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Special Issue: The Drug Policy Debate

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Welcome to Volume 14 (2013 issue) of the Security and Defense Studies Review. There have been many changes here at the Center since we published Volume 13 last year, not least of which has been the redesignation of our center as the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (Perry Center). The new name was activated on April 2, 2013, following authorization by Congress in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act. Our new name honors former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, who is credited with the foundation and continued support to the Center. Additionally, on March 29, Dr. Richard Downie concluded his service as Director of the Center after nine outstanding years of leadership.

This Review covers a diverse array of topics, with a focus on the intersection of drug policy and security in the United States, elaborated in a section of brief essays by prominent policymakers, scholars, and government officials. This special section comes as a result of the Hemispheric Forum on U.S. Drug Policy Options held at the Center in May 2012 and moderated by Dr. Howard Wiarda. With commentaries by Marilyn Quagliotti, deputy director of supply reduction at the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy; Timothy Lynch, director of the Project on Criminal Justice at the Cato Institute; Peter Hakim, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue; Craig Deare, interim dean of academic affairs/dean of administration at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at National Defense University; AMB Adam Blackwell, secretary of multidimensional security at the Organization of American States (OAS); and GEN (ret.) Barry McCaffrey, former U.S. Army General, fourth director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy and currently serving as president of the BR McCaffrey Associates consulting firm, the diversity of opinion on this controversial and timely topic is well-represented.

The rest of Volume 14 offers a number of unique perspectives and analyses. The first section, on foreign policy and security issues, leads with an analysis of U.S., China, and Latin American relations by Michael Kryzanek of Bridgewater State University. Two articles on challenges to citizen security in the Caribbean follow, one written by Perry Center Adjunct Professor, Hilton McDavid, and Noel M. Cowell, and the other by Tyrone James. The section concludes with an incisive geopolitical study of the U.S.–Latin America security relationship, by Philip Kelly of Emporia State University.

Next, three articles bring Brazil front and center. In “A Tentative Embrace,” AMB Myles Frechette and Frank Samolis explore the complexities of the U.S.-Brazilian dynamic. Former Perry Center Professor Salvador Raza offers a proposal for an improved and expanded border security system in Brazil. Finally, former Perry Center Research Assistant Shênia K. de Lima offers an analysis of the Brazil-

This volume also includes one article on governance and instability and one annotated bibliography on civil-military relations. Abbott Matthews, a former Perry Center research assistant, ably examines the similarities and differences between the recent coups in Honduras and Paraguay, and Brian Loveman, of San Diego State University, delivers an extensive annotated bibliography on civil-military relations in Latin America, sure to become any scholar’s favorite point of reference for this topic. Finally, this volume contains five reviews of recent major books on these and other related topics.

The Security and Defense Studies Review always seeks to display a diverse cross-section of the scholarship and expertise of the Perry Center community, and Volume 14 continues that tradition of provocative and relevant publications.

With best regards,

Kenneth LaPlante
Acting Director, Perry Center
FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY ISSUES
China, United States, and Latin America: Challenges and Opportunities

Michael Kryzanek

ABSTRACT

This paper provides a comparative analysis of China’s emerging role in international relations and its ties to the United States and Latin America, and China’s future impact on the Western Hemisphere. The author discusses the challenges and opportunities inherent to the current China-U.S. relations, such as currency, military, intellectual property, cyber security, and human rights tensions, and the impact those factors will have on the relationship in the future. China’s pursuit of closer ties with the countries of Latin America, long seen as within the U.S. sphere of influence, represents a major challenge for the U.S.-China relationship.

The topic of China–United States relations is not only at the center of policy debates and discussions in both countries, but has also spilled over as a regional issue in Asia, and indeed as a core concern in the international community. Lost in the intricacies of this critical bilateral relationship is the role that China is playing in the hemisphere as it seeks to expand its influence, establish new trading partnerships, and move into the diplomatic vacuum left by the United States as Washington pays closer attention to events outside its traditional sphere of influence. While China–United States relations will continue to occupy the highest level of policy interest and policy initiatives, China–Latin America relations are in a period of significant development and vibrancy. Therefore, when looking at the emerging role China plays in international relations, it is important to move beyond the multiple points of opportunity and challenges in its relations with the United States and expand the discussion to explore China’s other hemispheric ties and what those ties mean not only to the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, but also to the future influence on the United States in the region closest to its borders. As a result, this article will first examine the latest developments in China–United States relations and then move into a discussion of China–Latin America relations, in each case evaluating the impact of current bilateral and regional relations on all the players and the direction of future bilateral and regional relations.

This chapter is adapted from a paper delivered at the International Conference on the "Reemerging China and Its Impact on Asia and the United States," Hong Kong, January 12-13, 2012.
China–United States Relations

The current state and future direction of China–United States relations is formed against the backdrop of a series of key developments in both countries. First, since the economic changes instituted by Deng Xiaoping beginning in 1978, China has emerged as a global power with regular GDP growth in the 9 percent range. By encouraging foreign direct investment, maintaining what many say is an undervalued currency to boost exports, and by establishing a stable social and political climate, China has become the factory to the world and in the process has expanded overall national wealth and the size of its middle class.¹ There is now wide agreement among western industrial countries that China is indeed the superpower of the future and cannot be ignored as a major player in the international community. Furthermore, data which show that by 2020 the Chinese economy will surpass the United States confirm that the foreign policies developed in Washington must respond effectively to the challenges faced by an ascendant China.² Second, China–United States relations are heavily influenced by the debate going on in numerous sectors of American society on the extent to which the nation is in decline and mired in a state of gridlock that makes effective competition with China difficult, if not impossible. Besides the fact that China’s economy will likely surpass that of the United States in the next 10 years, there is the view among many elites that America has lost its innovative edge; that the public policy sector is leaderless and self-serving; and that key areas necessary for national development—education, infrastructure enhancement, research and development, and social cohesion—are on the downslide. Those with a more optimistic outlook point to the fact that this malaise of decline is merely the result of the recent economic meltdown and will disappear once growth resumes and unemployment improves. This argument rests on the view that Americans are already beginning to ignore the failures of Washington and are moving forward on their own to resuscitate the nation by vigorously accenting the importance of entrepreneurship, small business startups, and the development of new high technology and environmental initiatives that will again make the United States an economic force to be reckoned with.³ This debate is certain to continue.

Third, the relations between China and the United States are going to be defined within an Asian context. It is not just China that is emerging, but the entire Asian region from South Korea to India to Indonesia to Malaysia. Even countries such as Vietnam and Cambodia, which even 20 years ago were mired in poverty, are beginning to show impressive national economic growth. Only Japan, with its enormous export economy, appears to be lagging behind its regional neighbors, but even in Japan there are encouraging signs of reform and renewal. What the advancement of the “Asian tigers” means is that the United States must fashion an economic and diplomatic strategy that takes into consideration a momentum shift away from traditional regions of attention such as Europe and Latin America and toward Asia.⁴ President Obama’s trip to the Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit and his policies aimed at building new ties to the region are examples of how the United States recognizes the importance of Asia and the need to form new approaches and policies to deal with the new global reality. In many respects, the future of China–United States relations will be formed within the entire Asian sphere. Regional trade, in-
vestment and security policies, negotiated agreements to settle disputes, and regional strategies for future relations will rule the day.\(^5\)

**The Obama Administration’s China Strategies**

Currently the Obama administration can be described as following a “dialogue” approach in its dealings with China. Under the direction of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States has initiated two diplomatic efforts designed to address a range of issues between the two countries. The first is the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Working with Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geitner and their Chinese counterparts, the Obama administration has met frequently since 2009 to discuss a range of issues in the areas of trade, energy, and human rights. In particular the dialogue is focused on how the two countries can work together to respond to the financial meltdown that has cast a dark shadow over the global economy.

The second of these approaches is the Strategic Security Dialogue, which is largely devoted to maritime security and cyber security concerns and the avoidance of any military miscalculation that could lead to a dangerous confrontation. As China expands its military-industrial complex and seeks to expand its influence in Asia, it is important that the two countries come to an understanding of potential threats to the relationship and the avenues for addressing points of conflict. At the core of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the Strategic Security Dialogue is an attempt by the Obama administration not only to find common ground with the Chinese government but to form a relationship that is built on trust and cooperative problem solving. In the words of Secretary Clinton:

> It is up to both of us to more consistently translate positive words into effective cooperation—and, crucially to meet our respective global responsibilities and obligations. These are the things that will determine whether our relationship delivers on its potential in the years to come. We will address them firmly and decisively as we pursue the urgent work we have to do together. And we have to avoid unrealistic expectations.\(^6\)

Secretary Clinton’s words accent the importance that the Obama administration places on negotiation, transparency, tension reduction, and bilateral partnerships. In the government lexicon such an approach is often called quiet diplomacy, a process in which two nations facing numerous areas of disagreement but, seeking to avoid counter-productive confrontations, not only meet frequently but at many bureaucratic levels in order to find common ground and push forward with incremental policy decisions. There are often no major breakthroughs or grand solutions, just constant efforts to develop a working relationship and seek workable adjustments in areas where there are differences and divisions.

The approach of the Obama administration has as its ultimate goal the full integration of China into the international community—not just in terms of membership in the World Trade Organization or the G-20, but as a nation that will assist the West in responding to economic and security threats. There remains the view among many in policymaking centers in Washington and in European capitals that
China remains at the fringes of the international community—economically powerful, but strategically an outsider with only a marginal role in addressing and solving global problems. Secretary Clinton captures this view when she states: “One of my top priorities has been to identify and expand areas of common interest, to work with China to build mutual trust, and to encourage China’s active efforts in global problem-solving.”

Policy Challenges in China–United States Relations

While the United States strategy is to accent the importance of dialogue with China and create a climate of mutual trust and cooperation, there are serious policy differences between the two countries that could develop into major points of contention. What is most distressing about these policy differences is that they cut across the full spectrum of the existing relationship and are not marginal or minor in character.

Currency Tensions

There has been much political bluster in the United States over the unwillingness of the Chinese to make changes in what many feel is an undervalued yuan—a strategy designed to continue the enormously profitable export market. Although the Obama administration has sought to convince the Chinese to allow the yuan to appreciate more quickly as a pathway to broader domestic economic growth for both countries, it is the Republicans in Congress and those who were running for the presidency in the 2012 election that were most vocal in demanding a revaluation of China’s currency. Presidential candidate Mitt Romney called for a more aggressive posture in demanding that China end its refusal to move on the revaluation of the yuan. In a statement reported by National Public Radio in November 2011, Romney pledged that on the first day as president he would “slap tariffs on Chinese exports to make up for its artificially low currency.” Romney also linked the undervalued yuan with the unemployment situation in the United States, saying, “We can’t just sit back and let China walk over us…they’re stealing our jobs and we are going to stand up to China.”

For its part, China has responded to these recommendations and threats with its own bluster and posturing. During the height of the economic meltdown in the United States, Chinese officials boldly called on the international financial community to have the dollar replaced by the yuan as the international reserve currency. This aggressive stance was rejected outright by the international financial sector since the dollar accounts for 60.7 percent of the world’s $9.7 trillion in currency reserves. Yet the Chinese are wary of the dollar as a reserve currency and tout the emerging international strength of the yuan. The Chinese hold approximately $2 trillion of its currency reserves in dollars, and there is fear that the weak American economy coupled with the downgrading of the U.S. government’s credit rating will weaken the dollar and the value of their holdings. There is also anecdotal evidence that even though the international financial community remains wedded to the dollar, the yuan is on the rise and can no longer be dismissed as a successor. For example, Somali pirates and Russian gangsters often require payment for their illegal activities in yuans, not dollars or euros.
There is cautious optimism in the Obama White House that China will begin to make significant strides to revalue the yuan as it turns inward to respond to domestic consumer demand and away from its reliance on exports. Again, the emphasis in the Obama administration is to convince the Chinese of the global benefits of a revalued yuan, especially in light of a downturn in imports from China. But there are those in the international financial community who believe that the yuan as a reserve currency is not that far-fetched—that it could, in fact, replace the dollar in the future. While this would be a blow to the United States and its dollar dominance in international currency circles, the yuan as a reserve currency would push up its exchange rate, lessen the reliance on exports, and provide a needed stimulus for heightening domestic purchasing power.

**Military Tensions**

Unlike the currency tensions between China and the United States, it is the expansion and modernization of China’s military that has prompted the Obama administration to take concrete counter steps. Currently, China spends about $100 billion a year on its military, second only to the $700 billion spent by the United States. But despite the huge gap in expenditures and the widely held view that China would not risk any type of military confrontation with the United States and risk its lucrative export markets, the Obama administration has become increasingly concerned about China’s stepped-up militarization. In 2011 China launched its first aircraft carrier (a retrofit of an aging Ukraine ship), a clear sign that the Chinese government is serious about spreading its influence in Asia, not only in its ongoing dispute with Taiwan, but also in the contested waters of the South China Sea, which are rich in natural resources. Both Vietnam and the Philippines have expressed concern over China’s militarization, and the launching of the aircraft carrier has only heightened their anxiety.

While most naval experts assert that the Chinese aircraft carrier is years away from actual deployment and may be more of a prestige gesture since China’s rivals in the region, India and Japan, have the mammoth ships (even Thailand has a carrier), the growing emphasis by China’s leaders on militarization has prompted the Obama administration to begin what can only be described as a containment strategy in the region. At the Pacific Summit President Obama announced an agreement with the Australian government to station 2,500 Marines in the port city of Darwin. Although Chinese expansionism in Asia was not mentioned directly by the President, it was clear that the announcement to deploy the Marines was the “first shot across the bow” against Chinese militarization, especially its naval expansion. Obama said in his remarks, “We are here to stay. This is a region of huge strategic importance to us.” If indeed the military action taken by the Obama administration is part of a containment strategy, it signals that the United States is becoming serious about what it views as a growing Chinese threat to the region.

As for the Chinese, the deployment announcement by President Obama prompted a stern response. Xinhua, the Chinese state news agency stated, “China has always opposed any move to complicate the disputes with involvement of external forces, insisting bilateral dialogue is the best option.” But from the United
States perspective, the military deployment is a reminder to China that it cannot take aggressive steps that are perceived as threatening to the nations in the region or believe that it is immune from accepted international norms of behavior. President Obama further stated in his Australian speech that if China does not respect international rules, “we will send a clear message to them that we think that they need to be on track in terms of accepting the rules and responsibilities that come with being a world power.”

Although the action of the Obama administration to deploy troops in Australia can be viewed as a containment strategy, it is also a sign that the United States is recalibrating its foreign and security policies and shifting its attention to Asia and away from Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary of State Clinton has been in the forefront of this shift and has been successful in convincing the President that American military presence, even though minor in scope compared to Iraq and Afghanistan, must recognize the new balance of power in the world with China at the center of that new balance.

**Intellectual Property and Cyber Security Tensions**

Often down the list of issue areas that continue to cause tensions between China and the United States is the failure of the Chinese to address its failures in following international rules regarding patents and intellectual property rights and its recent efforts to hack into American business and national security computer systems. Yet despite the lack of international attention, these areas have been the focus of an ongoing debate within Washington policy circles over how best to pressure China to end these harmful and dangerous activities that are causing growing concern in American corporate sectors and within the highly sensitive and secretive national security system of the United States.

