 Osorno, La Guerra de los Zetas, and Jorge Ferández Menéndez, De los maras a los zetas (Mondadori, Mexico: Random House, 2009 [2006]).
8 Conclusions by the author based on the analysis of field information and other published sources of information.
9 Derived from field information and analysis by the author.
10 Statements derived from the author’s analysis of field information and other published sources.
12 Statements based on the author’s field research.
Conclusions based on the author’s field research and anthropological analysis of the field information.

Osorno, La Guerra de los Zetas. Grijalbo.


Author’s conclusion based on the analysis of the dynamics of the Zeta Cartel, and supported by the October 2011 arrest of Manssor Arbabsiar and his frustrated assassination attempt of the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/us-iran-tied-terror-plot-washington-de-disrupted/story?id=14711933.

Based on the definition established in 2000 by the American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, IV, pp. 645–650.

Information based on the author’s field interviews and research.

Conclusions by the author based on the dynamics and relational patterns of the drug cartels in Mexico during the period 2008–2012.


Conclusion by the author based on the analysis of the dynamic pattern of the organized crime organizations in Mexico, and supported by the analysis of Ioan. Grillo, El Narco: The Bloody Rise of Mexican Drug Cartels (NY: Bloomsbury, 2012), pp. 245–269.

Ibid.

Statements derived from the author’s field research in Northeast Mexico, 2008–2012.

For security reasons, the identities and specific information of the people whose testimonies are presented are not disclosed.

It must be considered that more than 56 percent of the workforce in Mexico (more than 35 million people) earn around $5,000 per year, on average. National Institute of Geography and Statistics, Indicadores de Ocupación, Empleo y Remuneraciones, Mexico, 2012 online, http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/bie/.

Grillo, El Narco: The Bloody Rise of Mexican Drug Cartels (pp. 271–317).

Statement based on contemporary anthropological standards.

Congress of the United Mexican States, Political Constitution of the United Mexican States Articles 73, 89, and 118, 2012 [1917].

For further discussion on government corruption in Mexico and Latin America and its relation with drug-trafficking organizations, see Garay Salamanca, Luis Jorge, and Eduardo Salcedo-Albarán, Narcotráfico, corrupción y Estados: cómo las redes ilícitas han reconfigurado las instituciones en Colombia, Guatemala y México (Mondadori, Mexico: Random House 2012).

Because of the diversification efforts of several Transnational Criminal Organizations in Mexico in search of other avenues of income and to consolidate regional power, not only have law enforcement and military organizations been penetrated, but also several other government organizations and institutions. This is why an integral approach should be undertaken by the government to ensure that all public servants comply with strict professional performance standards and security measures.

Force Multipliers can be the result of surprise during an engagement, the tactical advantage of one of the parties, superior weaponry, or higher degree of mobility during an unconventional or asymmetric conflict. The Zetas and other cartels in Mexico have displayed two or more of these characteristics in their engagements with federal forces, and because of that the term can be considered in the present context.


In actuality, any contemporary armed conflict is by definition asymmetric. However, for practical uses, the term has been considered in this work as only pertaining to nonconven-
tional conflicts.

34 Conclusion based on the author’s field research.

35 One of the many public opinion surveys that reflect the high level of trust of the Mexican Population in their Armed Forces can be seen at CONTORNO, Centro de Prospectiva y Debate (08/07/2013) [online] http://contorno.org.mx/contorno/articulos/documento/864/la-confianza-en-las-instituciones-del-estado-mexicano.

36 Statements based on the author’s field research and interviews in northern and western Mexico (2008–2012), and supported by the conclusions of Luis Astorga, Seguridad, traficantes y militares (Mexico: Tusquets, 2007), pp. 11–16.

37 Most cartels recruit their members from rural or marginal regions of the country, where they have established considerable networks over the years to obtain material resources and manpower, either voluntarily or by force. A good example is the Sinaloa Cartel, which has developed an extensive support network in the rural areas of the state of Sinaloa in western Mexico and has forced the support of the population in other regions of the country. Author’s field research, 2008–2012.

38 While it is true that most public opinion polls indicate that the majority of the civilian population of Mexico supports the federal government in its actions against the drug cartels, it must be considered that there have been several manifestations in the year 2011 and 2012 against the Calderón administration because of the violence generated in the efforts to control the TCOs in the country.
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Symbolic Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Mexico

Dwight Wilson

Abstract

This paper proposes to contribute to our understanding of the process of democratic consolidation in Mexico. It argues that political cultural change is a necessary component of consolidation and takes the core of political culture as “symbolic narratives” the predominant stories about the nation that establish the terms of political competition. Democratic consolidation thus includes the liberalization of symbolic narratives that circumscribe the power of the state. Mexican symbolic narratives since independence, in contrast, have reserved a preponderant role for the state as an agent of positive social transformation. Considering this political cultural heritage illuminates the illiberal tendencies in Mexican democracy today, and makes it clear that democratic consolidation faces higher hurdles than often assumed.

Introduction

Why does Mexico continue to display vestiges of its violent, fragmented, and authoritarian past? Despite decades of slowly paced democratic reform and 12 years of peaceful transfer of power, and despite the fact that outward authoritarianism does not seem to be a realistic alternative, it does not appear to be a fully consolidated liberal democracy. Persistent problems of governance alert us to the fact that even as democracy appears to be stable, it might not meet the expectations for liberal democracy. If consolidation is to be fruitfully employed as a social science concept, it must also be understood as a process of cultural change.

This article proposes to contribute to our understanding of the role culture plays in democratic consolidation, and will define the core of political culture as “symbolic narratives,” overarching stories about the nation and the purposes of politics that establish terms for political competition. It will argue that democratic consolidation consists of the changing of political culture to accept liberal premises for political action. The article will outline the most important Mexican symbolic narratives of the past with the purpose of illustrating their inconsistency with liberal democratic expectations for politics—in particular a limited state and circumscribed public power. The predominant symbolic narratives of Mexican politics have instead privileged the state and its power as an agent of positive social transformation. To understand the condition of democracy today it is essential to grasp the conduct of this symbolic social discourse over centuries. The
article will review the major symbolic narratives since independence: a radical liberal narrative, answered and displaced by the narrative of the long dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, and in turn a Revolutionary narrative given its fullest expression by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) regime lasting until the recent transition to democracy.

In considering such a heritage, we are better equipped to grasp why democratic transition and the construction of liberal democratic political institutions have not produced a consolidated liberal democracy in Mexico.

Transition and Consolidation

In June 2012 Enrique Peña Nieto won the presidency for the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), returning the former ruling party to power after a 12-year absence. The return of the PRI has been feared by democratic reformers, but the PRI’s resurgence can itself be taken as an encouraging sign of the democratic advancements Mexico has made in the last decades. Democratic reforms taking place since the 1970s had set the stage for a genuine democratic opening, but a diminished presidency wrangling with a freewheeling multiparty competition in a divided Congress would have been inconceivable just two decades ago. Today, though, the democratic transition appears solid, even irreversible. Political parties of every ideological stripe vie for competition and do win elections, while an explosion of civil society groups has accompanied the opening of the political system and federalism, once a chimera proclaimed in the constitution but absent in practice, has matured. The PAN’s (Partido Acción Nacional) handing over power to the opposition PRI appears to confirm the solidity of Mexican democracy. It seems impossible that even the return to power of the party that constructed the “perfect dictatorship” could effect a return to the stifling monopolization of power seen in the past.

Nonetheless, this is to say only that the transition to democracy is complete, and not that the political system has become a consolidated democracy. Evidence from Mexico suggests that democratic consolidation might face higher hurdles than previously imagined. Politically motivated violence has not melted away with the authoritarian one-party regime. Most visibly, drug gangs routinely murder political officials. Aside from this, political violence continues apace as citizens and armed groups clash with authorities. Revolutionary groups such as the EZLN (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) and EPR (Ejército Popular Revolucionario), though no longer on the radar screen of the international media, continue to defy the state and occasionally commit acts of violence. In perhaps the most dramatic display of political discord, in both the 2006 and 2012 elections Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the losing presidential candidate of the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática), has refused to accept defeat, and charged fraud, denying the legitimacy of two presidents. Charges of human rights abuses occur with alarming regularity, while official impunity remains as entrenched as ever before and journalists uncovering official corruption and abuse face intimidation and retribution.

Clearly then, transition is not the endpoint of democratization; scholars have
identified democratic consolidation as the more inchoate process by which democracy is stabilized, institutionalized, and becomes, in a word, permanent.\textsuperscript{3} Mexico’s recent history of democratic opening would apparently make it a prime candidate for consolidation. Simply taking the stability of political institutions or the consensus of political elites as our metric, we might conclude that Mexico has reached a point of no return on the road to democratic consolidation. The transfer of power by the PRI to the PAN and the return of the PRI to power provide compelling evidence in this regard.

Given the actual, more troubling, state of Mexican democracy, however, it is distinctly possible that its democratization has in fact been a process of the consolidation of a formal democracy that nonetheless continues to bear the hallmarks of an illiberal and authoritarian past. Pockets of illiberal tendencies and the systematic quality of these events signals that they spring from a deeper failure of the rule of law and widespread disapprobation for the political process as practiced in the new democracy. Mexico might well be permanently democratic in political form, but not a liberal democracy in substance. The question for consideration then concerns what is required for a formally and outwardly democratic country to become a consolidated liberal democracy.

**Culture and Consolidation**

The sources of democratic consolidation have proved frustratingly elusive. The literature on consolidation following the worldwide wave of democratizations in the latter part of the twentieth century never clearly identified the requisite institutional and behavioral requirements, threatening to make consolidation an incoherent concept.\textsuperscript{4} Many scholars thus began to include political cultural requisites as foundational for democratic consolidation. For a fuller understanding of the process of democratization we must understand it not simply as an array of institutions, or the agreement among elites to use the democratic process for the pursuit of power, but as including a process of cultural change. Diamond, for instance, calls the link between political culture and democracy a “classic and fundamental theme”\textsuperscript{5} and has tried to balance attention given to institutions, elites, and culture. Fukuyama lists culture as the “deepest” of four levels at which consolidation takes place, providing the ultimate foundations for democratization that takes place at higher levels of ideology, institutions, and civil society. Democratic transition may take place at those more superficial levels, but consolidation only comes with what he calls the slow process of change in the “a-rational, ethical habit” of culture.\textsuperscript{6}

While many political culture studies rely on a definition of political culture as subjective values and beliefs, as pioneered by the landmark *Civic Culture* of Almond and Verba,\textsuperscript{7} an “interpretivist” strain of studies turns to a symbolic understanding of political culture as one better equipped to capture the complexity and mutability of culture.\textsuperscript{8} Murray Edelman, for instance, writes that “Politics is for most of us a passing parade of abstract symbols . . .”\textsuperscript{9} and that “pictures create a moving panorama taking place in a world the mass public never quite touches, yet one its members come to fear or cheer, often with passion and sometimes
with action.” Edelman draws our attention to the importance of symbolic communication as one of the pillars of politics and points out the role symbols play in motivating behavior. Symbolic communication orders the political world and focuses our attention on some areas while shifting it away from others. As Edelman observes, political facts are often less important than the symbolic constructions that order them and give them meaning.

To the literature on symbolic politics authors such as Brysk add the symbolic “narrative,” which “describes clusters of messages intended to change attitudes . . .” These narratives are essentially stories about politics, and successful narratives “work because they contain elements of successful communication—legitimate speakers, compelling messages, and satisfying plots” that can lead to collective action and social change. Narratives orient people within their national panorama, identifying heroes and villains and supplying them with roles. Conservatives, reformers, and revolutionaries must all tell a story about the nation’s origins and its destiny and how their favored political arrangements best suit its character. Symbolic narratives thus arrange the beliefs and attitudes considered by Almond and Verba, placing some concepts at the center of importance, and pushing others to the margins.

Symbolic narratives construct expectations for appropriate behavior and establish the terms of political interaction that undergird the regime. As Brysk writes, “Symbolic politics involves the maintenance or transformation of a power relationship through normative and affective representations.” Symbolic politics therefore acts as a mechanism producing collective action. Narratives give shape and meaning to political information that would otherwise remain overwhelming in its scope and quantity. Narratives privilege certain events and personalities and imbue them with symbolic meaning, creating authoritative interpretations of the national character and proper political institutions and behaviors. These interpretations are translated into action because certain behaviors are constructed as consistent with the prevailing understanding of the national political character.

There will naturally be many competing narratives at any time, and the most compelling will attract adherents and produce conflict. A group or regime may successfully implant its favored narrative, dominating political communication, thus achieving premier status. Seldom will competition be extinguished outright, however, and “counternarratives” will always challenge the dominant narrative as opponents attempt to alter the social discourse to advance their own projects. The replacement of a dominant narrative with a counternarrative amounts to a “paradigm shift” in which new purposes are erected for politics and meanings are attached to concepts. This dialectic is a process inherent in politics and likely to continue in perpetuity.

Geertz describes culture as a “social discourse,” and much as in a discourse, the conflict of narratives seldom breaks off and begins anew. Instead, competing narratives and their proponents act as interlocutors, addressing the same national conditions and responding to each other. Thus, despite radically divergent interpretations of society and normative prescriptions for the national good, narratives are constrained by unyielding facts that must be confronted. In Mexico, for example, the fact of the colonial legacy was the preeminent question with which
independence-era elites were forced to contend. Though conservatives and liberals warred over their different judgments of the past and present and their plans for the future, neither could fail to begin their communicative efforts within the strictures of a racially divided, corporatist, and Catholic society founded on medieval principles. The continuity in Mexican political behavior is visible in the underlying structures of power, in the face of sometimes radically gyrating constitutional structures and elites.

Symbolic narratives thus dominate the public discourse on politics and are the beginning point for participation in political communication, though they are themselves the product of the attempts to understand and change the current dispensation. These symbolic narratives are part of a tapestry in which individuals, institutions, and ideas are inseparable. Part of the value in this approach lies in preserving an important place for culture while overcoming the “timelessness” of some cultural theories that exclude space for significant political changes. By recognizing the contextual shaping of political narratives—the evolutionary branching of symbolic narratives from earlier conflicts and consensuses—it makes a space for continuity within change.

**Symbolic Narratives and Consolidation**

How might we view the consolidation of liberal democracy from this perspective? From the symbolic politics perspective, the cultural change that contributes to consolidation of liberal democracy consists of widespread participation in the symbolic language of individual rights and limited governmental power, the hallmarks of liberalism as a political ideology. There will not be, of course, a single liberal symbolic narrative that nurtures liberal democracy. Given the diversity of democratic experience in the world, from North America and Europe to Africa and Asia, it would be unlikely that that would be the case. Rather, just as all political regimes are distinctive, a uniquely national symbolic narrative will govern every country. We may speak of a family of liberal narratives, however, that unites its members with a characteristic morphology. This morphology in essence contains the contents of liberal ideology written into a national story, a national panorama focused on freeing individuals from overbearing public power. The overarching story in the United States, for example, has privileged the value of freedom above any other political value, and continues to inspire political action. The precise contours of freedom are far from settled and are regularly contested and redefined, but there exists a broad consensus on the basic respect for individual civil and political liberties that has remained intact as these rights have been extended to a wider population from the early days of the republic.

This style of narrative resists imposition from above as in the case of a coterie of elites instructing the masses, or a revolutionary vanguard speaking in the name of the people. The liberal narrative concerns limitation of the power of the state and of its representatives, and limits the public sphere of action to prevent imposition on the individual, private sphere. As will be seen in the case of Mexico, symbolic narratives have since independence originated within elite circles that projected them downward. These symbolic narratives center on the need for lead-
ership in achieving transformative goals for all of society and on breaking with
the past for the creation of a new future; they establish the symbolic means for a
dominating state that empower state officials to act beyond the scope of liberal in-
stitutions. Predominant Mexican narratives have displayed illiberal features even
in cases in which the primary goal is to establish a society in the liberal mold.
Following is a sketch of Mexican political culture understood as symbolic nar-
ratives—the flow of its social discourse—followed by thoughts on its effects on
the present.

Symbolic Politics in Mexico

The historian Héctor Aguilar Camín has called the nineteenth century the period
of “the invention of Mexico,” wherein the early liberals employed “symbolic en-
gineering” serving their own political purpose, constructing the idea of a unified
Mexican nation with its beginnings in the Aztecs’ struggle for liberation from the
oppression of the Spanish. Symbolic engineering that legitimates the actions
and programs of some while discrediting others has been practiced throughout
history and indeed continues today. The symbolic narratives that have gained pre-
dominance in Mexico—the liberal narrative of the latter nineteenth century, the
narrative of the regime of Porfirio Díaz, and the narrative of the Revolution—all
share a progressive zeal that demands the use of state power for the renewal and
regeneration of a backward society.

The Liberal Narrative

The confrontation between conservatives and liberals that followed independence
was conducted not only in the halls of power and on the battlefield, but, equally
importantly, in the writing of history, the manipulation of symbols. At indepen-
dence both past and future were opened to interpretation, and immediately two
broad tendencies were established: the liberal interpretation of Mexican history
as a struggle against the despotism of a dark age, and the conservative one of the
same history as the defense of civilization and order. The colonial period and
independence were not simply brute facts that determined the balance of power,
but events that underwent a continual process of interpretation, of attachment of
meanings. The liberals, for example, preferred to date the beginning of Mexican
independence with the famed uprising of the creole priest Miguel Hidalgo, while
conservatives denounced his revolution as corrosive pillaging. It was only be due
to the liberals’ defeat of conservatism and the successful imposition of their own
narrative that Hidalgo became widely known as the father of independence.

Institutionally, Mexico took the favored forms of the liberals relatively early.
After the short-lived empire of the conservative Agustín Iturbide there was no
realistic alternative to republicanism. Though conservatives turned to the French
to reestablish monarchy under Maximilian after the Reform War of the 1850s,
the project was doomed, and the ejection of Maximilian in 1867 only solidified
the victory of liberalism as the quasi-official ideology of Mexico. The liberals
of the early independence era reshaped the understanding of what it meant to be
Mexican from monarchical, Catholic, and Spanish to republican, secular, and fed-
eralist. The liberals envisioned a Mexican republic founded on the citizenship of individual small property holders, akin to that of the United States. The purposes attached to political behavior of liberals, however, were distinctive and not those of the traditional western liberal.

The victorious liberals confronted an entrenched structure founded on—as they saw it—Catholic absolutism and exclusivist corporate identities. Liberal reform laws attacked the roots of this society in an attempt to abolish the conservative heritage of the Spanish colony. Pragmatic liberals came to see the power of the state itself as the only force capable of achieving the drastic transformation required to create a modern, progressive republic. The unrivaled hero of nineteenth century liberalism, Benito Juárez, for example, felt compelled to rule by decree and ensured his continual reelection, finally leaving the presidential palace only upon his death in 1872. His commitment to an abstract constitutionalism and the rule of law are unquestioned, but he was pressed by the same paradox the liberal regime faced on a larger level: he saw circumstances as forcing him to violate the constitution in order to preserve it, creating what in essence was a constitutional dictatorship.

Like the colonial authority and conservative caudillos, the tradition of Mexican liberalism was in no way averse to the use of state power. Liberalism only departed from conservatism in the attempt to deploy state power toward the reconstruction of social and political relations, rather than the maintenance of the Hispanic order. Liberalism in power reflected the assumption that Mexican society was backward and required far-reaching reform, and the liberal project presumed a paternalistic handling of the masses. Like the conservatives, liberals viewed the lower orders as in need of instruction in understanding their own good.

Instead of a decentralized state with power held by an informed citizenry, the liberal-dominated republic in reality exhibited a strong family resemblance to regimes of proudly authoritarian character. Only the ends to which power would be wielded were changed. Instead of defending a state founded upon monarchy, religion, or military privileges, the state was directed toward uprooting those vestiges of the past and creating a strong constitutional and egalitarian state, a sight unseen in Mexico, which would require a hand as stern as that of Iturbide or the infamous dictator Santa Anna. Liberals shared conservative assumptions about the use of state authority and in short order gave birth to the long dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, who took power in 1876 and remained until he was overthrown in the great upheaval of the Revolution of 1910.

The independence movement of Hidalgo, constitutional tweaking, and reformist laws themselves could not restructure Mexican society, of course, and those goals remained distant ideals even in the 1860s and 1870s, when the liberals were finally able to gain the upper hand, but the nationalistic cachet of liberalism allowed the dominance of the liberal symbolic narrative and the creation of the expectation that power be used in the advancement of liberal political goals.

**The Porfiriato**

The unanticipated fruit of the reform period was the long-term dictatorship of
Porfirio Díaz from the 1870s to 1910, which banished political opposition in the name of a “peace, order, and progress.” Reflecting the new era, a new national history was being written wherein the administration of Díaz occupied the pinnacle of Mexican social and political evolution. The narrative of the independence period shifted toward new territories, leaving behind the preoccupations of the past, but was nonetheless a continuation of the previous discourse, its starting point the place where the previous one had ended. Thus, the narrative of the Porfiriato claimed to have fulfilled and surpassed the classical liberal mission: the pre-Hispanic past would be glorified as an enlightened classical civilization uprooted and destroyed by barbarous Spanish invaders, radical independence leaders such as Hidalgo hailed as the heroic founders of an independent nation, and Juárez honored as the patriotic defender of the national integrity and of enlightened reform. But the new canonical story went further, appending a new chapter wherein the Diaz regime was the culmination of the liberal epic. As the earlier liberals had done, the Diaz regime set itself to remaking society, reeducating and molding Mexico, a task that necessitated a strong hand and compliant population.

Some of Diaz’s supporters expressed this political transcendence as the convergence of liberalism and conservatism. These “conservative liberals” believed, in principle, in the efforts of the earlier generations of liberals and endorsed the ideals of the Reform, but were skeptical of its implementation, believing it to be unrealistically accelerated. The early liberals’ reform efforts were considered too radical for conditions in Mexico. Mexico was simply not mature enough to introduce the full range of political liberties envisioned by the leaders of the Reform. Recognizing that the social backwardness engendered by centuries of Spanish rule would require years of guidance toward enlightened self-interest, the newly ascendant liberals concluded that despotism would be the best mechanism for achieving the future liberal society.

This period is also well-known as the era of positivist philosophy in Latin America, and Mexico is considered one of the countries to most enthusiastically embrace the philosophy grounded in science and progress. In positivism, Diaz found an ideal pillar on which to rest his rule.

Underlying the various assumptions of positivists and their fellow travelers was the expectation that the administration of society should be based on objective principles, rather than politics. The French philosopher Auguste Comte—the most influential positivist in Latin America—subscribed to an organic view of human society and posited a tidy stage theory of social development that seemed to mirror the social evolution of many Latin American nations from colonial order, independence, and finally the relatively stable dictatorial regimes taking root throughout the region. Mexican elites, too, found much in positivism to give them hope concerning their own troubled nation as a strong figure appeared capable of steering the country from chaos into peaceful development.

The positivism of Mexico was not uniform among the elite of the latter nineteenth century. Though derived in good part from the philosophy of Comte, the positivism of Mexico was transmuted for implementation in another context. In addition to the Comtean strand of positivism, the Mexican mélange included Ben-
tham’s and Spencer’s utilitarianism and Darwinism. Permeating the entire mix was a fascination with the potential of science to provide the basis for material growth, and this scientism formed the essential core of Mexican positivism.\textsuperscript{24}

The presumption of the Porfirians was that the key to orderly development had been uncovered, and the chaotic past had been left behind. The scientific optimism of many liberals led them to believe that the forces underlying social, economic, and political development could be discovered and harnessed toward optimal ends. Díaz is said to have described his approach to governing as \textit{poca política, mucha administración}, an admonishment to minimize politics and focus on administration.

The elitist assumptions of the positivist brand of thinking are immediately discernible. The notion that objective principles underlie the social world, and that the proper method is necessary for uncovering them, leads in short order to the presumption that those possessing, in this case, the proper scientific credentials for understanding these hidden processes constitute a natural elite, while those unfortunate enough to remain uninformed require proper instruction and guidance.

As did previous narratives of Liberals and Conservatives, the Porfirian scientific narrative included an arrangement of the symbols of the Mexican nation and a formulation of acceptable political means and ends. The Porfirián state filled the public square with a newly invented story about the national origins and destiny, one that featured a logical progression from liberalism toward a culmination in Díaz. The regime used public rituals and architecture as forms of securing loyalty to a Porfirián national myth. Díaz filled the public space with nationalist imagery that functioned as symbols of his own power, canonizing Juárez as the patron saint of liberalism, erecting monuments to him and other Aztec and liberal heroes, and revitalizing Mexico City to display its modernity.\textsuperscript{25}

Díaz and his advisors provided the state a claim of scientific authority and a pretext to declare ideological opposition outmoded and unneeded in modern Mexico. Radical liberalism and conservatism alike could be consigned to a by-gone and barbarous era that none should lament.

\textit{The Revolutionary Narrative}

The opposition during the Porfiriato, though harassed and gaining some prominence only after 1900, responded to oppression by constructing a competing narrative. Indeed, positivism came most clearly into focus when attacked by its enemies as a tool of exploitation and a cover for greed.\textsuperscript{26} The middle-class and liberal Francisco Madero did not intend to go far beyond democratic reforms when he called for an armed uprising against Díaz, but his efforts unleashed a wave of variegated ideological movements.

There were many loosely defined programmatic elements for which revolutionaries fought and died. Knight finds embedded in the “genes” of the Revolution causes as varied as nationalist anti-imperialism, agrarianism, liberalism, labor reform, indigenism, and anti-clericalism. None of these necessarily implies commitment to any other, and indeed some collided with each other.\textsuperscript{27} Each of them, though, would be called upon throughout and following the Revolution,
and together they embodied a loose ideological pastiche that underpinned the PRI regime that finally consolidated the Revolution.

Most of all, these genetic elements demanded a regenerative movement to restore or transform some part of society. As an integral revolution fought in the name of social justice became the officially sanctioned view of the many years of carnage, the state would once again be enlisted as the most appropriate and capable agent for transforming society, this time in the image of an integral Mexican Revolution.

The consensus (of the winners) was that Díaz and his ilk had shamed the nation, robbed the people of their liberty, and ground the poor under their heavy boots. The end effect of the Revolution was the construction of a nationalist, anti-imperialist, populist revolution for the Mexican nation. Despite the fact that revolutionary leaders had warred with each other, pursuing conflicting aims, they were all enlisted into the service of an integral “Revolutionary Family” with a purportedly cohesive ideology. The new regime, drawing on the populist and socialistic ideological currents gaining in popularity in the young twentieth century, would mark a profound shift in participatory rhetoric. The Revolution brought the question of the masses to the center stage and promised a regime for the entire nation. The Revolution, as the story went, had set the nation on the path toward the construction of a new, socially just Mexico that expiated the sins of Díaz. The social discourse could no longer exclude the majority of the nation as had been done until then, but had to integrate them. The symbolic narrative of the Revolution would do precisely this, even while retaining the top-down and statist methods of previous regimes. The mythology of the Revolution—nationalism, agrarianism, and indigenism—celebrated the participation of the people. The new mythology also informed the people that their demands had been heard, their suffering ameliorated, that the new regime was theirs, that revolutionary guardians protected their interests, and that further participation required their support of the political party that finally consolidated the Revolution, as it was their party.

Revolutionary and socialistic in rhetoric, the political party springing from and claiming to embody the Revolution—finally the PRI after two name changes—nonetheless differed little from the scientific politics of the Díaz regime in squelching the articulation of alternatives. The party appealed to the memory of the Revolution as a great unifying event of the Mexican nation that secured national sovereignty and modernization, identifying itself as the party of the Mexican nation. The revolutionary narrative was sustained by an authoritarian corporatism using state resources to craft a message and understanding of the national destiny, shifting over time from an agrarian indigenism to a statist industrialist model, while retaining the essential rhetoric of the revolution for the people.

It was a radical rhetorical shift, but the rhetoric did not match the reality in which continuity marked much of the political structure, the manner in which political elites exercised power. Indeed, the new regime would pursue the state-building begun under Juárez and Díaz, taking it to heights undreamed of in the nineteenth century. The grand national narrative, the symbolic structure that re-
placed the modernizing Porfiriato, was another in which political competition and accountability were regarded as superfluous to the forward-looking mission of the regime.

The leaders of the PRI preferred to buy off any potential troublemakers and put them safely on the state’s payroll. The less cooperative, such as the PAN, were marginalized and tolerated. This single-party corporatist system ruled through cooptation and corruption for seven decades, appealing to the symbolic narrative that extolled the agrarian and populist origins of the Revolution. The regime that grew from the Revolution was committed to some postures such as nationalism and inclusiveness, and the regime did extend participation to a level unheard of in Mexican history. The national drama appeared to take an about-face, and the symbolic narrative did, but the conduct of politics continued in many ways unchanged.

As inequality persisted, corruption flourished, and official impunity thrived unabated, perceptions of the Revolution began to diverge from the symbolic rhetoric of the regime leading not only to discontent in the public, but splits within the party itself as some saw the Revolution betrayed; these divisions within the ruling party were exacerbated as the party’s leadership turned toward neoliberal economic policies in the 1980s in attempt to shore up the flagging economy. The division within the party’s leadership and failures of the regime to deliver on its promises demanded the political opening that began in the 1970s and culminated in the party’s loss of the presidency in 2000.

Two Hundred Years of Symbolic Engineering

Successful narratives are those that have reached dominant status, those adopted by powerful political actors able to capture the government and transmit their interpretations of politics widely. In Mexico, a handful of competing political narratives have dominated the symbolic political sphere since independence.

What do these various narratives share? These sweeping epics are built with elements that have important consequences for the way in which political concepts are given meanings. The social order in colonial Mexico was founded on rituals and ceremonies that advertised to the people the natural order of hierarchy, and everyone’s place in that spiritual body, reinforcing the social distinctions and code of Spanish colonial administration. While the predominant symbolic narratives that have captured the public space since independence had as their primary goal the erasure of this order, a deeper continuity results from the construction and reconstruction of national paradigms that have as their end the creation of a new Mexico. What the most successful narratives have shared is their organization around grand plans to reorganize the political system and transform the nation.

Such symbolic images have transcended institutional limitations and granted wide latitude to public officials who are variously in their positions for the purposes of eliminating backwardness and to enlighten the downtrodden masses. Knight points out the “bipartisan” character of the moralizing missions the upper classes have undertaken for the less fortunate, who are held back from proper lives. The narratives and counternarratives that have constituted “official” understandings...
of the nature and goals of politics in Mexico have been, essentially, evangelizing missions that call for heroic action by the state and its representatives to uplift the masses and transform society to meet its goals.

The rhetoric that composes symbolic narratives, naturally, need not match reality. Symbolic narratives condition understanding of the social and political world, motivating people to action, inspiring protest and revolt, but can also encourage quietude. Wedeen shows that symbolic communication can produce power simply by overwhelming the terms of public discourse, stressing that the construction of symbolic meaning need not immediately imply the creation of legitimacy, or that the majority of the target audience for symbolic construction even believe the rhetoric they consume. Rather, an important effect of symbolic communication can be simple compliance as a result of immersion within a dominant political discourse.\(^{30}\) It is not necessary that a regime’s behavior always be accepted as legitimate, but only the majority continues to participate by simply accepting it for what it is. Though in Mexico people have always been well aware of abuses of power and corruption, often complaining bitterly, they have also continued to observe laws, pay bribes, and vote.

As Elkins and Simeon write, political culture is “the nature of the political game.”\(^{31}\) The nature of Mexico’s political game has concerned, at its core, the remaking of a backward society through enlightened state leadership. For two hundred years confrontational utopias have been constructed and the ends of the state contested. When a consensus is constructed and successfully implemented, it has been around an all-encompassing narrative that extends the scope of the state widely. Narratives respond to social conditions—such as the facts of the colony and decades of civil war—and political elites have historically responded with despotism, which itself became fact with which politics has to deal as new counternarratives are constructed.