For years Chinese officials have promised that they would end the practice of awarding questionable domestic patents on a range of United States technology innovations or demanding that American corporations hand over their technology or other industrial secrets as a prelude to entering the Chinese market. In some cases these property infringements range from bootlegging American movies or creating counterfeit clothing items to requiring the transfer of sophisticated technology and computer software to guarantee access to the lucrative Chinese consumer economy. From the Chinese perspective, the failure to follow international rules on intellectual property rights is ignored in large part because government officials view these violations of established rules as part of China’s national development strategy.

The intellectual property tensions between China and the United States may be headed for at least a tentative resolution. At a meeting of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, China’s Vice Premier promised to monitor property rights infringements more closely and to take steps to end the blatant pirating actions that have diverted millions of dollars in royalties and profits away from American corporations and individuals. While the statement of the Vice Premier was a welcome sign that China is now willing to follow intellectual property rights rules, United States officials have heard these promises before while blatant piracy continued unabated. This issue of intellectual property rights infringements will likely continue
without a clear resolution.

In the area of cyber security there is growing concern that China is engaging in a heightened level of hacking into business and United States security sites in a move to either disrupt our computer systems or to gain access to corporate strategies and technological innovations. In 2010 a report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, American aircraft manufacturer Northrop Grumman compiled a list of “electronic intrusions and disruptions” from inside China since 1999. Although the report acknowledged that it was difficult to determine the source of the hacking, since the number of Internet users in China is in the hundreds of millions, the report expressed concern that there was sample evidence that there were sufficient disruptions that targeted defense engineering data and U.S. military operational information to conclude that it was likely that these actions were the result of “state sponsorship.”

Industrial/military espionage using computer hacking is nothing new in the new world of Internet technology, but United States security experts in the public and private sectors are becoming increasingly concerned that China is ratcheting up its cyber attacks, especially in order to gain access to our technological innovations. As with the property rights infringements, China is using its cyber hacking as a means of expanding its research and development strategy, only not by internal methods, but by external computer espionage. Admiral Mike McConnell, former head of the super secret National Security Agency, stated in an interview that the Chinese took drastic steps to gather information about United States military capabilities after the Gulf War. As McConnell said in an article in The Atlantic, “They (the Chinese) were shocked….They had no idea warfare had progressed to that point, and they went on a crash course to take away our advantage.” McConnell and others in the intelligence sectors are convinced that difficult talks with the Chinese are on the horizon as cyber security issues rise to the top of China–United States relations.

Human Rights Tensions

Economic and security issues often dominate the debate on the current status and future direction of China–United States relations, but it is the area of human rights that has the potential to create the most serious dispute between the two countries. China’s stern authoritarian state and its harsh crackdown on dissent have prompted the United States to follow a comprehensive human rights policy approach. These approaches have included some modest sanctions, open criticism of the government on issues such as freedom for Tibet and open Internet access, calls for release of religious (the Falun Gong and other Christian groups) and ethnic prisoners (the Uighur Muslims in the western regions of China), and regular congressional hearings designed to keep the issue of democratization and freedom in China at the forefront of American foreign policy.

The role of the United States in stressing the importance of Chinese democratic reform coincides with growing unrest among the people of China who are becoming increasingly vocal in their criticism of government corruption, failure to admit serious policy failures in housing and transportation, and crackdowns on a wide range of dissidents. The most well-organized human rights opposition to
the party leadership in China is that of the social activists, lawyers, and labor leaders who belong to the wei quan or “rights defense” movement. These advocates for democratic reform have been instrumental in developing the Open Constitution Initiative or Gongmeng, which has been instrumental in uniting disparate opposition factions. The Gongmeng has faced constant harassment by the secret police to the extent that their offices have been shut down and their phones tapped. There is also another human rights group active against the government, which has formed a Charter 08 document, a democracy manifesto, similar to the Czechoslovak Charter 77 document that was instrumental in bringing down Soviet communism in that Eastern European country. The signers of the Charter 08 have faced regular harassment, detention, and seizure of property. 21

In the wake of these numerous examples of human rights violations and police state actions, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a strong statement criticizing China’s human rights record, which Clinton described as “deplorable.” Many observers of U.S.-China policy felt that the Obama administration’s harsh criticism of China’s human rights crackdowns was in a response to the Arab Spring democracy uprisings. The United States views China as on the wrong side of history as the push for democratization and individual freedom expands in the Middle East. As Secretary Clinton further stated, “They’re [the Chinese government] worried, and they are trying to stop history, which is a fool’s errand. They cannot do it. But they’re going to hold off as long as possible.” 22 The Obama administration in particular was most critical of China when it jailed Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo on subversion charges and refused to allow his wife to travel to Oslo Norway to accept the prize.

Human rights tensions between China and the United States escalated significantly in April 2012, when famous blind dissident Chen Guangcheng escaped from his home detention outside of Beijing and asked for asylum within the American embassy. Mr. Chen’s asylum request immediately touched off one of the most difficult periods of China–United States relations, especially since Secretary of State Hilary Clinton was in Beijing for sensitive talks with the Chinese leaders. 23

After a period of diplomatic negotiations between the embassy and the Chinese leaders, Chen was permitted to leave the embassy and enter a hospital to be treated for what many thought was cancer. While at the hospital there was much confusion over whether the Chinese would detain Chen again and whether his family members would be targets of repression as they had been during the years of his house arrest. Chen complicated the matter by suggesting that U.S. embassy officials had pressured him to leave the embassy and that he was not able to speak to his dissident companions. Eventually, the crisis came to a quiet conclusion when U.S. officials announced that Chen would be receiving an invitation to be a visiting scholar at New York University and was allowed to leave the country with his family. Chinese officials did not publicly acknowledge the agreement allowing Chen to leave and demanded that the United States apologize for accepting Chen into its embassy. In May 2012 Chen Guangcheng left China for the United States.

The incident involving Chen Guangcheng has far-reaching repercussions on future Chinese-American relations as the Chinese leadership sees this diplomatic dust-up as an invasion of its domestic policy and a bold attempt to rouse up the dis-
sident movement. As for the United States, this incident was the subject of intense debate as to whether American diplomats let Chen down, pushed him out of the embassy, and then tried to save face with a last minute deal to get him out of the country. Both countries were apparently caught by surprise over Chen’s bold escape right at the time of Secretary Clinton’s visit. But for the Chinese, the Chen incident points out the widening dissident movement in the country and the difficulty it will have now that a high profile critic of the government has pushed the human rights envelope.24

Despite the difficulties created by the Chen incident and the likely enhancement of the dissident movement in China, the Chinese leadership is now faced with what may be the first phase of a political reform struggle that will difficult to control. The ideological and corruption divide in the country brought on by the Bo Xilai scandal and now the Chen Guangcheng incident will foster intense self-reflection and the blame game as the new leadership comes into office. The new leadership may choose to follow the model of harsh repression associated with the Tiananmen Square uprisings and tolerate no challenge to its authority, but with the Chinese people angered over corruption, villages and unions moving toward greater openness and participation in local decisionmaking, and the liberal elites demanding democratic-like changes, the party leaders are facing the harsh reality of a country that has evolved to the point where economic development has touched off a liberal democratic reform movement.

It is important to point out, however, that being viewed as on “the wrong side of history” and enduring ever stronger criticism from the United States on its human rights policy at this time does not appear to be of major concern to the Communist Party leadership. Despite its popularity in the west, the political opposition in China remains small, and the middle class, which would be the source of a major movement for democracy and freedom, is currently more interested in economic prosperity and stability, not challenging the government. The Chinese leadership is banking on the apathy and inaction of its people on issues related to human rights and political opposition.

Future Opportunities, Challenges, and Threats

Not only is the future of China–United State relations linked to economic, financial, and security concerns, it will also be dependent on less predictable issues and conditions such as the impact of public opinion in the United States, the inevitable drive for liberalization and democratization in Chinese society, and the question of whether China will be able to sustain its high growth rates over time. In many respects China is at a crucial crossroads in its national development and its ties to the United States. How both countries react to public opinion pressures, the push for a more open society, and the prospect of significant economic readjustments will define the manner in which this key relationship moves forward.

American Public Opinion

In a number of recent polls of American attitudes toward China there is clear evidence that the people of the United States understand that the Chinese are on course
to become an international economic superpower. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll in 2011 showed that 75 percent of those polled are resigned to the fact of Chinese economic power and its challenge to United States dominance. Moreover, the same poll found that 66 percent of the respondents now understand that China holds significant debt obligations of the United States and that this debt relationship with China is dangerous to the U.S. national interest. Many of those polled call for stronger ties to South Korea and Japan to offset the growing dependence and dominance of China. But throughout the polling data there is evidence that Americans are not anxious to develop policies that damage the friendly cooperation between the two countries and the need to continue the bilateral relationship. Furthermore, there is little concern at this time about the military threat from China. Most Americans feel secure that China’s military ambitions are not directed at the United States and are years away from making China a true military superpower.25

But what is different about public opinion in the United States toward China is that there is a growing mood in the public, often driven by politicians in Washington, to push for a “Buy American” strategy and to make a concerted effort to take measures that lessen our dependence on Chinese exports. These efforts are in their infancy and may just be political posturing, but nevertheless Americans could easily be led by governmental leaders in the future to support a national policy route that challenges Chinese trade. One small example is that in Washington’s historic Smithsonian Museums, the gift shops have memorabilia of the United States almost exclusively made in China. Political leaders placed pressure on the Smithsonian to “Buy American” and end the purchase of Chinese goods. This step received national attention, even though it made only a miniscule dent on the China trade. Yet such actions are symptomatic of what could happen if there is a concerted effort nationally to change the terms of trade with China. Trade with China will continue to be a huge part of United States economic relations, but there will definitely be more efforts in Washington and throughout the country to lessen the dependence on Chinese goods.

**Liberalization and Democratization**

One of the foundational principles of national development theory is that in authoritarian countries with restrictive liberties, changes in the internal political and personal dynamics of the nation are inevitable as economic growth expands the middle class and leads to heightened demands for political reform and individual freedom. China’s harsh crackdown of the nascent liberty movement in the 1980s in Tiananmen Square showed clearly that the government would not tolerate open challenges to its authority. But since those days there have been more examples of open criticism of the government, especially against corruption, an expansion of civic engagement groups organizing protests, and growing displeasure among the young about issues such as Internet access, free speech, and questions about why China cannot follow a more Western governing model. Many of these challenges to government authority are occurring as the Chinese economy advances and brings with it prosperity to an ever-larger number of its people.

Speculating on when a groundswell of opposition for political and governmental change will surface is foolhardy, since the government of China has been
adept at keeping control and pacifying the populace with the benefits of its growing economy. But as the Chinese middle class grows and a new generation clamors for more openness and transparency, the ability of the Communist Party leadership to maintain the status quo and political control will become increasingly more difficult. One need only look at the Arab Spring movement to see that control of the existing system is not perpetual and can be subject to quick and unexpected jolts from a disgruntled populace.

Chinese officials may begin to make minor changes at the margins of political life in China as a means of appeasing the opposition movement. Already there is some evidence of this is in Guangdong Province, where Communist Party chief Wang Yang has begun taking liberalization steps that are catching the attention of the average Chinese citizen. Yang’s so-called Guangdong model accents more transparency in government, support for trade union activity, open meetings with disgruntled workers, and a greater willingness to support the work of external NGOs, which in the past were looked on as radical interlopers bent on reforming the government. The Guangdong model, however, is being challenged elsewhere in China, such as in the internal province of Chongoing, where the party boss there, Bo Xilai, holds on to the more traditional state control model, even to the extent of returning to the values and vision of Mao Zedong. Bo has presented himself as a party leader who abhors the materialism that has encroached into Chinese society as a result of the economic advancement of the last 20 years. The Chongoing model, however, may have slipped significantly as a result of the corruption scandal that erupted in March 2012, as Mr. Bo was publicly chastised and eventually removed from a high party position for alleged corruption. Later Bo’s wife was implicated in the murder of a British businessman, further tainting his reputation.

It will be interesting to see how these two governing models play out in the coming years and whether the liberalization and quasi-democratization efforts associated with the Guangdong model have support throughout the country or whether the more restrictive forces of the traditional authoritarians will win out and maintain control. The important point is that there are now the beginnings of two approaches to national governance emerging in China.

**Sustaining Economic Growth**

Perhaps the most important issue as China moves forward in the coming years is whether the economy can maintain its regular double-digit growth. There are important signs in economic data coming out of China that the “boom years” are coming to a conclusion and that the Chinese people will be experiencing a tightening of credits, growing inflation, a drop off in exports, and much slower growth. There are those, such as Australian academic Salvatore Babones, who believe that numerous changes in the internal Chinese economy and society will limit growth and transform the nation into a middle-level economic power like Brazil, Mexico, and Russia, not an economic superpower that will dominate the world. In the coming years, according to Babones, China will face enormous environmental, demographic, educational, and trade-related pressures. It will continue to grow, but not at the rate it has in the past since it must now contend with domestic issues related to significant
challenges in dealing with environmental overload brought on by rapid industrialization and urbanization, an aging population requiring larger state expenditures, a still underdeveloped educational system, and the reality that other nations are not going to sit by and allow China to dominate the export arena.\textsuperscript{28}

There are those who dismiss Babones's assessment. Arvind Subramanian of the Peterson Institute of International Economics is convinced that China’s dominance as the world’s premier economic superpower is secure and will only continue its high level of growth and international influence. China’s position as the world’s banker, its position as the factory to the world, and its control of huge debt obligations of the United States ensure that it will not only become the dominant economy in no more than 20 years, but that it will maintain that dominance well into the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{29}

But while this debate is going on there are undeniable signs that China will be forced to face critical economic and financial problems in the coming years. These problems are indeed solvable and may be but a short diversion on the road to economic superpower status. The fact that China faces these challenges, however, must at least temper the view that its economic dominance of the world economy is guaranteed and imminent.

\textbf{China–Latin America Relations}

In recent years China has developed a growing interest in the countries of Latin America and to a lesser extent the Caribbean, similar to its growing involvement in the economic development of African nations. Much of the interest is in forming diplomatic and economic relationships that are tied to China’s insatiable demand for raw materials, oil, and natural gas and commodities at a time when a number of the Hemispheric nations are booming and the repositories of key natural resources valued by China. This growing interest in forming ties to Latin America is part of China’s overall strategy (often referred to in China as its “going out strategy”) in dealing with the emerging economies in the world and the fast-changing character of the global economy as new competitors enter the international market and seek to diversify their trade and investment portfolios.\textsuperscript{30}

This interest of China in Latin America is not without a historical foundation. During the Mao era China emphasized the Ya-Fei-La or Asia–Africa–Latin America position that it could best achieve solidarity with these developing regions of the world. Even though the Mao era is a distant memory, Chinese leaders continue today to see these emerging regions, especially Latin America, as continuing a form of international kinship. There is also in today’s China a belief that its economic model can be transferred to a Latin America that suffered through the Lost Decade of Development due to failed import substitution policies and neo-liberal experiments. Chinese universities teach courses in international development and use the Lost Decade in Latin America as proof that the Chinese model works best to achieve successful economic development.\textsuperscript{31}

It is important, however, to place China’s new-found interest in Latin America and the Caribbean and the pride that it takes in spreading its model to the emerging economies of the world within the context of its existing ties to the United
States and Europe. China continues to see its diplomatic and economic ties to the U.S. and Europe as primary and holding the greatest potential, while its growing involvement in the Western Hemisphere is still in its infancy and not in any way designed to compete with or replace its traditional trade and investment partners. China watcher Margaret Myers states about the Chinese economic interest in Latin America, “The cooperation (between China and Latin America) itself is limited, or is merely a short-term effort to secure access to new technologies or scientific methods. In other cases, cooperative engagement should be thought of not as a leveling of the playing field, but as an element of China’s ever-evolving economic statecraft.”

Even though China is new to Latin America and the Caribbean and its interest there may be short-term and part of its desire to play a larger role in the international arena, its recent ties to the region are impressive. In 2000 China was the seventh largest export market for Latin America and received only 2 percent of the region’s exports. By 2011 China accounted for 10 percent of Latin America’s exports and is the leading destination of its exports for Latin American giants, Brazil and Chile. Brazil has been particularly important in China’s trade relations with Latin America. From 1988 to 2008 trade between China and Brazil rose 1,838 percent. Most of the increase was in Brazilian exports of raw commodities and materials, with China exporting industrial products to Brazil. Bolivia and Peru (mining) and Ecuador (petroleum) also have entered China’s Latin America trade circle, although not on the level of Brazil and Chile, which provide a wider range of what China needs. To further advance its trade relationship with Latin America China has signed three free trade agreements in the region: Chile (2006); Peru (2010); and Costa Rica (2011). Latin America’s other giant economy, Mexico, remains clearly tied to the United States, although China has declared Mexico one of its “strategic partners” in Latin America. Table 1 shows the chief areas of China–Latin American trade by share of exports to China and share of total Latin American exports to China by sector.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) by China in Latin America, another sign of its interest in the hemisphere, is also on the rise. In 2010, FDI in Latin America by China was $15.3 billion; one year later FDI by China in Latin America had reached $22.7 billion. It is interesting to note that only 13 percent of China’s outward investment is in Latin America, with 75 percent targeted in Asia. Furthermore, in 2009 the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands received 73 and 22 percent of the $7.3 billion in Chinese FDI, respectively. Both the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands are offshore corporate tax havens. Yet despite the accent on Asian investment and the disparity of investment in the two offshore centers, this upward trend in FDI is only expected to increase in the coming years.

Table 2 catalogs the primary Chinese investment projects in Latin American from 2009–2011 that are not linked to the Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands.

Although China’s interest in Latin America is clearly driven by trade and investment interests, there are a few political/military issues that also propel this ever-expanding hemispheric relationship. Starting in 2004 with a visit of President Hu Jintao to Latin America, there have been a number of follow-up visits to the region by high-level delegations, including Hu Jintao’s heir apparent, Xi Jinping. During those visits, bilateral agreements were signed in areas such as cultural exchanges,
science and technology, consular relations, tourism, protection of investments, and, of course, trade.

There have also been limited military ties with some Latin American countries, particularly those with leftist governments such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Cuba. Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador have purchased Chinese military equipment and have had discussions with military officials. The Chinese do not seem to be placing much emphasis on military ties to Latin America, although any further expansion of visits to the region may signal a greater degree of cooperation in the future, and of course such military ties send a signal to the United States that there is another player in the region. The Latin American governments, especially those on the left, encourage the Chinese presence as they seek to show greater independence from the United States.  

If there is a political issue that the Chinese seek to accent in Latin America it is over the recognition of Taiwan. At last count 12 of 23 countries in the Caribbean and Central America maintain ties to Taiwan, which has sought to gain influence in the region through trade, investment, humanitarian assistance, and infrastructure projects. To counteract the Taiwanese position in the Caribbean and Central America the Chinese have instituted generous aid programs, building soccer stadiums in Costa Rica and St. Kitts, hospitals and schools in Dominica, and a huge resort complex in the Bahamas at a cost of $3.5 billion. Only time will tell whether this aid assistance competition between Taiwan and China will change any of the diplomatic affiliations of the countries in the Caribbean and Central America, but one thing is certain—both nations are trying hard to gain friends though huge aid programs.

### Conclusion: China–United States and Latin America

China–United States relations will remain at the center of the foreign policy agendas in both countries in the coming years and likely will be maintained at high levels of importance and perhaps controversy. Despite the current economic and political challenges faced by China and the changing nature of American superpower

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**Table 1: Chief Areas of China—Latin American Trade by Share of Exports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Share of Total Latin American Exports to China (percent)</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copper alloys</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>Chile (90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ore and concentrates</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>Brazil (89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soybeans and other seeds</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>Brazil (83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ores and concentrates of base metals</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>Chile (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude petroleum</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Brazil (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soybean oil</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Argentina (79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp and waste paper</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Brazil (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feedstuff</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Peru (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2: Primary Chinese Investment Projects, 2009–2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US $ millions</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Iron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Iron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Iron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Copper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Iron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Steel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,070</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


status in the international arena, both countries can ill afford to create a climate of antagonism, mistrust, and fear—there is just too much at stake to have the relationship enter a confrontational phase. Dialogue, cooperation, diplomatic negotiations, and bilateral agreements that are fair and free of partisan rhetoric should be the key elements of the future relationship. There will of course be areas of dispute and differences of approach, but both countries have a history of putting aside divisions and working quietly and incrementally to resolve thorny issues. China must adjust to the growing call in the United States for a more open and competitive trade policy regime, and the United States must recognize that China is an economic powerhouse whose strength gives them new opportunities to influence the bargaining process. What is important for both China and the United States is that they maintain their current posture of working out mutual areas of concern without heightening tensions.

As to China and Latin America, there is no doubt that China’s emerging role in Latin America and the Caribbean is driven primarily by its need for raw materials and commodities. China’s bilateral trade, foreign direct investment, and diplomatic presence in the region all point to a strategy based on the view that the hemisphere is the next frontier of resource extraction. But while China is clearly after the natu-
eral resources that are abundant in the hemisphere, it is also important to mention that China and Latin America have fostered this relationship within the traditional sphere of influence of the United States. With Washington occupied elsewhere and the Latin Americans anxious to diversify their political and economic ties, China is seizing upon this vacuum of influence, while the Latin American countries are only too happy to show the Colossus of the North that there are other partners in the new global marketplace. As the countries of Latin America, especially the ABC countries—Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—move forward with their development and reach new levels of growth, they can be counted on to seek to expand their ties to China, a condition that will be welcomed in Beijing, but one that will be viewed with concern and apprehension in Washington.

Notes
7 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p.63.
31 Margaret Myers, “China’s Engagement with Latin America: More of the Same?” Backgrounder: *China in Latin America*.
32 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 9.
A Perspective on Cutting Edge Research for Crime and Security Policies and Programs in the Caribbean

Hilton McDavid and Noel M. Cowell

ABSTRACT

If the Jamaican society is to extricate itself from its four decades of economic malaise, the 40-year trend of increasing violent crime and insecurity must be reversed. However, this is only possible with proper and adequate diagnoses of causes and the formulation of appropriate policies and solutions. Jamaica and the rest of the Caribbean must adopt (and adapt) relevant crime response policies and approaches to fight all types of crimes and violence, and the authors argue that this is only achievable through coordinated strategies and evidence-based policymaking underpinned by an integrated program of cutting-edge research. By identifying the best program assessment indicators and adjusting policies that are inadequate, a country like Jamaica can turn the tide against the criminal organizations that are holding the formal economy and legal institutions hostage. Through careful analysis of other regional programs and perspectives, it is possible to find workable models for Jamaica to follow.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent events of 9/11 have created a more complex global security environment, as the bipolar world gave way to what has now matured into a multipolar political and international security paradigm. In the Caribbean, the most important and immediate threats to national security are transnational organized crime and corruption. The transborder shipment of narcotics (mainly into North American and European markets) and the importation of weapons (predominantly from the United States, with smaller flows from Haiti and Central America) generate large profits for criminals (McDavid, Clayton, and Cowell 2011). The intimate connection between the formal sector and the "underworld" in some of the Caribbean jurisdictions, and more specifically between politics and organized crime, means that these ill-gotten gains are used to corrupt both elected and nonelected officials and to compromise the process of governance. The result is political protection for major criminals as they morph into “respectable” businessmen and “honorable” politicians through government contracts and through the establishment of ostensibly legitimate enterprises from the proceeds of crime (Bourne 2010; Harriott 2008).

These criminals often use tactics similar to those of narcoterrorist groups
with notionally political agendas (Stapley 2006). Among the most common in the Caribbean are extreme acts of violence intended to inspire fear in people and prevent cooperation with law enforcement. Methods of intimidation include the vicious and indiscriminate murder of witnesses; civilians of all categories and ages (neighbors, friends, relatives, children, and old women); and members of the security services and even of the church. This is often accompanied by random destruction of both private and public property. These terror tactics are deployed with the utmost impunity while gang members boast of their “dog heartedness” (ruthlessness and coldness) in perpetrating the most extreme atrocities. The intention is to ensure that the community cowers in fear while the gangs conduct a range of criminal enterprises in the face of a state crippled by corruption.

A wide range of scholars and public commentators have pointed out that Jamaica is plagued by an epidemic of criminal violence, one of the most staggering features of which is the murder rate. McDavid, Cowell, and Clayton (2011) pointed out that in recent times this has placed Jamaica in the range of countries involved in light-to-medium civil conflict. With a mere 8.1 homicides per 100,000 in 1970 (Ward et al. 2009), Jamaica had by 2005 already been declared the murder capital of the world with a rate of 58 per 100,000 inhabitants (BBC Caribbean, 2006). The rate continued to climb, however, peaking at 62 per 100,000 in 2009. These dramatic developments have been attributed to a combination of poverty, urban decay, social exclusion (Levy 1996; Levy 2007), political patronage, and “garrisonization”—a range of corrupt and violent tactics aimed at securing political dominance in well-defined communities (Harriott 2008).

Several studies have suggested that crime and violence are threatening the welfare of Caribbean citizens and have effectively become the paramount challenges to the economic development of the region (Maetens and Anstey 2007; United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime and World Bank 2007; ECLAC 2008). Others have noted that the levels of violence and corruption in Jamaica have deterred investment, destroyed capital formation, and discouraged business development. Some urban areas have been reduced to derelict lots as businesses have been bankrupted by extortion (Clayton and Blake 2010). This reflects the impacts of both crime and the fear of crime. For example, recent research has shown that the perceived level of corruption is significantly higher than it actually is (Powell and Lewis 2010). The fiscal burden of crime and corruption to Jamaica includes lost life expectancy as well as the cost of injuries and health care (McDavid, Cowell, and McDonald 2011). It also includes the higher cost of doing business in an environment characterized by high levels of corruption and high losses due to theft, extortion, and missed investment opportunities. High rates of crime make property rights less secure, people tend to work less hard and invest less capital, and businesses may reduce the level of their operations as investors are understandably concerned about law and order and the capacity of the state to prevent their property from being appropriated by others (Barro 2000). This environment provides fertile ground for the growth of criminal gangs that are estimated to control budgets greater than the national budgets of some of the smaller Caribbean jurisdictions, and to possess weapons more powerful and sophisticated than many of those issued to the police forces in the region (McDavid, Clayton, and Cowell 2011).
Largely as a result of Jamaica’s failure to control crime and corruption, the country has become increasingly uncompetitive. The 2012-13 *Global Competitiveness Report* identified the country’s competitiveness as 97th out of 144. The report noted that while the economic outlook for Latin America as a whole showed a “relatively rosy picture for the coming years,” certain countries, including Jamaica had lost competitiveness “mainly due to a deterioration of the security conditions” (World Economic Forum 2012, p. 31). According to this report the most significant factor undermining national competitiveness for Jamaica was the “business cost of crime and violence” (p. 217), and the “most problematic factors for doing business” was identified as “crime and theft” (p. 216).

The true economic cost, however, is best evaluated on a long-term basis. Jamaica’s economy has stagnated for four decades, with low growth and declining productivity, while other countries have transformed their productive potential and development prospects. Clayton (2012) recently reflected on two possible paths that Jamaica might have missed following the precipitous descent into crime and violence in the early 1970s. First, he speculated that if over the last 40 years “Jamaica’s rate of productivity growth had kept pace with that of Barbados, then Jamaica today would be almost three times more productive and wealthier than it is now, and the quality of life would have been correspondingly transformed.” Going further, he suggested that if Jamaica had sustained the growth rate of the 1960s, then today’s economy would be almost 10 times larger than it is now (p. 18).

Aside from the deleterious economic impact, it is clear that the growth of criminal violence in Jamaica has severely weakened the state’s moral authority as well as its capacity to govern. Despite the enormous significance of the indictment of Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, in 2010 and the subsequent 40 percent fall in the murder rate, gangs and criminal syndicates retain extensive control over certain communities, and the diversity, creativity, and absolute impunity attached to the criminal enterprise continues to expand. Simultaneously the state has been unable to properly affirm its role in the delivery of public goods such as security, education, health services, and basic infrastructure. In all of this, perhaps the most serious is the vacuum in personal security and welfare provision, which in many cases, has been filled by Dons—leaders of criminal gangs with strong community and political support.

We argue, in this essay, that if the Jamaican society is to extricate itself from its four decades of economic malaise, these trends must be reversed. This, however, will only be possible with proper and adequate diagnoses of causes and the formulation of appropriate policies and solutions. Jamaica and the rest of the Caribbean must adopt (and adapt) relevant crime response policies and approaches to fight all types of crimes and violence, and we argue that this is only achievable through coordinated strategies and evidence-based policymaking underpinned by an integrated program of cutting-edge research.

**The Need for Research**

A palpable weakness of Caribbean crime policy in the past has been the search for short-term solutions. Often this is the result of limited economic resources, political expediency, and a paucity of strategic analysis. This has led to the many missteps and missed opportunities. One critical deficit in crime prevention strategy, for ex-
ample, has been the failure to apply intellectual capital to an understanding of the long-term impact of anti-crime initiatives. Given the magnitude of the problem, we would suggest that far too little research has been done to underpin the numerous “crime-fighting” initiatives that have been launched across the region. Instead, policymakers have chosen to focus on more politically expedient approaches, involving statistical manipulation, public relations, and sloganeering, to create the impression of effective crime management. In severely under-resourced economies such as those in the Caribbean, deficiencies in knowledge and credible data have plagued every facet of crime response.

It is in the society’s interest that the crime response complex be managed, and managed well. Among the central requirements of this imperative is the collection of the best information reasonably available about crime and its impact and the deployment of that information strategically to combat the problem. Connected to this is the need for those directly responsible for responding to crime to nurture a robust capacity for critical thinking, for self-criticism, and for engagement with the diverse perspectives of other sociopolitical actors, particularly the press, the scholarly community, human rights lobby groups, and, indeed, the general public.

This is important, because while we stress the value of credible information and data gathering as a basis for decisionmaking, it is also important to bear in mind that public policy is always going to be influenced by other forces. Despite intentions to the contrary, data and empirical research supply only some of the inputs that influence the making of policy, and they can be overridden by contrary moral sentiments, the tides of cultural change, the vagaries of politics, emotionalism, sensationalism, residual ignorance, and the inertial forces of laziness, habit, and vested interests. This knowledge should not diminish our zeal to ensure that crime management policy be built on a solid foundation of empirical research. Rather, the messiness of real-world decisionmaking demands greater vigilance to ensure that informed policy decisions are made and appropriate responses can be directed at vested interests, including those who would deliberately or inadvertently defend the interest of criminal elements. The necessity of coordinated, targeted, and comprehensive research is underlined by the significant gaps that tend to exist between knowledge and implementation and by the existence, historically, of significant levels of territoriality and intragovernmental balkanization (Ruth and Reitz 2003). According to Ruth and Reitz, “a defining feature of the American crime response complex is its utter disconnectedness” (p. 46). The situation is not much different in the Caribbean, whose law enforcement apparatus derives from the same eighteenth and nineteenth century British roots and where intergovernmental agencies and legislative initiatives have been slow to respond to the increasing diversity and creativity of constantly evolving criminal enterprise.