The centralized, hierarchical control of previous regimes handed the preponderance of control to individuals and small groups since independence. These institutional arrangements were ostensibly constructed as necessities for the greater good, bestowing the pretense of legitimacy to the victors of the Reform War, to Díaz, and to the winners of the Revolution. Symbolic narratives both make possible the structures of power and are reproduced by them. They are, in a sense, impossible to escape.

Conclusions

What does this cultural context mean for democracy in the twenty-first century? The effects of the battles between liberals and conservatives, Porfiriants, and revolutionaries still linger; the country still lives in the house built by Juárez, Díaz and the PRI. Parties are used as vehicles for personal advancement, demonstrations and strikes provoke violence in the streets, and armed rebels continue to advocate total rejection of the political system, though with little support. This is the historical legacy of the past grand transformational narratives, and continuity thus derives from the confrontation with centuries of authoritarian rule. Liberals, Porfiriants, and revolutionaries all strove for transformation and in doing so laid
the foundations for abusive regimes. The result was nearly two hundred years of concentrated state power.

It is possible that as the democratic reforms take root and establish terms of political communication that repudiate the authoritarian past, including a PRI that has distanced itself from its own past, the groundwork for democratic consolidation is being laid. Now any political actor who wishes to be taken seriously must partake of the discourse on reform and democratization of the state with the purported aim of limiting its reach. Has a shift in political culture that will herald the consolidation of liberal democracy perhaps already occurred?

The rights to political participation and opposition are for the most part respected as never before. Twenty-first century liberals now see the most auspicious opportunity for long-term democratic consolidation, given the slow-moving institutional evolution of the past several decades and the multivocal nature of the public space. Reformers are advantaged by the emphasis on participation indelibly integrated into the national consciousness by the Revolution and the current international nostrum hailing democracy. Though not the individualistic and egalitarian utopia dreamed of by early liberals, conditions approximate those necessary for a liberal democratic political system through the presence of institutional guarantees, reputable elections, and an active civil society.

However, institutional arrangements alone cannot complete consolidation, but require the additional respect for a democratic process founded on rule of law and the rights of political adversaries. Consolidation will hinge on the formation of a consensus around a new national narrative that recognizes this respect as a primary goal for politics, and on the end of grand narratives promising the renovation of the nation and elimination of political enemies. Change, even fundamental change, is not necessarily removed from political goals, but these must be accompanied by the normative acceptance of pluralism, political equality, and the rule of law as intrinsically valuable, on the predominance of a liberal symbolic narrative.

The symbolic narratives discussed above have comprised the political cultural conditions and the terms of political interaction for centuries. Democratic optimists who emphasize short-term shifts have underplayed this reality and instead expect to see democratic consolidation follow institutional reforms. The cultural changes tantamount to democratic consolidation may be under way, but cultural shifts are unpredictable, and sometimes only accomplished after decades of conflict. Similar situations of uncertainty of direction have, of course, occurred before. Mexican political culture wavers as it did before the victory of the liberal regime over the conservatives and during the Revolution. At no other time in history has the regnant symbolic narrative, still only emerging, borne so close a resemblance to the liberal family tree. There is, however, no consensus around a grand national narrative that has replaced the PRI’s revolutionary story. Indeed, the populist and revolutionary rhetoric of the old PRI still carries weight, as seen in the continued popularity in some sectors of López Obrador and of the continued currency of corporatism as a political strategy. The difficulty faced by liberal democratic reformers lies in the fact that a liberal democratic symbolic narrative will not result through top-down imposition, as is made clear by Mexican history.
Consolidation through cultural change may be a process taking place over generations, rather than electoral cycles.

In closing we note that the state of democracy in Mexico is of more than academic interest. Mexico possesses a unique capacity to have a direct and daily impact on the United States, the two countries sharing a two-thousand-mile border as they do, and the U.S. has an obvious interest in the stability of its regime. The fragile state of democracy in Mexico, buffeted by gruesome drug violence in addition to manifold economic and political problems, is unfortunately neglected in the United States. An awareness of its cultural heritage and sober reflection on its potential for democratic consolidation puts us on notice that democratization, even if permanent, does not translates into the consolidation of liberal democracy, a task that may be much more arduous than imagined.

Notes

1 Significantly violent episodes have erupted over the proposed site for a new airport serving Mexico City (see http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/475742.html), and following a teachers’ strike in Oaxaca (see http://www.economist.com/node/8108336?zid=305&ah=417bd5664dc76da5d98af4f7a640fd8a), for example.


10 Ibid.


13 Brysk, “‘Hearts and Minds,” p. 561.

14 Ibid.


Smith illustrates both the frequency with which authorities attempt to manipulate national myths and stories to political ends and the dangers of abuse inherent in such attempts. See Rogers M. Smith, *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership*. Contemporary Political Theory (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ch. 1.


Latin America’s Foreign Policy as the Region Engages China

R. Evan Ellis

Abstract

This article examines the foreign policy of Latin America and the Caribbean toward the People’s Republic of China. It finds that, for those nations recognizing Taiwan, most Latin American nations have had relatively few political differences with the PRC. Exceptions include Brazil’s bid for a seat on the UN Security Council and Mexico’s receipt of the Dali Lama under the sexenio of Felipe Calderón. Within the region, the most important differences have emerged on issues of foreign economic policy. The article finds that Latin America’s heterogeneous orientation toward China on economic issues may be understood in terms of four cross-cutting cleavages, which reflect economic, political, and geographic divisions in the region more broadly: (1) north versus south, (2) populist regimes versus market economies, (3) pure resource exporters versus industrialized exporters versus nonexporting capital recipients versus pure importers, and (4) Pacific versus Atlantic.

Introduction

As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has reemerged onto the world stage in the first decade of the 21st century, its growing economic and political weight has captured the attention of business and political elites across the globe. Because of China’s concentration on expanding and diversifying exports to spearhead the development of a country of more than 1.3 billion people, the primary product consumption, the consumer products, and the financial flows generated by China’s reemergence have profoundly impacted every other part of the planet. In this context, Latin America is but one region among many in which the PRC’s expanding commercial presence, reinforced by its political engagement, has spawned both hopes and fears and pushed the region to rethink its policy toward the civilization that for thousands of years has defined itself as the “middle kingdom.”

It is difficult to speak of a single “Latin American foreign policy” toward the PRC, given the diversity of the region. With the exception of small Chinese communities in Latin American countries and a minor role for Chinese teachings in some Latin American revolutionary movements, the region has had few ties to the PRC beyond the new business relationship. In addition, differences between Latin American countries with respect to economic structure, geographic position, and belief systems lead each to see China differently.
Further complicating matters, the most important aspects of Latin America’s relationship with the PRC involve trade and Chinese companies “on the ground” in the region. Although these interactions create imperatives for their respective governments, they are not part of what is traditionally considered “foreign policy.”

The purpose of this paper is to characterize Latin America’s orientation toward the PRC and, by extension, toward Chinese companies and other actors. The first section focuses on how the relationship has evolved over time from a distant, politically focused interaction, to a more intensive relationship with an agenda principally shaped by economic issues. The second section provides an overview of key issues, contrasting the relative harmony that exists between China and the region in terms of politics with the complex mix of conflict and harmony in the economic sphere. The third section identifies some of the principal divisions that categorize Latin American countries with respect to their orientation toward China, culminating in a discussion of the emerging and important Atlantic-Pacific divide. The fourth section focuses on Latin America’s military relationships with China, and the final section looks at the future of Latin America’s orientation toward China, including the challenges and consequences created by the increasing presence of Chinese actors “on the ground” in the region.

**Evolution of Latin America’s Diplomatic Posture toward the PRC**

From before the seizure of power in China by Communist revolutionaries in October 1949 to the final collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Latin America had very limited interaction with the People’s Republic of China beyond occasional political and cultural exchanges.

For the first 11 years after forcibly taking control of mainland China, the new government, led by the father of the revolution, Mao Zedong, was not recognized by any of its counterparts in Latin America. Instead, Latin American governments continued to maintain diplomatic relations with the successors of the prior regime, who had fled to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) and, from there, continued to assert themselves to be the legitimate government for all of China.

The first “mavericks” in Latin America to recognize the Communist government of Mao Zedong diplomatically were members of the new revolutionary left. In September 1960, the communist regime in Cuba became the first government in Latin America to recognize the PRC, following its own successful seizure of power in January of the previous year. The second to recognize the PRC was Chile, which did so in December 1970, shortly after the inauguration of the country’s first socialist president, Salvador Allende.

Subsequent advances in diplomatic recognition of the PRC in Latin America reflected both changes in the broader international posture toward China, as well as political change in Latin America. At the beginning of the 1970s, the U.S. rapprochement with the PRC opened the door for its international “legitimization,” including the seating of the communist government, rather than the nationalists, at the United Nations in October 1971. Almost immediately thereafter, Peru established diplomatic relations with the Chinese communist regime, followed by Mexico and Argentina. Jamaica recognized the PRC in November 1972, six
months after the inauguration of the new left-of-center government of Michael Manley and his People’s National Party. Similarly, the Republic of Suriname recognized the PRC in May 1976, six months after being granted independence by the Netherlands.

The second major change in international context impacting Latin America’s diplomatic posture toward the PRC was the formal diplomatic recognition of the PRC by the United States in January 1979. Following this lead, Ecuador and Colombia established relations with the PRC the next year, followed by the island of Antigua in 1983. In July 1985, Bolivia’s lame-duck president Hernán Siles established relations with the PRC one month before the inauguration of his conservative successor, General Hugo Banzer, who chose to maintain the relationship. In October of the same year, Grenada established relations with the PRC. Paralleling diplomatic recognition of the PRC by Suriname a decade earlier, Grenada’s change came 10 months after free elections restored democratic governance to the island in the wake of the 1983 U.S.-led takeover. Similarly, in December 1985, 10 months after the installation of Daniel Ortega as president of Nicaragua, that regime also recognized the PRC.5

The story of Latin America’s changing diplomatic posture toward the PRC also includes an important role by the region’s Chinese “Friendship Societies” such as the Asociación de Amistad Ecuatoriano China, Asociación de la Amistad Colombo – China, and the Asociación De Amistad Chileno – China, among others. In the days prior to the diplomatic recognition of the PRC, these organizations, drawing on the modest Chinese communities of their respective countries,6 played an important role in maintaining unofficial ties with the PRC and working toward diplomatic recognition.7 With the achievement of such recognition, the friendship societies tended to evolve into social clubs or business organizations that coordinated tours to the PRC or facilitated business contacts.

With the collapse of global communism, marked by the November 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and the December 1991 dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the movement to recognize the PRC in Latin America and elsewhere lost momentum, replaced by the question of when the world’s “last communist governments,” the PRC and Cuba, would fall.8 Widespread protests against the Chinese communist regime in June 1989 were harshly suppressed by the government. Nonetheless, the drama of Tiananmen Square deepened the isolation of the Chinese communist regime from the international community and for a time pushed the question of diplomatic recognition off the table for those Latin American governments continuing to recognize Taiwan.

In 1997, with the memories of Tiananmen Square fading and the intellectual power of the “Washington Consensus” weakening in Latin America, the PRC began to make new advances in its battle for diplomatic recognition. In this new “post–Cold War” struggle, however, previous ideological considerations were replaced by material incentives in what came to be referred to as “checkbook diplomacy.”9 The smaller nations of Central America and the Caribbean that continued to diplomatically recognize Taiwan were increasingly wooed with financial inducements, including soccer and cricket stadiums, hospitals, and other public
works projects. It was also during this period that the distant Western Hemisphere began to feel China’s new economic weight in the international system, following almost 20 years of sustained PRC economic growth that had begun with China’s cautious opening to the world in 1978. In 1997, the Caribbean governments of the Bahamas and Saint Lucia recognized the PRC (although Saint Lucia would reverse this position in May 2007), followed by Dominica in March 2004 and (for the second time) Grenada in 2005.

This progression culminated in the change in diplomatic recognition by Costa Rica in June 2007, arguably a strategically significant event. That nation was the most economically developed state in Latin America, and its president at the time, Dr. Oscar Arias, was the broker of the November 1987 Central American peace accords and one of the most respected political leaders in the region. The “fall” of Costa Rica was expected to lead to changes in diplomatic recognition by a number of other Central American states. Indeed, during this period, leading figures in a number of the states continuing to recognize Taiwan, including Mauricio Funes (while candidate for the presidency of El Salvador); Richard Martenelli in Panama, Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, and later, Porfirio Lobo in Honduras, signaled their interest in changing position.

The principal factor preventing the PRC from making further diplomatic advances in the region following the change by Costa Rica was arguably the election of a nationalist (KMT) government in Taiwan the following January and an agreement between the new Taiwanese president Ma Jeng Jeou and his PRC counterpart Hu Jintao to suspend the competition for diplomatic recognition while the “two Chinas” sought to improve relations with each other.

The “freezing” of the diplomatic status quo in 2008, however, did not block the advance of commercial relations. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, virtually every state in the region was conducting a full spectrum of economic interactions with the PRC. This included Honduras, which in 2011 signed a contract with the mainland Chinese company Sinohydro for a major new hydroelectric plant, and Nicaragua, which contracted Chinese companies for the launch of a new telecommunications satellite as well as the possible construction of its own transcontinental canal.

In January 2012, the reelection of the nationalist KMT government in Taiwan enabled the continuation of the “rapprochement” underlining the freezing of the diplomatic status quo in the Latin America, even though Central American and Caribbean presidents such as Porfirio Lobo of Honduras continued to express interest in changing diplomatic recognition.

Beyond questions of diplomatic recognition, the PRC has created a hierarchy of sorts for its relations with countries of the region. Five Latin American nations have been designated by the PRC as “strategic partners” of the PRC: Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, and Chile. The designation, however, is only a recognition of the importance that both parties afford each other and not an indication that the relationship is positive. Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, for instance, each have significant bilateral disputes with the PRC despite their designation as “strategic partner.”
Finally, Latin America’s foreign policy toward the PRC also has an important multilateral dimension. The Organization of American States has afforded the PRC formal observer status, to include hosting a member of the People’s Liberation Army at the Inter-American Defense College (IADC) in Washington, D.C. Although the PRC is not an observer in UNASUR, the organization has sought cooperation with the PRC for the financing of regional development projects. Similarly, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean State (CELAC) has conducted formal political interactions with the PRC, including a visit by the CELAC leadership to the PRC in August 2012. On the economic front, both the Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank have made the PRC a member.

Relative Harmony on Political Issues versus Diversity on Economic Ones

Latin American countries that diplomatically recognize the PRC generally have few strong conflicts with it on political matters. Their economic orientations toward the PRC, however, run the gamut from harmonious to highly conflicted, depending on the sector and the domestic coalition affected.

On noneconomic issues, Latin American governments generally emphasize areas of agreement with the PRC and play down points of contention. Such consensus is made easier because few countries in the region are actively pursuing extraregional political agendas. Thus, issues such as PRC sovereignty over Tibet—of great importance to the PRC but of little relevance to Latin American states—is commonly conceded by Latin American regimes in bilateral communiqués following meetings with senior PRC officials. This harmonious orientation is arguably reinforced by the PRC’s promotion of nonintervention in internal affairs of each partner by the other, effectively confining interactions to material issues rather than political ones. Although expressions of concern over issues such as censorship or alleged human rights violations appear in the public debate in Latin America, Latin American governments have rarely pressed such issues in their interactions with the PRC to the point of adversely affecting their trade with or investment from the PRC.

To the extent that political differences with the PRC are expressed by Latin American governments, it is more commonly done by the larger countries of the region. Brazil, for example, has been frustrated by what it perceives as a lack of support from the PRC for its bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, while Mexico has incurred the ire of the PRC leadership by meeting with the Dalai Lama.

In select instances, Latin American states have also sought the PRC’s “political” support for their positions on specific international issues. The Argentine government of Cristina Fernandez has actively sought Chinese backing in its dispute with Great Britain over “ownership” of the Falklands/Malvinas islands. Colombia and Ecuador have solicited PRC support for their bids to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). Former Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez repeatedly sought to “associate” the PRC with his crusade against global forces of “imperialism,” although the Chinese have politely demurred.
Latin America Military Collaboration with the PRC

As documented in greater detail elsewhere, Latin America’s military engagement with the PRC generally falls within four categories: visits by senior leaders, professional military education and training exchanges, military equipment purchases concentrated in the ALBA states, and participation by the PRC in humanitarian activities and exercises in the region.

Although Latin America’s interactions with the PRC are much more extensive than is generally recognized, none of the countries of the region have publicly pursued exclusive military alliances with the PRC, and all sides have proceeded with caution, albeit for different reasons. Although Venezuela under the leadership of Hugo Chávez spearheaded the introduction of Chinese arms into the region, the attempts of the late leader, through his rhetoric, to draw the PRC into his “anti-imperialistic” crusade were delicately rejected by the PRC.

Virtually every country in Latin America has sent senior defense officials to the PRC on visits and most maintain a permanent defense attaché in the PRC. Between early 2010 and late 2012, there were more than 30 visits at the Minister of Defense or Chief of Staff levels between senior Chinese military officials and their Latin American counterparts, including Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Uruguay, and Peru. While the specific content of discussions that occur during these visits is seldom reported, the meetings may be understood as opening the door for or moving forward other forms of military cooperation between the countries involved. Additional forms of potential military cooperation include agreements on specific professional military exchanges and training programs between the two countries, procurement of Chinese military goods, or in-progress, associated training and maintenance, as well as a range of other topics.

As with leadership visits, virtually all of the countries maintaining diplomatic relationships with the PRC have also sent personnel to China for training. Latin American personnel have attended the strategic-level institute for foreigners within the PLA National Defense University in Changping in the greater Beijing area, as well as more operational-level schools, such as the Chinese equivalent of command and general staff colleges for ground forces and naval personnel near Nanjing, and a special forces institute near Shijiazhuang.

In the domain of acquisitions, Latin American military purchases of major Chinese end items, to date, have been concentrated in the countries of ALBA. With the exception of the purchase of Chinese-manufactured small arms, anti-aircraft munitions, and a handful of transport aircraft acquired in the pre-2000 period, Venezuela was the first to purchase significant military hardware from the PRC, acquiring Chinese air defense radars and 18 K-8 combat aircraft in 2008. Subsequent acquisitions included Chinese Y-12 and K-8 military transport aircraft and riot control vehicles. Venezuela also publicly announced plans to acquire Chinese armored amphibious vehicles. Although not strictly military, it also contracted with the Chinese space services provider Great Wall Industrial Corporation for the development and launch of two satellites: a communication relay satellite launched in 2009, and an imaging satellite launched in 2012.
Venezuela’s ally Ecuador, which had previously leased MA-60 military transport aircraft from the Chinese, followed Venezuela’s lead and acquired four air defense radars from the Chinese company CATIC. The Ecuadorean military subsequently suspended the procurement, alleging that the Chinese supplier had not complied with its contractual obligations to prepare the equipment for the wet jungle conditions into which it was deployed.

Bolivia, which had previously acquired Chinese HN-5 anti-aircraft missiles, also followed Venezuela’s lead in acquiring K-8 fighter aircraft. Bolivia also purchased Chinese H-425 military transport helicopters, as well as military engineering equipment. Since 2006, the Bolivian military has also received a number of Chinese trucks, buses, and nonlethal gear, and has followed Venezuela’s lead in contracting for the development and launch of a telecommunications relay satellite.

Beyond ALBA, Argentina and Peru have been the primary countries to explore the acquisition of Chinese military equipment, although Guyana, Suriname, Jamaica, and even Colombia have received some Chinese military goods. The experience of Argentina with such equipment to date has arguably been mixed. Its military began acquiring WMV-551 armored personnel carriers in 2008, but subsequently suspended the procurement over quality issues. It also announced an interest in acquiring the Chinese X-11 helicopter, but was forced to cancel the deal when the French, a key equipment and technology provider to the Argentine military, threatened to suspend cooperation with Argentina over the issue, claiming the Chinese helicopter was a copy of their own. A plan to develop and produce a new helicopter in Argentina jointly was announced by the Argentine Ministry of Defense in October 2011, but to date has not moved forward.

In 2009 Peru almost became the first nation in the Hemisphere to acquire Chinese armored vehicles, but its plans to acquire the MBT-2000 tank, politically controversial within Peru itself, was abandoned when the Ukrainian engine manufacturer could not supply engine spares required as part of the deal.

Beyond military hardware, Latin America has also cautiously accepted PRC military activities of a humanitarian nature in the region, concentrated in three symbolic deployments. In 2004, the PLA sent a contingent of 126 military police to participate in the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and maintained a presence there until October 2012. In November 2010, the PLA conducted a bilateral exercise in Peru jointly exercising the capabilities of a mobile field hospital that it had just provided to the Peruvian armed forces. Lastly, in December 2011, the recently commissioned PLA hospital ship “Peace Ark” sailed to the Caribbean where it made port calls, providing medical services in four Latin American countries: Jamaica, Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica.

The general absence of controversy within Latin America regarding such deployments is significant but does not indicate that Latin America welcomes a PRC military presence. In the case of MINUSTAH, the composition of the force was a United Nations question, not a Latin American one, although the force came under Brazilian command. In the case of the “Angel de Paz” exercise, the “exercise” was arguably part of the military’s acceptance of the Chinese field hospital. With respect to the voyage of the “Peace Ark” to the Caribbean, no nation was in the po-
sition to oppose entry of an unarmed medical ship to the region, or to refuse to take advantage of the humanitarian services that it was offering to provide once there.

Multiple Cross-Cutting Cleavages in the Region’s Orientation toward the PRC

Differences in the policies and style of Latin American governments toward the PRC on economic matters are far more apparent than in the political arena. Such differences tend to manifest themselves in the approach toward trade with the PRC, the style of soliciting and incorporating investment from China, and the way that Chinese interest in public works projects is managed.

Latin America’s heterogeneous orientation toward China on economic issues may be understood in terms of four crosscutting cleavages, which reflect economic, political, and geographic divisions in the region more broadly: (1) north versus south, (2) populist regimes versus market economies, (3) pure resource exporters versus industrialized exporters versus nonexporting capital recipients versus pure importers, and (4) Pacific versus Atlantic.

Such divisions generally do not reflect a debate within the region about whether to engage with China—viewed as almost inevitable given China’s omnipresence in global commerce and finance. Rather, they map out differences regarding how to engage with China, including the level of importance and confidence to give to the PRC in those interactions.

North versus South. The relationship of Latin American states with the PRC manifests a distinct north-south divide, with a border that can be drawn roughly at Nicaragua. The distinction reflects the persistent close integration of the economies of Mexico and Central America with those of the United States and Canada.

Such integration is reinforced by trade accords, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the case of Mexico and the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) for the states of Central America. These bonds are also reinforced by human ties, with many immigrants from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras living in the United States sending remittances to family in their countries of origin. Costa Rica and Panama are special cases in this division, linked through free trade agreements and strong commercial relationships to the U.S., but with increasingly important commercial interactions with the PRC.

There is also significant variability in the pattern. Mexico has long had an independent foreign policy and was one of the early countries in the region to diplomatically recognize the PRC. However, such relations have been troubled by persistent large trade deficits with the PRC, as well as Mexico’s hosting of the Dalai Lama on various occasions. Mexico is also one of Latin America’s largest and earliest investors in the PRC, and, reciprocally, has worked hard at federal, state, and local levels to attract Chinese investors in sectors such as autos, computers, and telecommunications. Similarly, Honduras, which does not maintain diplomatic relations with the PRC, has contracted with a Chinese company for a major hydroelectric project, the Patuca III dam, and has been in talks with Chi-
inese companies regarding the possible sale of the state telecommunications firm Hondutel, as well as a biofuels project encompassing 2.7 million hectares of forest in the country.\textsuperscript{37}

In contrast with countries of the north, those of the south have generally pursued more significant economic and political engagement with the PRC for a longer period of time, although the style of that engagement has differed greatly, as noted in subsequent sections.

**Populist Regimes versus Market Economies.** The regimes represented by the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA) have differed markedly from other Latin American governments in their approach to engaging the PRC. In the economic realm, the ALBA regimes have been more likely than others to contract Chinese companies without formal competition, often leveraging financing by Chinese banks, based on government-to-government negotiations. Isolated from traditional financial markets, countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have been more willing to turn to the PRC as an alternative source of financing for both infrastructure projects and consumer goods, creating massive revolving credit financing vehicles with loans secured by parallel contracts for the delivery of commodities.

Although the rhetoric of populist leaders such as Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia has been characterized by enthusiasm that at times borders on exuberance,\textsuperscript{38} the relationships have had difficulties, including Nicaragua’s continuing recognition of Taiwan and public disputes between Ecuador and Chinese companies regarding the concession for the Port of Manta and the loan for the Coca-Coca-Sinclair hydroelectric project.

In “market economies,” in contrast to ALBA states, the pursuit of an expanded commercial relationship with the PRC seeks to complement, not replace, a continuing engagement with the United States, Europe, and Western institutions. The approach to doing business is also different, with Chinese companies more likely to have to participate in competitive bids for infrastructure projects and for rights to mines and oilfields.\textsuperscript{39}

In this dichotomy, Argentina is arguably a “mixed case.” As in Venezuela, Argentina under Cristina Fernandez has depended on primary product sales to China to sustain its economy—soy in the Argentine case. As the role of the state in Argentina has expanded, in contrast to Venezuela, its interventions such as currency controls and the seizure of control of the Belgrano-Cargas railway system\textsuperscript{40} have been as likely to hurt Chinese interests than to help them. Protectionism in Argentina has harmed Chinese manufactures\textsuperscript{41} and impeded Chinese infrastructure projects, blocking the entry into the country of Chinese goods and laborers for the PRC-financed Urea plant in Tierra del Fuego.\textsuperscript{42}

**Pure Resource Exporters versus Industrialized Exporters versus Non-Exporting Capital Recipients versus Pure Importers.** A third way to examine Latin America’s economic orientation toward the PRC is according to the potential economic costs and benefits that accrue from the relation: “pure resource exporters,” “industrialized exporters,” “nonexporters,” and “small-state capital recipients.”
“Pure resource exporters” are those whose economies are focused around primary-product exports, while lacking a politically significant manufacturing sector. This category includes both market-oriented states such as Chile and Peru, as well as populist states, such as Venezuela. In such countries, the orientation toward commercial engagement with the PRC has been very positive because the benefits of such engagement are significant, while the industries and others harmed are either few or politically voiceless.43

“Industrialized exporters” encompasses states such as Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia, with both significant export-oriented primary product sectors selling goods to the PRC, as well as politically important industries and labor unions that are damaged by competition from Chinese products in their own country and third markets. The results of such divided political imperatives have been particularly evident in Argentina, which by 2012 was exporting almost 90 percent of its soy production to the PRC, relying on it for over $10 billion in loans for infrastructure projects and looking to China to be a key player in its petroleum sector following the nationalization of Repsol YPF. At the same time, reflecting concerns over domestic industries and workers, Argentina had imposed 38 protectionist measures against the PRC, including restrictions on Chinese tires44 and toys,45 as well as textiles and computer equipment.46

Similarly for Brazil, the PRC is the nation’s number one trading partner, principal purchaser of its soy and iron, and increasingly a key investor in the mining and petroleum sectors. Yet, as with Argentina, the protection of domestic industries has led Brazil to impose an increasing array of protectionist measures on the PRC, from tariffs on shoes and tires,47 to a 30-percentage point increase in the industrial products tax announced in September 2011.48

The third category encompasses states that, while not exporting significant quantities of goods to the PRC, benefit from major Chinese loans and investments. These are generally states in Central America and the Caribbean that initially received sports stadiums, roads, and other benefits for switching their diplomatic recognition to the PRC, but now have transitioned into being recipients of major loan-backed infrastructure projects. These include such projects as the Jamaica Development Infrastructure Program (JDIP), commercial investments such as the port of Freeport in the Bahamas and the North-South toll road in Jamaica, or resort projects such as Baha Mar and Blackwood Pointe in the Bahamas and Bacolet Bay Resort in Grenada.

Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama are special cases in this category. Costa Rica has received major Chinese investments such as a new stadium and the expansion of its refinery at Moin, yet is also tied to the PRC via the export of semiconductors to the PRC from the Intel plant near San José. In the case of Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, although none diplomatically recognize the PRC, each has benefitted from Chinese loans and investments, including the Patucha III dam in Honduras, work on a major new canal49 and refinery50 in Nicaragua, and the presence of Hutchison-Whampoa51 and various smaller Chinese manufacturers in the Panama Canal zone.

The benefits provided by the relationship with the PRC has arguably fostered
a strong pro-PRC sentiment in these countries, yet has also generated significant discussions within their societies, with opponents to China-funded public works projects raising questions about the use of large numbers of Chinese workers to build them, the associated expansion of Chinese communities, and the accumulation of debts to the PRC to pay for the infrastructure being built.

The final category is Latin American states with neither substantial exports to the PRC, nor significant loans, investments, or gifts from it. This category includes Guatemala, El Salvador, Belize, and those Caribbean states that do not recognize the PRC, as well as Mexico, which does receive some Chinese investment and exports to China, but for which such benefits are eclipsed by imports from China and other factors. In virtually all countries in this category, the orientation of government toward the PRC has generally been less positive than is the case with the other three, since the net flow of benefits coming from expanded engagement with the PRC is relatively limited and the net harm from the entry of Chinese products into local markets is ever greater.

**Pacific versus Atlantic States.** An important new division is emerging within Latin America with regard to the PRC between a block of Pacific-facing states and the rest of the region. Shared motivations, based on expanding commercial engagement with Asia, interpreted through similar ideologies, have driven Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Chile to form a new block, the “Alliance of the Pacific,” with Panama and Costa Rica participating in the founding activities of the new group as observers.

Regimes in each of these states coincide in seeking to position themselves as hubs for the expanding commerce between Asia and other states in the Hemisphere and in following a relatively capitalistic, market-oriented approach to doing so. Each of these countries also takes pride in more-efficient-than-average bureaucracies to support its postulated new role, as well as a sufficiently sophisticated legal system, independent judiciary, and tradition of respect for contracts and private property, so as to give confidence to Chinese and other investors.

In the four summits leading to the formal launch of the organization at the summit in Paranal, Chile, in June 2012, the founding members achieved remarkable progress in the initial steps toward a functional multilateral organization, including agreements to coordinate trade promotion policies toward the PRC and, in some cases, to share resources, such as the new Chilean-Colombian consulate opened in Shanghai in 2012. They also made progress in standardizing investment regulations, and even creating shared financial markets that could support doing business with the PRC. Some analysts have even suggested a logical complementarity between the Pacific Alliance and the emerging new Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to bring together similarly like-minded nations from Asia and the Pacific coast of Latin America in order to form a new trading community.

In contrast to the Alliance of the Pacific, the countries on the Atlantic side of the continent are in disagreement on how to engage the PRC. As noted previously, both Brazil and Argentina have major primary product industries seeking to export to China, yet both have adopted increasingly protectionist policies, pushed by domestic manufacturing and labor constituencies that have undercut Chinese
interest in investing there. In the north of the continent, as noted previously, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have engaged the PRC principally through state-to-state mechanisms. In Central America, Nicaragua and the states of the Northern Triangle are effectively part of the “Atlantic” camp, lacking the diplomatic relations or physical or intellectual infrastructure to engage the PRC effectively, although each has a Pacific coastline.\footnote{54}

**Latin America’s Business and Societal Response to China**

Although studies of inter-state relations most commonly focus on government-to-government interactions, an increasingly important component of China’s relationship with Latin America is how nongovernmental elites and publics react to both China as an actor and the activities of Chinese entities on the ground in Latin America.