“Off-the-Shelf” Crime-Prevention Programs

The default response of crime fighters in several Caribbean territories, including Jamaica, has been to draw on well-documented strategies that have been tried (and ostensibly proven) in other jurisdictions. It is therefore not uncommon for crime chiefs to be heard loudly touting initiatives, which, even if they are given other
names (Anti-Crime-Investigation Department [ACID] Kingfish, Special Anti-Crime Task Force), can be easily recognized as slight modifications of time-worn strategies such as “aggressive order maintenance,” “broken windows policing,” “problem-oriented policing,” “quality of life policing,” or “zero tolerance.” The latter is by far the most popular among crime fighters and the general public, and when it is rolled out rarely is there any attempt made to disguise its pedigree.

The problem with these off-the-shelf crime-reduction programs is that often they are neither true to their source nor relevant to the sociocultural context into which they are imported. In fact they sometimes reflect an arbitrary inchoate admixture of goals, policies, strategies, and tactics that became particularly confusing and misleading in popular use. There are also issues arising from a lack of cultural fit as well as different judicial systems, laws, regulations, and procedures when we attempt to copy these strategies from the environments in which they were originally conceived and applied. The result, not surprisingly, is that in a country like Jamaica, a succession of crime-fighting strategies have been rolled out over the last two or three decades, all inspired by some imported policy and all floundering in a quagmire of dramatically increasing murder and extortion. The strategy of zero tolerance in Jamaica, for example, ran into major pitfalls. For one, it conflicted with the burgeoning rate of serious and violent crimes and a police force, penal system, and judiciary that were under strength both in terms of manpower, infrastructure, and material resources. The entire criminal justice system lacked the capacity to deal with the exponential increase in detentions and trials of those who committed relatively minor offences.

Research and Evidence-Based Crime Prevention

Research on what works in preventing crime has long been of interest to criminologists (Ruth and Reitz 2003; Van Dijk 2007). One of the more encouraging trends of the last 30 years has been evidence-based crime prevention. This line of scholarship essentially seeks to carry out research directed at finding evidence on the basis of which a distinction can be made between effective and ineffective crime strategies in any given situation. Van Dijk, for example, draws our attention to several studies carried out since the 1980s aimed at identifying effective alternatives for crime prevention. This type of policy-oriented research continued into the first decade of the twenty-first century and included several seminal pieces that, according to Van Dijk, amounted to “a passionate plea for evidence-based alternatives to more cops, courts, and corrections” (Tonry and Farrington 1995; Clarke 1997; Waller 2006). In this regard, therefore, perhaps the most telling criticism of the approach that has typified Jamaica and the Caribbean is that such approaches tend to be one-dimensional and mechanistic in that they lead policymakers into the trap of thinking that policing is the sole or best method of preventing crime. While there is probably nowhere in the world where this is true, it is particularly not true in poor countries like Jamaica or Guyana, where the myriad of socioeconomic problems (e.g., poverty and lack of education) and cultural differences (e.g., religious and racial) need to be addressed if any serious impact is to be made on the crime problem.

Despite these limitations however, support for evidence-based crime pre-
vention is deservedly growing and has been bolstered by a number of recent developments, including a movement toward an evidence-based approach in other disciplines, such as medicine and education. In law enforcement, evidence-based research is the precursor to evidence-based policing, and this entails a transition from the reliance on anecdotal evidence, personal experience, and conjecture to a reliance on formal, structured, and systematic approaches to data gathering, analysis, and use.

In more recent studies, there has been an increased effort to improve the degree of confidence in claims about what works in preventing crime. This has come about through the use of high-quality empirical evidence and rigorous and transparent review. Again, the approach is not without its limitations. A common critique of the evidence-based approach, for example, is that it favours discrete interventions with immediate effects, conducive to experimental testing. More complex and holistic measures with diffuse, long-term impacts fall outside the scope of the experimental designs contemplated in this paradigm. A related criticism is that the high-cost methodologies used in research on evidence-based crime strategy preclude its use in all but the most economically better-off countries (Van Dijk 2007). Such criticisms, however, only lend urgency to the need to develop cost-effective, cutting-edge approaches to research and policymaking that are appropriate to the needs of countries that combine severe resource constraints with huge and intractable crime problems. Furthermore, a suggestion for the use of more hard scientific, research-based evidence is not an argument for suspending intuition or common sense; it is merely an assertion that these cannot be the sole basis upon which the challenges of law enforcement are addressed.

The challenge of bringing evidence-based crime policy and strategy to resource-poor countries is compounded by the fact that the reality of crime and security issues is quite complicated and not amenable to simplistic analysis. There is a tendency to trot out simplistic and undigested statistical analysis of crime trends in the region. This is aggravated by the fear of crime and the increasing public demand for action from political and constabulary leadership. In this regard the countries of the Caribbean have a lot to learn from the experiences of more advanced countries. During the 1990s there was a dramatic decline in petty crimes in New York City. This was widely attributed to the zero-tolerance approach to crime under Mayor Rudy Giuliani. Gladwell (2003), however, argued that the reduction was not due to the policy of “zero tolerance,” but rather to the fact that the youths who were perpetuating such crimes had matured. Indeed, the level of crime in New York started falling in 1990, and by 1993 the level of violent crime and robbery had fallen by 20 percent. The zero-tolerance policy was not introduced until 1994. More telling however, was the fact that similar trends were observable in a range of U.S. cities, including those that had not changed their policing strategies. Another example may be drawn from Scotland, where police were able to report that incidents of home invasions had declined by a half between 1995 and 1996 and 2004 and 2005. Police high command attributed this to the benefits of crime-prevention measures, improved street lighting, and new detection techniques. However, deeper analysis revealed that the missing variable was the price of VCRs, which at the end of that period was a mere one-tenth of the price at the start. This single factor transformed
home invasions into a high-risk, low-value crime and almost certainly made a significant contribution to the reduction in crime (Clayton 2008).

**Enriching the Assessment Agenda**

The argument over what counts as success in crime response is a matter of longstanding contention. Central to crime strategy as a whole but particularly crucial to the evidence-based approach is the need for valid assessment strategies. But there is real danger that people, when pushed to evaluate programs, will adopt approaches that are far from objective or will focus on outcomes that matter very little (Ruth and Reitz 2003). If left unattended, many crime response professionals will prefer to rate their own performance and do so according to criteria that are easily measured, within their control, and make their work appear useful. Police departments, for example, have typically assessed their own operations by counting the number of arrests made by officers or by calculating the amount of time it takes the average patrol car to respond to an emergency call. Such indicators, as Ruth and Reitz pointed out, are imperfectly related to any of the major goals of crime response. Indeed empirical studies have shown that overly prolific arrest rates can increase rather than suppress crime, and that, while not undesirable as an aim in itself, shortened response time to police hotlines calls do little or nothing to prevent crime.

In many ways these approaches that concentrate on output contradict the concept of “publicness” (a complex and highly contested concept), which influences and governs the effective management of public services in general and the police service in particular. Private value tends to take the form of output (that is, product and services), whereas public value registers in the public mind in the form of outcomes, that is, how conditions and social groups are affected. In other words, the incidence of crime (an outcome) is far more important and meaningful than the number of police patrols per day, an output (Alford 2001).

**Assessment Project and Goal**

Modern security and law enforcement requires a realistic goal-directed approach that should not seek to settle all controversies in advance but place “contestable aspirations” on the table, ensuring that they cannot be ignored or assumed away (Bayley 1994). The assessment project we envision is one that constantly seeks answers to questions such as the following:

1. Does the crime-response program under examination reduce future criminal offending? Does it align well with other strategies of crime prevention (such as social intervention)? Does it ameliorate the fear of crime in the community?
2. Does it promote justice for victims, offenders, and communities?
3. Does it reduce recourse to informal alternatives for protection and the dispensation of justice?
4. Does it foster greater respect for the legitimacy of law and the crime-response complex within all relevant communities?
5. Does it avoid extending criminal law further than necessary to address serious
harms faced by society?

**Embracing Differences and Ideas and Cutting-Edge Research**

This approach that we envision is one that is distinguished fundamentally by its reliance on cutting-edge research. It should embrace differences and ideas and recognize that a difference is something to celebrate. It should acknowledge the fact that it is through difference of perspective that a number of ideas, many of which have revolutionized the way we think of social, economic, and cultural phenomena, have emerged. We must adopt a philosophical perspective that recognises the validity of difference and appreciate that cutting-edge research is, importantly, about the interrogation of established ways of seeing, being, and knowing in security and policing. The cutting edge research of which we speak could therefore be characterized by the following:

- **Objectivity** in the sense that its design and execution is removed from the control of linked or interested parties;
- **Innovation** in that it propounds novel and effective methodological approaches to understanding the situations and phenomena in national security and policing;
- **Scalable** in that it offers novel and effective pedagogical approaches to police education and training;
- **Policy-oriented** in that it supports the design of effective methods of undertaking security, crime response, and policing research.

An example of this would be modelling the risk-taking behaviour of various types of criminals and for different crimes. Modeling risk propensities has been an element of psychological research since at least the late 1950s (see, for example, Atkinson 1957). It has been tentatively applied to crime from both a phenomenological (Lyng 1993) and a positivist perspective (for example, Kulig et al., 1998). Broadly speaking, this body of literature supports the highly controversial field that has come to be known as “psychological profiling.” Controversy or no controversy, however, we suggest that there is a need to better understand the factors, both psychological and environmental, that are associated with the propensity to offend. If, for example, it were possible to better understand the factors motivating persons who engage in the dangerous practice of transborder drug smuggling on their bodies (“drug mules”), it may then be possible to devise solutions to dissuade would-be narcotics smugglers through well-focused social marketing, explaining the probability of being caught on the first attempt, the probability of death from ingestion, and the consequences of conviction. This kind of modeling could also assist in establishing the best deterrents, the best countervailing incentives, as well the types and methods of rehabilitation.
Conclusion

Security institutions and their environment are critical areas of policy concern largely under-researched in the Caribbean. There has been considerable historical research and some that has focused on the contemporary setting. There is, however, a dire need for evaluative research that examines recent and contemporary law enforcement initiatives with an eye on strategies for the future.

Numerous crime-fighting initiatives have been carried out. There is a need to consider the factors, national, regional, and international, that motivated these initiatives. There is also a need to look carefully at their outcomes and the implications of these outcomes for future security and law enforcement strategy. Consider some recent initiatives: In 2003 Trinidad and Tobago implemented the Special Anticrime Unit of Trinidad and Tobago (SAUTT). This initiative, which was modeled after earlier ones in Jamaica, arguably did little to solve the crime problem and was disbanded in 2011 with the change of government. In response to illicit trafficking and the associated escalation of violence, Jamaica established a unit called Kingfish in 2004–2005. The main goal of this squad was to investigate and prosecute the leaders of Transnational Organised Crime (TOC), the “Kingfishes” in the country. The formation of this unit may very well have been influenced by the need of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency to extradite three individuals who were characterised by U.S. President George W. Bush as international drug kingpins. From all indications, this was the only significant achievement of Kingfish, which was disbanded in 2010. The successor to Kingfish, the Major Organized Crime and Anti-corruption Task Force (MOCA) was created in early 2012, and this multidisciplinary unit includes members of both the military and the police along with customs officials, lawyers, and accountants. This group, as the name indicates, will concentrate on eradicating major organized crime and corruption. In so doing, emphasis will be placed on the money trail and taking the profit out of crime.

Our central argument is that initiatives such as those need to be the subject of dispassionate critical analysis as part of a broader agenda of research on law enforcement and security. We suggest that among the many factors that constrain effective crime fighting and policing in the Caribbean region is the absence of an appropriate framework for research to underpin the design and evaluation of policing and security policy. This gap contributes significantly to tendencies to adopt policing and security strategies that are inconsistent with the social realities to which they are applied and effective only in their ability to placate public opinion in the short run. The result is growing public cynicism in the context of growing crime and a drift in places such as Jamaica toward informal sources of justice. At least part of the solution to this problem is a research thrust that deliberately seeks to be objective, that espouses differences in ideas and perspectives, that combines the best of traditional approaches with new and innovative methodologies, and that sets out to lay the basis for policies and strategies that meet the challenges of contemporary policing and security.
References


The Growth of the Private Security Industry in Barbados: A Case Study

Tyrone James

ABSTRACT

The rise and involvement of private security companies in what was hitherto the domain of states has been quite topical, calling the attention of academics and practitioners alike as they debate the practical and conceptual issues relating to this change within what can be described as the sovereignty of states. The purpose of this essay is to conduct a case study of the private security industry in Barbados with a view to understanding its structure, reasons for growth, and relationship with the formal police force. I argue that the growth of the private security companies in Barbados will be a force extension to the state law enforcement agencies and can contribute significantly to the fostering of a safe and stable environment.

Introduction

Defense and security has traditionally been the domain of states and remains a foundational element of good governance. Within the context of this paradigm, states have developed police forces and armies to protect their sovereignty and maintain a peaceful and stable environment for social and economic development.

As civilization becomes more complex, however, states find themselves challenged to provide the traditional public goods, as competing demands require a level of response appropriate to the quality of life and political objectives of the ruling elites. One of the areas of public good that states find themselves challenged to provide is that of security, as states balance the fine line between having enough police to ensure the security of the state and being seen as a police state. In this regard, it becomes necessary for states to take a pragmatic view of the situation and identify those critical areas they cannot outsource and to outsource to private enterprise the noncritical areas.

This pragmatic view has facilitated the exponential growth not only of private security companies, but of private military companies that provide actual combat services to their clients. The concept of private security companies is not new, however; records exist of the use of private security forces in the 13th century BCE, when Egyptian Pharaoh Ramses II hired private security to complement Egypt’s own military and security forces. This practice reportedly continued in ancient Rome, where the wealthy hired private security personnel to protect their families and property. In more recent times private security companies have risen to a level of technological sophistication, involved in financial, national security, and the de-
fense industries, among other areas, and in fact in control of a significant percentage of security information relating to every sphere of activities of our modern society.

The rise and involvement of private security companies in what was hitherto the domain of the state has been quite topical, calling the attention of academics and practitioners alike as they debate the practical and conceptual issues relating to this change within what can be described as the sovereignty of states. My purpose is to conduct a case study of the private security industry in Barbados with a view to understanding its structure, reasons for growth, and relationship with the formal police force. I argue that the growth of the private security companies in Barbados will be a force extension to the state law enforcement agencies and can contribute significantly to the fostering of a safe and stable environment.

Investigating the Definitions of Private Security Companies

To better appreciate the topic it is necessary to discuss what is and what is not a private security company/agency. This is now more relevant in light of the diversification of private agencies in areas of national security and even national and international conflict zones.

Parker (2009) recognized that the traditional concept of security agencies that operated within national boundaries and offered basic domestic property protection and surveillance systems had evolved to where “multinational corporations [were] offering international clients a range of services, including some that [were] traditionally seen as military operations reserved for states’ armed forces,” such as in Iraq, where they reportedly account for 16 percent of foreign personnel in that country. While there existed no agreed upon definition, she moved toward a classification based on the nature of services offered to make distinctions between mercenaries, private military companies (PMCs), and private security companies (PSCs). Despite that distinction Parker (2009) somewhat accepted the generalized grouping of private military and security companies (PMSC).