First, the “rise of China” globally has captured the attention of business, students, academics, journalists, and others across the region. Although motivations and responses differ, the people of Latin America are captivated by the prospect of the PRC as a market, a source of investment and loans, and an “alternative” to a world dominated by the U.S. and Western institutions, while others fear the impact that it could have on their businesses or the development of their country. The attention that China has commanded affords it significant “soft power,” in the form of businesses committing resources in pursuit of China-related opportunities, Latin American academics and journalists dedicating countless pages and gigabytes to writing about the PRC, and students dedicating years to the study of China, the Mandarin language, and the Chinese character set.

LA-POP, the first major social sciences survey in Latin America to include questions about the PRC, reported that more than 20 percent of the region believed China to be the most influential actor in their particular country, and 23 percent believed that China would soon be so. Moreover, although a much larger portion saw the U.S. as continuing to be the most important actor in the region, a significant margin (68% to 62%) saw China’s role in the region as more positive than that of the U.S.\footnote{55}

Although the impact of Latin American business on China and its companies is a story that involves thousands of people, it can be seen at the highest level through the elites who helped to build their countries’ trade with the PRC and investment deals with its companies. These included the late Ricardo Claro, Alejandro Luksic, and Jean Ponce LeRou in Chile; the Brazilian billionaire Aike Bautista; and Argentine businessmen Sergio Spadone, Franco Macri, Nuria Quintela, and Carlos Bulgheroni. Each spearheaded or helped set up major Chinese investments in their respective countries or investments by private interests from their companies in the PRC, as well as leveraging relationships in their own governments to facilitate such deals. Similarly, the story of Colombia’s opening to China must similarly include the protagonism of figures such as Gustavo Gaviria, Guillermo Velez, and Martin Ibarra.

In addition to the actions of such elites, Latin America’s interactions toward “China” at the popular level increasingly include responses to the presence of
Chinese commercial ventures “on the ground” in the countries of the region. These include, but are not limited to, mines, oilfields, factories, retail outlets, and infrastructure projects, although growing ethnic Chinese communities in Latin American countries are also becoming an increasingly important factor in the politics of the region.

Many proposed Chinese projects in the region to date have been high-visibility ventures that have become subjects of contention within the countries in which they are to occur. The projects elicit enthusiasm because of their effect on investment and local jobs while, at the same time, opposition based on concerns over the terms of the deal and associated loans, issues of transparency, the number of locals versus Chinese to be employed, and environmental and other concerns. In Suriname, a project by the firm *China Zhang Heng Tai* to produce palm oil on a 40,000-hectare Patamacca plantation in Marowijne was blocked by local activists fearful that the Chinese laborers to be brought in would displace local jobs. In Trinidad, concern over the number of Chinese workers employed in various projects led Eroll Mcleod, Trinidad labour minister, to proclaim in June 2012 his intent to establish a “labor policy” against the entrance of Chinese construction workers on projects in the country. In the Cayman Islands, China Harbor’s attempt to build a cruise ship terminal there was blocked by the British government, which retains authority over the islands, on the grounds that proper contracting procedures were not followed. Similarly, retail projects, such as the proposed $1.54 billion 3,000-store “Dragon Mart” complex in Cancun, Mexico, have been opposed because of their impact on local manufacturers.

Many Chinese projects have also faced opposition from environmentalists. In spring 2012 a commitment by the government of Ecuador to the Chinese company Ecuacorriente to develop a mine in the department of Zamora Chinchipe, for example, spawned a protest march across the country by CONAIE, the country’s most powerful indigenous organization. The proposed Chinese mining project Rio Blanco near the Peruvian city of Piura and a dam project in Chone, Ecuador, by the Chinese firm Tiesiju have similarly been the objects of protests by those seeking to block the projects on environmental grounds.

Once in place, Chinese projects in Latin America, like others, have also faced a myriad of operational challenges, from labor disputes to security concerns. The Hierro Peru mine in Marcona in the south of the country has been the subject of annual strikes since being acquired by the Chinese in 1993, including protests in Ica in September 2011 that forced the country’s vice president to take the issue before the Peruvian National Congress. Other Chinese companies have had similar labor difficulties, including China Metallurgical Corporation, operating the Sierra Grande mine in Argentina, the China Railroad Engineering Corporation in Venezuela, and China Harbor Engineering in Jamaica.

In the security domain, Chinese companies operating mines and oilfields have been confronted by violent protesters blockading and, in some cases, overrunning work sites, including the takeover of an Andes Petroleum oilfield in Tarapoa, Ecuador, in November 2006; the blockade and violence that killed more than 30 persons outside a nearby site in Orellana in 2007, directed at the Chinese company...
Petroriental, which had broken through similar roadblocks set up by protesters in Orellana in 2007; and blockades against the Cerro Dragon oilfield in Argentina in 2012, in which the Chinese company Bridas had an interest. Other incidents include Linden Guyana, where, in August 2012, protesters cut off access to the Chinese-owned Bosai mine, forcing the company to cease its bauxite exports for a number of weeks.\textsuperscript{67} While such incidents have largely involved radical protesters, Chinese operations in Latin America have also been victimized by guerillas. Over the course of 2011, the petroleum operations in Caquetá, Colombia, of the Chinese-owned firm Emerald Energy were subject to multiple attacks, including actions against pumps and company vehicles and the kidnapping of three Chinese affiliated with a Chinese petroleum services company, Great Wall Drilling, which was doing work for Emerald, ultimately forcing the Colombian armed forces to become involved in the protection of those oil drilling operations.

In general, Latin American governments have done everything possible to protect Chinese companies and their operations from protesters, criminals, guerillas, and other threats, although, as with the protection of other private interests, their ability to do so is insufficient. In the process, however, Latin American governments on both the right and the left are increasingly becoming security partners for the Chinese companies in whose presence and success they have an increasing stake. The government of Honduras, for example, although not diplomatically recognizing the PRC, has dedicated military units to provide site security for the construction of the Patuca III hydroelectric facility by the Chinese company Sino-hydro.\textsuperscript{68}

Beyond Chinese companies, Latin American governments have also increasingly been called upon to protect Chinese communities in their midst, as the visibility of those communities is elevated by growing quantities of Chinese merchandise, Chinese companies, and Chinese laborers working on projects in the country. Major incidents of violence against Chinese communities occurred in Valencia, Venezuela, during the run-up to the 2004 recall referendum,\textsuperscript{69} as well as two incidents in Surinam, the first on Christmas Eve 2009, south of the border town of Albina, and the second in October 2011 in Maripaston.\textsuperscript{70}

Conclusions

As with Latin America’s relations with the United States and other parts of the world, its relationship with the PRC will continue to evolve. The cleavages identified in this paper between north and south, populists versus market-oriented economies, groups of beneficiaries, and Pacific versus Atlantic will both shape, and be shaped by, that relationship. At the same time, the engagement of Chinese companies on the ground in Latin America will make the relationship increasingly a domestic, as much as a foreign, policy matter for Latin American governments. In the process, the formal foreign policy agendas of Latin American governments will be less about seeking alliances and aid packages, and more about coordinating with the Chinese government regarding the behavior of their firms and the protection of Chinese personnel, leading academics and others to reexamine the boundaries of “foreign policy.” In practical terms as well, as the Chinese gov-
ernment increasingly negotiates on behalf of its companies and personnel in the region, both sides may have to “rethink” the contemporary meaning of the long-used phrase “non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.”

Notes

1 The Mandarin word for China, Zhong Guo literally translates as “middle kingdom.” The associated pictogram for China (中国) focuses on the concept of China in the world.
2 Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spencer, In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War (Duke University Press, 2007). In addition, unique among Latin American governments, from 1950 to 1954 Colombia sent a battalion of soldiers to Korea as part of the U.S.-led United Nations force fighting against the North Koreans and the Chinese.
4 Although Allende was ousted by a military coup in September 1973, the government of General Augusto Pinochet that replaced him chose to continue diplomatic relations with the PRC, given that the regimes of both Mao and Pinochet needed other countries to recognize them to increase their international legitimacy. See Cynthia A. Watson, “U.S. Responses to China’s Growing Interests in Latin America: Dawning Recognition of a Changing Hemisphere,” in Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America, eds. Cynthia Arnson, Mark Mohr, and Riordan Roett (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009): 65–71.
5 To some degree, the timing of the change was a product of the consolidation of Sandinista rule in that country.
6 Often such organizations had roots in the “beneficence societies,” mutual aid organizations by which Chinese communities provided help to newly arriving members of the community and those in need, as well as providing assistance to family and social causes in China itself.
7 Others, such as the Asociación Paraguaya de Amigos de la Republica Popular China (APACHI), arguably continue to do so to this day.
8 The exemplar of the attitude that the West had triumphed in the battle of ideas against communism was arguably Francis Fukuyama’s essay, “The End of History?” The National Interest, Summer 1989. For an extended version of Fukuyama’s thesis, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992, 2006).
12 In January of 2008, a new nationalist (KMT) government was elected to power in Tai-
wan. As part of the effort by Taiwan’s new president, Ma Jing-yeou, to reach out to improve relations with the PRC, both sides agreed to suspend “checkbook diplomacy.” See, for example, “Presidente electo de Taiwán rechaza ‘diplomacia de la chequera,’” *El Mercurio*, Santiago, Chile, March 23, 2008.


16 In December 2012, Honduran President Lobo publicly declared his interest in establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, while also maintaining relations with Taiwan. See Joseph Yeh, “Honduras’ Dual Taiwan, China Recognition Unacceptable: MOFA,” *The China Post*, December 26, 2012.

17 In general, this has involved the establishment of binational commissions with periodic meetings to coordinate issues relevant to the relationship. These meetings are generally at the ministerial level, but are supported by lower-level working groups.

18 “UNASUR to Strengthen Ties with China,” *Xinhua*, July 28, 2011.

19 The visit was led by the foreign ministers of each of the three states leading CELAC at that time: Nicholas Maduro, representing Venezuela; Alfredo Moreno representing Chile; and Rogelio Sierra, representing Cuba. See “Maduro fue a China para fortalecer nexos de la CELAC,” *El Universal*, Caracas, Venezuela, August 10, 2012.


30 “Pekín se desmarca de vínculo ideológicos con Venezuela a la llegada de Chávez,” September 23, 2008.

31 For details, see R. Evan Ellis, *China–Latin America Military Engagement* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, August 2011).


There are a relatively smaller number of immigrants from Costa Rica and Panama in the United States, arguably because of the relatively greater prosperity of those countries and the absence of a legacy of civil wars that created a flood of refugees from other Central American states to the U.S. in the 1980s. According to Department of Homeland Security statistics, Costa Rica and Panama were the two Central American countries with the lowest legal emigration to the United States, with 68,170 residency permits granted to Costa Ricans since 1980 and 82,300 to Panamanians over the same period. See “Persons Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status by Region and Selected Country of Last Residence: Fiscal Years 1820 to 2011,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed January 10, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2011-1.

In January 2013, the Chinese company Beijing GED Orient Tech Development and a local Honduran partner, Junior Reyes, signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a biofuels production project involving 2.7 million hectares of forests in Olancho, Colón, Yoro, Francisco Morazán, La Paz, Lempira, Copán, and Mosquita. The project contemplated the eventual creation of up to 300,000 jobs and the generation of up to $2 billion annually in tax revenue for the Honduran state.

Bolivian president Evo Morales, during his 2011 visit to the PRC, for example, proclaimed, “China is a country so great that from here, I can imagine that within a short time, the United States will be a colony of China.” See “Evo anuncia siete convenios con China,” Los Tiempos, Cochabamba, Bolivia, August 16, 2011. Similarly, Hugo Chávez, during one of his own visits to the PRC, declared that the Latin American revolutionary figure Simon Bolívar and the Chinese revolutionary leader Mao Zedong “would have been great friends.” See Alberto Alemán Aguirre, “Relaciones que saben a petróleo,” El Nuevo Diario, Managua, Nicaragua, August 15, 2012.

As with the North-South dichotomy, the populist-market economy dichotomy is imperfect. In the nations of the Caribbean, as in populist regimes, large loans from Chinese banks are one tool by which Chinese construction companies circumvent traditional competitive procurement processes to win work projects for the state.


The falloff in Chinese demand for primary products that has accompanied the slowing of growth in the PRC has hurt the economies of these states, but to date the relationship has continued to cause sufficient benefits so as not to jeopardize the positive orientation of these regimes toward the PRC.


The canal project in Nicaragua is estimated to cost $30 billion and will consist of a waterway for ships and a “dry canal” railroad for freight. The Chinese company in charge of the project is the Hong Kong-based HK Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Co. Ltd. See Tim Rogers, “Nicaragua Taps China for Canal Project,” *Nicaragua Dispatch*, September 11, 2012.

The total cost of the project is reported to be $6 billion. In April 2012, two contracts were signed between the Nicaraguan petroleum organization Petronic and the Chinese company CAMCE for the initial phase of the project: one for $183 million to construct the refinery terminal, and a second for $50M to construct 3.8 kilometers of submarine piping required for the facility. See “Chinos construirán mega refinería en Nicaragua,” *El Comercio*, April 27, 2012.


The division was highlighted by Dr. Frank O. Mora, then–Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, in remarks to a group of senior Latin American defense and security analysts on the topic of emerging strategic issues in the region. Remarks to the seminar “Colleagues for the Americas Seminar,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, Fort Lesley McNair, Washington, D.C, January 17, 2013. Quoted with permission of Dr. Mora.


This refers to the absence of a substantial body of businessmen with the knowledge or connections required to do business in the PRC beyond small-scale imports of Chinese merchandise.


See, for example, “Acusan al alcalde de Sapalache de apoyar violencia contra Río Blanco,” *El Comercio*, Lima, Peru, November 23, 2011.


Mireya Tabuas and Maria Alesia Sosa, “No es un cuento chino,” *El Nacional*, Caracas,

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Venezuela, April 15, 2012.

66 In September 2010, local workers staged protests against China Harbor Engineering Company near Kingston, Jamaica, on the grounds that the company had not hired the promised number of Jamaicans in its government-funded work on the Palasodes road project. See Kimmo Matthews, “Angry Protesters Demand Jobs on Palisadoes Project,” Jamaica Observer, Kingston, Jamaica, September 22, 2010.


68 “Honduras firma convenio con China para hidroeléctrica,” La Tribuna, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, April 17, 2011.


The Challenge of Cybersecurity for the Caribbean: What Are the Policy Options?

Kevin Newmeyer

Abstract

This paper addresses some of the policy issues affecting cybersecurity in the Caribbean and how best to respond to those challenges. International organizations such as the International Telecommunications Union and the Organization of American States called for all states in the region to develop national cybersecurity strategies to protect their critical infrastructure, business interests, and private citizens. The Caribbean states have lagged in establishing national cybersecurity strategies. The challenge for Caribbean states and other developing nations remains how best to protect their security and economic interests in a connected environment. Which strategic paradigm fits the culture and the capabilities of such nations? This paper examines the threat and the various alternative frameworks to respond to the growing cyber threat including national security, economic, and public health approaches to cybersecurity.

Introduction

The Internet and web-enabled technology continue to penetrate more and more of the daily lives of individuals around the world. Powerful computing platforms capable of instantaneous communication with remote data centers are carried in the pockets and purses of individuals across the Caribbean. While the Internet offers the prospect of economic growth to the region (Moore-Miggans, 2012), it is not without risk. Recent news stories have detailed the theft of tens of millions of dollars in a matter of hours through a worldwide ATM fraud that included banks in the Dominican Republic (Marzulli, 2013). Additional threats from cyber espionage and critical infrastructure attack made headlines in the United States and elsewhere (Barnes, 2013; de Brun, 2013). While estimates vary considerably, the Internet security firm Norton estimated that costs exceeded $338 billion in 2010 in direct and indirect losses from global cybercrime (Whittaker, 2011). Internet-aided terrorism, espionage, fraud, and critical infrastructure attacks threaten governments large and small around the world. Cybersecurity policy development, however, has lagged behind the significant changes in technology and the threat. This policy-governance gap is particularly true in the developing world with its reduced economic and human resources (Lock-Teng Low, Fook Ong & Aun Law, 2011). The Caribbean Telecommunications Union (2011) called the Caribbean Basin a breeding ground for cybercrime due to the failure of policymakers to
comprehend the growing challenge to regional law enforcement.

For small Caribbean nations to develop, grow, and diversify their economies they need to be connected to trading partners and customer bases beyond their shores, but without adequate security strategies these nations and their citizens become exposed to greatly increased risk of cybercrime, critical infrastructure attack, and other illicit activity (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Ellefesen & von Solms, 2010; Glennon, 2012). A well-crafted national strategy offers a means to reduce the risk through improved practice and substantive policy.

Background

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) published the National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide in September 2011 recommending governments adopt a values-based strategy commensurate with their perception of their national cyber risk (Wamala, 2011). The 2011 guide was a marked improvement over the earlier Cybersecurity Guide for Developing Nations (Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2009). Earlier, the Organization of American States adopted AG/Res. 2004 (XXXIV-O/04) “Adoption of a Comprehensive Inter-American Strategy to Combat Threats to Cybersecurity: A Multidimensional and Multidisciplinary Approach to Creating a Culture of Cybersecurity” at its General Assembly in June 2004 (Organization of American States, 2004), which called on member state governments to implement cybersecurity laws as well as technical and operational measures. Both organizations have conducted capacity-building events in the Caribbean. As recently as March 2012, the OAS Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) called on member states to publish and adopt national cybersecurity strategies (Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, 2012).

Advanced industrialized nations such as the United Kingdom (Cabinet Office, 2009), New Zealand (New Zealand Government, 2011), and the United States (Bush, 2003) published national cybersecurity strategies and instituted policies to improve their cybersecurity. Some smaller nations such as Malaysia, Uganda, Romania, and South Africa (Luiijf, Besseling, & de Graff, 2013; Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, n.d.) published national strategies. The Caribbean region, however, continues to lag behind in the publication and adoption of cybersecurity policy. This differs from the trend in other parts of the world, where governments are recognizing the need to respond to increased threats in a sector vital to economic and social development (Luiijf et al., 2013; OECD, 2012). As of May 2013, no Caribbean nation has promulgated a national cybersecurity strategy.

The Difficult Definition of Cybersecurity Strategy

Among the challenges facing Caribbean nations in developing a cybersecurity strategy is the difficulty in defining the subject. Academics and organizations have presented a number of options, but none has reached international consensus on what a strategy should contain or even what cybersecurity means (ENISA, 2012; Lehto, Huhtinen, & Jantunen, 2011; Luiijf, et al. 2013; Klimberg, 2012; OECD, 2012). Along with the cyber definitional challenges, cultural differences
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at the international level in other security fields complicate consensus building (Aldis, 2008). These cultural and language differences hinder the direct comparison of definitions (Klimberg, 2012) and reflect how an individual nation perceives the nature and threat from cyberspace (Lehto, et al., 2011). Even nations with published national cybersecurity strategies do not always define the term in their documents (Luiijf, et al., 2013; OECD, 2012). Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009), traced the origins of securitization of the cyber domain to the initial discussion by computer scientists of weaknesses in networked systems. More recently the cyberspace securitization debate morphed due to the greatly increased concerns of attacks on critical infrastructure and potential terrorist exploitation of the Internet following the attacks of September 11.

Rowe and Lunt (2012) commented that the present definition of cybersecurity moved beyond traditional technical concerns of information assurance and data validity and now reflects the integration between the physical world and cyberspace, where actions taken in the digital world can cause physical damage. Events like the damage of Iranian nuclear program centrifuges by a cyber attack or the denial of service attacks in Estonia have demonstrated the ability of cybersecurity to garner the public’s attention (Agresti, 2010). The variance in definitions of cybersecurity reflects the variety of approaches that different nations have taken when developing and drafting their strategies (Lehto, et al., 2011; Luiijf, et al. 2013).

The Current Global Cybersecurity Policy Landscape

Academic research on cybersecurity strategy and policy in developing countries has only recently started to appear. Tagert (2010) had limited options but to use press articles, interviews, and a few official documents from governments and international organizations when completing his dissertation on cybersecurity policy in Rwanda and Tunisia. More recently national policy papers became more widespread. Luiijf, et al. (2013) compared 19 national cybersecurity strategies in an effort to find common ground, but only Romania, Uganda, India, and South Africa are developing nations. The situation is different in the developed world. The United Kingdom (Cabinet Office, 2009), New Zealand (New Zealand Government, 2011), and the United States (Bush, 2003) published national cybersecurity strategies and took steps toward implementation. As of May 2012, 10 European Union countries have published national cybersecurity strategies (ENISA, 2012). These nations recognized the national security and economic risks brought by the technology that is now fully integrated into their societies (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Klimberg, 2012; Lehto et al., 2011; Luiijf et al., 2013; OECD, 2012).

A few developing nations such as Malaysia, Colombia, South Africa, and Uganda have publicly disclosed national cybersecurity strategies (ENISA, 2012; Luiijf, et al., 2013; Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, n.d; Phahamohlaka, L., Jansen van Vuuren, J., & Coetzee, C., 2011). The Caribbean region, however, continues to lag behind in the publication and adoption of cybersecurity policy. Personal discussions with regional representatives at the 12th Regular Session of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism in Washington, DC,
revealed that only Trinidad and Tobago had taken concrete steps to establish a national cybersecurity strategy, but as of May 2013 no strategy had been published.

One of the major challenges to adoption is that there are multiple, competing visions on how to achieve cybersecurity or even how to frame the discussion. In his examination of cybersecurity policy in Africa, Tagert (2010) found two basic paradigms for cybersecurity being recommended by international organizations and the developed West. One focused on building national cybersecurity incident response teams often called CSIRTs or CERTs, which would serve as response agencies for cyber incidents. The alternative approach was to develop a legal and procedural framework similar that of the G-8 nations, which ignored the technological and institutional capacity of the majority of developing nations. The Organization of American States (2004) included CSIRTS and legal reform in their declaration on cybersecurity.

More recent work by Luijif et al. (2013) and the OECD (2012) found a variety of approaches in their study of 19 published strategies with economic, national security, counter-terrorism, and response to unchecked globalization as motivating factors. Further complicating the development of national cybersecurity strategy are the competing paradigms for viewing the problem. The three most commonly encountered have origins in national security theory, economic theory, or public health (Mulligan & Schneider, 2012). The selection of paradigm is essential to the formulation of the national strategy. The paradigm determines the framework of the strategy, the relationship with the private sector, and the means to monitor implementation.

**Cybersecurity Paradigms**

The national security paradigm reflects the traditional role of the state in securing the country’s borders and enforcing the rule of law. Harknett and Stever (2009) outlined the unique nature of the cybersecurity problem as one that encounters the interface of the public-private and economic-defense in a previously unseen manner. Cybersecurity is seen to be fundamental to the military and economic security of the nation and required an approached rooted in traditional national security arguments (Harknett & Stever, 2009; The White House, 2009).

The economic paradigm reflects the growing importance of the internet and information flow to the economic well being of the nation. Moore (2009) proposed an economic theory approach to cybersecurity highlighting the current misalignment of incentives, asymmetries, and externalities of the traditional security based approaches. Rishikof and Lunda (2011) extended this idea beyond the developed world, arguing that global standards are needed in a connected, globalized economy where cyber problems can spread unchecked across ungoverned network interconnections.

Recently, several authors advanced the public health model approach to cybersecurity. This approach originated from the concept that cybersecurity is a public good and that improvements in any area benefit all participants in the network. Extending from the ideas of immunizations and quarantines to protect the population from contagious disease, Charney (2012), Mulligan and Schneider
(2012), and Rosenzweig (2011) argued for the public health model as a means of shifting from purely defensive strategies to an alternative that seeks to improve the security of each system connected to the global network. Devices that are connected to the network must be secured to prevent risk to others in the global common.

National Security Paradigm

One of the dominant themes in cybersecurity strategies remains national security. Agresti (2010) attributed the emphasis placed on national security in cybersecurity strategy and doctrine to the need to protect critical infrastructure and the importance of those public and private systems to the operation of government. Luijif et al. (2013) found that 8 of the 19 examined specifically cited national security as a driver for development of the strategy, and the majority mentioned a threat to critical infrastructure. Spain went so far as to include its national cybersecurity strategy as a specific section of its national security strategy document (Luijif et al., 2013). Jamaica included organized transnational cybercrime as a tier-one threat in its recent national security strategy (Clayton, 2012). There is little doubt that the changes in information technology, connectivity of systems, and increased utilization of computer-controlled systems created significant changes in the practice and responsibility of national security (Choucri & Goldsmith, 2012; Leeuw & Leeuw, 2012; Stevens, 2012; Tabansky, 2011).

Cybersecurity strategy development in the United States began in 1998 under the Clinton administration in an effort to secure critical infrastructure and received greater attention following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (Thomas, 2011). The focus on national security and economic security remained consistent through Democratic and Republican administrations (Harknett, Callaghan, & Kauffman, 2010; Harknett & Stever, 2011; The White House, 2009). The focus continued in 2013 when the Obama administration responded to the lack of Congressional action by issuing an executive order aimed at improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity (Obama, 2013). A similar focus on national and economic security was found in the United Kingdom approach (Cabinet Office, 2009; Klimberg, 2012; Luijif, 2013).

Harknett et al. (2010) found the fundamental nature of cyberspace to be a strategic military environment. The argument centered on the environment of cyberspace as one where the offensive approach dominates the defensive response. It also diminished the role of deterrence and legal strictures on nation-state and criminal actors. The arguments also tend to emphasize potential damage from cyber attacks, the potential “cyber Pearl Harbors” (Van Eeten & Bauer, 2009).

The arguments from this neo-realist school of thought reflect a strong military focus to cybersecurity strategy. Kramer (2010), making the case for an integrated government strategy on cybersecurity, emphasized that the national security risks to military systems, critical infrastructure vital to defense, and espionage targeted at defense interests should be the primary responsibility and objective of the government’s cybersecurity strategy. Agresti (2010) and Vacca (2011) argued that the lack of structure in cyberspace allowed for the easy importation of military
cultural legacies into the policy debate on cybersecurity. These arguments are also neo-realist but additionally support the securitization arguments of Dunn Cavelty (2013) and Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009).

A number of counter arguments and limitations on the national security focus must be considered as well. The United Kingdom’s national cybersecurity strategy clearly identified cybersecurity as “more than a traditional problem of national security or of conventional military defence” (Cabinet Office, 2009, p. 24). National security–focused cybersecurity strategies tend to be top-down in approach and may therefore lack the necessary buy-in of civil society and the private sector (Barnard-Wills & Ashenden, 2012; Klimberg, 2012). Overemphasis on security moves the policy debate from the public sphere of government to behind closed doors and may create tension (Barnard-Wills & Ashenden, 2012; Mulligan & Schneider, 2011). A second risk of excessive securitization is the potential for overregulation of cyberspace (Betz & Stevens, 2011). Overregulation could hamper economic growth and the freedom of information flow. Questions also remain as to the effectiveness of deterrence in cyberspace (Harknett, et al. 2010, Stevens, 2012). Overall, the national security focus tends to increase military influence on cyberspace policy (Dunn Cavelty, 2013). The potential danger in this approach is that other sectors may be excluded from the policy formation process.

**Economic Approach to Cybersecurity**

Economic incentives sometimes serve as tools to achieve strategic ends. These incentives may be positive or negative. The insurance process provides an insight into the process of managing cyber risk (Sagalow, 2006). Companies employing better cybersecurity practices obtain insurance at lower rates. The objective of economic approaches to cybersecurity is the alignment of the market incentives such that corporations and individuals take action to enhance the security of their systems (Van Eeten & Bauer, 2009; Moore, 2009).

Focusing on the misalignment of economic incentives, Moore (2009) argued that with modest government policy changes aimed at better aligning the incentives to the market, cybersecurity would be improved. Moore (2009) found that security suffered when the entities responsible for protection of systems and data were not affected by the failure to protect the system. The “bill” would be borne by others in the network. A key finding was the lack of disclosure of data breaches by corporations seeking to avoid a drop in share price or customers while security firms were also interested in inflating losses to build demand (Moore, 2009). At the policy level, Moore (2009) made two recommendations that could be applied in a national cybersecurity strategy: (1) make the Internet service providers (ISP) responsible and accountable for eliminating malware-infected computers connected through their systems; and (2) require disclosure of security incidents such as data theft, cyber espionage, and control system intrusions. With the failure of the federal or national level government to impose standards, states and other sub-jurisdictions have imposed standards that have complicated the business regulatory environment (Glennon, 2012). With greater transparency, consumers and potential customers could better assess security risk.
Kleiner, Nicholas, and Sullivan (2013) found a correlation between lower rates of software piracy in a nation with significantly lower rates of malware on the nation’s networks. With malware being the key enabler of cybercrime and critical infrastructure attack, this provided additional support to an economic argument for national cybersecurity strategy.

One of the challenges to an economic model is the difficulty in determining the cost of the externalities inherent in the Internet. Gordon (2007), in testimony before the U.S. Congress on private sector cybersecurity investment cost-benefit analysis, stated that although difficult to determine, there is a cost due to customer loss resulting from customer-perceived insecurity and the unknown liability resulting from a breach. At a national level this could manifest as investors avoiding a country with weak cybersecurity practices and no discernible strategy or policy being a less-desirable partner for investment.

A second, related factor comes from the costs, and thus the benefits, involved in securing computer systems. No reliable procedures exist for determining the total size of vulnerabilities in systems or the probability of system penetration by a hostile actor (Garfinkle, 2012; Rue & Pfleeger, 2009). Without confidence in the risk assessment, the benefit of increased investment cannot be determined. Spending more for cybersecurity does not necessarily mean that the security is increased (Freidman, 2011; Garfinkle, 2012).

**Public Goods/Public Health Approach to Cybersecurity**

The third leading approach to national cybersecurity policy treats the Internet and cyberspace as public goods. A public good is defined as something that is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable (Mulligan & Schneider, 2012). As a public good, improvements in any area benefit all participants in the network. Extending from the ideas of immunizations and quarantines to protect the population from contagious disease, Charney (2012), Mulligan and Schneider (2012), and Rosenzweig (2011a) argued for the public health model as a means of shifting from purely defensive strategies to an alternative that seeks to improve the security of each system connected to the global network. Mirroring the public health focus of preventing the spread of infections, devices that are connected to the network must be secured to prevent risk to others in the global common (Charney, 2012; Rosenzweig, 2011a; Sales, 2012).

The use of a system’s cybersecurity does not diminish the security for others and all participants enjoy the same access to the system’s security. The role of government in protecting the common good in the public health system by establishing quarantines or developing vaccination requirements for school attendance provided the metaphor for cybersecurity strategy. In the public health model, improved cybersecurity is the desired public good. Cybersecurity is the desired positive state in the loosely interconnected cyber network (Mulligan & Schneider, 2012).

The use of health metaphors for cyberspace problems emerged in the 1980s as personal computers rapidly expanded into the office and home (Dunn Cavelty, 2013). Viruses, worms, and infections are commonly used biological metaphors.
for computer malware. The public health approach to cybersecurity draws from this literature (Charney, 2012; Mulligan & Schneider, 2012). Charney (2012, p.54) identified several public health parallels that could be applied to improve Internet security: educate users, detect and identify infected devices, notify users of compromised machines, provide treatment/remediation to infected devices, and prevent infected machines from endangering other users of common systems. This applies primarily to individual users and small businesses, since larger firms normally have enterprise level IT departments charged with these activities. Charney (2012) suggested two policies for achieving better security: (1) identify infected devices so they can be removed and cleaned, and (2) develop a system of health certificates that could be securely exchanged at a machine level to verify the cleanliness of a device to other users. One of the creators of the Internet, Vint Cerf (2013), extended the metaphor by pointing out the need for a cyberspace fire brigade to respond to threats to home and small business computer users who lack the knowledge and resources to defend systems from malicious attackers much as local fire departments act to protect homes and property.

An additional policy option considered in a public health model is the importance of counter-piracy measures. Microsoft found a strong positive correlation between protection of intellectual property and lower malware infection rates by the elimination of pirated software, which is most often not patched or contains built in flaws (Kleiner et al., 2013). The public health parallels here are the elimination of counterfeit medication and the licensing of medical practitioners.