Within this context she defined mercenaries as “non-nationals hired by one of the parties to an armed conflict to take part in [that] conflict.” These, she noted, are motivated by pecuniary interests and are often referred to as “soldiers of fortune.” While the distinction between mercenaries and private military companies is somewhat tenuous, Parker (2009) identified the latter as providing “services associated with replacing or backing up an army or armed group or to enhance effectiveness.” The distinction could be that while private military companies “tend to specialize in the provision of military skills, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, consulting on strategic planning and force deployment, operational and logistical support, training, maintenance of weapon systems, and technical skills to legitimate domestic and foreign entities” (Parker, 2009), mercenaries are generally involved in direct combat operations. In contrast, private security companies “are registered civilian companies that specialize in providing contract commercial services to domestic and foreign entities aimed at protecting personnel and property from criminal activity” and generally provide key point and VIP/close protection, investigation, surveillance, points-of-entry security, and risk management.

Like Parker (2009), Richards and Smith (2007) also found the identification
of an internationally accepted definition extremely elusive and saw it as a direct result of the overlapping of functions among these agencies; this in their view was compounded by the “involvement of a number of often unofficial and/or illegal operators such as mercenaries and neighborhood civil defense forces.” Richard and Smith’s (2007) categories were slightly different from those of Parker (2009) and included PSCs, PMCs, internal security divisions (ISDs), and non-lethal service providers (NSPs).

**Evolution of Private Security Companies**

Private security companies pre-date state police forces by centuries. Private security existed at least since the 13th century BCE in the Egypt of Pharaoh Ramses II, and later when the wealthy in ancient Rome hired private security personnel to protect their families and property. Later in 1822, when Sir Robert Peel reformed the criminal law reform bill, thereby developing the modern police force, private security continued through such companies as Pinkerton, Wells Fargo, and Brinks.

The catalyst that brought about the evolution of private security and public policing, according to Steenkamp (2002), followed Maslow’s classical Motivational Theory, and came out of a felt need for safety and security. In their desire for additional protection for self and property, people found it necessary not only to arm themselves, but also to build physical protective barriers around their properties. This over time advanced to the more sophisticated concept of statutory legislation compelling others to refrain from certain actions under pain of punishment (Steenkamp, 2002). Security structures became a permanent and necessary element of modern civilization to the point where governments lost the reins of power and societies degraded into anarchy because of weak or nonexistent security mechanisms to enforce the laws and maintain proper social order. Historically, the level of security and protective services offered by the state never fully addressed the needs of the society, according to Steenkamp (2002). This inability of the state to provide the security needs of the society created an opportunity for the private security sector to proliferate and also facilitated the development of the weapons industry and other physical and strategic security measures that now define not only the micro private security industry but also the macro military and security industry.

**The Growth of Private Security Companies**

Despite the many physical and statutory measures established over the centuries to ensure a safe society, the general populace has always had some dissatisfaction with the level and quality of services provided by the state. This is supported by Richards and Smith (2007), who pointed to a global trend toward increased security provision by non-state actors fuelled by a combination of factors including the dynamics of fiscal and economic constraints faced by governments and “the chronic insecurity and poor quality of policing in many countries.”

The private security industry has now grown and diversified into many areas, including the provision of military and other core defense forces services. Fidler (2007) noted that more than “20,000 armed expatriates working for private security companies” were in Iraq, which equated to more than the combined total of all the
non-U.S. troops, and despite drawdown of troops by the United States and other countries, the actual numbers of private security were not appreciably affected. The 2003 Iraq War, he further observed, “accelerated a controversial trend” where private security agencies were now involved in core national security activities such as “repair and maintenance of battlefield systems, close protection for visiting government officials, and the interrogation of prisoners” among others.

In its online newsletter, privateofficer.com (2010) noted that the private security industry was one of the fastest growing industries in the United States, with the Department of Labor estimating a growth rate of 17 percent for the industry by 2016. To support this view privateofficer.com (2010) pointed to the growth rate in California, Nevada, and Arizona, which exceeded 22 percent. This growth, they noted, was related to concerns about increased crime. The 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States also contributed significantly; there has been a steady increase in the employment of security guards and patrol services since 2003. This trend was also noted by the National Association of Security Companies, which observed that between 11,000 and 15,000 private security companies employ 1.2 million private security officers, almost double that of police officers (privateofficers.com, 2010).

This exponential growth explosion within the private security industry was seen by Steenkamp (2002) as the best indicator of the success of the private security industry within the free market system. The data he was able to assess suggested that the annual growth rate of private security in America during the 1970s was about 10 percent, which essentially outpaced most segments of the economy. Steenkamp (2002), in attempting to understand the rationale behind this phenomenal growth, hypothesized that this growth was largely due to the increase in crime and the apparent inability of public law enforcement to arrest this trend coupled with the increasing professionalism of private security services. This view was largely supported by Abrahamsen and Williams (2005), who noted that “Fear and insecurity have become defining features of life in Kenya,” with the UN placing Nairobi “as one of the world’s most dangerous capital cities” and insecurity being the major deterrent to economic growth. In this environment of increased crime and violence and reduced confidence in the police force, private security companies proliferated. In addition, this demand for security services and additional protection rose sharply after the 1998 terrorist attack on the U.S. embassy, and the 2002 hotel bombing and attack on an Israeli airliner. The expatriate community in Kenya is now one of the most lucrative markets for private security services.

The Need for Regulation

The diversification of private security companies into what was traditionally the domain of sovereign states has raised many concerns, and their involvement in military conflict zones has revealed significant regulatory and legal gaps (Fidler, 2005). The growth and diversification of the industry has been at such a rate that it has essentially outpaced domestic regulatory provisions under which they operate. Private security and military companies have now moved out of the realm of domestic activities to involvement in international conflicts that involve multiple nations, such as the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. This controversial involvement, and in some instances the assumption of defense and security-related roles, accelerated after the
2003 Iraq War (Fidler 2005).

This trend has raised many concerns internationally as it is seen by many as undermining state sovereignty, since no international protocols exist to address these developments, placing a dependence on inadequate domestic regulations to address any issues. This raises its own issues because domestic laws and regulation governing private security companies clash in “some respects from country to country and leave important gaps in other areas” (Fidler, 2005). In this regard, Cottier (2006) observed that the globalized nature of private security companies gives rise to many policy-related, legal, and practical issues since the services provided do not fall within an established legal framework. Cottier (2006) further noted that since the international system is based on states and the rule of law, the increase of private security companies and their involvement in activities, which was once only the domain of states, brings into question the traditional state monopoly on violence.

The absence of strong regulatory structures to govern these agencies has also facilitated an environment within the industry that, according to Deputy Police Minister Fikile Mbalula, of South Africa, has facilitated issues “ranging from private guards selling their identity documents and certificates to illegal and desperate foreign nationals, to racism, sexism, sexual harassment and exploitation and blatant disrespect of fundamental human rights” (Mkhulisi, 2010). Mbalula pointed out that while private security companies were concerned with profit maximization, many employees were inadequately trained and underpaid and on many occasions were allowed to operate above state organs. For these reasons private companies should not be allowed to run amok in the name of fighting crime and should be regulated (Mkhulisi, 2010). This has also provided challenges for many companies that have responsibility for the safety and security of their personnel in military conflict zones, especially when they are required to carry arms.

The issuance of arms to private security personnel raises especially serious concerns with Cottier (2006), who saw it through the lens of control and accountability. This, he noted, was more troubling in a conflict and post-conflict zone because law enforcement under these conditions, without the ability to apply it within the framework of the legal system, is generally ineffective. Additionally, as operations become globalized and companies are required to operate across sovereign borders, they must now consider the opportunity cost of not having established and accepted regulations and standards. Additionally, Cottier (2006) insisted that the private security industry (companies and personnel) should be accountable as corporate citizens and should be answerable to society for all aspect of their professional activities.

Private security has evolved into a highly specialized industry providing security for people and property under commercial and contractual arrangements (Richards and Smith, 2007). This industry, when effectively regulated, can be a significant force extension to the national security infrastructure. Failure to properly and adequately regulate the private security industry can create unique governance and developmental problems in normal or conflict environments, especially in light of their involvement in many sensitive areas of national security.

This trend toward the outsourcing of security functions, which is far advanced in the United States, “partly in response to public sector downsizing, but also because of the changing nature of warfare,” theoretically “allows governments
and public institutions to increase efficiency by concentrating on their core functions whilst transferring surplus responsibilities to private companies" (Richards and Smith, 2007).

Private/Public Security Forces Relations

The professional activities of private security have shifted into what was seen traditionally as the domain of states and has caused some commentators to raise questions of accountability and other issues of responsibility to the social and political structures of the state (Cottier, 2006). The transformation has been so comprehensive that private security personnel were increasingly behaving like public police: “they wear uniforms, carry weapons and drive lighted patrol cars on private properties like banks and apartment complexes and in public areas like bus stations and national monuments” and “more and more….they’re being granted official police powers” (Schneier, 2007). He saw this involvement in what traditionally were government functions as prejudicial to public policing and “placing law enforcement at risk.”

This issue has been given new impetus on the heels of the action of the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, who in December 2011 deployed 400 police officers to replace striking private security workers at the Charles de Gaulle and Orly Airports in Paris—a move that the unions described as “a violation of French laws guaranteeing the right of employees to strike” (Crumley, 2011). This raises questions about the role of the police vis-à-vis private security and could also engender acrimony.

While there is a requirement for further research into the relations between private security and public police forces, it was provocatively described by Sotlar (2009) “as involving conflict, competition, cooperation and partnership.” In a 2006 survey conducted in Slovenia, Sotlar (2009) revealed that “security officers believed (more than policemen) that they really cooperate with police officers in a process of enabling security and law enforcement,” while the police respondents, “were far more reserved on these relationships.” While both groups believed that private security had a critical social control, both were also doubtful as to whether private security companies will ever be allowed to manage prisons and prisoners in Slovenia. Despite this acknowledgement of the importance of private security by both groups, police respondents did not support the expansion of powers of private security officers, including use of physical force (Sotlar, 2009).

Security, Governance, and State Power

Good governance is a complex concept that was concretized when nation states emerged with a central authority to command and manage the affairs of the state; where this structure has fractured, empires have vanished and regimes have crumpled from the failure of good governance (Anam Khan, 2010). Anam Khan (2010) further noted that “security in its comprehensive sense is premised on three factors: one is the traditional security emerging from statist discourse, but also security of the people that can come from economic progress and good governance and rule of law; these three things, working together, are really what determine security.”

The traditional Wesphalian concept of state power as articulated by Max We-
ber recognizes the central importance of a strong state with a safe and secure internal environment for the development of its society; to this end the state had the monopoly on the employment of violence, even on its citizens, to achieve these ends. This narrow view, however, was rejected by Sachs (2003), who viewed Weber’s concept as outdated and leaning towards elitists and oppressive internal security structures. Sachs (2003) further argued that changing world dynamics have now moved the security debate toward the more inclusive concept of “human security,” in which the fulfillment of the “need of individuals for safety in other arenas of basic need,” such as “access to clean food and water, environmental and energy security, freedom from economic exploitation, protection from arbitrary violence by the police, gangs, or domestic partners,” are more relevant. Conflicts, he further noted, were now almost all internal because populations were concerned with quality of life issues, thus requiring planners to address problems such as “environmental pollution, depletion of the ozone layer, [global] warming, and massive migrations of unwanted refugees.”

Without doubt, private security has a role to play within the continuing hostile security environment, but this must be done within regulations to guide their operations and establish standards for the protection of customers. Percy (2010), agreeing that regulation of the private security industry was vital, noted that while domestic, international, and informal regulation exists, they were “deficient and contains significant gaps.” She further noted that regulation was necessary “because PSCs challenge both political and military control; because the rules governing PSCs are unclear; because the industry suffers from a lack of transparency; because PSCs are insufficiently accountable for their actions; and because the industry’s future growth ought to be monitored to protect the public interest.” These problems, she argued, are more a failure of the state to enforce and direct regulation rather than inherent to the private security companies.

The Barbados Environment

Background

Barbados is the easternmost island in the Caribbean chain of islands and is located more in the Atlantic Ocean than in the Caribbean Sea. It is extremely flat, with the highest point at Mount Hillaby, standing at 1,104 ft. The capital, Bridgetown, is located on the western side of the island. The annual temperature is 80 degrees F (27 C). The annual rainfall is 1,500 mm (60 in.) (U.S. Department of State).

Barbados is the most populated island in the Caribbean Sea, with a population of 281,698 residing on its 166 sq. miles. A British colony that gained its independence from Britain in 1966, its history is one of the main determinants of its population mix, with approximately 90 percent of the population described as black; 15 percent having both African and British ancestry; and 4 percent of European-British descent (U.S. Department of State).

The people of Barbados are very industrious, and after gaining political independence in 1966 were able to transform it from a low-income economy dependent upon sugar production into an upper-middle-income one based on tourism. Barbados is now one of the most prosperous countries in the Western Hemisphere outside
of the United States and Canada, with a very stable parliamentary-type democracy modeled on the British system. Barbados has an independent judiciary composed of magistrate courts, which are statutorily authorized, and a Supreme Court, which is constitutionally mandated. The Supreme Court consists of the high court and the court of appeals, each with four judges. The Chief Justice serves on both the high court and the court of appeals. The court of last resort is the Caribbean Court of Justice (U.S. Department of State).

The economy of Barbados is based mainly on tourism, with offshore banking and financial services becoming an increasingly important source of foreign exchange and economic growth. The once-dominant sugar industry has declined in importance over the years and now contributes less than 1 percent of GDP and employs only around about 500 persons. The average rate of unemployment during the last quarter of 2006 was estimated at 7.6 percent (U.S. Department of State).

**Crime and Security**

The Caribbean had the distinction of being an idyllic tourist destination until the recent past, when incidences of crime and violence started to mar its reputation. *The Economist* (2008) noted that “increasingly, some countries, particularly in the English-speaking Caribbean, are earning a reputation for their sharply rising rates of crime,” with the attendant result of “high economic costs, including an adverse impact on foreign investment and tourism.”

According to a 2007 report published jointly by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank, murders occur in the Caribbean at a rate of 30 per 100,000 persons, compared to Eastern Europe, where murder rates are 17 per 100,000, and the United States, where they are 7 per 100,000. The report also notes that assault rates are significantly above the world average and rates of rape, kidnapping, and other violent crimes are also on the rise. The locus of this problem is in the drug trade, which diverts police and other resources away from other important activities, increases and invites violence, undermines social and community unity, increases addiction-related crimes, and increases the availability of firearms.

While Barbados does not see the level of crime as some of its neighboring islands, there is still cause for concern, as reported in the NationNews of August 10, 2011, when an “urgent call” was made by the president of the Barbados Association of Retired Persons (BARP) for “more protection for the elderly and tourists in the aftermath of the recent spate of crime: the killing of an elderly man and his son-in-law, the rape of a St. John woman, and the shooting of two police officers.” The president expressed concern that the elderly were increasingly targeted by criminals, and called for residents to report all suspicious activity in their area to the police and on visitors to be vigilant. This call was echoed by a veteran hotelier, who noted that there had been at least nine attacks on guests, including two rapes over the last three years.