The public health model also implies information sharing on threats to the system (Charney, 2012; Mulligan & Schneider, 2012; Rosenzweig, 2011a). This can present challenges on several levels similar to the information sharing externalities in the economic approach (Rosenzweig, 2011a). The barriers present problems for government to private industry sharing when the security classification of the information becomes involved. Similarly, private industry sharing of information with the government may become problematic when privacy and liability concerns are considered (Rosenzweig, 2011a; Ruth & Stone, 2012). Private-private sharing of information faces similar legal restrictions as well as competitive pressures.

The United States Approach to Cybersecurity

The United States has considered cyber challenges a threat to national and economic security since before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Sharp, 1998, 2010). However, the problem changed from a nuisance issue in the early 1990s to a prime national security issue early in the 21st century (Greenwald 2010; Rosenzweig, 2011b; Sharp, 2010). The continued rise of state and non-state actors capable of inflicting damage via cyber means has only increased the focus on Internet-delivered threats to security (Sharp, 2010; Thomas, 2011). The recent Obama administration (2013) executive order on critical infrastructure protection again points to the risks to national and economic security from malevolent cyber actors.

The U.S. response to cybersecurity challenges has been mixed at best. It has
a national cybersecurity strategy, but the document dates to 2003 (Bush, 2003). In one of his first acts, President Obama called for a comprehensive review of U.S. policy on cybersecurity (Greenwald, 2010), but little has been done to implement the results (Coldabella & White, 2010; Greenwald, 2010; Lewis, 201; Newmeyer, 2012; Sharp, 2010). Comprehensive cybersecurity legislation has still not been enacted and led President Obama to issue his critical infrastructure protection executive order (Obama, 2013). The present failure to enact meaningful cybersecurity legislation places the U.S. at risk (Ruth & Stone, 2012). Debates continue on issues of privacy protection and how to regulate the private sector. While the White House published its *International Strategy for Cyberspace* (Obama, 2011), the document does little to address the current domestic situation. The challenges to government coordination and overall responsibility remain (Glennon, 2012; Newmeyer, 2012), as do the critical interactions between government and the private sector (Hare, 2009, 2010; Harknett & Stever, 2009).

There are, however, clear indications of securitization of cyber issues in the United States (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009). References to “Cyber Pearl Harbors” continued to appear in statements from leading government officials (Bumiller & Shanker, 2012). The role of the military in U.S. cybersecurity remains large and ill-defined (Newmeyer, 2012; Rosenzweig, 2011; Sharp, 2010). Defense has been forward-leaning in establishing policy and making organizational changes for cybersecurity. Among the initiatives was the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), to have overall responsibility within the military for cyber defense and attack issues (Theohary & Rollins, 2010). The Defense Department also has established relationships with the private sector through its Defense Industrial Base threat information sharing initiative.

Overall, the U.S. approach to cybersecurity is divided and fragmentary. The unclassified version of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative established 12 initiatives the federal government should pursue with the goals of defending against immediate threats, defending against the full spectrum of threats, and strengthening the future cybersecurity environment (The White House, n.d.). The overall thrusts of U.S. efforts align with those of other nations that have publicly disclosed national cybersecurity strategies (Luiijf et al., 2013; Klimberg, 2012; OECD, 2012). Like other nations, the U.S. seeks enhanced government coordination, better public-private cooperation, improved international cooperation, and protection of fundamental values of freedom of expression and free flow of information (Obama, 2011; OECD, 2012; Chabinsky, 2010).

As with all of the national cybersecurity strategies studied, the U.S. strategy is unique and reflects powerful elements of its national culture (Luiijf et al., 2013). The separation of the U.S. military from domestic law enforcement resulting from the Posse Comitatus Act complicates the issues for cyberdefense and cybersecurity. Additionally the federal nature of U.S. government is guided by a constitution that never conceived of computers, malware, or Stuxnet like attacks on critical infrastructure. This combination of factors has led to a fragmented collection of policies, laws, and initiatives. Overall the policies are guided by national security and economic factors as indicated by president’s critical infrastructure executive
order (Obama, 2013). In practice more national security tools are used than economic or public health tools.

What Should the Caribbean Do?

There is ample evidence that Caribbean nations face threats involving cyberspace (Brown & Thompson, 2011; Caribbean Telecommunications Unit, 2011; Chambers & Turksen, 2010; Clayton, 2012; Organization of American States, 2004; Sund, 2007; Whittaker, 2011). The Internet also provides opportunities for economic growth and national development (Erickson & Lawrence, 2009; Hamilton, 2010; Moore-Miggins, 2012; Mullings, 2011). A well-developed information technology or outsourcing sector would reduce the region’s reliance on a fragile tourism sector. A key factor to attracting investment and establishing sustained growth in these industries is developing confidence in the security conditions and legal structures related to the cyber domain that protect investment and intellectual property. Strong national cybersecurity strategies and policies serve to build the confidence of potential investors and international partners.

The Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (2012) reiterated the call upon all of the states in the Americas to develop and implement national cybersecurity strategies. Fortunately, there is a building body of research and recommendations for Caribbean nations to consult in order to implement the comprehensive strategies envisioned when the OAS (2004) first called for implementation of national cybersecurity strategies.

In assessing 19 individual national cybersecurity strategies, Luiijf et al. (2013) found three general goals for national cybersecurity strategy: (1) align the whole of government, (2) provide focus for public and private planning with established roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders, and (3) signal a nation’s intent to external parties. This study is particularly useful in that it offers the first side-by-side comparison of strategies among nation states of different sizes and levels of development. The goals described in Luiijf et al. (2013) encompass the efforts of a superpower such as the United States but are equally appropriate for an emerging nation in the Caribbean.

Two international guides to cybersecurity strategy development provide guidance that could be readily adapted to Caribbean states. Wamala (2011) produced the ITU National Cybersecurity Guide, which listed 14 key elements that a national cybersecurity security program should contain. The suggestions include key OAS (2004) recommendations, specifically the need to adopt new legal measures for cybercrime, the establishment of national level cyber incident response teams, the call for partnership with the private sector, and the need for international cooperation (Wamala, 2011). The strategy guide also included recommendations for establishing high-level government accountability for cybersecurity, establishing a national cybersecurity coordinator, and developing training programs for the general public and the cybersecurity workforce (Wamala, 2011).

From a European prospective, Falesii, Gavrila, Klenstrup, and Moulinos, K. (2012) developed an 18-step process that included the common themes of establishing clear governance and leadership structures, international cooperation,
stakeholder engagement, cybersecurity education, and incident response capability. Falessi et al. (2012) also recommended organized cybersecurity exercises to assess and improve performance.

Ultimately, Caribbean nations will have individually to adapt elements from the international models to fit within their culture and resources. What cannot continue is the failure to undertake the necessary government action required to protect citizens from cyber threats. Cybercrime in the region is already a multi-million dollar business (Caribbean Telecommunications Union, 2011; Clayton, 2012; Dito, Contreras, & Kellerman, 2013; Monihe, 2012; Monihe, 2013), but none of the states have joined the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. Government action is required to modernize legislation across the region to meet the challenge of the new crimes (Caribbean Telecommunications Union, 2011).

Cybercrime, however, is not the only threat the must be considered when dealing with cybersecurity (Caribbean Telecommunications Union, 2011). Government data files have been compromised (Monihe, 2013) and hacking incidents have increased throughout the region (Caribbean Telecommunications Union, 2011). The region needs to enact improved intellectual property protection regimes in order to build confidence in potential investors (Erikson & Lawrence, 2008). Recent research by Microsoft demonstrated that countries with better intellectual property protection regimes had lower instances of malware infection (Kleiner et al., 2013). In the interconnected world of cyberspace, weakness in any one region can affect the security of others (von Solms & Kritzinger, 2012). Caribbean governments need to take action to improve the security of systems located within their territory not only to protect their own citizens, businesses, and governments but also to protect each other and the rest of the users in support of public health model of cybersecurity (Mulligan & Schneider, 2012).

Just as in international relations theory, a pure paradigm is not usually applicable in a national context. Caribbean states lack resources to dedicate to cybersecurity issues in isolation from other security concerns. While national security and critical infrastructure concerns remain, Caribbean states should consider leveraging the economic and public health paradigms to improve their positions relative to cyber threats. Improving cybersecurity will require a mixture of legislation, regulation, education, and formulation of incentives for private sector providers.

**Conclusion**

The Caribbean internet environment is among the fastest growing in the world (Dito et al., 2013; Kleiner et al., 2013). As such it is also one of the areas of growing cybercrime and cyber risk. The global spread of malware facilitates the substantial criminal activity that has penetrated the region and allows the region to be used in third-party attacks on others. Cybercrime is a serious threat to at least one nation in the region (Clayton, 2012). Failure to establish comprehensive cybersecurity programs allows the problem to grow.

Caribbean states need to the leverage the assistance available to develop and implement coordinated national cybersecurity programs that address current shortcomings in legislation, policy, and education. The plans need not be com-
plex, but they need to be done in concert with the private sector and international partners. Education programs must be a key part of the strategies in order to inform the growing body of technology users with powerful computers at their fingertips. The global system is only as secure as the weakest link, and the Caribbean is currently one of the weaker links.

Caribbean cyber strategies should incorporate standards that increase the transparency surrounding cyber incidents in both the government and the private sector networks where citizens’ personal information may be compromised. Breach notification laws provide valuable information for the public to assess risk and demand accountability. Finally, cybersecurity strategies need to consider the development of the human resources needed in an interconnected world. Education programs at all levels should consider developing the skills needed for cybersecurity professionals in government and the private sector.

The approach to cybersecurity that is appropriate for the Caribbean will not be the same as the approach taken by a global economic and military power like the United States. The scale of the problem and the interests are not identical. Research has shown that countries tailor their cyber security strategies to their cultural, economic, and national interests (Falessi et al., 2012; Luijff et al., 2013). Whereas a national security focus for a global superpower may be appropriate, a strategy that aims to protect the global commons from infection may be more appropriate for a small island state. The path to economic development in the 21st century must include a significant digital dimension. Serious efforts should be made within the Caribbean region to adapt and adopt cybersecurity strategies.
References


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Colaboración para la Lucha contra Redes Ilícitas a través de Esfuerzos Interdepartamentales e Internacionales

Celina B. Realuyo

Resumen

El crimen organizado transnacional (COT) en América Latina representa una amenaza formidable para la seguridad nacional. Estos grupos ilícitos han operado en el hemisferio occidental durante décadas. Sin embargo, recientemente, la velocidad y la violencia asociada a estos grupos no-estatales han exacerbado la magnitud de los problemas hasta alcanzar niveles alarmantes. Los grupos criminales no se limitan únicamente a traficar narcóticos. Sino que también operan redes de trata de personas, el tráfico ilegal de armas, se dedican a la extorsión, el crimen cibernético, y la intimidación política. Este accionar socava la seguridad, genera inestabilidad, y ahuyenta la inversión extranjera y el turismo. Este ensayo examina las iniciativas en marcha en el hemisferio occidental para hacer frente a la convergencia del crimen organizado transnacional y otras redes ilícitas. Además, proporciona sugerencias para implementar estrategias más eficaces para hacer frente a los grupos ilegales cuya evolución pone en peligro la seguridad nacional de los Estados Unidos y de sus aliados.

Introducción

Este capítulo analiza los esfuerzos de colaboración entre agencias de EE.UU., naciones asociadas y organizaciones multilaterales para responder a las amenazas híbridas planteadas por redes ilícitas a través del desarrollo diplomático y entidades de defensa de seguridad nacional en el Hemisferio Occidental. El ingenio, la adaptabilidad, la impunidad y la capacidad de redes ilícitas de burlar las contramedidas las hacen un enemigo formidable para los gobiernos. Algunos actores ilícitos han ampliado sus actividades a través de la comunidad global, en los dominios aéreos, terrestres, marítimos y el ciberespacio. Los países deben adoptar estrategias y políticas comprehensivas y multidimensionales para combatir las amenazas transnacionales que plantean estas redes ilícitas.

Las iniciativas analizadas aquí se concentran en programas en el Hemisferio Occidental para enfrentar la amenaza convergente del crimen organizado trans-
nacional (COT) y otras redes ilícitas, emprendidas por la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito (ONUDD), la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA), la Iniciativa Regional de Seguridad para Centroamérica (CARSÍ, por sus siglas en inglés) y la Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta Interagencial Sur del Comando Sur de EE.UU (JIATF-S, por sus siglas en inglés). Cada uno de estos esfuerzos representa modelos de colaboraciones que requieren de voluntad política, capacidad institucional, mecanismos, recursos y medidas de efectividad para ser exitosos. Estos ejemplos instructivos de colaboración interdepartamental e internacional en América evidencian la necesidad continua de fomentar comunidades de interés para comprender redes ilícitas y divisar estrategias más efectivas para contrarrestarlas conforme evolucionan más y amenazan la seguridad nacional de Estados Unidos y sus aliados.

En base al análisis de estos ejemplos, se ofrecen las siguientes recomendaciones para la consideración de las autoridades:

• Promover modelos colaborativos para la seguridad y el desarrollo que incluyan los siguientes elementos críticos: voluntad política, instituciones, mecanismos de evaluación de amenazas y desarrollo de contramedidas, recursos y medidas de efectividad para garantizar el éxito en contra de las redes ilícitas.

• Garantizar que los convenios, acuerdos y estrategias internacionales incluyan con planes de acción robustos y tienen los recursos adecuados a fin de restringir las operaciones y facilidades de los agentes ilícitos.

• Fomentar una mayor coordinación de donantes para que todos estos programas de seguridad y desarrollo se complementen en vez de duplicarse entre sí. Debido al nivel de voluntad política demostrado en estas organizaciones, debe existir un interés en asignar recursos y capacidad de construcción en las áreas geográficas específicas más vulnerables al crimen organizado transnacional.

La naturaleza de la amenaza de las redes ilícitas

A través de nuestra historia, los gobiernos han sido responsables por garantizar y fomentar la seguridad, prosperidad y gobernanza. El ritmo del cambio sin precedentes en un mundo globalizado ha desafiado estas misiones básicas del Estado-nación. Desde presiones demográficas hasta una economía global cada vez más interconectada, y desde la carrera por los recursos hasta la sobre carga de información, los gobiernos luchan por sobrellevar lo que el académico de la Universidad de Harvard, Joseph Nye, llama “la difusión de poder” en el Siglo XXI. Los gobiernos se enfrentan a una amplia gama de amenazas para la seguridad nacional que emanan de agentes ajenos al estado así como de Estados-nación tradicionales. Las redes ilícitas, que incluyen organizaciones criminales transnacionales, narcotraficantes, pandillas y grupos terroristas, se encuentran entre estos agentes ajenos al Estado. Si bien las actividades ilícitas han estado entre nosotros desde la antigüedad, lo que es nuevo hoy es el carácter universal, prolífico y convergente.
de redes ilícitas alrededor del mundo. Estas redes amenazan el estado de derecho, las instituciones gubernamentales, la economía y la sociedad. En palabras del ex-Comandante Supremo Aliado en Europa, el Almirante James Stavridis, “Al igual que los gobiernos y negocios legítimos han adoptado los avances de la globalización, los traficantes ilícitos también han explotado los beneficios de la globalización para progresar en sus actividades ilícitas”.\(^1\) Las actividades ilícitas como el tráfico de drogas, armamento, contrabando y trata de personas no son nada nuevo; sin embargo, su velocidad, escala y violencia asociada como resultado de la globalización han hecho de estos crímenes transnacionales desafíos a la seguridad nacional.

**Las redes ilícitas aprovechan las cadenas mundiales de suministro**

Las redes ilícitas buscan navegar, infiltrar y/o dominar las cadenas mundiales de suministro para progresar en sus actividades y potenciar su poderío. En realidad prosperan en sociedades abiertas con el flujo libre de bienes, personas y capital. Al igual que los negocios lícitos, las redes ilícitas están igualando la oferta y demanda por bienes, servicios, capital e información para sus clientes. Los agentes ilícitos usan e incluso buscan controlar o cooptar cadenas de suministro alrededor del mundo para facilitar el movimiento de “personas malas y cosas malas” como drogas, armas y bienes falsificados.

Independientemente de la industria o geografía, existen cuatro elementos críticos de cualquier cadena de suministro cuya integridad debe ser preservada y protegida a toda costa:

1. **Pertrechos**: ¿Qué se está trasladando a través de la cadena de suministro? ¿Personas, bienes, artículos esenciales, servicios, datos? ¿En dónde se originan esos materiales y cuál es su origen?

2. **Recursos humanos**: ¿Quién controla y dota de personal a la cadena de suministro? ¿Quiénes son los facilitadores clave de esa cadena de suministro? ¿Quién controla estos mecanismos o modos de transporte?

3. **Dinero**: ¿Quién está financiando la cadena de suministro? ¿Qué modelo de negocios se emplea para generar ingresos? ¿En dónde se origina el financiamiento y hacia dónde se dirige?

4. **Mecanismos**: ¿Qué modos de transportando emplea la cadena de suministro? ¿Las personas, bienes y servicios se desplazan por tierra, aire, mar o el ciberespacio? ¿Cómo está organizada la cadena de suministro?\(^2\)

Si bien cada uno de estos cuatro elementos críticos de las cadenas de suministro mundiales tiene sus características únicas, la seguridad de cada uno de ellos es vital para salvaguardar las cadenas de suministro. ¿Quién asegura estos elementos? La competencia global ha llevado al sector privado a identificar y adoptar los medios más eficientes para igualar la oferta y demanda de bienes, servicios e información y para incorporar mecanismos de manejo de riesgos;\(^3\) del mismo modo, las redes ilícitas han adoptado estas mejores prácticas. Desafortunadamente, las
normas internacionales de seguridad y control gubernamental de las cadenas mundiales de suministro aún se encuentran muy retrasadas.

Los agentes ilícitos son muy conscientes de estas debilidades y las explotan para avanzar sus intereses; aprovechan las brechas en gobernanza, normas y supervisión para fortalecer sus empresas. Las redes ilícitas se adaptan fácilmente a su cambiante entorno operativo. A menudo operan como proveedores de servicios entre sí. Es primordial maximizar las ganancias para las organizaciones criminales transnacionales. Sus actividades distorsionan los precios y mercados globales, socavan la confianza del consumidor e incluso ponen en peligro a los consumidores alrededor del mundo, como en el caso de drogas falsificadas.

Como resultado de la globalización, el gran volumen y la velocidad del comercio internacional hacen que sea virtualmente imposible controlar y asegurar las cadenas mundiales de suministro. No obstante, los gobiernos deben mantenerse al tanto de las formas en que los agentes ilícitos explotan a un mundo con cada vez menos fronteras e identificar las vulnerabilidades de las cadenas mundiales de suministro. Por consiguiente, los gobiernos deben desarrollar medidas para combatir redes ilícitas al aprovechar y salvaguardar los cuatro elementos de las cadenas de suministro: pertrechos, recursos humanos, dinero y mecanismos. Nuevas estrategias para combatir crimen organizado transnacional y redes ilícitas, incluyendo los que se discuten a continuación, abordan estos desafíos cada vez más.

Estrategias para combatir al crimen organizado transnacional y a las redes ilícitas

Los gobiernos a nivel local, nacional, regional y multilateral deben idear estrategias integrales para abordar amenazas complejas, adaptativas y convergentes de seguridad nacional de redes ilícitas. Se están realizando varios esfuerzos para fomentar la colaboración interagencial e internacional para hacer frente al crimen organizado transnacional y promover la seguridad en el Hemisferio Occidental. Estos esfuerzos regionales serán analizados a través de las lentes de la estrategia
La Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional de mayo de 2011 reconoce y describe apropiadamente la convergencia de amenazas planteadas por redes ilícitas: Las amenazas criminales transnacionales y redes de tráfico ilícito continúan extendiéndose dramáticamente en tamaño, alcance e influencia — representando importantes desafíos para la seguridad nacional para Estados Unidos y nuestros países socios. Estas amenazas trascienden fronteras y continentes y merman la estabilidad de las naciones, trastocando las instituciones gubernamentales a través de la corrupción y el daño a los ciudadanos alrededor del mundo. Las organizaciones criminales transnacionales han acumulado riquezas y poder sin precedentes a través del contrabando y otras actividades ilícitas, penetrando los sistemas financieros legítimos y desestabilizando los mercados comerciales. Extienden su alcance mediante la formación de alianzas con funcionarios gubernamentales y algunos servicios de seguridad del estado. El nexo crimen-terror es una preocupación seria ya que los terroristas emplean redes criminales para el apoyo logístico y financiamiento. Estas redes están cada vez más involucradas en el crimen cibernético, que cuesta a los consumidores miles de millones de dólares anuales, al tiempo que socava la confianza mundial en el sistema financiero internacional.

La lucha contra las redes criminales transnacionales y de contrabando requiere de una estrategia multidimensional que salvaguarde a los ciudadanos, rompa la solidez financiera de las redes criminales y terroristas, altere las redes de tráfico ilícito, derrote a las organizaciones delictivas transnacionales, com-

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**Figura 2. Gestión de cadenas mundiales de suministro**

**Cuatro elementos críticos**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Recursos Humanos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¿Qué se está desplazando?</td>
<td>¿Quién se está desplazando?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¿Qué recursos se acceden?</td>
<td>¿Quién está en control?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¿Cómo se usa la tecnología?</td>
<td>¿Quién es el facilitador?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dinero</th>
<th>Mecanismos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¿Quién está financiando?</td>
<td>¿Qué modos de transporte?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¿Cómo se generan los ingresos?</td>
<td>¿Rutas terrestres, aéreas, marítimas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¿A dónde se dirigen los ingresos?</td>
<td>¿Qué hay del ciberespacio?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
bata a la corrupción de los gobiernos, fortalezca el estado de derecho, apoye a los sistemas jurídicos y mejore la transparencia. Si bien estos son importantes desafíos, Estados Unidos será capaz de divisar y ejecutar una estrategia colectiva con otras naciones que se enfrenten a las mismas amenazas.⁵

Reconociendo al crimen organizado transnacional como una amenaza de seguridad nacional, Estados Unidos emitió su Estrategia más reciente para Combatir al Crimen Organizado Transnacional en julio de 2011, que busca construir, equilibrar e integrar las herramientas del poderío norteamericano para combatir el crimen organizado transnacional y amenazas relacionadas a la seguridad nacional de EE.UU. La estrategia postula que el crimen organizado transnacional amenaza los intereses de EE.UU. al tomar ventaja de Estados fallidos o espacios en disputa; forjar alianzas con funcionarios gubernamentales foráneos corruptos y algunos servicios de inteligencia extranjera; desestabilizar instituciones políticas, financieras y de seguridad en Estados frágiles; socavar la competencia en mercados estratégicos mundiales; usar tecnologías cibernéticas y otros métodos para perpetrar fraudes sofisticados; creando el potencial de transferencia de armas de destrucción masiva (ADM) a terroristas; y expandir redes de contrabando de armas, narcotráfico y trata de . Los terroristas e insurgentes acuden cada vez más a las redes criminales para conseguir financiamiento y adquirir apoyo logístico. El COT también amenaza el comercio interconectado, el transporte y sistemas transaccionales que desplazan personas y comercian en la economía mundial y a través de nuestras fronteras.⁶

Los objetivos políticos clave de la estrategia son:

1. proteger a los norteamericanos y a nuestros socios contra el daño, la violencia y la explotación de las redes criminales transnacionales

2. ayudar a países asociados a fortalecer la gobernanza y transparencia, quebrantar el poder corruptor de redes criminales transnacionales y romper alianzas Estado-delincuencia

3. quebrantar el poder económico de las redes criminales transnacionales y proteger mercados estratégicos y el sistema financiero de EE.UU. frente a la penetración y abuso del COT

4. derrotar las redes criminales transnacionales que plantean la amenaza más grande a la seguridad nacional que tienen por objetivo sus infraestructuras, privándolas de sus medios de facilitación y evitando la facilitación criminal de las actividades terroristas

5. construir consensos internacionales, cooperación multilateral y fortalecer la interdependencia entre el sector público e iniciativa privada para derrotar el crimen organizado transnacional.

Las principales acciones de la estrategia incluyen:

- reducir la demanda de drogas ilícitas en Estados Unidos, negando así la financiación a las organizaciones de tráfico ilícito
• continuar atacando las redes de tráfico y distribución de drogas y sus medios de apoyo dentro de los Estados Unidos para reducir la disponibilidad de drogas ilícitas

• cortar el flujo ilícito transfronterizo de personas, armas, dinero y otros financiamientos ilícitos a través de investigaciones y enjuiciamientos de liderazgo clave en el COT, así como a través del ataque a los medios de apoyo e infraestructura de las redes de COT

• identificar y tomar acción en contra de la corrupción corporativa y gubernamental dentro de los Estados Unidos

• trabajar con el Congreso para asegurar la ratificación del Convenio Interamericano en contra de la Fabricación Ilícita de y Tráfico de Armas de fuego, Municiones, Explosivos y Otros materiales relacionados

• buscar adhesión al Protocolo en contra de la Fabricación ilícita y Tráfico de armas de fuego, sus partes y componentes y munición, complementando el Convenio de las Naciones Unidas en contra del Crimen organizado transnacional.

Otras acciones prioritarias buscan: mejorar el intercambio de inteligencia e información; proteger el sistema financiero y mercados estratégicos en contra del crimen organizado transnacional; fortalecer la interdicción, investigaciones y enjuiciamientos; desarticular el tráfico de drogas y su facilitación de otras amenazas transnacionales; y edificar capacidad, cooperación y sociedades internacionales.

Esta nueva estrategia eleva el crimen organizado transnacional a nivel de amenaza a la seguridad nacional y concentra la atención sobre los efectos destructivos del COT sobre los intereses de EE.UU., domésticos y en el extranjero. En el pasado, el crimen organizado ha sido considerado y tratado como una cuestión policial local. La estrategia nueva busca organizar y coordinar mejor los esfuerzos interdepartamentales dentro del Gobierno de EE.UU. para abordar el crimen organizado transnacional y promover la cooperación internacional en contra de esta amenaza mundial.

Antes de la publicación de esta estrategia, las agencias de EE.UU. como los Departamentos de Seguridad Nacional, Justicia, Estado y Tesorería, así como las fuerzas policíacas y comunidades de inteligencia, han estado contrarrestando, buscando y enjuiciando activamente las organizaciones criminales transnacionales durante años. Desde controles fronterizos hasta normas bancarias, se han forjado funciones y responsabilidades para combatir actividades ilícitas para estas agencias en sus áreas de responsabilidad respectiva. Aquellos quienes investigan las redes ilícitas y de crimen organizado transnacional, tanto dentro como fuera del gobierno, esperaban un lenguaje y orientación más audaz sobre cómo esta nueva estrategia sincronizaría y coordinaría los esfuerzos de EE.UU. por combatir al COT en el gobierno. Sin embargo, al momento de este escrito, el Gobierno de EE.UU. no ha emitido un plan de implementación para esta estrategia nueva. La estrategia no crea una nueva agencia gubernamental, establece un puesto de fis-
cal de la Casa Blanca, asigna fondos adicionales, o potencia un organismo rector.

Quizá el mayor desafío de la implementación de la Estrategia para Combatir al Crimen Organizado Transnacional de 2011 no son el adversario de los agentes ilícitos, sino más bien el estado fiscal de los Estados Unidos. Algunos, incluyendo al antiguo Presidente de la Junta de Jefes del Estado Mayor Conjunto, el Almirante Mike Mullen, consideran que la deuda nacional es la amenaza más grande para la seguridad nacional de EE.UU. En estos tiempos de austeridad fiscal, no está claro cómo estos organismos encargados con el combate al COT pueden igualar los recursos e ingenio de estos agentes ilícitos y “hacer más con menos”. Con un presupuesto limitado, y en ocasiones reducido, la comunidad interagencial de EE.UU. se verá en la necesidad de buscar formas más innovadoras y eficientes para enfrentar y combatir al crimen organizado transnacional.

El frente diplomático: Iniciativas de las Naciones Unidas

Convención y protocolos de Palermo

La Convención de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) contra el Crimen Organizado Transnacional, conocida como la Convención de Palermo, es el principal instrumento internacional para contrarrestar al crimen organizado y promover la cooperación internacional coordinada. Fue adoptada en diciembre de 2000 en Palermo, Italia, y fue complementada por tres protocolos dirigidos a la trata de personas, especialmente mujeres y niños, el tráfico de inmigrantes y la fabricación ilícita y contrabando de armas de fuego. La Convención de Palermo establece al crimen organizado transnacional como una amenaza contra todas las naciones miembro de la ONU y establece las definiciones y lenguaje común para caracterizar actividades que constituyen este fenómeno.

Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito

Como custodio de la Convención de Palermo, la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito (ONUDD) ayuda a los países a crear el marco legal doméstico para investigar infracciones penales relacionadas al crimen organizado y enjuiciar a los criminales y adoptar nuevos marcos de referencia para extradición, asistencia legal mutua y cooperación policiaca internacional. La ONUDD es líder mundial en el combate contra las drogas ilícitas y el crimen internacional. Establecida en 1997 a través de una fusión entre el Programa de Control de Drogas de las Naciones Unidas y el Centro para la Prevención del Crimen Internacional, la ONUDD tiene su sede en Viena, con 54 oficinas regionales, cubriendo más de 150 países alrededor del mundo. El 90 por ciento de su presupuesto depende de contribuciones voluntarias, principalmente de gobiernos. La ONUDD es una de las principales fuentes mundiales para servicios confiables de información, análisis y ciencias forenses relacionados con las drogas ilícitas y la delincuencia. Sus publicaciones incluyen el Informe Mundial sobre las Drogas, el Informe Mundial de la ONU sobre la Trata de Personas, 2009, el informe de 2010, Corrupción en Afganistán: Soborno según las denuncias de las víctimas y el informe de 2011 Comercio mundial de opio afgano: Evaluación de amenazas. La
ONUDD también ofrece herramientas y recursos prácticos para formuladores de política, legisladores y profesionales de la justicia penal.\textsuperscript{12}

El programa de trabajo de la ONUDD se apoya en tres pilares. Primeramente, los proyectos de cooperación técnica en campo mejoran la capacidad de los estados miembro para contrarrestar las drogas ilícitas, el crimen y el terrorismo. En segundo lugar, el trabajo de investigación y analítico aumenta el conocimiento y la comprensión de las drogas y los problemas del crimen, y amplía la base de pruebas para las decisiones políticas y operativas. Y en tercer lugar, el trabajo normativo asiste a los Estados en la ratificación e implementación de los tratados relevantes, el desarrollo de legislación doméstica sobre drogas, crimen y terrorismo, y la provisión de servicios de secretariado y sustantivos a los organismos basados en tratados o el gobierno.\textsuperscript{13}

La ONUDD ofrece asistencia especializada y experiencia en las siguientes áreas:

- \textit{Crimen organizado y tráfico}: la ONUDD ayuda a los gobiernos a reaccionar a la inestabilidad e inseguridad causada por crímenes como el contrabando de drogas ilícitas, armas, recursos naturales, bienes falsificados y humanos entre países y continentes. También aborda las formas emergentes de criminalidad como el crimen cibernético, tráfico de bienes culturales y crimen ambiental.

- \textit{Corrupción}: la corrupción es un importante impedimento para el desarrollo económico y social. La ONUDD se asocia con los sectores públicos y privados, así como con la sociedad civil, para minimizar el control de los corruptos sobre el gobierno, las fronteras nacionales y canales de comercio. En años recientes la oficina ha aumentado sus esfuerzos por ayudar a los estados a recuperar los activos robados por oficiales corruptos.