Despite this concern, police statistics on crime indicate that there has been a gradual reduction in crime in Barbados, with sex-related crimes such as rape, indecent assault, etc., falling from a high of 200 in 2006 to 169 in 2010; minor crimes
against the person, such as assaults, woundings, etc., from 1,957 in 2006 to 1,806 in 2010; major crimes against property, such as theft, from 2,099 in 2006 to 2,093 in 2010; drug crimes, from 919 in 2006 to 830 in 2010; and firearms and ammunition crimes, from 118 in 2006 to 78 in 2010. However, major crimes against the person, such as murders, serious bodily harm, etc., saw an increase from 790 in 2006 to 923 in 2010 (barbadospolice.gov).

**Private Security in Barbados**

The security guard industry in Barbados is well developed, with approximately 317 security companies registered with Barbados Corporate Services. Despite this number of companies on their registry, Corporate Services has said that they are unable to confirm whether all the companies are indeed operational. A wide range of services are provided from consultancy to the installation of burglar alarms, sale of security management systems, cash escort, access control, and training and provision of guard dogs and other K-9 services, among others.

Although some of the companies are regional or international, most of them are locally owned. A large percentage of the locally owned companies are operated by ex-police officers, while others are owned by politicians or other businesspeople. In fact the formation of many of the companies came out of specific relationships, as was explained by the owner of a small company that employed six persons and had a contract with a government department. However, it would also appear that a large percentage of companies came into existence in 2007, when the Cricket World Cup took place in the Caribbean. Many persons with inside contacts on the planning were encouraged to set up companies to take advantage of the increased demand for security guard services.

Barbados is also the corporate headquarters of a number of regional and international firms, banks and other financial services, embassies and consulates, and other offices of regional and international organizations. It is standard operating practice for these organizations, regardless of the crime environment, to contract with private security to provide a number of services.

**Regulation of Private Security Companies**

While regulation is recognized as critical and necessary to the professionalism and control of the private security industry, this aspect is not well developed in Barbados. For their part, there exists a Private Investigator and Security Guard Act Chapter 372E of the Laws of Barbados, which came into force in December 1985 with the express purpose of “licensing and control of private investigators and security guards and for related matters.” Part 2 of the Act establishes a Private Investigators and Security Guards Licensing and Advisory Board with the responsibility for the administration of the Act and the advisement of the Minister on matters relating to private investigators and security guards as determined by the Minister. The Minister has the sole responsibility of appointing members to this board.

Part 3 of the Act, “Meaning of Private Investigator and Security Guard and Powers and Duties thereof” defines a security guard as any person licensed under the Act to “provide services for the protection of persons or property or to prevent
the theft or the unlawful taking of property” (Section 7). Under Section 9 of the Act, a security guard in the performance of his functions has the powers to arrest any person without warrant who may be in breach of the peace, or commits or attempts to commit treason or felony. However, Section 10 prohibits security guards from being involved in monitoring or recording private conversations and the taking or using of photographs of another person without the prior consent of that person.

To set up a security company, Section 15 requires the applicant for a license to provide such information as:

- the applicant’s full name, address and date of birth;
- the applicant’s educational background;
- the places at which the applicant was previously employed; and
- the service intended to be provided by the applicant.

This must be accompanied by a personal bond in an amount approved by the Board, with one and more sureties and a certificate of character from the Commissioner of Police and one other person acceptable to the Board.

**Private Security Agencies—Use of Firearms**

The firearms regulations in Barbados, as in the other Caribbean jurisdictions, are very strict and heavily regulated. In the English-speaking Caribbean, the laws on firearms is so strict that the possession of any part of a firearm, functional or otherwise, ammunition, or even a spent shell is an offence under the law. The Firearms Act of Barbados, Chapter 179 of the Laws of Barbados, requires all persons in possession of a gun or ammunition to have in his or her possession a valid license issued by the Commissioner of Police.

Under this Act, the Commissioner of Police is the sole determinant of who receives a license and has the power under Section 14 of the Act at any time to vary the conditions subject to which a license is held, and can amend or alter the specific conditions under which a license was previously issued.

The issue of firearms for private security, given the extent of caution surrounding the issue of firearms in general, is a very involved matter. While there are no regulations governing this aspect of the industry, the decision is left largely up to the discretion of the Commissioner of Police to accommodate the security companies. However, the police department has confirmed that it issues firearms for the use of private security companies under the following procedures:

- The security company applies for a firearm under the normal procedure.
- The individual(s) whom the company will allow to carry the weapon must also apply separately for a license.
- After written confirmation from the Ministry of Defense and Security confirming that the company is indeed licensed to operate in the stated capacity, both the company and individual(s) are vetted in the usual way.
When a firearm license is issued under this arrangement, only the weapon assigned can be carried by that individual. As a matter of fact, the license is not transferrable; thus, when that employee ceases work at the firm the license is revoked so that no person receiving a license under one firm can obtain employment with another firm and benefit from having the license.

Conclusion

The private security industry in Barbados is not unlike those in many other jurisdictions. However, it is poorly regulated and leaves a great deal to the companies themselves to determine how to function. This has opened a credibility gap with a number of companies who employ less than reputable individuals and on many occasions fail to ensure that they are licensed as required by law. The Ministry of Defense and Security has administrative responsibility for the companies, but operationally there is no identified agency. In fact, the Ministry has one individual identified as responsible for the registration and maintenance of all matters relative to private security companies, who without doubt has little time to follow up, since he must fulfill other duties within the Ministry.

The inadequacy of the available regulatory and licensing system allows for many inconsistencies within the industry. With only one person responsible for the maintenance of private security mechanism and a poor transparency and accountability mechanism, the system opens itself up to illegal practices and corruption. Additionally, several companies have political affiliations, where the company is owned by a politician or has some connection to a political parties or individuals. Many companies were started specific to a government contract. This is in no way peculiar to Barbados, as a cursory check into other Caribbean countries revealed more or less the same situation.

Many security companies, especially where they provide guard duties, do not require or provide training to their personnel. Because there is generally a high turnover at that level, many do not consider it cost effective to provide training. This is evident by the numerous complaints regarding security guards who come in contact with the public.

With a police force establishment of 1,539, however, the private security industry in Barbados could provide a significant force extension to the crime-fighting capabilities of the law enforcement agencies if the necessary relations were developed and fostered. This was evident during 2007 Cricket World Cup, when several matches, including the finals, were played in Barbados. Under the security plan, private security companies played a major role in venue access-point security and accreditation under the oversight of the police.

While there is some interagency collaboration between the police and private security companies, many operate as though are above the law. In fact, there are many private security firms that seem to operate above the law of the land, and many researchers have found that poor regulation could lead to an undermining of democratic principles and the justice system in these situations. A case in point in Barbados was a situation where a report of domestic violence was made to the police via telephone by the wife of a prominent businessman who lived in a gated
community. Members of the Royal Barbados Police Force responded to the report and were refused entry by the security guards at the entrance. This appears not to be an isolated incident with regard to a lack of cooperation between official police and private security firms.

The private security industry in Barbados to a large extent is very well established but not properly or adequately regulated. Many gaps exist in the legislation for the monitoring and evaluation of the industry, leaving it largely to regulate itself. The authorities in Barbados maintain a more strict control in the area of firearms, where the police have jurisdiction, though it may be necessary to provide the police with oversight authority over the professional aspects of firearm control while the Ministry of Defense and Security maintain control over registration and licensing.

One of the problems confronting researchers in the Caribbean is the lack of transparency that exists in many operations, whether business or government. This extends to the availability of information. The barriers encountered in gathering information on the security industry suggests that it involves some level of sensitive security. This researcher attempted to gather comparative data from St. Vincent for comparison to Barbados, but received little assistance and was directed to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Security. This situation largely hindered the research effort and affected the overall results and conclusion.

Given the dearth of information available on private security companies and their operations within Barbados and, by extension, the wider Caribbean, and the reluctance to provide information due largely to political concerns, further study into this topic is recommended.


A Geopolitical Interpretation of Security Concerns within United States–Latin American Relations

Phil Kelly

ABSTRACT

In this article, Dr. Philip Kelly discusses the geopolitics of security concerns between the United States and Latin America. Kelly defines the various schools of geopolitics and, subsequently, the characteristics of traditional geopolitics. By breaking down the Western Hemisphere into three separate Americas—North America, Middle America, and South America—Kelly assesses each region and its unique geopolitical characteristics. Finally, the article addresses a number of geopolitical concepts that represent the structure of current Western Hemispheric security. In conclusion, Kelly suggests that South America ultimately remains a low priority in North American strategic security concerns, and posits that a united and prosperous Latin America isolated from Eurasian connections directly benefits North American security.

Overview

North American security rests upon a variety of premises, all relevant to a discussion of our safety within this hemisphere and the world. Among significant premises would be a strong navy and army, national economic stability and prosperity, an insightful and consistent political leadership, a vibrant and healthy citizenry, an acceptance of legitimacy among the leading world powers, effective international institutions and laws, and the eradication of nuclear-terrorist threats. But the spatial or geographical aspect also rates as a further premise of American security concern. Accordingly, the intent of this article is (1) to describe what is meant by a model of geopolitics, the method that relates geography to foreign policies and actions, and (2) to suggest an explanation for the U.S. security relationship with our neighbors to the south based on several primary geopolitical tenets.

In the structural or intercontinental realm of geopolitics, the United States attains its security, in large part, by avoiding encirclement by powers hostile to us that might have established control over the greater Eurasian continent. In this spatial environment, our security lies in our effective intervention in Eurasia, and not in a more contained Fortress America defense. This stance of extracontinental awareness has held consistent since before our own independence, and it will continue to be our focus indefinitely. I remain convinced that this would have been a strategic priority regardless of who had occupied the North American lands—whether they had been English, Chinese, Russian, or even Iranian—because it would have been natural to the geographical setting.
This said, our vital global orientation is within the northern sectors of our planet and not within the south, where much of Latin America resides. Nicholas Spykman stated this northern orientation quite clearly when he wrote (1938: 29-30; 1944 41-44):

The North Atlantic is today the most desirable body of water on which a state can be located... [our] consideration of climate and distribution of land masses have led to the conclusion that the political activity of the world is, and will continue to be, centered between 25 degrees and 60 degrees north latitude [where] history is made.

More recently, Henry Kissinger argued similarly in his conversation with the Chilean foreign minister (Hersh 1983: 263): “The axis of history begins in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes on to Tokyo. What occurs in the southern world is not important.”

In addition to this northern concentration, U.S. security is also fully East-West in its orientation, and this direction extends toward establishing and maintaining favorable power balances upon either extreme of Eurasia, the western and eastern rimlands. The following well-known quotations of George Kennan (1951: 10), reflective of Halford Mackinder and of Spykman (1944: 34, 43-45; 1942: 3-7, 457, 466-468), underlie the wide acceptance of this Eurasian-directed strategy:

“It is essential to us, as it was to Britain, that no single Continental land power should come to dominate the entire Eurasian landmass. Our interest has lain rather in the maintenance of some sort of stable balance among the powers of the interior, in order that none of them should effect the subjugation of the others, conquer the seafaring fringes of the land mass, become a great sea power as well as land power, shatter the position of English, and enter—as in these circumstances it certainly would—on an overseas expansion hostile to ourselves and supported by the immense resources of the interior of Europe and Asia.”

“Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.” “Our objective is to prevent the domination [of Eurasia] by hegemonic powers whose principles and ideals are opposed to the whole course of Western Civilization.” “It will be cheaper in the long run to remain a working member of the European power zone than to withdraw for short intermissions to our insular domain only to be forced to apply later the whole of our national strength to redress a balance that might have needed but a slight weight at the beginning.” “If we are to avoid the conclusion of such an encirclement [by Eurasia] in the future, our constant concern in peace time must be to see that no nation or alliance or nations is allowed to emerge as a dominating power in either the [heartland and rimlands] of the Old World from which our security could be threatened.” “The strategic picture demands that we conduct our military operations in the form of a great offensive across the oceans. If our allies of the Old
World are defeated, we cannot hold South America; if we defeat [the Eurasian enemy] abroad, our good neighbors will need no protection.”

A North-South axis for North America defense simply lacks relevance, unless somehow events in Latin America come to threaten this northern Eurasian focus. But, fortunately, Latin America does not currently pose a security threat to the United States, as this article concludes.

The potential for future danger, likewise, will likely remain remote. While such good fortune rests with several causes, the geopolitical patterns described below will suggest some primary reasons for this relief. South America, in particular, is distant and quite isolated from the major strategic configurations of the north. The republics clearly have neither the interest nor the ability to become involved in the diplomacy of balancing Eurasia (Kelly 1997: 84-134), and, assuredly, any Eurasia power probably would feel likewise even were the American states receptive to an anti-U.S. alliance.

Middle America is less separated from major world affairs, but it differs from South America in being under the command of the northern master as its Caribbean sphere of influence. This attachment of Middle America to the United States demands that the region be a passive participant in northern stratagems. Here, I can confirm: the Monroe Doctrine of the United States is safe and not threatened because no external danger exists.

Finally, the security relations among the American republics both of the middle and the southern portions of the hemisphere for the most part enjoy a substantial regional stability, a zone of peace, and this represents a further reason not to fear the possibility that our southern neighbors would call attention away from the northern preoccupation with Eurasia. Here also, the existing geopolitical patterns of Latin America have encouraged such peace and stability.

Before delving into the geopolitics of the strategic linkages between the United States and its southern friends, I will describe what I define as classical geopolitics, and how it might contribute to our discussion. A much maligned, and often misunderstood, approach to the study of international relations, classical geopolitics, nonetheless, has much to offer both to students and to practitioners of foreign affairs, including those pertinent to relations with the nations to the south. Accordingly, this article’s design will be two-fold: (1) an explanation of the qualities of the traditional version of geopolitics, and, once accomplished (2) an application of certain of these qualities to a description of the current security concerns within United States–Latin American relations.

The Classical Geopolitical Model

The focus of the classical version of geopolitics rests on the positioning of states and regions, and how these spatial aspects may affect countries’ international policies and actions. More specifically, the following appears to fit most of the extant definitions of traditional geopolitics:

The study of the impacts of certain geographical features, such as states’ and regions’ positions and locations, resources, distance, climate, topography, sizes and shapes of countries, and the like, upon
states’ foreign policies and behaviors as an aide to state craft and as a source for theory.

Its level-of-analysis position is structural or strategic; its orientation is modernist or traditional; and its application to policy is inherently neutral to any ideology or partisan viewpoint, being rather a reliable tool for decision makers and academics in their attempts to find some order to the usual complexity of international relationships.

A theory differs from a model within this explanation. Such a generalization is usually just a sentence setting out some relationship of probability, or the likelihood that if “A” happens, then “B” may also happen. For instance, the more frontiers a state possesses, the more war involvements it will incur. Frontiers correlate with wars. I have found this theory to be true for South America and elsewhere (Kelly 1992). In contrast, a model represents a typology of the entire array of assumptions, concepts, and theories that would correspond to an established definition of geopolitics.

For instance, in the case of geopolitical assumptions, we imagine that environmental factors will condition behavior. We cannot substantiate these assumptions; we simply must accept them as being true. Geopolitical concepts provide the vocabulary of our model, being passive, yet descriptive. They provide definitions, assumptions, and theories with the necessary words and materials for their application to foreign affairs. And again, geopolitical theories require some evidence of probability, and, unlike concepts, they must submit to testing and replication to locate that predictability.

Unfortunately, the theory-testing requirement for probability remains problematic. Statistical significance, perhaps, provides the best measure of predictability, but only a small portion of the spatial theories I will describe below will lend themselves to quantification. Nor will rational choice yield the necessary assistance. Consequently, beyond these tests, I will likewise enlist for examination much rougher and subjective estimations to substantiate theories, such as common sense and logic, historical examples and maps, and statespersons’ actions, among other calculations, with the hope that the reader will understand my replication dilemma.

The exact dividing line between concepts and theories also tends to elude me. Indeed, where does the passive concept evolve into an active theory? The exact separation would be difficult to locate with precision, but is such a divisor of great importance? I think not. And consequently, this uncertainly between concept and theory will not distract me, either, for I merely will combine the two aspects into one, a concept/theory, within this article.

Finally, a model is the summation of all of these parts: assumptions, concepts, and theories, and all these sectors must correspond to the established definition of the model’s topic. One might imagine a basket, the outer perimeters being the sides of the container and what enters the container being the assumptions, concepts, and theories. The basket’s gatekeeper figures as the definition itself, for, again, what enters the basket must correspond to the definition. In a recent publication (Kelly, 2012b), I located 43 theories/concepts eligible for entry into the geopolitical basket.

The worth of a model is that its distinct parts can be applied to an investi-
gation of foreign affairs. For example, it might be helpful to know that the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was, in geopolitical terms, a shatterbelt—that the diplomatic structure of South America derives from a checkerboard pattern, a major reason for the continent’s current stability. Keeping Middle American states away from Eurasian ties protects the Monroe Doctrine. Hence, for enhancing our understanding of hemispheric security, concepts/theories allow us to interpret events in more depth, relying upon a variety of established spatial guidelines that have been used traditionally in international relationships.

Several additional aspects of the traditional description of geopolitics must withstand review before we can proceed on to Latin America:

1. **Geopolitics does not equate to political geography.** The realm of geopolitics lies within political science, and that of political geography within geography. Whereas geopolitics is strategic or international, political geography locates primarily in the domestic areas and in states’ political boundaries. Certain issues of these two schools may overlap, such as immigration, pollution, violence, and business, but this overlap should not negate the general distinction. My concern is geopolitics and not political geography, the international and not the national.

   Despite these differences, both political geography and geopolitics have suffered similar past disgraces, respectively, the problem of geographical determinism for geographers, and the problem of fascism for adherents of geopolitics. Both problems, unfortunately, were associated with racism, and neither of the branches has escaped from its questionable heritage, a disgrace to both, but in my opinion, quite exaggerated and not a repudiation that deserves to continue.

2. **The model of geopolitics is not part of the model of realism.** Somehow, geopolitics has become intertwined with realism. Indeed, it is seen as a rather minor part of that model. Such a tie errs markedly, for the two models inherently differ.

   The focus of geopolitics rests upon the impacts of spatial positions, or the study of pertinent locations of states and regions and other geographical factors that may render some effect upon states’ foreign policies and actions. In contrast, the focus of realism derives from protecting countries against security threats within an anarchic international environment—how may such threats be eased and resolved? These two foci rest on very different perspectives.

   Within the description of realism, the overall problem, unfortunately unsolvable, is international anarchy, the unreliability of international law and organizations toward guaranteeing states’ security. These protections, law and collective security, are simply lacking. Attempts of individual states to augment their safety will suffer a “security dilemma,” such attempts setting off arms races that will worsen the situation. The best solution, albeit a temporary one, might come in a consensus or accepted legitimacy among the great powers for moderation and compromise that might extend into some amount of security.

   The models of geopolitics and realism, at times, may appear to overlap, for instance, in their common interest in balance-of-power systems. Yet their descriptions vary. For realists, the emphasis is shown in a state’s attempt to
achieve a favorable power accumulation, thus deterring an attack by a weaker aggressor. A state might also perform a balancer role, siding with the weaker party to bring about equilibrium among the members. In Eurasia, the United States enjoys both advantages in its security constellation, the stronger Western Alliance against the weaker Soviet Union, and a North American balancer role among the major states at either extreme of Asia and Europe. Quite differently, from the geopolitical perspective the configuration of balance is spatial or positional, the placement of countries within a regional or strategic arrangement. A nation’s security may also be the focus, but likewise, we may observe a variety of configurations within the balance: checkerboards, dependency, pan regions, key nations, and so forth. The unique patterns of the arrangement become our interest, and not the relevant national strengths of the performers. For instance, a checkerboard balance resembles the traditional premise of “my neighbor is my enemy, but the neighbor of my neighbor is my friend,” a “leap-frogging” feature that is not mainly power-oriented. More on this structure as it relates importantly to the geopolitics of South America below.

Neither of the two models, geopolitics and realism, should be attached to the pejorative notation of power politics. I am not certain what “power politics” might mean—exploitation by the wealthy states, the bullying nature of the powerful, reliance upon military threats within foreign affairs? Whatever the distinction, the label should not be affixed to either geopolitics or realism models, because the term is polemical and negative and not relevant to the study or the practice of either of the two models.

3. The classical version of geopolitics is modernist and not post-modernist. I refer in this instance to the rising school of critical geopolitics, a radical political-geography alternative to, and critique of, classical geopolitics. (Kelly 2006). The contrasting schools of geopolitics, the classical and the critical, are widely set apart, despite their common geopolitical labels, in these ways:

a. In its ontological stance, the critical finds one’s environment or vision so biased or subjective that a common reality among individuals is not possible, the ubiquitous biases being so intense. Consequently, theory as based upon predictability of a common reality is simply not possible. Specifically, the critical version ignores theory. Alternatively, the classical, though aware of subjectivity, finds sufficient commonality to warrant the construction of valid theory based upon predictability.

b. The epistemological approaches differ also. Critical proponents claim the existence of elitist exploitation within international foreign-policy establishments, geopolitics being one tool of this subjugation. For proving the exploitation, the technique of deconstructing elitist scripts and actions will reveal evidence of these attempts at subjugation. The classical approach is neutral to a radical claim of elitist bias; rather, geopolitics is depicted as a useful tool of statesmen and students, assisting toward seeing international positional realities in a deeper perspective, and, these, not tied to subjective claims of exploitation. The traditionalists test likely theories by enlisting
the examples of statistics, history, logic, common sense, experts, and other such methodologies.

c. Accordingly, the various levels of analyses significantly contrast between the two, the critical appearing on the elitist and decision-making dimensions and the classical on the strategic or international levels. One side studies the biases of decision makers; the other side studies their actions within the foreign-affairs milieu.

d. Consequently, the focus of study for the critical comes first on deconstructing, showing the exploitation of the elite, and, later, on establishing an emancipation of subject peoples and on putting an end to the elitists’ hold on national power. Clearly, the classical is not radical and activist; instead, it is bent toward providing a neutral conceptual model for providing better insights to the policies and actions of foreign affairs.

One further point should be raised relative to this modernist/post-modernist discussion. Latin America inherently does not hold post-modernism in its geopolitics for several reasons. First, I have found no such expressions in the literature or policies of the critical version, for the main thrust in the past and at present is strongly traditional (Kelly 1997). Second, classical geopolitics finds a receptive environment within the foreign and military establishments and policies of the Latin American republics (see for example, Child 1985, 1979; Burr 1955). Third, the isolated location of South America, its unique topography, and the positions of its several republics all serve as fertile soil for the application of classical geopolitics. Unlike any other global region, Latin America holds a majority of the classical concepts/theories that one would find in a completed geopolitical model.

4. Classical geopolitics lends itself to the availability of a wide variety of concepts/theories and to the extensive application of these to foreign affairs actions and policies. Several further explanations might be useful here before proceeding on to Latin America and its geopolitics. First, geopolitics as a foreign policy instrument perhaps is among the oldest of such approaches within this topic, for ancient kingdoms and empires clearly enlisted the aspects of position, resources, and the other spatial dimensions to their military and diplomatic strategies.

5. Second, I have located at least 43 (and the number keeps growing) concepts/theories of the classical variety that fit within the geopolitical model (Kelly 2012b). Each of these can be applied separately or in combination to factors within a nation’s, and a region’s, spatial environment.

6. Third, I have already tested the comparison of two diverse regions, at two different time intervals. My study (Kelly 2011) contrasted the ancient Greece Peloponnesian War, in classical geopolitical terms, with the contemporary diplomacy of South America. Enlisted for this portrayal were such spatial concepts/theories as shatterbelts, checkerboards, heartlands, encirclement, the Monroe Doctrine, influence spheres, buffer and lintel states, choke points, distance and topography, frontier disputes and organic borders, integration and manifest
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destiny, sea power and land power, and other classical geopolitical terminology, all applying easily as taken from a traditional geopolitical model. In addition, I found common geopolitical structures within both regions, but contrasting outcomes within those structures. Whatever the case, a student interested in applying geopolitical features to foreign events need only select from the model those concepts/theories that may pertain to the situation of concern.

Classical Latin American Geopolitics

In this section I will attach various classical concepts/theories to the contemporary geopolitics of Latin America in an attempt to gauge the security concerns within the American hemisphere. However, I will first briefly mention two broader geopolitical characteristics of the hemisphere that will better introduce our topic: first, the southern region as a zone of peace; and second, the entire hemisphere as characterized more broadly within a three-Americas classical description:

1. Latin America as a zone of peace. Latin America is currently enjoying a period of substantial peace and structural stability (Kelly 2007), in part a factor of the unique patterns of the geopolitical placement of states and the different topography within the region. It is a perfect place to apply traditional geopolitical interpretations because of its isolation and terrain. It reminds me of the Galapagos Islands near the coast of Ecuador, also so isolated, with their untouched ancient fauna and flora. This unique combination has resulted in an era of harmony in the region, which will become evident after following discussion of classical concepts/theories.

2. The geopolitics of the three Americas.
   a. North American geopolitics. The northern region of the United States, Canada, and Mexico is determined to secure three enclave bases within the rimlands of the Eurasian continent: Western Europe, the Persian Gulf, and Japan and South Korea. American security rests, not upon a Fortress America defense, but, instead, upon a favorable balance (or favorable imbalance) of power on Eurasia as rendered by the three secured enclaves. If this balance were lost, it is assumed within the geopolitical literature, the security of the entire Western Hemisphere would be placed in jeopardy. North America clearly is the wealthier in resources, technology, and position among the three American areas, and has the advantage of possessing a two-ocean navy and of balancing the larger states on the eastern and western fringes of Eurasia. The northern sector also is more united, the North American Free Trade Association integrating commerce and investment, and it is clearly superior to the other regions in the wealth of manufacturing and technology.
   b. Middle American geopolitics. The area also reveals strategic characteristics in its geopolitics, although these come from a passive dependency relationship to the United States. It reacts, instead of acts, in strategic ways. The outstanding characteristic of this region would be the Monroe
Doctrine, the prevention of Eurasian strategic intrusions into the area that would threaten the northern republic. The shatterbelt of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, pitting the Soviet Union against the United States within the Caribbean and linking Cuba in opposition to the region’s U.S. allies within this configuration, reveals a worst-case security risk against the Doctrine. The disunity of Middle America, its political and economic instabilities and weaknesses, pose a strategic opportunity to outside powers, with this United States sphere of influence domination the best resolution for filling the Middle American power vacuum.

c. South American geopolitics. Lacking any sort of strategic involvement or interest, South America is distinct from the other two zones in being isolated from the north in its distant global southern habitat and, thus, in its autonomy, I label the area an independent geopolitical region. I have found little mention and interest among the leading South American writers of geopolitics (Kelly 1997: 84-134) concerning their country’s involvement in the strategic balances of power within Eurasia as a security concern. In contrast, the region’s focus rests upon matters within the continent itself, with frontier settlement, protection of resources, and integration representing the greater interests.

From describing the two broader security backgrounds of Latin America, I turn now to defining, and then to applying, six leading geopolitical concepts/theories that should throw more light upon the topic of hemispheric security:

- **Shatterbelts**: The intrusion into America of Eurasian enemies, a violation of Monroe’s Doctrine;
- **Checkerboards**: The historic balance of power structure, particularly in South America, of alternating allies and opponents;
- **Buffer states**: The weaker republics stabilizing the checkerboard structure by separating the major powers and thus preventing them from directly confronting one another; also, the suffering of territorial losses to their more powerful neighbors;
- **Absence of territorial and frontier disputes**;
- **The dominance of Brazil within South American diplomacy and development**;
- **The shift from military regimes to democracies**, bringing a change to more cooperative geopolitical strategies.

*Shatterbelts*. This geopolitical structure poses as a region in competition that holds good potential for escalation into conflict and possible warfare (Kelly 2011a; 1986). The pattern has two levels, the strategic and the regional, where the competition is both between outside strategic rivals and between internal regional rivals, both horizontal and vertical alignments. The shatterbelt is formed when states at both levels become intertwined vertically and horizontally with each other, the strategic powers aligning against each other and with their regional allies or clients,
which themselves are in struggle against each other.

Shatterbelts serve as escalators of conflict, and, hence, they tend to be war prone. A common danger is that of “catalytic wars,” smaller nations within regions in turmoil that draw the outside interveners into unwanted and unintended strategic conflict, the best historical examples being in Middle Europe before World War I and in Cuba during the missile crisis. In the case of Latin America, Middle America has been the most susceptible to shatterbelts, and in its past has cycled between being a sphere of influence and being a shatterbelt (Kelly 1997: 164). In all cases, the middle region has lacked autonomy and has been forced to be subservient to outside powers.

1520s–1650s     Spanish sphere of influence
1620s–1820s     shatterbelt (England against Spain)
1890s–1960s     U.S. sphere of influence
1960s–1980s     shatterbelt (United States and Soviet Union)
1980s–         U.S. sphere of influence

Interestingly, in colonial times and in the immediate years following, both North and South America suffered from shatterbelts, the European powers continuing their involvements in America. Napoleon Bonaparte, fortunately, upset the European balance, thus forcing a retrenchment of forces back to Europe (Kelly and Perez 2003). Since that early period, neither North nor South America has seen a shatterbelt involvement, a reflection of the stability of the northern tier and of the isolation in the southern tier. But, in both cases, this absence came to the advantage of the United States.

At present, no shatterbelts exist within any of the three Americas, or elsewhere in Eurasia (Kelly 2012a), because the United States enjoys the status of single-world hegemon. Since shatterbelts require two strategic rivals to compete over regions beyond their domains, and, clearly, a hegemonic rival to North America does not appear on the immediate horizon, the hemisphere is safe from involvement in strategic conflict within the context of shatterbelts. It matters little to U.S. security that Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela in Middle America have not conformed to its policies because, without a strategic linkage to Eurasian opponents, China and Russia being the distant candidates, their opposition and irritations can be ignored. In sum, the absence of shatterbelts in America bolsters North American security, the Monroe Doctrine not being challenged by this war-prone structure.

Checkerboards. Unlike shatterbelts, the remainder of our geopolitical concepts/theories relative to security matters in Latin America will show positive and stabilizing characteristics that are helpful to Yankee security. Indeed, both Middle America and South America are sub-regions at peace. No security dangers toward North America are imminent from either region—a consequence, in part, of various geopolitical structures.

Checkerboards involve geopolitical configurations that reveal an alternating array of states as allies and other states as opponents in a “leap-frogging” fashion: “My neighbor is my enemy, whereas the neighbor of my neighbor my friend.” Outcomes may be stable or unstable, depending on the patterns within the structure. For instance, I have compared these formations in the ancient Peloponnesian War
and in contemporary South American diplomacy, where the Greek system suffered persistent and deadly warfare and the American lands enjoyed a stable and enduring peace. The structures were the same, but the patterns, and thus, the outcomes, differed.