- \textit{Prevención del delito y reforma de la justicia penal}: La ONUDD fomenta el uso de manuales de capacitación y la adopción de códigos de conducta y estándares y normas dirigidos hacia garantizar que los acusados, los culpables y las víctimas pueden depender de un sistema de justicia penal que es justo y está basado en los valores de los derechos humanos. Una fuerte norma jurídica también infundirá confianza entre los ciudadanos sobre la efectividad de las cortes y la humanidad de las prisiones.

- \textit{Salud y prevención del abuso de las drogas}: a través de campañas educativas y basando su enfoque en resultados científicos, la ONUDD intenta convencer a los jóvenes de no consumir drogas ilícitas, a las personas farmacodependientes para buscar tratamiento y a los gobiernos en ver el uso de las drogas como un problema de salud, no un delito.

- \textit{Prevención del terrorismo}: la ONUDD avanza hacia un enfoque más programático que implique el desarrollo a largo plazo, la asistencia personalizada a organismos involucrados en la investigación y la resolución de casos vinculados al terrorismo.\textsuperscript{14}
El presupuesto consolidado de la ONUDD para drogas y crimen para el bi
enio 2010-2011 sumó $468.3 millones. Las contribuciones voluntarias están pre
supuestadas en $425.7 millones, de los cuales un 64 por ciento está destinado al programa contra las drogas y el 36 por ciento para el programa contra el delito. Estados Unidos fue el segundo país contribuyente más grande después de Co
lombia, contribuyendo $34.3 millones para el financiamiento de la ONUDD en el 2010.15

El Informe Anual de la ONUDD 2010 “demostró cómo la salud, seguridad y justicia son los antídotos para las drogas, el crimen y el terrorismo”, de acuerdo al Director Ejecutivo, el Director Antonio Maria Acosta. Presentó el trabajo de la organización sobre la promoción del tratamiento antidrogas y desarrollo alternativo, la mejora de la justicia penal, el fortalecimiento de la integridad y reducción de la vulnerabilidad ante el crimen. A fin de combatir el crimen organizado transnacional, la ONUDD desarrolló el Manual para la Evaluación del Riesgo del Crimen Organizado Grave para ofrecer a los legisladores herramientas para la evaluación de amenazas inmediatas, la dirección de tendencias actuales, y probables desafíos futuros para poder implementar estrategias efectivas para combatir al crimen organizado. En abril de 2010, Brasil auspició el Doceavo Congreso de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Prevención del Crimen y Justicia Penal para considerar estrategias comprensivas para enfrentar los desafíos mundiales para la prevención del crimen y sistemas de justicia penal, particularmente las relacionadas con el tratamiento de prisioneros, justicia juvenil, la prevención de crimen urbano, contrabando de inmigrantes, trata de personas, lavado de dinero, terrorismo y cibercrimen.

En sus esfuerzos anticorrupción, los Estados que forman parte de la Conven
ción de la ONU en contra de la Corrupción se reunieron en Doha, Qatar, en noviembre de 2009, y aceptaron establecer un mecanismo para revisar la implementación de la Convención contra la Corrupción. En el marco del nuevo mecanismo, todos los estados miembros serán evaluados cada cinco años en el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones bajo la convención. En base a las autoevaluaciones y evaluación de pares, el mecanismo ayudará a identificar las brechas en las leyes y prácticas nacionales anticorrupción. El nuevo mecanismo de supervisión de la convención representó un avance significativo en la campaña mundial contra la corrupción. Para abordar la trata de personas, la ONUDD desarrolló, en cooperación con la Iniciativa Global para la Lucha contra la Trata de Personas, un modelo de ley para guiar a los Estados miembro de la ONU en la preparación de leyes nacionales contra la trata de personas.17

En el 2009, la ONUDD lanzó una iniciativa internacional para el tratamiento y atención contra las drogas en sociedad con la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS) que es un punto de referencia en el desarrollo de un enfoque compren
sivo, integrado y basado en la salud para las políticas antidrogas. El Programa Conjunto ONUDD-OMS para el Tratamiento y Atención de la Farmacodependencia tiene por objetivo brindar atención humanitaria y accesible a más perso
nas con dependencia a las drogas y enfermedades relacionadas con las drogas (especialmente VIH/SIDA) en países de ingresos medios y bajos, buscando su
Como ejemplo de las iniciativas más recientes, el Director Ejecutivo de la ONUDD, Yury Fedotov, inauguró el Centro de Excelencia para Estadísticas Criminales sobre Gobernanza, Víctimas del Delito, Seguridad Público y Justicia el 1 de octubre de 2011, en la Ciudad de México. El centro desarrollará estudios de campo, compartirá conocimiento en el área de estadísticas criminales y organizará una conferencia anual internacional sobre estadísticas. Fedotov afirmó:

Conforme las bandas criminales y de narcotraficantes se vuelven más sofisticadas en su afán por evitar la detección y escapar de la justicia, apoyamos al gobierno mexicano en el fortalecimiento e intercambio de métodos de recopilación de datos relacionados a la gobernanza, víctimas del crimen, seguridad pública y justicia para que ellos - y otros países - puedan responder mejor a estas amenazas.

El Director Ejecutivo también destacó:

Todos debemos recordar que el crimen organizado puede tornarse transnacional y sin fronteras; ya no es un problema de un sólo país. Por tanto, este centro de excelencia ayudará a asistir en la respuesta del gobierno contra el crimen en México, y sus conclusiones también serán cruciales para las autoridades regionales e internacionales y las organizaciones que luchan en contra del crimen organizado transnacional.

La amplia gama de actividades de la ONUDD, como el Centro de Excelencia para Estadísticas Criminales en la Ciudad de México, demuestra enfrentamientos constructivos bilaterales y multilaterales dirigidos contra el crimen organizado transnacional y redes ilícitas que deben continuar conforme estas amenazas cambian y convergen en el nuevo entorno de seguridad mundial. Ya que muchos de los programas de la ONUDD están dedicados al fortalecimiento de las instituciones para luchar contra las drogas y el crimen alrededor del mundo, y sus resultados normalmente no son inmediatos, es difícil evaluar su efectividad. Además, ya que la mayoría de los programas son ejecutados en sociedad con gobiernos anfitriones y otros órganos multilaterales o no-gubernamentales, es un desafío determinar el rendimiento de las inversiones de la ONUDD. Si bien la misión de la ONUDD es noble, sería de ayuda si la organización pudiera ofrecer más información sobre su programación y medidas institucionales de efectividad para demostrar mejor el impacto contra el crimen organizado transnacional, y los programas que en realidad funcionaron.

El frente diplomático: Iniciativas de la Organización de Estados Americanos

La Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) ha combatido el fenómeno de las redes ilícitas en América a nivel multilateral a través de tres vehículos: el Plan de acción Hemisférico contra el Crimen Organizado Transnacional, la Comisión Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas (CICAD), y el Comité Inte-
ramericano contra el Terrorismo (CICTE). La OEA desde el principio reconoció que la amenaza de actividades ilícitas era transnacional en su naturaleza y requería de iniciativas dinámicas sobre política, sociales, económicas y de seguridad para responder a redes ilícitas.

Plan de acción hemisférico de la OEA en contra del crimen organizado transnacional

El Plan de acción hemisférico de la OEA en contra del crimen organizado transnacional fue adoptado en octubre de 2006 para promover la solicitud de los estados miembros de la OEA de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra el Crimen organizado transnacional (Convención de Palermo) y los Protocolos del mismo: el Protocolo para Prevenir, Suprimir y Castigar el Tráfico de Personas, Especialmente Mujeres y Niños; el Protocolo en contra del Contrabando de Inmigrantes a través de Tierra, Mar y Aire; y el Protocolo en contra de la Fabricación y Tráfico Illegal de Armas de Fuego, sus Partes y Componentes y Munición. Sus objetivos generales son:

1. prevenir y combatir el crimen organizado transnacional, en pleno respeto de los derechos humanos, usando como marco de referencia la Convención de Palermo y los tres protocolos adicionales

2. mejorar la cooperación en las áreas de prevención, investigación, enjuiciamiento y decisiones judiciales relacionadas con el crimen organizado transnacional

3. fomentar la coordinación entre los órganos de la OEA responsables por asuntos relacionados con el combate del crimen organizado transnacional y cooperación entre los organismos con la ONUDD

4. fortalecer facultades y capacidades nacionales, subregionales y regionales para lidiar con el crimen organizado transnacional.

El Plan de Acción Hemisférico estableció acciones específicas en las siguientes áreas: estrategias nacionales contra el crimen organizado transnacional, instrumentos legales, asuntos policíacos, capacitación, intercambio de infantería y asistencia y cooperación internacional.20

A pesar del entusiasmo inicial sobre el Plan de acción, el Grupo Técnico sobre Delincuencia Organizada Transnacional de la OEA solamente se ha reunido en tres ocasiones (Ciudad de México, en julio de 2007, Washington, DC, en octubre de 2009, y Trinidad y Tobago, en noviembre de 2001).21 En la reunión de noviembre de 2011, el Secretario de Seguridad Multidimensional de la OEA, Adam Blackwell, afirmó que el crimen internacional es “el problema de todos, ocurre en países desarrollados y en vías de desarrollo en donde la pobreza, la desigualdad, la exclusión social y política y los desafíos de gobernanza son tanto causas como consecuencias del problema”. Los asistentes a la reunión debatieron y ofrecieron algunas recomendaciones sobre la gestión policiaca en el Hemisférico, una cuestión fundamental en la mejora de la seguridad para los ciudadanos
El Secretario General de la OEA, José Miguel Insulza, explicó que “las fuerzas policiales tienen la gran responsabilidad de ser los principales representantes del Estado para garantizar el cumplimiento del Estado de Derecho, dentro de una comunidad en una comunidad pequeña o grande”, para lo cual destacó que no se puede sobrestimar “la importancia de fomentar el desarrollo de capacidades para garantizar una respuesta eficaz de la policía en un marco democrático”.

Si bien el Plan de acción hemisférico de la OEA en contra del crimen organizado transnacional tiene buenas intenciones, no es claro lo que se ha logrado en realidad, ya que la información relativa a su programación es limitada. Muchas de esas reuniones de la OEA emiten comunicados que suenan prometedores, pero las acciones hablan más que las palabras. Para complicar las cosas aún más, los Estados miembros de la OEA tienen dificultades para financiar y dotar de personal a las nuevas iniciativas que apoyan el Plan de Acción ante la recesión económica mundial y la escasez de recursos.

Comisión Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas

A fin de enfrentar los desafiantes problemas del narcotráfico y el abuso de las drogas en el Hemisferio Occidental, la OEA estableció una agencia conocida como CICAD, la Comisión Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas, en 1986. Esta se concentra en fortalecer las capacidades humanas e institucionales y en desafiar los esfuerzos colectivos de sus Estados miembro para reducir la producción, tráfico y uso de drogas ilegales. La CICAD recibió casi $3 millones de su presupuesto total de $7.8 millones en 2010 de los Estados Unidos para contrarrestar el tráfico y abuso de drogas ilegales, incluyendo metanfetaminas. Sus actividades específicas buscan:

- prevenir y tratar el abuso de sustancias
- reducir la oferta y disponibilidad de drogas ilícitas
- fortalecer las instituciones y maquinaria nacionales para el control de las drogas
- mejorar las leyes y prácticas de control de lavado de dinero
- desarrollar fuentes de ingresos alternativas para productores de coca, amapola y marihuana
- ayudar a los gobiernos miembro a mejorar su recolección y análisis de datos en todos los aspectos de la cuestión de las drogas
- ayudar a los Estados miembro y el Hemisferio en pleno a medir su progreso con el paso del tiempo al abordar el problema de las drogas.

Durante más de 10 años, el Mecanismo Multilateral de Evaluación (MEM, por sus siglas en inglés) de la OEA/CICAD ha fortalecido la colaboración regional y subregional en todos los niveles incluyendo métodos de sensibilización.
y tratamiento antidrogas, recopilación de información, compartir y armonizar modelos legislativos de lucha contra el narcotráfico y la delincuencia, prácticas de extradición y otras medidas de control. El MEM despliega la experiencia de los revisores independientes de todos los países de la OEA, que ha resultado en cientos de recomendaciones que países y la CICAD están trabajando en medidas concretas y efectivas para implementar.27

La realización de las recomendaciones del MEM es una parte esencial del conjunto de herramientas que permite a los países de la OEA funcionar como una fuerza cohesiva contra la doble amenaza de las drogas y la delincuencia. El MEM se concentra en la consolidación de instituciones, reducción de demanda, reducción de oferta, medidas de control y cooperación internacional. Cabe destacar que los informes nacionales de evaluación del MEM publicados en 2010, llevaron a los expertos hemisféricos independientes que redactan los informes a hacer más de un tercio de sus recomendaciones en el área de las medidas de control de narcóticos. Estas recomendaciones incluyen establecer y/o refinar leyes y reglamentos para controlar armas, municiones y material conexo para frenar la creciente violencia que representan las drogas ilícitas y el crimen.28


Entre sus diversos programas, la CICAD continuó realizando sus actividades en la lucha contra el lavado de dinero y el combate del terrorismo financiero (AML/CFT) en Latinoamérica y el Caribe en 2010. Los programas de adiestramiento AML/CFT de la CICAD buscan mejorar el conocimiento y capacidades de jueces, fiscales, defensores públicos, agentes del orden público y analistas de unidades de inteligencia financiera. La Sección Anti-Lavado de Dinero de la CICAD organizó 17 seminarios y talleres en 14 países en 2010, capacitando a casi 700 jueces, fiscales, oficiales del orden público, analistas de unidades de inteligencia financiera y funcionarios de gestión de activos falsificados, entre otros participantes. Se asoció con la ONUDD, la iniciativa de Recuperación de Bienes Robados del Banco Mundial, el Instituto Bancario Mundial, el Ministerio del Interior de España y la Oficina de Asuntos internacionales de Narcóticos y el Orden Público del Departamento de Estado, así como el Comité Interamericano contra el Terrorismo (CICTE) de la OEA y los gobiernos de los estados miembro de la CICAD.

La CICAD también coordinó con el Programa de Asistencia Legal de la ONUDD para Latinoamérica y el Grupo de Acción Financiera del Caribe, la Interpol y Sudamérica (GAFISUD) el establecimiento de la Red de Recuperación de Bienes de la GAFISUD como vehículo para el intercambio de información
sobre la identificación y recuperación de bienes, productos o instrumentos de actividades ilícitas transnacionales. Esta iniciativa está basada en las pautas de CARIN (Red Interinstitucional de Recuperación de Activos de Camden) en Europa.  

En noviembre de 2011, la CICAD celebró su 50a sesión y el 25o aniversario de la comisión, en Buenos Aires, en donde el Secretario de la OEA, Adam Blackwell, dijo: “Los vínculos entre las drogas, la delincuencia, la violencia y las armas son evidentes y exigen una mayor coordinación entre los países de la región para ser capaz de enfrentar con un enfoque comprensivo y multilateral”. El Secretario Blackwell agregó que “la reducción en la demanda por drogas a través de la educación” sería uno de los pilares funcionales de la CICAD. Durante esta reunión, la CICAD aceptó ampliar algunos de sus programas más innovadores a otras regiones, como Centroamérica y el Caribe. Se destacó el proyecto para el establecimiento de Tribunales de Tratamiento de Drogas. Estos tribunales, que buscan mejorar la calidad del tratamiento para infractores farmacodependientes, recibieron un fuerte apoyo de los Estados miembro, varios de los cuales solicitaron que OEA implementara programas piloto en sus territorios. Los países también destacaron el uso de evidencia científica producida en el Observatorio Interamericano sobre Drogas como un pilar para el establecimiento de políticas públicas en campo y solicitaron que la Secretaría Ejecutiva de la CICAD continúe trabajando en el fortalecimiento de sistemas nacionales de información.

**Comité Interamericano contra el Terrorismo**

La OEA también cuenta con una entidad independiente conferida con la misión del contraterrorismo en América. En el 2002, el CICTE (el Comité Interamericano contra el Terrorismo) estableció una Secretaría Ejecutiva dentro de la Secretaría General de la OEA después de los ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre de 2001. Su misión es promover y desarrollar la cooperación entre Estados miembro para prevenir, combatir y eliminar el terrorismo, de acuerdo con los principios de la Carta Magna de la OEA y la Convención Interamericana contra el Terrorismo. La Secretaría de la CICTE ha desarrollado una amplia gama de programas de asistencia técnica y de desarrollo de capacidades para ayudar a los estados miembros de la OEA a prevenir, combatir y eliminar el terrorismo. La CICTE supervisa 10 programas divididos en seis extensas áreas: controles fronterizos, controles financieros, protección de infraestructura crítica, asistencia y consultas legislativas, ejercicios de manejo de crisis y desarrollo y coordinación de políticas. El último programa está dedicado al fomento de la cooperación internacional y coordinación con otros órganos internacionales, regionales y subregionales, así como el sector privado.

En concreto, el CICTE mejora el intercambio de información relacionada al terrorismo entre Estados miembro, incluyendo el establecimiento de una base de datos interamericana sobre asuntos de terrorismo; ayuda a los Estados miembro a redactar la legislación apropiada contra el terrorismo; compila tratados y acuerdos bilaterales, subregionales, regionales y multilaterales firmados por Estados miembro; fomenta una adherencia universal a convenciones internacionales contra el terrorismo; mejora la cooperación fronteriza y medidas de seguridad para la docu-
mentación de viajeros y desarrolla actividades de formación y manejo de crisis.

Estos programas multilaterales de seguridad de la OEA para contrarrestar la amenaza de redes ilícitas (incluyendo organizaciones narcotraficantes y grupos terroristas) ilustran el potencial pero también los desafíos inherentes de cooperación multilateral. Ya que muchas de las estrategias y políticas para abordar fenómenos ilícitos incluyendo el tráfico de drogas, armas y personas son nacionales, la OEA tiene dificultades para dictar conjuntos de soluciones a los Estados nacionales soberanos. Varios países en la región cuentan con recursos limitados para enfrentarse a las organizaciones narcotraficantes que a menudo están mejor capacitadas y equipadas que las fuerzas gubernamentales. La situación se complica aún más por la historia problemática de los países de América Latina que han hecho la transición de dictaduras militares a gobiernos democráticos responsables por salvaguardar el estado de derecho. Aún quedan sospechas profundas sobre la función de las fuerzas de seguridad y defensa, e inquietud relativa a abusos de poder y corrupción de estas fuerzas en caso de emplearse contra redes ilícitas. Por lo tanto, la OEA sirve como foro y catalizador para estados miembro para comprender mejor la amenaza del crimen organizado transnacional y redes ilícitas y para compartir recursos y mejores prácticas para fomentar la seguridad regional, mientras se incorporan medidas de efectividad para evaluar el verdadero impacto de la programación de la OEA.

El frente de desarrollo
Centroamérica se ha convertido en la desafortunada víctima de las agresivas campañas anti-narcóticos de los gobiernos de Colombia y México. Ya que los agentes ilícitos han percibido más riesgos en sus operaciones en Colombia y México, han intensificado sus actividades en América Central. Los crecientes flujos de narcóticos a través de América Central han contribuido al aumento de los niveles de violencia y la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos, que están debilitando el apoyo ciudadano para la gobernabilidad democrática y el estado de derecho. La violencia es particularmente intensa en los países del “triángulo norteño”, El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras, con algunos de los índices de homicidio más elevados en el mundo. Los ciudadanos de casi todas las naciones centroamericanas actualmente consideran la inseguridad pública como el principal problema al que se enfrentan sus países. En vista de la naturaleza transnacional de las organizaciones criminales y sus habilidades para explotar territorios sin gobierno, algunos analistas afirman que la inseguridad en América Central constituye una amenaza para los Estados Unidos.34

El Sistema de Integración Centroamericana (SICA) es una organización regional con una Secretaría en El Salvador, compuesta de los gobiernos de Belice, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, y Panamá. Su Comisión de Seguridad fue creada en 1995 para desarrollar y reforzar la seguridad regional a combatir redes ilícitas entre otras amenazas transnacionales. El 14 de abril de 2011, el Secretario General de SICA, Juan Daniel Alemán, presentó la nueva estrategia al Grupo de Amigos de la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica, que incluyó ministros y viceministros de defensa, seguridad y re-
laciones exteriores incluyendo el Ministro de Defensa guatemalteco, Abraham Valenzuela, Secretario de Estado Adjunto de EE.UU. para Asuntos del Hemisferio Occidental, Arturo Valenzuela, el Ministro Adjunto de la Presidencia de Guatemala, Mauricio Boraschi, el Ministro Adjunto Asistente canadiense para las américas Jon Allen y el Primer Comisionado de la Policía Nacional nicaragüense Aminta Granera.

Los cuatro pilares de la estrategia regional de seguridad son la Prevención, el Combate a la Delincuencia, la Rehabilitación y Reintegración y el Fortalecimiento Institucional. Esta estrategia está basada en la premisa que la seguridad en Centroamérica es una responsabilidad compartida y uno de los principios clave es que implica una cadena interconectada entre acciones locales, nacionales y regionales, desde una perspectiva de asignaciones de recursos y debería aprovechar las sinergias, de acuerdo a Alemán. La estrategia de SICA requerirá de una estrecha cooperación entre los países centroamericanos y la comunidad internacional para lograr el éxito en la lucha contra la violencia y es otro ejemplo de sociedades multilaterales para combatir la convergencia de amenazas de redes ilícitas.

Los Estados Unidos reconocen que sus esfuerzos en Colombia y México han proporcionado incentivos para que grupos criminales para se desplacen a Centroamérica y otras áreas en donde pueden explotar debilidades institucionales para continuar sus operaciones. En respuesta, la Administración americana ha garantizado que la seguridad de todos los ciudadanos es una de las cuatro prioridades predominantes de la política de EE.UU. en América Latina y ha buscado desarrollar sociedades de colaboración con países a lo largo del Hemisferio. Estas sociedades han tomado la forma de la cooperación bilateral en seguridad con países como Colombia y México, así como programas regionales como la Iniciativa de Seguridad de la Cuenca del Caribe y la Iniciativa Regional de Seguridad para Centroamérica (CARSI).

Iniciativa Regional de Seguridad para Centroamérica

En el frente diplomático y de desarrollo, el CARSI, patrocinado por EE.UU., busca promover la seguridad de los ciudadanos y el desarrollo socioeconómico como respuesta directa a la creciente amenaza de las redes ilícitas. CARSI fue creado originalmente en el 2007 como parte del paquete de asistencia antidroga y anticrimen centrado en México, conocido como la Iniciativa Mérida. CARSI no sólo proporciona equipo, capacitación y asistencia técnica para apoyar las operaciones inmediatas de las fuerzas del orden y de interdicción, sino que también busca fortalecer las capacidades de instituciones gubernamentales para abordar los desafíos de seguridad y las condiciones económicas y sociales subyacentes que contribuyen a ellas.

Las cinco metas de la CARSI son:

1. asegurar las calles para los ciudadanos en la región
2. interrumpir el desplazamiento de criminales y contrabando dentro y entre las naciones de Centroamérica

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3. apoyar el desarrollo de gobiernos Centroamericanos fuertes, capaces y responsables

4. restablecer la presencia efectiva del Estado y seguridad en comunidades en riesgo

5. fomentar niveles de seguridad mejorados y coordinación del estado de derecho y cooperación entre las naciones de la región.39

Los esfuerzos colaborativos de CARSI por combatir redes ilícitas en Centroamérica incluyen programación en la interdicción de narcóticos, apoyo a las fuerzas policíacas, edificación de capacidades institucionales y áreas de prevención. Además de los tradicionales programas “capacitar y equipar”, la asistencia de EE.UU. proporcionada a través de CARSI también apoya unidades especializadas que investigan y trabajan con, policías de EE.UU. para alterar las operaciones de bandas transnacionales y redes de tráfico. Encabezados por el Buró Federal de Investigaciones (FBI) las unidades del Centro Transnacional Antipandillas (CAT), que se crearon en El Salvador en 2007, ahora se extienden hasta Guatemala y Honduras con apoyo de CARSI. Del mismo modo, la Administración de Control de Drogas, el Servicio de Inmigración y Control de Aduanas y el INL del Departamento de Estado también han aprobado programas unitarios en Centroamérica. Entre otras actividades, llevan a cabo investigaciones complejas sobre lavado de dinero, contrabando de dinero y tráfico de narcóticos, armas de fuego y personas.40

En Centroamérica a través del programa CARSI, la Academia Internacional de Formación Policiaca en El Salvador adiestró aproximadamente a 450 oficiales de las fuerzas del orden de los siete países de CARSI en 2010. En sólo 3 meses del 2010, la unidad CAT en El Salvador manejó 141 pistas de investigación y diseminó información a agencias de fuerzas del orden de viaje nacional e internacional. El Servicio de Protección de Aduanas y Fronteras, trabajando con las fuerzas fronterizas nacionales de CARSI, realizó evaluaciones de más de 30 puntos de entrada terrestres, marítimos y aéreos a través de la región y ha proporcionado adiestramiento usando equipo de inspección no-intrusiva proporcionado por el Departamento de Estado.41

Los programas de policía comunitaria Departamento de Estado/INL y la Agencia para el Desarrollo Internacional de Estados Unidos (USAID) están diseñados para edificar capacidad institucional y confianza local en las fuerzas policíacas al convertirlas en organizaciones basadas en la comunidad y orientadas al servicio. Uno de estos programas, el precinto modelo Villa Nueva en Guatemala, se está replicando con financiamiento CARSI como resultado de su éxito en el establecimiento de la confianza popular y reducción de la violencia. A fin de mejorar la capacidad de investigación de las naciones Centroamericanas, CARSI ha apoyado evaluaciones de laboratorios forenses, la implementación del sistema eTrace del Buró de Alcohol, Tabaco, Armas de Fuego y Explosivos para rastrear armas de fuego y la ampliación del Intercambio de Huellas Dactilares de Centroamérica del FBI, que ayuda a naciones asociadas en el desarrollo de
capacidades de huellas dactilares y biométricas. CARSI también busca reducir la impunidad mejorando la eficiencia y efectividad de sistemas judiciales Centroamericanos.

En el 2010, USAID continuó sus esfuerzos en la prevención de la delincuencia y la violencia, trabajando con gobiernos locales y nacionales, sociedad civil y líderes comunitarios para dotarles de amplios métodos de prevención y ofrecer oportunidades para la juventud en riesgo de involucrarse en el comercio de narcóticos y el abuso de sustancias. A través de su administración de fondos CARSI en el Fondo para el Desarrollo Económico y Social para Centroamérica, USAID apoya programas de prevención ofreciendo oportunidades educativas, recreativas y vocacionales para juventud en riesgo. En El Salvador, por ejemplo, el Proyecto de Crimen basado en la Comunidad y Prevención de la Violencia de USAID trabaja en 12 municipalidades para fortalecer las facultades de los gobiernos locales, organizaciones civiles, líderes comunitarios y la juventud para abordar los problemas de crimen y violencia. Estos comprensivos programas políticos, judiciales, económicos y sociales bajo CARSI tienen el objetivo de reforzar el Estado de Derecho, desarrollo financiero e instituciones democráticas. Su objetivo es hacer frente a las complejas amenazas planteadas por las redes ilícitas, trabajando con diferentes segmentos de la sociedad.

Quizá uno de los desafíos más grandes de su importante misión en Centroamérica es el financiamiento de EE.UU. en tiempos de austeridad fiscal y el índice en que se implementan los programas. Desde el año fiscal (AF) 2008, Estados Unidos ha proporcionado a Centroamérica $361.5 millones a través de Mérida/CARSI y la Administración Obama ha solicitado $100 millones adicionales para CARSI en el AF 2012. El Departamento de Estado aún no ha liberado información desde marzo de 2011, en cuyo momento el 88 por ciento de los fondos apropiados entre el AF 2008 y el AF 2012 había sido designado y el 19 por ciento se había invertido.

En la conferencia de SICA de junio de 2011, la Secretaria de Estado, Hillary Clinton, anunció que el financiamiento de EE.UU. para la Sociedad de Seguridad Ciudadana de Centroamérica superaría los $290 millones en el AF 2011. El compromiso de $290 millones incluye los $101.5 millones proporcionados a través de CARSI así como cualquier otra asistencia bilateral y regional de EE.UU. proporcionada para apoyar los esfuerzos de seguridad en la región en el AF 2011. Muchos expertos en Centroamérica temen que esto sea insuficiente para ayudar a las naciones Centroamericanas a alcanzar el estado de derecho, la prosperidad y la democracia ante las formidables redes ilícitas que operan en la región. No sólo carecen de recursos financieros los países Centroamericanos, también requieren de recursos humanos y capacidad para implementar estos programas de seguridad y desarrollo.

**El frente de defensa y seguridad**

En el Hemisferio Occidental, el narcotráfico y la violencia asociada representan la amenaza más seria y son un desafío formidable para las fuerzas gubernamentales, de defensa y de seguridad. Durante décadas, Washington ha invertido importantes
recursos en la oferta y demanda de los esfuerzos anti-narcóticos conocidos como la “guerra contra las drogas”. Estados Unidos y sus naciones asociadas han logrado avances significativos en la interdicción de narcotráfico ilícito en América, pero el comercio internacional de drogas continúa floreciendo. En junio de 2011, la Comisión Mundial sobre Política de Drogas, cuyos miembros incluyen al antiguo Secretario General de la ONU, Kofi Annan, tres expresidentes latinoamericanos (de Brasil, México y Colombia), el expresidente de la Reserva Federal, Paul Volcker, el ex-Secretario de Estado de EE.UU. George Schultz, el Fundador del Grupo Virgin Richard Branson y el Primer Ministro de Grecia George Papandreou, declaró que la guerra mundial contra las drogas ha fracasado después de 40 años.47

**Mandato del USSOUTHCOM contra el tráfico ilícito**

El Comando Sur de Estados Unidos (USSOUTHCOM), ubicado en Miami, Florida, es uno de los nueve comandos combatientes unificados conjuntos en el Departamento de Defensa. Es responsable de proporcionar la planificación de coordinación de contingencias, operaciones y seguridad para América Central y del Sur, el Caribe (salvo las mancomunidades, territorios y posesiones de EE.UU.) y Cuba, así como fuerzas de protección de los recursos de las fuerzas armadas de EE.UU. en estas ubicaciones. También es responsable por garantizar la defensa del Canal de Panamá y el área del canal. De acuerdo a la “Estrategia de Comando 2020: Sociedad para las Américas”, emitida en julio de 2010, los objetivos estratégicos del USSOUTHCOM son defender a Estados Unidos y sus intereses, promover la seguridad regional y ser un socio permanente de elección en apoyo de una región pacífica y próspera. Sus áreas prioritarias son la lucha contra el tráfico ilícito (CIT, por sus siglas en inglés), asistencia humanitaria/socorro en casos de desastre, y operaciones de mantenimiento de paz.

La misión principal de los esfuerzos de CIT del USSOUTHCOM es apoyar la interdicción del narcotráfico. El USSOUTHCOM colabora con otras agencias y naciones para apoyar la interdicción de organizaciones criminales transfronterizas a través de la detección y supervisión, intercambio de información y desarrollo de capacidades de naciones asociadas. Todos los esfuerzos están encauzados hacia el logro de los objetivos de interdicción de la Estrategia Nacional para el Control de las Drogas en EE.UU.

El Departamento de Defensa es la principal agencia Federal en esfuerzos por detectar y supervisar tráfico aéreo y marítimo de drogas ilícitas hacia los Estados Unidos. La Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta Interagencial Sur (JIATF-S, por sus siglas en inglés) es la fuerza de tarea nacional que sirve como catalizador de operaciones integradas y sincronizadas interagenciales de lucha contra el tráfico ilícito. Es responsable por la detección y supervisión de sospechas de actividad aérea y marítima relativa a las drogas en el Mar Caribe, el Golfo de México y el Pacífico oriental. El JIATF-S también recopila, procesa y disemina información antidrogas para operaciones interdepartamentales y con naciones asociadas. Usando información reunida mediante operaciones coordinadas por la JIATF-S, las agencias de orden público de EE.UU. y naciones asociadas son líderes en la interdic-
ción de narcotraficantes. La participación de interdicción de las fuerzas armadas de EE.UU. es en apoyo de esas agencias de orden público. Normalmente el personal militar de EE.UU. está involucrado en el apoyo de una interdicción durante operaciones marítimas en aguas internacionales, en donde las embarcaciones y helicópteros de la Marina de EE.UU. patrullan e interceptan presuntos traficantes. Las interdicciones reales - embarque, búsqueda, decomisos y arrestos - son dirigidas y conducidas por Destacamentos Policiales de la Guardia Costera de EE.UU. embarcados, o por agencias policiales anti-drogas de naciones asociadas.

Las fuerzas armadas de EE.UU. dedican una variedad de fuerzas en la región para apoyar los esfuerzos de detección y supervisión:

- **Maritimo**: normalmente, la Marina de EE.UU., la Guardia Costera de EE.UU. y embarcaciones de la nación asociada (Bretaña, Francia, Holanda, Canadá y Colombia) patrullan las aguas en el Mar Caribe, el Golfo de México y el Pacífico oriental durante todo el año. Los Destacamentos Policiales de la Guardia Costera embarcados en EE.UU. y en ocasiones embarcaciones navales de naciones aliadas comandan operaciones para abordar embarcaciones sospechosas, decomisar drogas ilegales y aprehender sospechosos.

- **Aire**: el JIATF-S usa aeronaves militares de EE.UU., interagenciales y de naciones asociadas ubicadas estratégicamente por la región y en dos Locaciones de Seguridad Cooperativa en Comalapa, El Salvador, y en Curasao y Aruba, antiguamente parte de las Antillas Holandesas. Estas aeronaves, en cooperación con las naciones asociadas y agencias de EE.UU., llevan a cabo misiones persistentes para supervisar áreas con una historia de tráfico ilícito. Las aeronaves de EE.UU. ofrecen capacidades de vigilancia únicas que complementan los esfuerzos de lucha contra el tráfico ilícito de las agencias de orden público norteamericanas y de naciones asociadas.

- **Otro**: el USSOUTHCOM también ofrece apoyo a naciones asociadas a través de la formación, intercambio de información y asistencia tecnológica y de recursos.

**JIATF-S: Estructura y operaciones**

Centrado en la lucha contra el tráfico ilícito, la JIATF-S quizá ejemplifica el mejor modelo de esfuerzos interdepartamentales e internacionales para combatir la convergencia de redes ilícitas, con una trayectoria comprobada de 20 años. La JIATF-S es una fuerza de tarea combinada militar-civil conferida con la misión de combatir el tráfico ilícito en América Latina y el Caribe. Si bien la JIATF-S rinde informe al USSOUTHCOM, busca su misión tetrapartita de detección, supervisión, interdicción y aprehensión con socios internacionales. Durante los últimos 20 años, la JIATF-S ha arrestado alrededor de 4,600 traficantes, capturado casi 1,100 embarcaciones y privado a carteles de drogas de un estimado de $190 mil millones en ganancias. El ex-Comandante del USSOUTHCOM y ex-Comandante Supremo Aliado en Europa, el Almirante James Stavridis, considera la JIATF-S “un tesoro nacional” y la “joya de la corona de SOUTHCOM” que
demuestra un enfoque del gobierno en pleno a la convergencia de amenazas transfronterizas como redes ilícitas.

La JIATF-S es un equipo conjunto, interagencial, internacional, combinado y aliado compuesto de los cuatro Servicios de las fuerzas armadas de EE.UU., nueve agencias de EE.UU. (incluyendo inteligencia y fuerzas del orden), y 13 naciones asociadas incluyendo Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, República Dominicana, Ecuador, El Salvador, Francia, México, los Países Bajos, Perú, España y el Reino Unido.\(^{51}\) El área de responsabilidad de la JIATF-S cubre casi 42 millones de millas cuadradas. Usando información de las agencias de orden público, la JIATF-S detecta y supervisa embarcaciones marítimas y aeronaves sospechosas en la Cuenca del Caribe y el Pacífico oriental y luego proporciona esta información a socios internacionales e interdepartamentales quienes tienen la autoridad de interceptar embarques ilícitos y arrestar miembros de organizaciones criminales transnacionales. En el 2010, la JIATF-S y socios internacionales e interagenciales fueron directamente responsables por interceptar 142 toneladas métricas de cocaína y 3,419 libras de marihuana y levar a cabo 309 arrestos, negando a organizaciones criminales transnacionales un estimado de $2.8 miles de millones en ganancias.\(^{52}\)

De acuerdo a la publicación de 2011 *Joint Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success*, los logros de la JIATF-S durante las últimas dos décadas pueden atribuirse a las siguientes lecciones aprendidas:

• *Conseguir un mandato de una autoridad más superior.* La misión y el equipo contaban con suficiente legitimidad con un claro mandato de autoridades superiores civiles y militares.

• *Adaptar una solución integral establecida para un problema específico.* La misión fue discreta y estaba identificada claramente (detener la entrada del narcotráfico a los Estados Unidos) con resultados mensurables (es decir, número de arrestos, intercepciones, embarcaciones abordadas y decomisos de drogas).

• *Conocer a los socios.* Un mejor entendimiento de los socios, sus intereses, capacidades y limitaciones fomentó una verdadera colaboración y cooperación y unidad de esfuerzos.

• *Obtener recursos.*

• *Generar redes.*

El informe también destacó varios errores a evitar:

• no comandar la presencia de personal interagencial en su equipo

• no separar al personal interagencial en edificios separados

• no faltar el respeto a socios más pequeños, pueden hacer grandes contribuciones
• no exigir acuerdos vinculantes sobre cooperación (por lo menos inicialmente)
• no ignorar la necesidad de un socio de sentir que ha hecho una contribución
• no tomar decisiones vinculantes sin escrutinio y apoyo significativo
• no olvidar crear una cultura de confianza y potenciamiento
• no tomar el crédito por el éxito colaborativo.53

La JIATF-S es considerada uno de los mejores modelos de cooperación internacional e interagencial para luchar contra las amenazas transnacionales. Es un equipo que mezcla experiencia, profesionalismo y conocimiento mayor que la suma de sus partes individuales, según el Almirante Stavridis.54 La JIATF-S ha ejecutado operaciones exitosas de interdicción que ilustran cómo una cultura de colaboración que incorpora facultades militares, de inteligencia y policiales pueden combatir la convergencia de amenazas supuestas por redes ilícitas. Sin embargo, no se ha puesto de manifiesto cuán fácilmente este modelo con más de 20 años de experiencia puede replicarse en cuanto a recursos humanos y financieros así como cultura colaborativa.

**Fomento de modelos colaborativos para combatir redes ilícitas**

Las redes ilícitas que incluyen delincuentes, terroristas y facilitadores han negociado alianzas estratégicas para promover sus intereses, amenazando el estado de derecho, cadenas mundiales de suministro y mercados libres y justos alrededor del mundo. A fin de contrarrestar la convergencia de estas amenazas, los gobiernos necesitan desarrollar estrategias internacionales e internacionales que aprovechen los instrumentos diplomáticos de desarrollo, de inteligencia, militares y policiales del poder nacional. Para este fin, los modelos colaborativos para la seguridad y el desarrollo requieren los siguientes elementos críticos: voluntad política, instituciones, mecanismos de evaluación de amenazas y ofrecer contramedidas, recursos y medidas de eficacia para garantizar el éxito en contra de las redes ilícitas.

Todas las iniciativas internacionales e interagenciales analizadas en este capítulo demuestran la voluntad política para combatir a las redes ilícitas. En el 2000, las Naciones Unidas reconocieron formalmente la amenaza de las redes ilícitas con la adopción de la Convención de la ONU contra el Crimen organizado transnacional y ha participado en muchas actividades para luchar contra el narcotráfico y el crimen organizado a través de la Oficina de la ONU para las Drogas y la Delincuencia. En el frente de EE.UU., la Estrategia para Combatir el Crimen Organizado Transnacional de 2011 representa un importante desarrollo en el reconocimiento de la amenaza a la seguridad nacional y defensa de la cooperación internacional y colaboración interagencial para contrarrestar el crimen mundial. Sin embargo, aún no se publicado un plan de implementación con misiones específicas para la interagencia de EE.UU. y medidas de efectividad al momento de este escrito. La realización pública de la amenaza de redes ilícitas para la paz y prosperidad de Estados-nación y mercados mundiales no es suficiente. Estos con-
Figura 3. Para combatir redes ilícitas
Fomentar la colaboración y comunidades de interés a niveles nacionales, regionales e internacionales

Figura 4. Elementos críticos para modelos de colaboración efectivos
venios, acuerdos y estrategias internacionales deben ser acompañados de planes de acción robustos y tener los recursos adecuados a fin de restringir el entorno operativo y facilitadores de los agentes ilícitos.

En el Hemisferio Occidental, iniciativas diplomáticas, de desarrollo y de defensa para luchar contra redes ilícitas están en marcha a través de la ONU, la OEA, la CARSI y la JIATF-S como se ha descrito anteriormente. Estos modelos de colaboración se centran en las contramedidas operativas y preventivas para enfrentar a agentes ilícitos y fomentar la seguridad y el desarrollo. Los esfuerzos actuales bajo el auspicio de instituciones multilaterales como la ONUDD y la OEA son notables y encomiables, sin embargo, carecen de medidas de eficacia que hacen que sea difícil determinar su impacto real anticrimen y su capacidad para establecer el dominio de la ley y las oportunidades socioeconómicas. Mientras tanto, la CARSI requerirá más recursos humanos y financieros para llevar a cabo programas para las fuerzas de la ley y desarrollo socioeconómico para luchar contra organizaciones criminales transfronterizas. En contraste, la JIATF-S ha disfrutado una trayectoria de 20 año de progreso contra el tráfico ilícito. Cuenta con todos los elementos críticos de un modelo colaborativo: compromiso, instituciones, mecanismos, recursos y métrica, así como una sólida cultura interagencial e internacional que se ha desarrollado a lo largo de su existencia. Todas estas iniciativas para combatir a las redes ilícitas en América son continuas pero parecen ejecutarse en paralelo. En este entorno de recursos limitados, una mayor coordinación de donantes garantizaría que todos estos programas de seguridad

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<th>Mecanismos</th>
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Tabla 1. Elementos críticos para modelos de colaboración efectivos en el Hemisferio Occidental
y desarrollo se complementen en vez de duplicarse entre sí. Debido al nivel de voluntad política demostrado en estas organizaciones, debe existir un interés en asignar recursos y capacidad de construcción en las áreas geográficas específicas más vulnerables al crimen organizado transnacional.

La globalización ha beneficiado a los sectores privados, públicos y civiles de la sociedad a lo largo de las últimas décadas. Hemos sido testigos de extraordinarios índices de crecimiento económico con importantes progresos en el comercio internacional, los mercados de capital, las ciencias y la tecnología. Mientras tanto, las redes ilícitas han aprovechado los proceso y las nuevas oportunidades que ofrece la globalización y han sacado provecho de instituciones débiles y de las lagunas en la gobernanza alrededor del mundo para ampliar sus emprendimientos. En el Hemisferio Occidental, las redes ilícitas han participado cada vez más en actividades relacionadas con las drogas, armas, falsificaciones y trata de personas que se han acompañado de niveles de violencia sin precedentes. En consecuencia, la amenaza del crimen organizado transnacional y las redes ilícitas se ha convertido en un problema de seguridad nacional para los Estados Unidos y sus aliados.

Ya que las redes ilícitas son una amenaza para la seguridad de los ciudadanos y para la seguridad económica, los gobiernos deben involucrar a los sectores públicos, privados y civiles para disminuir y derrotar el poder y la influencia del crimen organizado transnacional y agentes ilícitos. En palabras de John Aquilla, “Se requiere de una red para derrotar una red”. En ese sentido, los gobiernos alrededor del mundo deben formar redes que promuevan la colaboración interagencial e internacional para combatir la convergencia de redes ilícitas y las amenazas de seguridad nacional que representan para la comunidad internacional. Para garantizar el éxito, las iniciativas emprendidas para el combate de las redes ilícitas deben ser apoyadas por el compromiso político, las instituciones, los mecanismos, los recursos humanos y financieros y las medidas de eficacia para promover la seguridad y el desarrollo.

Notes

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7 Ibid.
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36 Testimonio de Arturo A. Valenzuela, Secretario Asistente de Estado para Asuntos del Hemisferio Occidental, Departamento de Estado de EE.UU., ante la Subcomisión del Senado sobre el Hemisferio Occidental, Cuerpo de Paz y Asuntos Narcóticos Mundiales, 17 de febrero, 2011.
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Perry Center Discusses Foreign Policy Dilemma in Latin America

Editor-in Chief, Perry Center Publications

In September 2013, the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies conducted a Hemispheric Forum on U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. The forum, one of a series of conferences that bring distinguished scholars together to discuss matters of urgency in the Hemisphere, addressed the dilemma faced by U.S. policy makers in the current political environment in Latin America and the Caribbean. Panelists remarked on the political relations between the United States and Latin American nations, relations that have grown distant and contentious in the last decade. A summary of the discussion is provided for readers.

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Bolivia’s announcement of the expulsion of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in April 2013 is the latest in a series of blows to U.S. access in Latin America. In the last two decades, U.S. stature in Latin America has diminished to the point that the United States wields little influence in political matters, particularly those related to security and defense issues. Scholars have frequently debated the reasons for the weakened position of what was—indeed for most of the past 200 years—the hemispheric hegemon. Resistance to U.S. presence and policies offers a serious dilemma to U.S. lawmakers: Where should the U.S. devote its efforts in order to maintain access to a region that is politically, economically, and socially vital to the United States?

On September 26, the Perry Center gathered a distinguished panel of long-time experts in U.S. foreign policy in Latin America to discuss these issues. The Hemispheric Forum was held on the campus of the National Defense University at Fort McNair in Washington DC. The panel included Douglas Farah, President of IBI Consultants and Senior Fellow at the International Assessment & Strategy Center; Eric Farnsworth, Vice President of the Council of the Americas/Americas Society; and Peter Hakim, President Emeritus and Senior Fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue. Maria Liz Garcia de Arnold, the first female Minister of Defense in Paraguay, rounded out the group.

The United States has its admirers and opponents in Latin America. As Gabriel Marcella of the U.S. Army War College notes, U.S. supporters point toward the country’s long support of the rule of law, free trade, social and economic reforms, and civil and political liberties. At the same time, critics of the United States cite the country’s history of intervention and unilateralism in the region, inattention to the Hemisphere, a perceived failure of the U.S.-sponsored war on drugs, the anachronistic and unpopular Cuban embargo, support for autocrats or dictators, and contempt for international institutions.
Leftist populist leaders in the region leveraged these perceived infractions by the United States for their own political benefit. Presidents like the late Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua rose to power partly on a platform of anti-American sentiment. In fact, evidence shows that anti-Americanism panders well to voters in Latin America. In the 2002 vote in Bolivia, when U.S. Ambassador Manuel Rocha publicly condemned Evo Morales and indicated that his election would jeopardize U.S. assistance to the country, Morales actually got a bump in the polls, so eager were voters to jump on the bash-the-U.S. bandwagon.

Policies opposed to the United States can manifest themselves into a real challenge to U.S. interests in the region. For example, the development of the ALBA coalition (the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas) led to the establishment of new regional institutions designed to replace U.S.-friendly ones (e.g., the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Organization of American States). U.S. ambassadors from Bolivia and Venezuela were expelled from their respective countries in September 2008 and January 2009. Bolivia kicked out the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in 2008 and USAID in 2013. Ecuador refused to renew the U.S. lease on the Manta Forward Operating Location (FOL) despite the airbase’s anti-drug flights that served the interests of all the Andean Ridge countries. In August of 2013, Venezuela withdrew from the Inter-American Commission and Court on Human Rights, calling it a “pawn” of the U.S. policies. Perhaps most worrisome, countries like Venezuela and Bolivia conspired with Iranian military and intelligence officials on how to join forces in an asymmetric conflict against the United States. The specter of the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa loom large over the Latin American landscape.

Some of the U.S. troubles may be self-inflicted. The leak of classified diplomatic cables and the National Security Agency (NSA) spying scandal further complicated relations in the Hemisphere. In March 2011, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Carlos Pascual resigned amid furor over a classified report in which he complained about inefficiency and infighting among Mexican security forces in the campaign against drug cartels. In April 2011, the U.S. ambassador to Ecuador was declared persona non grata when diplomatic cables questioning the integrity of the Ecuadorian police were leaked. President Correa offered diplomatic asylum to Julian Assange and to Edward Snowden (though he later withdrew the latter). Venezuela and Nicaragua both offered Snowden asylum. In September 2013, President Dilma Roussef of Brazil cancelled an important state visit to the White House over the NSA affair.

The U.S. has few options to deal with political opponents. These U.S. adversaries rose to power through legitimate democratic processes and seem to represent the interests of the majority of the populations in many Latin American states. In Bolivia, Morales was elected in 2005 by 52 percent of the voters, confirmed in a recall referendum with 67 percent of the vote, and reelected in December 2009 with 63 percent of the vote. His MAS Party won national elections in 2005 (only narrowly missing an absolute majority in parliament), in 2006 (seizing an absolute majority in the Constituent Assembly), and again in 2009
In Ecuador, Correa won the runoff election in November 2006 with 57 percent of the vote and was reelected in April 2009 with 52 percent on the first ballot. Correa’s PAIS Party received a majority in the Constituent Assembly in 2007 (winning 61 percent of the vote) and in 2009 only narrowly missed an absolute majority in Parliament. Correa was reelected for a third term earlier this year with 57 percent of the vote. Before his March 2013 death, Hugo Chávez ruled Venezuela for nearly 15 years. During that time, his party won the majority of seats in the Constitutional Assembly and National Assembly. Chávez was reelected as President in 2000, 2006, and again in 2012, each time with double-digit leads over the opposition candidate and with clear majorities of the electorate.

This presents a quandary for U.S. policy makers. For the most part—despite some political dirty tricks and election process irregularities—opinion polls and elections demonstrate that Latin American governments are considerably more representative today than any of their predecessors. Political participation and social inclusion has clearly grown even in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. At the same time, these leaders may be using democratic tools to ensure their political longevity. As panelist Douglas Farah stated, “Fidel Castro counseled both Hugo Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales to forgo armed revolution in favor of using the electoral process to gain power and then changing the constitutions and legal structures of their countries to ensure they could govern in perpetuity.”

Under these circumstances, what options are available to U.S. decision makers on how to reengage with a resentful Latin America? Should the U.S. rely upon its soft power tools—diplomacy, university access to Latin American students, goodwill generated among Latin American immigrants—or should it resort to something more politically aggressive to support U.S. interests? In other words, what should U.S. grand strategy in Latin America be in order to maintain access to a region that is politically, economically, and socially vital to the United States?

The panelists presented a number of diverse scenarios for future U.S.–Latin American relations. Peter Hakim forecast a hopeful future for Latin America, particularly for the growing middle class in the region. He predicted that anti-U.S. alliances in the region would lose influence and be replaced by more centrist policy makers. At the same time, he warned that the rise of populist leaders in Mexico and Brazil could jeopardize inroads made by the United States in the region.

Douglas Farah predicted that rhetoric from the ALBA nations would diminish primarily because no leader with the charisma of Hugo Chávez has emerged to replace the former Venezuelan leader. However, Farah voiced concern for Central American nations that have fallen under control of narco-traffickers. In particular, Guatemala, Honduras, and portions of southern Mexico suffer from such a heavy influence of cartels that many of their elected officials are beholden to them either through co-option or coercion. Consequently, policy decisions emerging from these areas are often at odds with the U.S. policy to contain illicit trafficking, the lifeblood of the transnational organized crime groups.

Eric Farnsworth struck a more optimistic note about U.S.–Latin American relations. He started by pointing out that the U.S. retains significant popularity...
in Latin America, according to public opinion polls. In other words, government officials in many Latin American countries are opposed to U.S. policies, but the citizens of these countries are not. What the United States lacks, in his opinion, is a cohesive strategy that articulates its policies toward the region. The United States has “lost its voice” and sends mixed and inconsistent messages on what it considers important, like democracy and rule of law.

Perhaps the most prudent path to follow in Latin America is one that former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Thomas Shannon refers to as “strategic patience.” The United States should emphasize cooperative efforts with its Latin American allies, ones that are of mutual concern for the United States and its partners in the region: advancing prosperity, addressing climate change, enhancing security, and improving education. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates understood the type of good will necessary to reestablish trust in a region that has been damaged by foreign policy and human rights mistakes. “The solution is not to be found in some slick campaign or by trying to out-propagandize [American opponents],” he said, “but through a steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time.” U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry echoed those sentiments at his November 2013 address at the Organization of American States: “The relationship that we seek and that we have worked hard to foster is not about a United States declaration about how and when it will intervene in the affairs of other American states. It’s about all of our countries viewing one another as equals, sharing responsibilities, and cooperating on security issues.” From this perspective, the United States would be well advised to speak softly and put down its big stick.
Perry Center Discusses the Latin American Electoral Cycle: Implications for Democratic Consolidation

Editor-in-Chief, Perry Center Publications

By many measures, the expansion of democracy in Latin America in the last three decades was extraordinary. During the 1960s and 1970s, military dictatorships or juntas ruled most countries. Only Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela avoided authoritarian rule during that period. In the 1980s, major political changes occurred in the region. In a little over a decade, from 1979 to 1991, 14 Latin American countries replaced military dictatorships or military-dominated regimes with elected governments. Today an elected government rules in every Latin American country except Cuba.

Since the early 1980s, the politics of Latin America have been transformed by the longest and deepest wave of democratization in the region’s history. At the same time, the continent has been confronting its most serious economic crisis since the Great Depression. The confluence of these two trends—democratic consolidation in the face of economic instability—raises serious concerns about the future of democratic governance in the region.

In December 2013 as part of a series of Hemispheric Forums, the William J. Perry Center hosted a round table discussion of democracy in Latin America. In particular, the group analyzed recent and upcoming elections in the Americas, events that might reflect the political uncertainty common in the region. The panelists included a number of subject matter experts on Latin American politics and democracy: Johanna Mendelson Forman, Senior Associate, Program on Crisis, Conflict and Cooperation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Roberto Izurieta, Director of Latin American Projects for the Graduate School of Political Management (GSPM) at George Washington University; and Harold Trinkunas, Charles W. Robinson Chair and Senior Fellow and Director of the Latin America Initiative at the Brookings Institution. Luis Bitencourt, Dean of Academics at the Perry Center, moderated the panel.

By most accounts, democracy in Latin America is flourishing. Since the mid-1990s, the level of democracy has increased steadily. Economic growth helped modernize many countries and led to increased rates of education and a rising middle class. Direct military involvement in politics is a phenomenon of the past. However, as the panelists pointed out, establishing democracy is one thing, while consolidating it is something else entirely. According to Johanna Mendelson Forman and Roberto Izurieta, strong democratic institutions are feasible, but require time to be built. Democracy needs time to “habituate” itself, as scholar Dankwart A. Rustow put it. Democratic governments must develop state capacity, accountability, and representativeness in order to provide adequate governance. Reformers need time to strengthen state institutions, develop rules and procedures for greater transparency and the rule of law, create and improve political parties and civil society organizations, and build effective working relations between the ex-
The panelists of the Hemispheric Forum emphasized that election processes are an important part of democratic governance, but they have limitations. In their opinion, Latin America doesn’t suffer from an election deficit—democratic elections have been commonplace in the region for decades—but rather an institutional deficit. In that sense, elections are a means to an end, not an end in themselves. Roberto Izurieta added that the problem in Latin America is that the elections aren’t always fair because of weak institutions.

The panelists believed that many Latin American nations are also economically vulnerable. Economic problems undercut prospects for democratic consolidation while simultaneously increasing the likelihood of democratic breakdown and the defeat of incumbents in stable democracies. Poor economic performance creates an especially destabilizing effect on young democracies. According to Harold Trinkunas, the quality of democratic processes in Latin America declined as a result of the global economic crisis. This damaged democracy’s appeal in many developing countries. Just as the middle class was rising and poverty alleviation was beginning to show tangible effects, prosperity began to crumble.

The panelists pointed out two examples of nations with economic conditions that could predicate political problems. In their opinion, Brazil needs to have some sort of economic adjustment and to deal with the overvaluation of currency. Debt burdens are high from a historical and comparative perspective. The coun-

Table 1. Recent and Upcoming Elections in Latin America and the Caribbean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Current President</th>
<th>Elections</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Sebastián Piñera</td>
<td>Nov 17, 2013/ Dec. 15, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Porfirio Lobososa</td>
<td>Nov. 24, 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Laura Chinchilla</td>
<td>Feb. 2, 2014</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Mauricio Funes</td>
<td>Feb. 2, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Juan Manuel Santos</td>
<td>May 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Ricardo Martinelli</td>
<td>May 2014</td>
</tr>
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Notes: Chilean Presidential Elections: In the first round of voting on November 17, Michelle Bachelet received 46.67 percent of the vote in the first round, in comparison to Evelyn Matthei, who received 25.01 percent of the vote. Bachelet won the most votes but fell short of obtaining an absolute majority. In the runoff election held on December 15, 2013, Bachelet won 62 percent of the vote. She assumes office on March 11, 2014.

In Honduras, Juan Orlando Hernandez, head of the Honduras Congress, defeated Xiomara Castro, the wife of former leader Manuel Zelaya. Castro is contesting the election results.

In El Salvador and Costa Rica, both elections appeared to be headed for second round run-offs at the time this article was headed for press. Second Round run-offs are scheduled for March 9 and April 6, respectively.
try’s leaders must deal with inflation and maintain investment and employment. The violent riots in 2013 over bus fare hikes are an example of the consequences of such reform attempts. In Venezuela, the Bolivarian revolution depended on oil revenue to fuel its reforms. This has, however, come to an end. Recent elections in Venezuela were characterized by marginally democratic or nondemocratic maneuvers by the government. The government has implemented economically risky plans such as nationalizing industries and reducing consumer prices to appeal to win votes. Trinkunas also expressed concern over economic changes that will take place in Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentina.

There is a silver lining associated with this dark economic forecast—one that might represent the best news for Latin American democracies. Despite uneven and lackluster economic performance over the past decade, democracy has endured in Latin America. Public support for democracy has shown surprising resilience despite persistent economic inequalities that are the most severe of any region in the world. According to Mitchell Seligson, Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project, although Latin American citizens are dissatisfied with failures of economic and political performance and, as a result, may opt to throw poorly performing parties and leaders out of office, they are not willing to abandon faith in democracy itself.\(^3\)

In other words, governmental instability in Latin America has been rampant, but even weak competitive regimes rarely succumb to breakdowns. Democratically elected presidents or their constitutional successors have resigned under pressure or been ousted in Argentina (1989, 2001, and 2002); Haiti (1991); Brazil (1992); Venezuela (1993); Guatemala (1993); Ecuador (1997, 2000, and 2005);

This may portend that the level of democratic consolidation in Latin American countries has reached a threshold that permits political resilience in the face of crisis. Serious economic or political problems can be dealt with democratically through orderly and effective means. This should deepen the level of democratic consolidation because citizens demonstrate faith in the democratic process and thereby seek to solve problems through democratic institutions, rather than extra-legal methods.

Ironically, the byproduct of economic problems and respect for democratic processes has permitted the region to adopt populist policies. Leftist populist governments came to power throughout the region, often led by victims of the former military governments. Recently, the trend toward leftist, populist governments has deepened. Since 2000, in South America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela have elected leftist presidents. Leftist populist leaders create their own challenges for Latin American democracies. According to Seligson, populism involves a core belief that the institutions of liberal democracy, especially legislatures and courts, are anachronistic, inefficient, and inconsistent with the true expression of “the people’s will.” Instead, populist leaders typically propose to “listen to the people.” Populism often can mean ignoring or marginalizing fundamental democratic guarantees of civil liberties, especially free expression and the right to due process. Recent crackdowns on the press in Venezuela and Ecuador come to mind. According to survey results
from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), leftists are less likely to support democracy than rightists.\textsuperscript{5}

Weak institutions in a populist nation are an especially corrosive combination. Panelist Robert Izurieta believes that populist leaders can exploit these weaknesses for their own political advantage. Leaders don’t observe the division of power, weak institutions are unable to challenge executive power, and consequently elections aren’t always fair. Johanna Mendelson Forman added that many presidents pursue a concentration of power by eliminating checks and balances. Subsequently, they are able to maintain control that could slip away despite economic problems.

This is especially important in a region that is considered the most unequal in the world. Many Latin Americans believe that elites in their countries enjoy disproportionate advantages. The wealthy can influence how policies are made and implemented, a term Dietrich Rueschemeyer labeled an “equality gap.” According to Rueschemeyer, “There is little question that the views of the better educated and of people in high-status occupations have a disproportionate influence on the production of culture as well as on its diffusion through education and mass communications.” Additionally, these groups can use their status and influence over education, cultural productions, and mass communications to shape the views, values, and preferences of subordinate groups.\textsuperscript{6}

Where individual countries are hesitant or reluctant to comport themselves democratically, the regional community has adopted universal practices that provide standards for all nations to follow. For example, a number of international treaties establish a minimum standard of democracy, rule of law, and human rights, obligatory requirements for signatory nations. Countries that do not abide by treaty requirements are liable to be censored from the organization. The Organization of American States (OAS) also provides guidance on democratic events and assistance to develop political institutions. For example, according to Harold Trinkunas, the OAS created a rigorous electoral observance process. The OAS programs subsequently turned election observing into a refined science by codifying election observation, setting up evaluation and monitoring standards, and practicing early intervention through mediation, negotiation, and technical support.

Two recent examples are provided. In 1993, Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano attempted a self-coup. He closed Congress and the judiciary, censored the press, and declared himself dictator for two-and-a-half years. The OAS condemned the coup, however, and subsequent international pressure forced Serrano to abdicate and seek asylum in El Salvador. In 2009, the Honduran military overthrew President Mel Zelaya for overstepping his Constitutional authority. The OAS called it a military coup and suspended Honduras from the group.

Sadly, the economic and security crises of Latin America have been beyond the capacity of many nations with underdeveloped institutions to handle. Consequently, according to Harold Trinkunas, there was a stronger consensus on democracy when the Inter-American Democratic Charter was signed in 1999 than there is today. Faith in democracy will worsen as deficiencies in institutions be-
come more apparent in the Hemisphere due to a lack of money. Consequently, political incumbents will have difficulty maintaining legitimacy as economic and political conditions deteriorate.

Notes

5 Seligson, 87.
Análise Exploratória da Securitização Militar do Ciberespaço nos EUA, Brasil e Canadá

Gills Lopes

RESUMO

O tema deste trabalho gira em torno dos impactos da securitização militar do ciberespaço na política internacional do século XXI. Escolhe-se como objeto de estudo a defesa cibernética, justamente por ela possibilitar inferências sobre a materialização politico-institucional de tal temática, buscando-se sustentação na teoria da securitização, proposta pela Escola de Copenhague. Nesse sentido, a presente obra busca: (i) identificar as principais ameaças (ciber)existentes para o setor militar, revelando o porquê de esse processo se intensificar no século XXI; (ii) projetar quais as condições para tal securitização; e (iii) explicar os efeitos dela na política internacional, com fulcro nos casos estadunidense, brasileiro e canadense. Para tal, engendra-se o Espectro da Securitização Militar do Ciberespaço (ESMC), um framework de análise baseado na teoria da securitização com foco na defesa cibernética num determinado tempo e espaço. Quanto à revisão da literatura, autores brasileiros e estrangeiros de Ciência Política e de Relações Internacionais figuram majoritariamente no corpo deste trabalho. No que se refere à metodologia, utiliza o estilo qualiquantitativo de análise, no que pese à utilização de entrevistas, estudos de caso, análise de discursos e documentos. Sua conclusão busca corroborar a hipótese de que, além de haver a securitização do ciberespaço pelo setor militar, tal processo tem reflexos na política internacional hodierna. Como consequência, é possível situar os três cases nesse ESMC.

Introdução

Defesa cibernética, ataques cibernéticos, guerra cibernética e armas cibernéticas são termos cada vez mais presentes em noticiários internacionais, artigos acadêmicos sobre segurança internacional e falas de autoridades, mundo afora.

Porém, entender simplesmente o que são tais objetos e onde eles podem ser empregados no campo de batalha sem atinar para como eles são transformados em questões “de segurança” tornaria este trabalho limitado.

As ações militares no ciberespaço não se dão abruptamente. Um amálgama entre a experiência militar com guerras informacional e eletrônica e a assimilação de novas ameaças parece dar o tom dessa empreitada cibernética, que passa
a incluir planejamento estratégico e controle operacional – elementos *ex-ante* e *ex-post*, respectivamente, da defesa cibernética – em seu intento. O presente trabalho enfatiza principalmente a fase anterior às ações militares no ciberespaço, enquadlando-a no processo de securitização.

As próximas subseções introduzem o estado da arte do tema ora em tela, ofertando um framework para analisá-los.

**Situando as unidades de análise**

*A política internacional do século XXI*: poder militar e política internacional sempre andaram juntos (Miyamoto 1998, 278). A nova ordem mundial engendrada pelo fim da Guerra Fria (Buzan et al. 1998, 7) se baseia, dentre outros, nos principais desdobramentos da Revolução da Informação que propicia a interconectividade entre pessoas físicas e jurídicas num grau inimaginável (Arquilla e Ronfeldt 1993, 141-143). Não é novo o fato de que, ao longo da história humana, os avanços tecnológicos terem ajudado a moldar percepções, estratégias e a própria organização militar (Arquilla e Ronfeldt 1993, 141-142). Porém, assim como no mundo real, o virtual também projeta novas possibilidades de interação social e de inferência acerca do poder político. No alvorecer do século XXI, as ameaças cibernéticas transbordam do setor societário e atingem os político e militar. A consequência para a política internacional hodierna, dentre outras, é a formulação de políticas exteriores e de defesa nacional que elevam o *status* das ameaças cibernéticas à alçada de assuntos pertinentes à segurança nacional.

**Segurança cibernética e defesa cibernética**: segurança cibernética se refere ao combate e à prevenção dos chamados crimes cibernéticos na esfera da segurança pública. Já defesa cibernética significa a salvaguarda da segurança nacional contra ameaças ciberexistenciais, dizendo, portanto, respeito ao setor militar.

**Infraestruturas críticas**: de acordo com a literatura consultada, em que pese Clarke e Knake (2012), as infraestruturas críticas de um Estado são o principal alvo que pode potencializar uma guerra cibernética. Daí, a necessidade de a defesa cibernética as abarcar. Para fins metodológicos, utiliza-se a definição fornecida pelo governo canadense: as infraestruturas críticas são o conjunto de processos, sistemas, instalações, tecnologias, redes, bens e serviços necessários para garantir a saúde, a segurança ou o bem-estar da sua população, bem como a eficácia do seu governo (Canadá 2009, 2).

**Guerra cibernética**: guerra cibernética não é a mesma coisa que guerra informacional ou guerra eletrônica (Arquilla e Ronfeldt 1993, 146). *Grosso modo*, guerra informacional diz respeito ao setor societário, em que governo e/ou meios de comunicação e/ou lobbies desempenha(m) objetiva(m) “desinformar” determinado público (Arquilla e Ronfeldt 1993, 141-146). Já guerra eletrônica é o bloqueio ou ruptura de sinais de comunicação no espectro eletromagnético. O conceito de guerra cibernética ainda não está pacificado, pois a literatura diverge sobre sua natureza. Porém, é possível encontrar relações entre os autores, sobretudo no que tange aos danos a infraestruturas críticas baseadas em redes e a criação de documentos e instituições militares para essa área. Numa visão mais holística, Bezerra (2009) afirma que a guerra cibernética é a utilização da Internet como fer-
ramenta de ação militar. Arquilla e Ronfeldt (1993, 30), por sua vez, entendem que essa é apenas mais uma forma de os Estados guerrearem. Já para Clarke e Knake (2012, xi), ela é uma alternativa à guerra convencional. Alternativa esta que pode, de facto, aumentar a ocorrência de combates tradicionais, cujos principais alvos são majoritariamente civis, justamente por estes dependerem de infraestruturas críticas baseadas em NTIC. Como se percebe, formam-se duas correntes: uma sobre o papel revolucionário e a outra acerca da natureza da guerra cibernética na seara castrense. Porém, como aponta Richard A. Clarke (apud Ramirez, 2010), a questão principal não é saber as chances de uma guerra cibernética ocorrer, mas as reais chances de ocorrer uma guerra.

O processo de securitização: reflexos para o campo cibernético

Buzan et al. (1998, vii) salientam que segurança significa sobreviver em face a ameaças existenciais, porém o que constitui uma ameaça existencial não é o mesmo entre os setores (Buzan et al.1998, 27).

Segurança é uma prática autorreferencial, ou seja, algo só se torna uma questão de segurança não por que uma ameaça existencial realmente existe, mas por que ela é dramatizada e apresentada como tal (Buzan et al.1998, 24). Assim, um ator securitizador reivindica uma necessidade e um direito de tratá-la por intermédio de meios extraordinários (Buzan et al.1998, 26). É nesse sentido que securitização se torna sinônimo de ato de fala (speech act), ou seja, ao falar, algo é feito (Buzan et al.1998, 26).

Com tal definição de segurança, os teóricos da Escola de Copenhague elaboraram um espectro, contendo três tipos de política de segurança: não politizada, quando não está na pauta do Estado ou não se encontra nas esferas públicas de discussão e decisão; politizada, quando é parte de política pública, requerendo decisão e alocação de recursos do governo; e securitizada, quando a questão é apresentada como uma ameaça existencial, exigindo medidas emergenciais e justificando ações fora do escopo normal do processo político Buzan et al.1998, 23-24).

Todavia, deve-se observar que o fato de um discurso/argumento apresentar uma questão como uma ameaça existencial para um objeto referente não cria, per se, securitização. Isto é o que Buzan et al. (1998, 25) denominam “movimento securitizador”. Para que haja, de facto, securitização, mais um estágio é necessário: a audiência deve aceitar a questão como tal.

A Figura 1 demonstra graficamente os níveis desse processo político.

Análise exploratória da securitização militar do ciberespaço: os casos estadunidense, brasileiro e canadense

A seleção dos casos se explica, primeiro, pelo fato de que, a partir do momento em que se opta pela teoria da securitização, avalia-se cada Estado de maneira bem meticulosa, buscando compreender não só os dados em si, mas também os processos políticos pelos quais eles são gerados – pois é o fato político que realmente importa para a teoria da securitização.

Os três países selecionados estão entre as 10 maiores economias do mundo,
possuem grandes territórios e desempenham papéis de protagonistas no cenário internacional.

A seleção de EUA, Brasil e Canadá se dá também por razões geopolíticas e logísticas: o fato de os três Estados se situarem no mesmo continente possibilita um recorte geral dos principais e maiores atores estatais americanos, no que tange à defesa cibernética; e a possibilidade de realizar pesquisas *in loco*, tendo acesso a fontes ligadas diretamente aos temas em apreço.

Quanto aos critérios que levam à seleção de um estilo misto de análise, atribui-se à influência da própria complexidade do tema e dos *frameworks* utilizado e proposto.

Buzan et al. (1998, 30) afirmam que mensurar objetivamente a securitização de uma questão é quase impossível, haja vista que cada Estado possui seus próprios limites para definir o que é uma ameaça. Entretanto, King et al. (1996, 5), por sua vez, asseveram que se quisermos entender o mundo em rápida mudança social, temos de incluir informações que não podem ser facilmente quantificadas, bem como as que podem.

Propõe-se, então, o Espectro de Securitização Militar do Ciberespaço (ESMC), que leva em conta aspectos intersubjetivos e objetivos.

Como observado por Buzan et al. (1998, 25, 30), a forma mais eficaz de se estudar securitização é por meio do discurso e de abordagens não objetivas. Esse discurso se traduz, aqui, por meio de argumentos de formuladores de políticas e de documentos oficiais. Em alguns casos, é possível constatar relações entre eles.

Os meios aqui utilizados se baseiam em índices, já que não há como mensurar

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**Figura 1 – Espectro da securitização, segundo a Escola de Copenhague**

*Fonte: Lopes, 2013, 43.*
a securitização em si mesma, mas sobre o grau/nível de politização em determinado elemento correlato ou, ainda, sobre certos operadores desses elementos, na fase mais extremada da politização, que é a securitização.

Assim, três índices ajudam nessa empreitada – o virtual, o documental e o institucional – e, ao final da análise, busca-se enquadrar os casos, no ESMC.

**O Índice de Politização Virtual da Defesa Cibernética (IPvDC)**

Este índice possui o seguinte problema: no século XXI, é possível constatar um aumento do interesse militar pelas ameaças cibernéticas, tendo como plataforma o próprio ciberespaço?

Assim, a amostra se compõe dos sítios virtuais oficiais das Forças Armadas e Ministérios da Defesa de cada um dos Estados, agrupados por ano.

A metodologia de análise consiste em medir a quantidade de palavras (dramatização) relacionadas à defesa cibernética que foi produzida e/ou adicionada na/à amostra, no que pese aos primeiros anos do século XXI.

Para a extração dos dados, prosseguem-se as seguintes escolhas:

a) motor de busca que filtre os resultados por ano e domínio. Assim, apenas o Google Search se credencia.

b) palavras-chave que estejam de acordo com (i) a temática deste trabalho e (ii) o(s) idioma(s) oficial(is) dos três países. Excetuando-se “Stuxnet”, que é um nome próprio, as palavras-chave selecionadas, por Estado e ordem alfabética, são:

- para os EUA: cyber arsenal, cyber attack, cyber attacks, cyber defense, cyber war, cyber warfare, cyber wars, cyber weapon, cyber weapons, cyberarsenal, cyberattack, cyberattacks, cyberdefense, cybernetic war, cybernetic warfare, cybernetic wars, cyberspace, cyberwar, cyberwarfare, cyberwars, cyberweapon e cyberweapons, totalizando 22 palavras-chave;

- para o Brasil: arma cibernética, armas cibernéticas, ataque cibernético, ataques cibernéticos, ciber arsenal, ciber defesa, ciberataque, ciberataques, ciberdefesa, ciberespaço, ciberguerra, ciberguerras, cyber arsenal, cyberataque, cyberataques, cyberespaço, cyberguerra, cyberguerras, defesa cibernética, espaço cibernético, guerra cibernética e guerras cibernéticas, totalizando 22 palavras-chave; e

- para o Canadá: arsenal cybernétique, arme cybernétique, armes cybernétiques, attaque cibernétique, attaques cibernétiques, cyber arme, cyber armes, cyber attaque, cyber attaques, cyber défense, cyber guerre, cyber guerres, cyberarme, cyberrarmes, cyberdéfense, cyberdéfense, cyberguerre, cyberguerres, defence cybernetic, défense cybernétique, guerre cybernétique e guerres cybernétiques, totalizando 23 palavras-chave.

c) URLs militares oficiais que abranjam o ministério da defesa e as forças singulares dos três Estados:
• para o Brasil: .mil.br, .exercito.gov.br e .defesa.gov.br;
• para os EUA: .mil e .defense.gov; e
• para o Canadá: forces.ca e forces.gc.ca.

d) para cada um dos Estados, realiza-se uma pesquisa com as mesmas palavras-chave.

É preciso, então, transformar as palavras-chave em termos de busca a serem lidos pelo Google. Para isso, sabe-se que: (i) o uso de aspas duplas permite encontrar o termo exato; (ii) em linguagem SQL (Structured Query Language) – de cuja sintaxe os comandos de busca do Google se baseiam –, a conjunção disjuntiva “ou” se expressa por seu equivalente em inglês e em maiúsculo “OR”; e (iii) para se pesquisar apenas em determinado URL, é preciso inserir o comando “site:” antes do endereço eletrônico, por exemplo “site:.mil.br”.

A Figura 2 mostra a técnica por trás da extração dos dados para este Índice.

Figura 2 – Técnica de extração dos dados para o IPvDC
Realiza-se a análise e validação dos dados por meio do chamado teste *t* para dados pareados\(^1\), o qual busca falsear a seguinte hipótese nula ou de trabalho \((H_0)\): em média, os sítios virtuais oficiais militares tendem a não alterar seu interesse pelas questões de defesa cibernética, no século XXI. Por conseguinte, a hipótese alternativa \((H_1)\) é a de que: com o passar do século XXI, o interesse da população em estudo aumenta. Em termos estatísticos, tem-se que:

- \(H_0: \mu_{\text{posterior}} = \mu_{\text{anterior}}\); e
- \(H_1: \mu_{\text{posterior}} > \mu_{\text{anterior}}\).

onde:

- \(\mu_{\text{anterior}}\): interesse médio nos sítios virtuais do ano anterior; e
- \(\mu_{\text{posterior}}\): interesse médio nos sítios virtuais do ano posterior.

Tendo em vista que os dados a serem obtidos são agrupados em 12 intervalos que correspondem aos 12 primeiros anos do século XXI mais o ano 2000 – que dará a primeira parcial do ano 2001 –, tem-se que a amostra observada é 12 \((n = 12)\). Nesse sentido, é possível comparar se o interesse se modifica sistematicamente a cada ano ou não.

Com a diferença \((D)\), é possível realizar a equação da estatística do teste *t* para dados pareados \((Equação 1)\), que verifica se uma tendência pode ou não ser explicada apenas pela casualidade (Barbetta 1994, p. 205).

\[
(1)
\]

\[
t = \frac{\bar{D} \cdot \sqrt{n}}{S_D}
\]

Assim, para que \(H_0\) se confirme, os valores da média das diferenças observadas \((\bar{D})\) devem se aproximar de zero. Para se chegar a isso, é preciso obter e o desvio padrão \((S_D)\) entre elas, ou seja, as *Equações 2 e 3*, respectivamente.

\[
(2)
\]

\[
\bar{D} = \frac{\Sigma D}{n}
\]

\[
(3)
\]

\[
S_D = \sqrt{\frac{\Sigma D^2 - n \cdot \bar{D}^2}{n - 1}}
\]

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Com a informação do teste $t$, parte-se para o último passo que é auferir a probabilidade de significância ($P$). Como $n = 11$, o grau de liberdade ($gl$) da amostra é $10$, pois $gl = n - 1$. Assim, utilizando-se a Tabela 1, projeta-se uma coordenada cartesiana, onde X representa o valor do $gl$ (10) e Y leva em conta o valor mais próximo do $t$ encontrado. Como $P$, para a presente amostra, é de aproximadamente $0,10$, tem-se que $\alpha = 0,10 = 10\%$, ou seja, o $t$ tem que se aproximar de 1,363 pela esquerda. Portanto, 1,363 está na coluna 0,10 da variável Área na cauda superior, que, em outras palavras, corresponde ao $P$.

Para a composição deste índice, utiliza-se o resultado do teste $t$ de cada Estado, se e somente se ele for aprovado quanto à sua probabilidade de significância ($P$), que, para este índice é de 0,10. Caso um Estado não passe nessa prova, seu escore para o presente índice será 0 (zero).

A Tabela 2 apresenta todos os resultados obtidos da pesquisa, agrupando-os ao final.

Já a Tabela 3 mostra os resultados da diferença desse interesse.

Com tais informações, é possível aplicar as Equações 1, 2 e 3, e obter os resultados, conforme a Figura 3.

**O Índice de Politização Documental da Defesa Cibernética (IPdDC)**

Busca-se auferir este índice por meio da análise qualitativa de documentos oficiais emanados pelo setor militar ou a ele endereçados e que se refiram à defesa cibernética.

Aquí, três critérios são assegurados: possuir documento oficial nacional de

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**Tabela 1 – Distribuição t de Student**

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<th>$gl$</th>
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<th>0,10</th>
<th>0,25</th>
<th>Área na cauda superior</th>
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<td>2,132</td>
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**Fonte:** UFSC 2011 (com adaptações).
Tabela 2 – Resultados das buscas nos sítios virtuais militares de EUA, Brasil e Canadá (2000-2012)

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<th>EUA_defense.gov</th>
<th>EUA_MIL</th>
<th>BR_A_mil</th>
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<th>BRA_defesa.gov.br</th>
<th>BRA_MIL</th>
<th>CAN_forces.ca</th>
<th>CAN_forces.gc.ca</th>
<th>CAN_MIL</th>
<th>TOTA_L_MIL</th>
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Fonte: Lopes 2013, 125 (com adaptações).

Tabela 3 – Cálculo da diferença de interesse virtual militar de EUA, BRA e CAN na defesa cibernética (2000–2012)

<table>
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<th>Período</th>
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<tr>
<td>(D_{X_{anterior} - X_{posterior}})</td>
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Fonte: Lopes 2013, passim (com adaptações).
### Figura 3 – Estatísticas referentes ao IPvDC

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<th>FIIA anterior</th>
<th>FIIA posterior</th>
<th>FIIA TOTAL</th>
<th>$\bar{D}_2$</th>
<th>BRASIL anterior</th>
<th>BRASIL posterior</th>
<th>BRASIL TOTAL</th>
<th>$\bar{D}_2$</th>
<th>CANADÁ anterior</th>
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<th>CANADÁ TOTAL</th>
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<td>(2)</td>
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<td>(5)</td>
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### Média (D-linha)

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<td>0,10 aprovado</td>
<td>0,25 rejeitado</td>
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*Fonte: Lopes, 2013, 127.*
defesa que abarque, ainda que de maneira geral, o tema em tela (2 pontos); pos-
suir documento oficial nacional de defesa cibernética que inclua medidas ex-
traordinárias, como criação de instituições e delegação de poder nessa área (3
pontos); e conter, no corpo textual de tal(is) documento(s), referência a armas 
cibernéticas – como o Stuxnet – e a ataques cibernéticos por parte de países es-
trangeiros, com o fito de potencializar a dramatização (1 ponto) \(^2\). Observa-se que,
pela pontuação, um documento de cunho geral que contenha tal(is) termo(s) se 
equipara a um documento específico. Mais uma vez, o que é testado aqui não é a 
eficácia das propostas do(s) documento(s), mas o poder de alcance do seu ato de 
faixa em dramatizar uma ameaça ciberexistencial.

Quando o valor deste Índice é zero, diz-se que a ameaça ciberexistencial não 
está sequer em pauta (não politizada). Quando a pontuação atinge 2, diz-se que 
tal questão é politizada. O Estado que conseguir um escore neste índice acima de 
2 demonstra ocorrer uma politização do tipo movimento securitizador.

**O Índice de Politização Institucional da Defesa Cibernética (IPiDC)**

Buzan et al. (1998, 27) apregoam que a securitização pode ser institucionalizada 
como uma resposta urgente a um dado tipo de ameaça persistente ou recorrente. 
Segundo esses autores, no setor militar tal manifestação se torna ainda mais vi-
sível.

É nesse sentido comprobatório que o presente índice opera qualitativamente, 
elencando as principais instituições militares de defesa cibernética em funciona-
mento.

Assim, excluem-se instituições militares de guerra eletrônica e de telemática, 
суja atuação é tão abrangente que acaba por abarcar assuntos relacionados à de-
fesa cibernética.

Ademais, sabe-se que: (i) Brasil possui três forças singulares; (ii) EUA e Ca-
nadá têm mais de três cada um (Estados Unidos [20--]); e (iii) todos eles também 
possuem um ministério da defesa – embora, no caso canadense, seu ministério de 
segurança pública jogue papel relevante também nos assuntos de defesa.

Para uma padronização dos resultados, realizam-se os seguintes aperfeiço-
amentos: (i) aglutinam-se as respostas do *US Marine Corps* com as do *US Navy*; e
(ii) omitem-se as respostas do *US Coast Guard*, haja vista que ele é a única força 
singular estadunidense que não se reporta ao EUA-DoD, mas sim ao *U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security* (Estados Unidos [20--]) \(^3\).

Assim, o IPiDC busca auferir uma resposta categórica binária – sim ou não – 
para cada ministério da defesa ou órgão centralizador (0 ou 3 pontos) e força 
singular (0 ou 1 ponto). Nessa visão, um Estado que possua apenas um órgão 
centralizador de defesa cibernética equivale a ter três singulares.

A pontuação, portanto, total vai de 0 a 6 pontos, sendo que a partir de 1 é pos-
sível apontar que há um movimento securitizador. As respostas são obtidas por
intermédio dos documentos oficiais dos Estados.

**O caso estadunidense**

Gagnon (2008, 48-49) afirma que a importância das atividades *web* nos EUA tem
levado suas autoridades a desenvolver doutrinas estratégicas sobre a Internet, bem como sobre suas possibilidades e potenciais ameaças.

Embora os EUA sejam a única nação cujas autoridades de segurança admitem publicamente o uso de armas cibernéticas em recentes conflitos (Gagnon 2008, 51), essa é uma possibilidade que, por exemplo, o Brasil só admite publicamente no final de 2012.

**O IPvDC estadunidense**

De acordo com a Tabela 3, observa-se que há um interesse militar anormal no ano de 2001, ano dos atentados às Torres Gêmeas. Como os ataques acontecem na metade do segundo semestre daquele ano, sua reverberação só ocorre entre o final de 2001 e o primeiro semestre de 2002, trazendo consigo perspectivas sobre os futuros focos de ameaças terroristas aos EUA, incluindo-se aí o ciberespaço. Daí o porquê de os valores referentes a 2002 serem maiores que os de 2003, ano em que eles se normalizam – se se tomar por base os valores a partir de 2004.

Para se ter uma ideia, o número de páginas/documentos virtuais que cita, pelo menos, um dos 67 termos buscados, em 2001, só é superado, em média, mais de seis anos depois. Mesmo assim, um possível aumento do interesse militar se mostra crescente, pois, a partir de 2003, os valores tendem a incrementar em média 7,7% a.a.

Percebe-se que a diferença final (Tabela 3) apresenta um valor muito alto. Utilizando um diagrama de pontos, é possível analisar a variação dessa amostra (Figura 4).

De porte dessas informações e utilizando o teste $t$, obtém-se o valor de 1,55 pontos para o caso estadunidense (cf. Figura 3). Após se constatar que seu $P = 0,10$, aprova-se, então, tal escore para o presente índice. Em outras palavras:

![Figura 4 – Variação da diferença do interesse médio virtual militar dos EUA (2000-2012)](image)

*Fonte: Elaboração própria.*
assume-se com 90% de certeza que há um interesse sistemático sobre temas que envolvem a defesa cibernética, por parte dos sítios virtuais oficiais militares dos EUA.

**O IPdDC estadunidense**


Os EUA lançam a NSS, no sentido de atualizar as últimas estratégias de segurança nacional dos dois governos W. Bush. De pleno, a ela afirma que estratégias para a proteção das redes cibernéticas estadunidenses constituem uma das mais altas prioridades de segurança nacional (Estados Unidos 2010b, 4).

A NSS busca conscientizar a nação e a esfera pública estadunidenses de que o ciberespaço faz parte de um conjunto de setores dependentes que estão na mira de inimigos, e dentro das chamadas ameaças assimétricas (Estados Unidos 2010b, 17). Assim, essa Estratégia considera o ciberespaço como um domínio – ao lado do espaço, mar, ar e terra (Estados Unidos 2010b).

Até este ponto, a NSS faz levantamentos referentes à *segurança cibernética*, e não à *defesa cibernética*. Entretanto, os EUA consideram outros Estados como potenciais inimigos que tiram proveito do ambiente cibernético para tentar invadir/sabotar suas infraestruturas críticas digitais ou mesmo obter informações privilegiadas (Estados Unidos 2010b, 27). Essa potencialização da dramatização estadunidense lhe garante, pelo menos, mais 1 ponto neste Índice.

Assim, a NSS prevê duas formas de prevenção a tais ameaças: (i) investir em pessoal e tecnologia; e (ii) reforçar as parcerias entre as esferas pública e privada nacionais e internacionais, conforme já ocorre com alguns países da Ásia (Estados Unidos 2010b, 42).

Um ano após o lançamento da NSS, os EUA dão vida à SOC, no âmbito do DoD. Ela é fortemente influenciada pela NSS, citando-a frequentemente, e estando assim dividida:

- **Contexto estratégico**: demonstra pontos fortes e oportunidades do DoD no ciberespaço, elencando as principais ameaças cibernéticas à segurança nacional, incluindo-se aí potenciais governos estrangeiros (Estados Unidos 2011a, 2-4); e

- **Cinco iniciativas estratégicas** em que o DoD deve: (i) tratar o ciberespaço como um domínio operacional, de modo que tome completa vantagem do potencial ciberespacial; (ii) empregar novos conceitos operacionais de defesa para proteger suas redes e sistemas; (iii) fazer parcerias com outros departamentos e agências nacionais, bem como acionar a esfera privada para permitir uma estratégia de segurança cibernética que envolva todo o governo; (iv) relacionar-se com aliados e parceiros internacionais para fortalecer a segurança cibernética coletiva; e (v) alavancar a engenhosidade da nação por meio de uma excepcional força de trabalho e rápida inovação tecnológica (Estados Unidos 2011a, 5-12).
Ademais, a SOC menciona que uma instituição voltada à defesa cibernética será responsável por garantir grande parte do que é exposto e também organizar as ações das suas Forças.

**O IPiDC estadunidense**

Em 2009, um Subcomando responsável por coordenar os órgãos de defesa cibernética é ativado, o *U.S. Cyber Command* ou USCYBERCOM (Estados Unidos 2010a; 2011a, 5), que já nasce composto por: *Army Forces Cyber Command; 24th US Air Force; Fleet Cyber Command*; e *Marine Forces Cyber Command* (Estados Unidos 2010a).

Nesse sentido, os EUA preenchem todas as variáveis do IPiDC, obtendo 6 pontos.

**O caso brasileiro**


Quanto a essa iniciativa, o professor da AMAN, Walfredo Ferreira Neto (mensagem de e-mail para o autor, 14 de agosto de 2011) informa que é favorável, e, ainda, afirma que a especialidade arma de Comunicações é a que deva ter uma maior carga horária relativa à cibernética.

Em fase de preparação para sediar grandes eventos – Copa do Mundo 2014 e Olimpíadas 2016 –, o governo brasileiro amplia ainda mais a discussão sobre as ameaças ciberexistenciais.

**O IPvDC brasileiro**

Tendo em mente os resultados das buscas virtuais (*Tabela 2*) e de suas diferenças
(Tabela 3), é possível analisar a variação do interesse militar brasileiro, expressada em seus sítios virtuais militares, conforme a Figura 5.

Como se retrata na Figura 5, o caso brasileiro aparenta ter graficamente um interesse crescente em politizar militarmente o ciberespaço.

Essas informações são suficientes para auferir o escore provisório brasileiro para o presente índice: 1,64 pontos, que se confirma somente após verificar que o seu P = 0,10 (Figura 3). Portanto, o IPvDC brasileiro é 1,64.

O IPdDC brasileiro

Leva-se em conta aqui dois Documentos índice: a Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END) e a Política Cibernética de Defesa (PCD), de 2008 e 2012, respectivamente.

Antemão, frisa-se que o próprio Ministério da Defesa (MD) já trata especificamente do termo “guerra cibernética” desde 2008, quando incorpora oficialmente a abreviação “G Ciber” ao jargão militar tupiniquim (Brasil 2008b, 71). Isso não quer dizer que as guerras convencionais são subvalorizadas por parte desse Estado; pelo contrário, a END assume que a tecnologia, por mais avançada que seja, jamais será alternativa ao combate, rejeitando a tentação de ver na alta tecnologia alternativa ao combate (Brasil 2008a).

O principal objetivo da END é modernizar a estrutura de defesa nacional. Para isso, busca-se atuar em três eixos estruturantes: (i) reorganização das Forças Armadas; (ii) reestruturação da indústria brasileira de material de defesa; e (iii) política de composição dos efetivos das Forças Armadas (Brasil 2008a).

O primeiro eixo estratégico, dentre outros, enumera 23 diretrizes estratégicas, as quais são atinentes a cada uma das três forças singulares. Para lograr essas diretrizes, a END dá novas posturas às Forças Armadas.

A sexta dessas 23 diretrizes elenca três setores estratégicos – o nuclear, o espacial e o cibernético –, ou seja, três domínios imprescindíveis para a defesa nacional do País, uma vez que, segundo o próprio Documento, não é independente quem não domina tecnologias sensíveis, tanto para a defesa como para o desenvolvimento nacional (Brasil 2008a).

Cada força singular brasileira se responsabiliza, então, pelo desenvolvimento de um setor estratégico. O Exército Brasileiro se responsabiliza pelo setor cibernético, conforme a Figura 6.

Além disso, a END projeta a criação de uma organização encarregada de desenvolver a capacitação cibernética nos campos industrial e militar (Brasil 2008a), a qual é criada em 2010 e analisada na próxima subseção.

Em dezembro de 2012, o MD publica a Política Cibernética de Defesa (PCD).

Ao contrário do texto da END, o da PCD é assaz curto, haja vista que trata apenas de um dos inúmeros temas daquela.

Em linhas gerais, esse Documento específico busca orientar o MD quanto às atividades de defesa cibernética, no nível estratégico, e de guerra cibernética, nos níveis operacional e tático (Brasil 2012, 11).

Pela primeira vez, um documento oficial brasileiro afirma que o País pode não só se defender no ciberespaço, mas também atacar (Brasil 2011e, 11). Cita, ainda,
poder trabalhar na construção de suas próprias armas cibernéticas, a fim de proteger os ativos de informação da administração pública federal (Brasil 2012, 12).

O IPiDC brasileiro

Para se entender o papel do órgão militar encarregado de pensar estratégias de proteção às infraestruturas críticas brasileiras, torna-se necessário contextualizar sua criação, a qual se dá, por exemplo, de maneira diferente da do USCYBERCOM.

Embora a END esteja focada em ações estratégicas de médio e longo prazo, o CDCiber é engendrado em menos de dois anos da publicação da END.

Segundo o Comandante do CDCiber, General José Carlos dos Santos, R$ 10 milhões foram investidos, em 2010, para a implantação do Centro, e outro R$ 1,5 milhão fora estimado para o seu pleno funcionamento (Loyola 2011). Lupion (2011), ao entrevistar Coronel Luis Cláudio Gomes Gonçalves, afirma que, embora subordinado ao Exército Brasileiro, o CDCiber irá coordenar as ações de defesa cibernética das Forças Armadas brasileiras. Portanto, o CDCiber tem, pelo
menos até o final de 2012, o mesmo papel integrador que o USCYBERCOM.4

A fim de assegurar, de forma conjunta, o uso efetivo do espaço cibernético pelas Forças Armadas, a PCD visa, dentre outros, criar o Sistema Militar de Defesa Cibernética (SMDC) e um órgão centralizador para coordenar as ações das três forças no ciberespaço.

Essas implementações demandam recursos materiais e humanos, e a PCD atina para isso, ao informar que pretende criar cargos e funções específicos para o desenvolvimento do setor cibernético.

Assim, o IPiDC brasileira é de 1 ponto.

O caso canadense

Desde os atentados de 2001 e a consequente política global da Guerra ao Terror, vê-se que a cooperação na área de segurança entre Canadá e EUA se adapta totalmente às ameaças do século XXI (Paquin 2009, 100). Não obstante, tal reformulação é vista como indecisa e mesmo inconsistente por parte da própria academia canadiana (Paquin 2009, 102). Talvez seja por isso que os assuntos de defesa e segurança cibernéticas, dentro do Canadá, não são totalmente separados, como se vê adiante.

O IPvDC canadense

Tendo em mente os valores expressos na Tabela 4, é possível analisar superficialmente a tendência canadense, conforme se vê na Figura 7.

O Canadá tende a manter seu interesse de forma homogênea até o final dos anos 2000, quando há dois picos totalmente contrários e simétricos, que colocam em xeque uma tentativa superficial de auferir se há, de facto, ou não, aumento de interesse. Porém, essas informações são imprescindíveis para a obtenção do escore provisório deste índice para o caso canadense: 1,18 (Figura 3).

Porém, como seu P = 0,25, automaticamente se aceita H, i.e., realmente, não

há interesse militar visto em seus sítios virtuais militares oficiais sobre os temas que envolvem a securitização do ciberespaço. Assim, seu escore é zero para o IPvDC.

O IPdDC canadense

Um adendo a este caso se faz imperioso: o documento canadense analisado e, portanto, validado para o presente índice é a *Stratégie de cybersécurité du Canada* (SCC), a qual é lançada em 2010. Ela não é uma publicação do ministério da defesa canadense (CAN-MD), mas sim do ministério de segurança pública.

Todavia, leva-se tal Documento em consideração, sob quatro alegações: (i) cita explicitamente o CAN-MD, tendo, portanto, reverberações no setor militar; (ii) é a única estratégia nacional voltada às ameaças cibernéticas daquele país; (iii) trata de assuntos aqui explanados, inclusive sobre a atuação de Estados estrangeiros no ciberespaço; e (iv) evidencia a não separação canadense entre defesa e segurança cibernéticas.

A SCC faz parte de um conjunto de estratégias que visa à concretude da *Stratégie nationale sur les infrastructures essentielles* (SNIE), de 2009, que, por sua vez, reflete as ponderações do *Un cadre de sécurité civile pour le Canada* (CSCC), cuja décima edição é lançada em 2011. Como já frisado, para auferir o escore canadense neste índice, considera-se apenas o SCC.

Evidencia-se que o SCC se refere apenas uma única vez, em todo seu corpo textual, às ameaças ciberespaciais, quando versa a questão dos perigos e catástrofes causados pelo ser humano – *d’origine anthropique* (Canadá 2011, 8).

Já a SNIE trata da natureza interconectada das infraestruturas críticas daquele país (Canadá 2009, 2). Por isso, seu principal objetivo é o de construir um Canadá mais seguro e resiliente, por meio de ações entre os 10 setores de infraestruturas críticas daquele país: energia e serviços públicos; finanças; alimentação; transporte; governo; TIC; saúde; água; segurança; e setor manufatureiro (Canadá 2009, 6).

Assim, ao estender, num só documento, o rol de setores a se resguardar, o Canadá não só abarca a esfera pública, mas também a privada para defender suas infraestruturas críticas.

Já a SCC se assemelha em parte à NSS estadunidense, no que tange à importância dada às infraestruturas críticas digitais para o dia a dia de suas sociedades.

As palavras do Ministro da Segurança Pública canadense, Vic Toews, assinalam que, dentre outros grupos de interesses, forças militares estrangeiras estão interessadas nos sistemas digitais canadenses (Canadá 2010, 1). Ele ainda informa que a SCC é o plano canadense para conhecer de perto as ameaças virtuais; daí o teor deste documento ser mais geralista, no que tange às ameaças cibernéticas.

Embora enfatize o combate ao crime cibernético – e, consequentemente, dê mais ênfase à segurança cibernética –, a SCC afirma que as ameaças cibernéticas mais sofisticadas vêm dos serviços militares e de inteligência de Estados estrangeiros com o intuito de obter algum tipo de vantagem (Canadá 2010, 5). Mais que isso, esse Documento adentra na seara da defesa cibernética ao tomar con-
hecimento de que determinados Estados assumem publicamente que os ataques cibernéticos são um elemento central às suas estratégias militares (Canadá 2010, 5).

Apenas uma subseção de meia páginade deste documento é dedicada à defesa cibernética, que termina por indicar que uma estratégia de defesa cibernética canadense está por vir (Carr 2012, 145).

Assim, com base em três pilares – proteger os sistemas governamentais, pro-mover parcerias públicas e privadas e ajudar os canadenses a estarem seguros online –, a SCC pretende fortalecer os sistemas virtuais de infraestrutura crítica, apoiar o crescimento econômico e proteger os canadenses quando eles se conectam uns aos outros e ao mundo (Canadá 2010, 7; Carr 2012, 244).

É importante ainda salientar que uma proposta de estratégia nacional de defesa cibernética é apresentada por Deibert (2012, 2), que busca demonstrar que o ciberespaço está mais para um ecossistema, um ambiente em que o Canadá deve se fazer presente, como outros países já fazem. Ele salienta ainda que, embora a SCC seja uma alternativa válida, ela é também tímida quanto a seus compromissos e especificidades, com muitas lacunas (Deibert 2012, 2). É uma conclusão a que aqui se chega também.

O IPdDC canadense

O Canadá ainda não tem um órgão voltado especificamente à defesa cibernética. Como já frisado, pela própria SCC, o CAN-MD buscará meios de melhor responder a futuros ataques cibernéticos.

Assim, o escore canadense nesse índice é zero.

Análise conjunta dos três casos


Tanto no Brasil quanto no Canadá, o interesse militar apresenta tendência homogênea; enquanto que nos EUA não.

Por fim, os escores finais dos três países para o IPvDC são apresentados na Tabela 4.

Quanto ao IPdDC, o Canadá e os EUA são os únicos que pontuam na variável sobre a dramatização explícita de guerras cibernéticas, em seus documentos ofici-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estado</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Situação</th>
<th>Pontuação</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUA</td>
<td>1,55</td>
<td>Aprovado</td>
<td>1,55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasil</td>
<td>1,64</td>
<td>Aprovado</td>
<td>1,64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadá</td>
<td>1,18</td>
<td>Rejeitado</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ais. Embora os canadenses não utilizem literalmente o termo “Stuxnet” – como o fazem, por exemplo, Alemanha e Holanda –, a dramatização militar evoca casos-chave na literatura da área, envolvendo ataques tradicionais conjugados com virtuais.

Já os EUA se mantêm na primeira posição, marcando seis pontos de seis possíveis para tal índice, conforme a Figura 8.

Transpondo os valores nominais do IPiDC para valores escalares, é possível realizar a pontuação de cada Estado, conforme exibe a Figura 9.

Como se vê, os EUA são o Estado que possui o maior IPiDC entre os três casos, marcando, pela segunda vez, pontos em todos os quatro atributos. Isso se deve, bem verdade, pelo fato de ele ser um potencial alvo de armas e ataques cibernéticos.

O Brasil demonstra interesse institucional pela defesa cibernética, oficialmente, desde 2008, quando a END prevê a criação do CDCiber, o qual é engendrado em 2010 e posto em funcionamento em 2012.

O Canadá, por outro lado, está num estágio que pode ser comparado ao que o Brasil apresentava um pouco antes do lançamento da END, em 2008. Os canadenses reconhecem os riscos e já sinalizam seu setor militar para que promova novos arranjos no âmbito da defesa cibernética. Todavia, seu escore neste índice é zero.

Após a extração e consequente análise do processo de politização da defesa...
cibernética nos três Estados, parte-se, finalmente, para o entendimento do ESMC.

O Espectro da Securitização Militar do Ciberespaço (ESMC)

Para se vislumbrar o ESMC, é preciso analisar os resultados dos três Índices de Politização da Defesa Cibernética conjuntamente. Somente assim, é possível dar vida ao ESMC.

Todavia, o total final dos Índices não garante, ainda, acesso ao ESMC. É preciso, porém, realizar algumas inferências e utilizar silogismos.

Primeiro, se se tomar como base o total dos Índices acima, os escores máximo e mínimo de cada índice são considerados locais; já os do total são globais.

Em segundo lugar, considera-se que: (i) o IPvDC é obtido ponderadamente; (ii) é possível um Estado obter escores máximos nos IPdDC e IPiDC e, mesmo assim, zerar o IPvDC; e (iii) os escores mínimos para se considerar uma questão politizada do tipo movimento securitizador são entre 3 e 6 (IPdDC) e 1 e 6 (IPiDC). Com isso, projeta-se 4 pontos como escore mínimo para se ter acesso ao ESMC, sendo pelo menos 3 pontos no IPdDC e 1 no IPiDC.

Terceiro, para se obter o escore do ESMC, procede-se com o seguinte: (i) reinicia-se a contagem em 0 a partir do quarto ponto do total final dos Índices; e (ii) zera-se o escore dos países com menos de 4 pontos.

**Tabela 5 – ESMC de EUA, Brasil e Canadá (2000–2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>País</th>
<th>IPvDC</th>
<th>IPdDC</th>
<th>IPiDC</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>ESMC</th>
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<td>6</td>
<td>13,55</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figura 9 – Projeção em barras do IPiDC de EUA, Brasil e Canadá (2000–2012)**

_Fonte:_ Lopes 2013, 96.
Por exemplo, os escores dos três casos analisados são transpostos para o ESMC, como mostra a Tabela 5.

Portanto, se, como a literatura aponta, os EUA se encontram atualmente na vanguarda da defesa cibernética, pode-se inferir que o valor de 9,55 pontos é um escore que se aproxima da pontuação máxima possível do ESMC.

Finalmente, chega-se à Figura 10, que apresenta o ESMC para os três casos aquí analisados.

Considerações finais

A partir da análise feita, pode-se deduzir que: (i) caso um processo de securitização ocorra num Estado e, uma vez isso se confirmando; (ii) esse processo estrangeiro influencie um processo político nacional de definir uma ameaça como “de segurança”; então (ii) é possível afirmar que esses dois processos intersubjetivos impactam objetivamente a política internacional – que nada mais é do que a interação objetiva, subjetiva e intersubjetiva de atores estatais fora do seu território nacional, conforme apregoam os teóricos da Escola de Copenhague.

Portanto, conclui-se que: (i) tanto EUA quanto Brasil securitizam ameaças ciberexistentes no século XXI; (ii) o Canadá, por outro lado, não securitiza, mas demonstra fortes indícios de seguir o mesmo caminho que os outros dois casos; mais que isso, (iii) o Canadá não só leva em consideração (elemento intersubjetivo) a forma com que outros atores agem no cenário internacional, como também, a partir deles, dramatiza suas próprias questões “de segurança” cibernética (elemento objetivo); e (iv) concorda-se com o fato de que os EUA estão na dianteira,
no que se refere ao desenvolvimento de capacidades cibernéticas.

Num mundo onde praticamente tudo hoje depende de sistemas em rede, Internet e computadores, ou seja, onde tudo está conectado, a defesa cibernética deixa de ser um enredo de filme de ficção científica e passa a ser política de Estado, no que pese à atualização de suas Forças Armadas, que é o braço armado do poder político (Fuccille 2007, 104).

Notes

1 Para este índice, vislumbra-se futuramente a utilização de modelos econométricos acerca de séries temporais, ao invés de testes para dados pareados.
2 Esse ponto extra pode ser obtido apenas uma vez, já que o objetivo final é um só: securitizar o ciberespaço.
3 Só quando há guerra no território estadunidense é que a Guarda Costeira se reporta ao DoD.
4 Essa afirmação é refutada com a publicação da PCD, vista na subseção anterior.
6 Coreia do Norte é um caso em potencial: mesmo com um restritíssimo acesso à Internet, seu setor/regime militar cibernético detém fortes credenciais entre a literatura especializada (cf. Clarke e Knake 2012; Carr 2012).
While the United Nations wrestles with peace efforts in Syria and the International Court of Justice resolves maritime border disputes between Peru and Chile, another regional institution quietly goes about its business. In spite of the relative lack of attention this institution receives, its decisions have shaped the political landscape in modern Latin America unlike any other organization in the history of the Western Hemisphere. As a result, a region with a sordid history of military governments and systemic human rights abuses has made immense strides toward democratic governance and individual freedoms.

The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR), together with its companion body, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), are autonomous organs of the Organization of American States (OAS). The IACHR promotes and protects human rights in the Western Hemisphere. Created by the OAS in 1959, the Commission has its headquarters in Washington, D.C. Together with the Court, established in 1979 in San Jose, Costa Rica, the Commission has emerged as a model of international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as of individual rights.

Since its inception, the Commission has made extraordinary progress. Through its 55-year history, it has processed over 12,000 cases. The Commission has held almost 140 sessions, some of them at its headquarters, others in different countries of the Americas. In the opinion of former Commission President Robert Goldman, no regional human rights body has had to confront more crises and endemic problems in more countries than the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

For a special report on the Commission, the Perry Center Publications Editor-in-Chief Pat Paterson met with Professor Richard Wilson, Director of the International Human Rights Law Clinic at the Washington College of Law, to discuss the most important cases or reports in the history of the Commission. Professor Wilson, a frequent lecturer at the Perry Center, is a longtime observer of the Commission and Court, where he and his students have presented more than 30 cases. Of the thousands of cases and reports of the Commission, Professor Wilson selected a few that he thought were especially important or influential.

IACHR Visit to Dominican Republic, 1965

The Commission’s visit to the Dominican Republic in 1965 came at an especially precarious time. President Trujillo had been assassinated on May 30, 1961. In February of 1963, a new government was democratically elected under Juan Bosch. However, Bosch’s proposed reforms were particularly unpopular with the military and landowners in the country. He was overthrown in a military coup in September 1963 after only seven months in office. A year and a half of turmoil followed. When another military rebellion occurred in April 1965, chaos ensued.
Those loyal to deposed President Juan Bosch fought against rebel military units. Other armed groups roamed the country. The United States responded by sending 42,000 U.S. Marines to the island to restore order.

At the behest of the Foreign Minister of the country, the Secretary General of the OAS asked the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights to visit Santo Domingo to investigate allegations of human rights violations by rival factions, including those against defenseless civilians. The Commission’s delegation arrived on June 1, 1965, in Santo Domingo. The representatives investigated cases of torture, political prisoners, prison conditions, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest, and disappearances. In addition, the Commission negotiated prisoner releases and secured the release and safe-passage from the country of various political leaders. The Commission, at the invitation of the Provisional Government of the Dominican Republic, remained in the country to observe and report on the presidential election held in June of 1966.

The Commission’s actions in the Dominican Republic in 1965 are an example of a special report produced after an on-site visit by its delegation. If requested by the host nation, the IACHR can carry out on-site visits to observe the general human rights situation in a country or to investigate specific situations. Such visits normally result in a report that details the human rights conditions observed by the members of the delegation. The report is published and presented to the Permanent Council and General Assembly of the OAS. Since 1961, the Commission has carried out 69 visits to 23 member States and published 44 special country reports. In the case of the visit to the Dominican Republic, the Commission produced two reports of its investigation and made numerous recommendations to the provisional government.

IACHR Visit to Argentina, 1979

Another important and precedent-setting site visit occurred in Argentina in 1979. The country was in the middle of an internal conflict against leftist insurgents. Insurgents launched a violent campaign fought against military forces in the country that had been in and out of power since the 1950s. In the early 1970s, the violence escalated as leftist guerillas bombed public sites such as hotels and theaters. Kidnapping and assassinations of high-ranking military and police officers occurred almost weekly. In 1976, President Isabel Perón was overthrown in a military coup. The military junta that seized power carried out a brutal campaign of repression that included illegal arrests, tortures, killings, and forced disappearances of thousands of people. Thousands of others were jailed in secret prisons throughout the country. Many others became desaparecidos because security forces disposed of their bodies, in some cases, by tossing live prisoners out of airplanes over the ocean.

The Argentine military government was very concerned about its reputation as a human rights violator. At first, its leaders denied that violations had occurred or claimed they were necessary tactics against a subversive and violent opponent. When that failed to work, they tried to cooperate with some human rights organizations. In 1976, for example, the Argentine military invited Amnesty Interna-
tional for an on-site visit. In March 1977, the group published its report, a very critical account of a government doctrine that used political prisoners, torture, execution, and disappearances as tactics.

In 1979, the Inter-American Commission conducted a site visit to Argentina at the request of the central government. The military junta hoped to relieve some of the international pressure on it by showing its reforms. During two weeks in September 1979, the Commission received the testimonies of thousands of persons, including relatives of the disappeared and other victims. The subsequent report, published in April 1980, further revealed the systematic nature of the human rights violations by the military government. According to one account, the report was credited with having helped halt the practice of disappearing victims. The final report also included numerous recommendations on how to improve the human rights practices in the country.

**Velásquez Rodriguez vs. Honduras: June 26, 1987**

In 1987, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights decided its first contentious case, an important one involving the disappearance of a student at the National Autonomous University of Honduras. The case involved the illegal detention, torture, and disappearance of Angel Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez.

Members of the intelligence branch of the Honduran military reportedly arrested Velásquez Rodríguez on September 12, 1981. He was accused of a number of political crimes, taken to jail, and subsequently subjected to violent interrogations and torture. There were few witnesses to his abduction and little evidence of him after his disappearance. Much of the evidence was circumstantial, including testimony by eyewitnesses who saw Manfredo Velásquez kidnapped by men in civilian clothes in broad daylight. Attempts to locate him through official channels like police records turned up nothing.

The Velásquez Rodríguez case had significant consequences for instances of disappearances, a common tactic of security forces in the region. As part of the decision process, the Court recognized that in cases of forced disappearances the government involved likely would “attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim.” Consequently, the government’s concealment or destruction of direct evidence, often the body of the person disappeared, makes it difficult to prove a violation of the right to life. As a result, the Court presumed Velásquez disappeared at the “hands of or with the acquiescence of those officials.” Additionally, the Court recognized that the fact that the government failed to investigate or make any inquiry into his disappearance, and thwarted attempts by the victim’s family to do so, implicated the government’s involvement in his disappearance. Furthermore, because Velásquez had not been seen for more than seven years, the Court concluded that Velásquez could be presumed dead and that the state could be held responsible for this as well. This lifted the requirement to provide conclusive evidence. Instead, the Court accepted circumstantial evidence—for example, testimony from victims of arbitrary detention or country reports produced by independent, nongovernmental organizations—as sufficient to judge the case. From this evidence, the Court concluded that the Hon-
The judges concluded that forced disappearances of people is a crime involving multiple violations of the most fundamental rights established in the American Convention of Human Rights. In the case of Manfredo Velásquez, the Court found the government of Honduras responsible for his disappearance, a violation of his right to liberty, and his death. The case established a precedent of international law in the cases of disappearances and represented the beginning of the Court’s judicial history. The Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, the first of its kind, was adopted a few years later.

**Barrios Altos vs. Peru**

One of the most significant cases of both the Commission and the Court occurred in Peru during the country’s violent struggle between leftist insurgent groups like Sendero Luminoso and state security forces. The government of President Alberto Fujimori responded with considerable force and, in some cases, with extralegal actions. In one such instance, members of a secret death squad of the Peruvian Armed Forces, the Colina Group, burst into a home in the Barrios Altos neighborhood in Lima, Peru, on the night of November 3, 1991. Intelligence had indicated that a group of Sendero Luminoso rebels were meeting in the house. Instead, the eight masked soldiers found a community fund-raiser on the first floor. (It was later alleged that the group was meeting on the second floor.) The soldiers opened fire on the group of civilians with machine guns equipped with silencers, killing 15 people, including an 8-year old boy, and wounding 4 others.

The Peruvian government under President Fujimori had a number of legal confrontations with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. In numerous cases, Peru questioned the decisions and authority of the Commission. In 1999, Peru attempted to withdraw from the Court’s jurisdiction to avoid processing several high-profile cases. However, the Court found Peru’s withdrawal to be impermissible under the terms of Peru’s own agreements to join the system. Despite that, Fujimori’s government continued to defy the Court by ignoring its orders and decisions.

As Peruvian judicial authorities tried to investigate the Barrios Altos massacre, the Peruvian Congress passed an amnesty law on June 14, 1995, that excused any human rights violations by the military or police since May 1980. President Fujimori signed the law into force the very next day. Numerous legal attempts by the Peruvian Courts to object to the amnesty law were overturned by the government.

On May 14, 2001, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the amnesty was unconstitutional in accordance with the American Convention on Human Rights. In particular, it found that armed forces of the state (namely the Colina Group death squad) committed the Barrios Altos massacre. It determined that the 1995 amnesty law prevented the victims of the attack from receiving a hearing on the case, and, among other violations of their rights, the victims of the attack were consequently denied the right to life. As a result of the Court’s ruling,
the Peruvian Congress repealed the amnesty law, and the government eventually paid $3.3 million in compensation to the families of the victims and survivors of the attack.

In a domestic follow-up case, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori and intelligence head Vladmir Montesinos were charged with “co-authoring” the attack. The President allegedly went to intelligence headquarters after the attack to celebrate with the hit squad. Following Fujimori’s resignation as President in 2000, the Peruvian government used the IACHR decision to justify Fujimori’s extradition to Japan, and later in its request to Chile for his extradition to stand trial for the Barrios Altos case. In April 2009, Fujimori was sentenced to 25 years in prison for his role in the attack.

**Abella v. Argentina (La Tablada)**

Finally, another of the significant cases in the Commission had to do with its powers to apply international humanitarian law, the law of war, in cases involving human rights violations that occur during armed conflict, whether internal or international. The 1997 case of Abella v. Argentina, known widely as the La Tablada Case, was one of the first in this arena. In 1989, a group of insurgents attacked the military barracks at La Tablada, in Buenos Aires province. After protracted shooting, the attackers were captured. Some were killed, others sentenced to prison, and others disappeared. In providing its analysis of the situation, the Commission concluded that it could not rely on the law of international human rights alone. It found that it could directly apply international humanitarian law. As the Commission stated, “The American Convention, as well as other universal and regional human rights instruments, and the 1949 Geneva Conventions share a common nucleus of non-derogable rights and a common purpose of protecting human life and dignity.” Their decision was controversial. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has declined to apply treaties other than those directly related to human rights. The IACtHR, at least initially, agreed with that position, finding that application of humanitarian law was beyond its treaty powers. However, in its decision in Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala in 2000, the Court switched course, finding that norms of the law of war could be “elements for interpretation of the American Convention.”

The powers and influence of the Commission and Court thus continue to have great relevance for any country in the Americas, and will continue to influence law and policy developments in the future, both within and outside of military forces.
Book Review

Organización de la Defensa y Control Civil de las Fuerzas Armadas en América Latina

Edited by David Pion-Berlin and José Manuel Ugarte

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Organización de la Defensa y Control Civil de las Fuerzas Armadas en América Latina, a new book edited by David Pion-Berlin and José Manuel Ugarte, though uneven, is an important contribution to our understanding of the modern defense and security sector in Latin America. Central to the book is Pion-Berlin’s theoretical chapter in which he outlines three models of defense organization focused on the role of the Ministry of Defense. Unfortunately all three models are strongly normative, focus only on the issue of civilian control of the armed forces, and are not centered on the ways in which civil-military relations actually work in the real world. Equally unfortunate is that many of the chapter authors pay mere lip service to Pion-Berlin’s formulation, resulting in a certain lack of cohesion in the book.

The theoretical formulation focuses on four elements: (1) greater civilian presence in the Ministry of Defense (MD); (2) a fully enabled MD in the chain of command; (3) reduction of military authority over operations, training, and budget (among others); and (4) division of military authority and a reduction of the ability to resist civilian (political leadership) direction. In developing this approach, Pion-Berlin fails to take account of the purpose and functions of the military as well as the larger defense sector. The formulation does not address whether or not the military can carry out its roles and missions effectively. With that said, Pion-Berlin correctly points out the importance of civilian officials holding responsible and authoritative positions within the MD—positions well beyond those of political appointees, such as Minister and Vice Minister, but of career civil servants as well. Interestingly, neither Pion-Berlin nor any of the other authors make the connection between an effective civil service in the government as a whole and effective civilian career officials within the MD. There is an obvious correlation between Latin American countries with strong civil services in general and those in which the MD is well staffed by career civilians.

At the normative level, Pion-Berlin argues that the “best” (ideal type) organization for defense is one in which the chain of command runs directly from the President to the Minister of Defense to each of the three military service commanders. A national security council (made up largely of civilian ministers—department heads) advises the President, while a military joint staff (Estado Mayor Conjunto) advises the Minister of Defense and the military services (service chiefs). This ideal type (along with his two other examples) ignores what
really happens in the MD of modern democratic states like the U.S. and the UK. In both, although the mechanisms are somewhat different, civilian-appointed political leaders command through complex policy interactions with uniformed officers and career civil servants. Indeed, in both countries uniformed officers and civil servants occupy policy-making positions. Thus the role of the senior military leaders and senior civilians (below the level of Minister of Defense) is more than merely that of the executor of policy and/or advisor to the political leaders. Nevertheless, Pion-Berlin is correct in that these individuals are in fact subordinate to the President and the Minister of Defense.

Pion-Berlin’s “second best” model puts the joint staff in the chain of command between the Minister and the services. Why this model is not as effective in ensuring civilian control as the first model is not at all clear. It is, after all, the model followed by such established democracies as the UK, Canada, and Australia. Of course, like the first model, this one is not nearly as simple as it appears on paper because defense policy is developed largely in a committee that includes both the Minister and Chief of Defence Staff along with junior ministers, civil servants, and senior military officers.

In the third model, which Pion-Berlin calls “dual command,” the MD is responsible only for administrative functions, while the military chain of command running from the President directly to the military commanders (usually through the joint staff) directs and controls operations. In his view, this model is fraught with danger to civilian control of the military. Yet, it is precisely this model in its archaic form without a joint staff or a single MD that prompted Edwin Lieuwen in his 1960 classic, *Arms and Politics in Latin America*, to cite Mexico as a case of highly successful civilian control of the military. In fact, there has been no military *pronunciamiento* in Mexico since the 1920s, and the last general to don the presidential sash was Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952–58), although his career was focused far more in politics than in the military.

The form in which the defense sector is organized is no absolute safeguard against military intervention or even undesired military participation in policy. Although it can help, it is not determinative, as the Mexican case demonstrates. That said, the larger the role that civilians play in the MD, the greater the likelihood of more positive civil-military relations, something that is strongly argued by Pion-Berlin. Thus it is disappointing that most of the chapters in the book fail to address this issue adequately, if they do so at all.

José Manuel Ugarte’s second chapter is also largely introductory. In contrast to Pion-Berlin, however, Ugarte focuses on the legal authorities that set the conditions in which the MD and armed forces operate in a number of Latin American countries. With the exception of Peru, Chile, and Argentina, Ugarte addresses countries not covered by the other chapter authors. While the legal and constitutional parameters are necessary for understanding the nature of defense organization and what civil control seeks to achieve, the weakness of the chapter is that it does not connect these parameters to any kind of actual behavior by military members, civil servants, or political appointees and elected officials.

The remaining chapters address individual countries and begin with Julian
Gonzalez Guyer’s study of Uruguay. In spite of Mr. Guyer’s academic credentials, he has no experience as an official of the Ministry of Defense. This is especially evident in his treatment of one of the central issues of civil-military relations in Uruguay, the role (or lack thereof) of career civilians in the MD. He makes no mention of the group that Pion-Berlin called “quasi-military” in an earlier work, but who are correctly called *equiparados*. As I pointed out in a paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association International Congress in 2000, *equiparados*, who perform the bulk of the work of the civilians in the MD, are civilian and not quasi-military. Guyer’s failure to address this issue raises the question of whether there has been any change in this area in the past 13 years.

Far and away the most rewarding chapter in the entire book is Marcos Robledo’s analysis of Chilean civil-military relations over the last 30-plus years since the restoration of democracy. His theoretical analysis goes well beyond Pion-Berlin, adding role and mission efficacy and efficiency to civilian control of the military. Robledo demonstrates the evolution of the legal authorities in and for the MD and their application in practice. In particular, he shows the impact of the legislation of 2010, which, among other things, institutionalizes the role of civilian career professionals within the MD.

Although Esteban Germán Montenegro’s chapter on Argentina adds little to our knowledge of the MD, he does raise a question that is worth addressing in some detail. Noting the problem of the lack of civilian personnel trained in defense matters, he states that “this has caused ministry officials to consider the loan of human resources from the armed forces, that is to say retired officers or officers still on active duty, as advisors to the diverse sections of the ministry so as to supply personnel with the required expertise to manage military affairs” (218). The issue here is the difference in the status of retired military in Latin America from the situation in the United States. In the United States, a retired military member is a civilian; in Latin America, that person is still considered military. The difference is both legal and cultural and is essential to remember when comparing the two.

Ciro Alegría Varona’s chapter on Peru shows just how far along the path to a strong MD and effective civilian control of the military the country has come since the fall of President Fujimori. The author points out that there are now a civilian Minister of Defense, two civilian Vice Ministers, and a civilian Secretary of the Ministry (similar in function to a General Counsel), who regularly meet with the service chiefs and the President of the *Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas* (CCFFAA) in the *Consejo Superior de Defensa* (Superior Defense Council). This structure corresponds to the British model of defense organization. The author, however, raises questions about the power of the civilians if the military members of the Council stay united. He does conclude that the Minister and his civilian subordinates hold a powerful card in their control (with Congress) over the budget and he notes that in the matter of the resurgent *Sendero Luminoso* insurgency in the VRAE, the Minister convinced the military to take operational charge of the campaign, which they had been reluctant to do (239-240). Alegría clearly shows that Peruvian civil military relations are in a state of transition to-
ward more democratic control of the military in terms that correspond to both the efficacy and the efficiency that Robledo stressed for Chile.

Alejo Vargas Velázquez and Christian Álvarez in their discussion of the Colombian MD lament, as do many of the authors, the lack of well-trained civilian career civil servants in matters of defense. They do, however, point out that the MD now has a civilian Minister, three civilian Vice Ministers, and a Secretary General, all with civilians on their staffs. Nevertheless, none of the Vice Ministers are in the operational chain of command, and there is no indication of the existence of a coordinating committee (or council) mechanism like that in Peru or the UK.

In the final chapter of the book, Orlando J. Pérez undertakes the analysis of civil military relations in six countries of Central America. He quickly dispenses with Costa Rica and Panama, which abolished their armies in 1949 and 1990, respectively, although he does note that both have robust police forces to provide for public security (287). This understates the case; for example, both countries’ maritime “police” are rather robust Coast Guards, and both countries have some significant light infantry capability.

In the other four countries, civilian participation is weak or nonexistent in the MD. In Guatemala, the Minister must be military under the constitution. In El Salvador, a retired general was Minister for a very brief time; all others have been generals on active duty. Honduras has a civilian Secretary of Defense (Minister) but his function in the chain of command is unclear, while in Nicaragua the position of Minister has been vacant since Daniel Ortega was elected to his second term as president. In any case, Pérez states that the Minister’s position was extremely weak (291). Pérez expands on the Pion-Berlin formulation in his analysis of the prerogatives of the military in all four states according to eleven criteria. These he summarizes in Cuadro 4 (304).

At the end of the day, this book demonstrates the distance traveled in the last decade or so toward civilian control of the military in Latin America. It is a mixed picture. In most countries the MD is significantly stronger and plays a real role in the making and executing of defense policy. More civilians hold positions of responsibility in many of the countries, but there remains a lack of career civilian personnel. Most of the authors decried the lack of civilians educated and trained in defense matters. This was, of course, the complaint that the Latin American defense ministers made to U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at the first Defense Ministerial of the Americas in Williamsburg, VA, in 1996. Perry responded by establishing the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies a year later. Pion-Berlin, Ugarte, and their coauthors reinforce the idea that the need for the Center continues unabated.

Notes

My informant on this subject was himself an *equiparado* who was a CHDS graduate. English translation by review author.

More about *Organización de la Defensa y Control Civil de las Fuerzas Armadas en América Latina*

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