Specific to South America, an alignment of Brazil with Chile and Colombia contrasts with an alignment of Argentina with Peru and Venezuela. Such a checkerboard structure has not been highly visible; today, it hardly shows. But, the potential for checkerboard escalation to continental conflict did appear temporarily in the Cisplatine War (1825–1828) between Brazil and Argentina over the Banda Oriental in the lands north of the La Plata estuary, now Uruguay. Checkerboard rivalries arose, likewise, during the Malvinas/Falklands conflict of 1982 between Argentina and Great Britain, where Peru proved to be Argentina’s prime advocate, Brazil separated itself in neutrality, and Chile actually sided with the British against the Argentines.

A variety of stabilizing geopolitical characteristics have accompanied the South American checkerboard, and all have contributed to a peaceful structure:

- **Avoidance of two-front conflict**, a common liability of checkerboards, since the member states must alternate in their alliance structures. This likelihood, nonetheless, is lacking in South America because of the isolation of frontiers brought about by the vast distances and harsh terrain that tend to separate the republics.

- **The absence of strong sea-power capacities**, unlike the prominence of this aspect in the Peloponnesian War that prolonged and made that conflict more intense, the Athenians being maritime, the Spartans being land based. The South American republics, in contrast, have been limited to the army component, making continentwide warfare more costly and more difficult to win.

- **The prohibitive costs of continent-wide conflict**, where movement of troops and supplies, over great distances and rugged inhospitable lands, would exhaust the treasures and resources of even the stronger land-power states.

- **The possibility of extra-continental and North American intervention**, particularly if shatterbelts appeared imminent in the continent to the Yankee. A South or Middle American checkerboard conflict of continental scope would clearly not be in the North American interest.

Overall, the persistent South American checkerboard structure enhances American security by stabilizing the continent’s politics in the several ways suggested above. A rather similar formation could be imagined in Central America as well; yet, this arrangement holds much less weight in security considerations. In part, North American dominance has reduced the presence of any sort of similar Middle American system, although during colonial times and into early independence, several wars were fought along checkerboard lines in attempts to unify the area.

**Buffer states.** Buffer states are smaller and weaker nations that are positioned between larger state rivals, such a structure cushioning direct contact, and thus conflict, between the neighboring opponents. These smaller and central states demonstrate neutral foreign policies and actions where such might be possible, and they
tend to enact either balancing or bandwagoning policies for their own security. The best example would be Paraguay astride its two larger neighbors, Brazil and Argentina. Another example would be the broader continental northwest-to-southeast crush zone corridor (Kelly and Perez 1998; Kelly 1997: 43, 137), where the additional buffer states of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay are located and play similar roles. Although the buffer-state phenomenon does not arise so clearly in Central America, the entire region of Middle America serves to isolate South America from North America (Kelly 1986). One could add that Middle America is more closely tied geopolitically to the northern republic because of the Monroe Doctrine’s aim to eliminate the vulnerability of shatterbelts.

The buffer state structure also stabilizes the checkerboard pattern. The six South American wars over the past two centuries happened within this crush-zone corridor, with the four buffers suffering extensive territorial losses to the greed of their more powerful neighbors. Yet, the cushioning effects of the weaker republics have lessened direct confrontation between the major checkerboard players, and the territorial settlements at the expense of the buffers have appeared to stabilize the later peace settlements.

An extension of the buffer quality is the lintel-state configuration of Paraguay, also a stabilizing factor within the Southern Cone (Kelly and Perez 1998). This feature resembles the image of a door or window lintel or header that bears the weight below according to its position as a wedge or beam. Whereas a buffer cushions contact between larger state opponents, a lintel tends to stabilize the adjoining region according to its rather fixed central position, and despite its weakness as a country. For instance, in Paraguay’s case, neither Brazil nor Argentina could absorb Paraguay into their territories without the other’s opposition; one party would certainly checkmate the other. Its sovereignty depends on this rivalry by neighbors, such that the blockage also serves to stabilize the surrounding countries of the region. Often, of course, as is the case with Paraguay, a buffer and a lintel state configuration may exist with the same country. But in either case, the two geopolitical fixtures help create a structural stability that will strengthen peace and, thus, North American security.

Absence of territorial and frontier disputes. With the possible Maranon conflict between Peru and Ecuador (a rivalry over petroleum sites that flares occasionally) an exception, Latin America’s frontiers remain settled for the moment, the several historical disputes largely dormant or recently resolved. Several reasons for such stability persist, but a primary cause derives from the isolated and less-inhabited frontiers, distant from, and little noticed by, the political forces of the national ecumens. In addition, boundary lines do not seem to intersect much across valued natural and energy resources. With the rise of democracies in recent decades, more interest has been devoted to border-resolution agreements and regional cooperation that have brought these disputes to an end.

The geopolitical theory of “the more borders, the more wars” has been substantiated in South America by statistical methodology (Kelly 1992), the point being that numerous frontiers encourage more international conflict across them. Unfortunately, the four central buffer countries felt the brunt of this correlation, although, with the frontiers for the most part so isolated and underpopulated and the territorial
prizes given to the larger republics, border conflicts have not escalated to continental proportions. Furthermore, the spatial concepts of contagion or diffusion and of falling dominos, where certain problems cross international boundaries, have been less evident in Latin America than elsewhere, again, in part because of vast territorial distances across rugged and uninhabited terrain that have separated most of the republics from each other, and, consequently, from significant dispute and warfare.

**Brazil as South American hegemon.** Brazil substantially leads the continent in population, territorial size, and industrial-technological prowess. Yet, to its Spanish neighbors, Brazil has traditionally been considered an expansionist nation, one bent upon continental mastery as well as Great Power global recognition. Thus, Brazil has been suspected by its encircling neighbors of desiring more territory so as to attain its alleged geopolitical ambitions for manifest destiny by extending its domain through the continent’s Charcas Heartland to the Pacific coast, and, like the northern Yankee, becoming an Atlantic-to-Pacific continental giant.

Yet this image of aggressive imperialism has waned lately (Selcher 1985) because of Spanish encirclement and opposition, particularly from Argentina; a shift in policy toward leadership in fostering South American trade integration; and a transition from military to constitutional government, reflecting a less aggressive tendency. As a result, Brazil now contributes a stabilizing function that is calming the long-held suspicions against it, which, consequently, enhances North American security as well.

**The shift from organic territorial doctrines to regional integration and cooperation.** South American geopolitics originated from German military missions assigned to train local armies. Such teams imported the organic features of traditional geopolitics, the ideals that “healthy” and successful countries were evidenced by their territorial growth and increased access to valued natural resources. These concepts were particularly prominent in the Southern Cone republics of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, and they were taught in military academies. Consequently, at mid–twentieth century, much of South American geopolitics stood for aggressive nationalist development and stronger consolidation of frontier regions within the sovereign domain. Such militarist planning augmented regional tensions, such as suspicions of Brazilian planned expansion over the continent’s Charcas Heartland. Hints of nuclear arms races between Brazil and Argentina accompanied these charges. Even to the present day, illegal immigration of Brazilian peasants into the underdeveloped hinterlands of the buffer states perpetuates this fear, as well as the earlier construction of Amazonian highways encouraging Portuguese settlement further westward to the Andes Mountains.

Nonetheless, much of the suspicion about Brazil appears to have dissipated, thanks largely to the arrival of democratic and less militarist governments to much of the region. This transition of democracy has shifted the geopolitical emphasis away from organic frontiers toward more pacific and cooperative geopolitical goals, such as regional economic integration, both under the aegis of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) and of the Latin American nuclear weapons-free zone, coined in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In this latter respect, all fissionable weapons-grade fuels at present have largely been removed from the Latin America republics’ energy programs, Mexico
being the latest in its trading of nuclear reserves for safer fuels with the United States. Hence, the danger of terrorist and criminal groups’ (the Mexican and Colombian drug cartels, in particular) gaining nuclear weapons and aiming them toward the north now has become quite minimal.

Conclusions

I will conclude with the following four observations regarding U.S. security concerns within the Western Hemisphere:

1. Latin America, and particularly South America, represents a low priority in North American strategic security considerations. The United States maintains a high focus on the Eurasian continent, which has historically been the case. In Mackinder’s and Spykman’s terms, our safety lies in secured rimland bases, these designed to prevent a consolidation of power over core areas of the heartland and of the rimlands by a country or coalition hostile to the United States. A Fortress America defense, established by fortifying key choke points in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, as well as in Latin America, cannot withstand the power and resources of Eurasia, according to the main geopolitical strategic predictions.

2. Within this strategic Eurasian constellation, the southern republics could engender threatening vulnerabilities to the Yankee, ones arising from power vacuums or anti-U.S. alliances that might become Eurasian footholds for further intrusion. We observe this possibility in the shatterbelt phenomenon, which the Monroe Doctrine was created to prevent. Although shatterbelts are more common to Middle America, these could arise in a different South America as well, where, under such circumstances, North America would be forced to abandon its Eurasian bases and, instead, formulate a last stand for security within its own hemisphere.

3. The remedy for this security quandary might come in the form of a united and prosperous Latin America, for both middle and southern sectors, a unity and prosperity tied to a firm and popular alliance with North America. Such a scenario could be difficult to bring about, because much of the region suffers from economic depression, lacking sufficient resources to resolve immediate political, social, and economic difficulties. For instance, in much of Middle America and in the South American buffers, the republics’ limited wealth cannot bring substantial stability. Consequently, these members would be good candidates for the power vacuums that would generate shatterbelts. The United States and its southern allies should be encouraged either to fill potential vacuums with successful development and/or to isolate them somehow from a possible Eurasian connection.

4. As a recognized and legitimate foreign-affairs model, classical geopolitics can be utilized as a tool for insight and for policy in the hemispheric security constellation. This article has shown several useful concepts/theories for this instruction, among these being:

a. The three-Americas characteristic, where the middle portion should be
seen as different from the southern portion, for the two sub-regions emit distinctly contrasting geopolitical considerations.

b. South America currently enjoys at the present moment a zone of peace, in part, a geopolitical description of distance and isolation from the northern competition within the context of Eurasia. In contrast, as a Yankee sphere of influence, Middle America reacts passively to world affairs and will remain a subservient pawn to U.S. strategic interests.

c. In terms of the Monroe Doctrine, the greater immediate security threat comes from a Middle American shatterbelt, caused by a political vacuum of some sort arising within the Caribbean, Central America, or the northern rimlands of South America. The less cooperative states of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, all aligned in opposition to U.S. interests in the region, would be good candidates for shatterbelts, were the strategic constellation is divided as well and receptive to aligning with Middle American client states. Yet, these three republics can easily be ignored, isolated, and punished with little cost to the Yankee, as the other part of the structure, at the strategic level, has stayed missing for the moment (again, the most likely candidates being China and, to a lesser extent, Russia.) With the “unipolar moment” extended into the coming years, the danger posed from Middle America is simply nonexistent, the current structure being a rather uninterested North American influence sphere extended casually over the region.

d. South America, in contrast, is at peace, its growing unity led by Brazil and Argentina, despite the traditional checkerboard rivalries that could divide the region. Such divisiveness is currently not present, the other geopolitical tenets playing their stabilizing roles as well, the buffer states and the central continental crush zone, the absence of territorial disputes, and the recent shift away from organic to integrationist geopolitics all performing to satisfaction as described by the geopolitical model.
Bibliography


FOCUS ON BRAZIL
A Tentative Embrace: Brazil’s Foreign and Trade Relations with the United States

Myles Frechette and Frank Samolis

ABSTRACT

Brazil’s economic performance, political stability, and search for greatness ensure that Brazil will play a strong role on many global issues and will strengthen regional economic cooperation. U.S.-Brazil relations have evolved from an alliance during and after World War II into a wary but crucial engagement today. The April 2012 meeting of Presidents Dilma Rousseff and Barack Obama deepened cooperation on common interests. Brazil’s foreign policy is set by economic factors more often than ideology, and Brazil wants to advance its core interests. The U.S. seeks to encourage Brazil’s rise. Nevertheless, differences between the U.S. and Brazil on trade and other issues will not be overcome easily. This paper examines how the shifting balance of power in the world has expanded Brazil’s spheres of action while outdated concepts like formal trading blocs prevent Brazil from achieving the narrower goals it set for itself.

Introduction

Perusing a map of the entire North and South American continents, it is impressive to note that the United States now has Free-Trade Agreements with all of the countries (except Ecuador) that form the western boundary of both continents. This is the result as much of happenstance as of design. Nevertheless, in the early twenty-first century the United States entered into Free-Trade Agreements with the Central American countries and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR, 2004), Chile (2004), Peru (2006), and Colombia and Panama (2011). Despite this impressive network of bilateral agreements, there has still been little progress in intraregional trade among countries in the Western Hemisphere. Notably absent from this series of agreements

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is any such accord between the United States and Brazil. Despite a patchwork collection of bilateral agreements, why has trade in the Hemisphere lacked cohesion and real integration? Although there has been some interest in restructuring the intraregional trade agreements (e.g., Venezuela’s efforts since 2006 to join Mercosur and the Andean Community’s reexamination of its trade agreements), progress has been halting. Moreover, the hemisphere was victim of perhaps the biggest failure in the world trading system with the slow, agonizing death of the Free-Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), an ambitious (though ultimately futile) attempt to create a hemisphere-wide free-trade area. Throughout this period, the two economic giants of the region, the United States and Brazil, have had a contentious trade relationship. While the United States was the driving force behind organizing and leading the FTAA, Brazil was the reluctant partner, focusing primarily on establishing Mercosur in 1991. The failure of the United States and Brazil to reach an approach to trade policy in the hemisphere has hurt both countries, and without a common strategy for moving forward, the region is likely to remain adrift.

This article first explores Brazil’s role in global affairs, including its role in the creation of Mercosur and Unasur. Second, this article describes Brazil’s trajectory in foreign trade policy. Finally, it concludes that the bilateral relationship is likely to remain conflicted in the short term, with neither country politically motivated or economically compelled to dramatically alter the status quo. Elevating and strengthening the formal bilateral consultation mechanism may be the best way forward.

**Brazil’s Role in Global Affairs**

The bedrock of Brazilian foreign policy is economic, and is likely to remain so despite Brazil’s increasing activity on a wide range of issues such as energy, biodiversity, climate change, monetary policies, peace keeping, Africa, and the Middle East. Although it is active in a variety of regional and global institutions, including the United Nations (UN), its related agencies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), in many ways Brazil remains a tentative and conflicted political and economic power.

Since declaring independence from Portugal in 1822, Brazil has viewed itself as destined for greatness. Brazil was a founding member of the League of Nations but walked away in 1926 when it became clear that Germany would be made a permanent member of the Council and Brazil would not. Brazil’s global campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council is an expression of this historic pursuit of greatness. In the 1990s, new voices and leaders emerged in Brazil who considered that the developed nations sought to “freeze” the international power order, thus barring Brazil’s rise. This focus in foreign policy in the 1990s was preceded by an erosion of the sense of alliance with the United States that took place during the 1960s and 1970s. President Cardoso (1995–2002) then began pushing for integration of Brazil with its immediate neighbors while asserting its autonomy. These sentiments fed the creation of Unasur as a mechanism for South-South Dialogue, along with the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) and the Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC). All “these initiatives seemed accompanied by a certain anti-Americanism.”

In June 1964, after the first session of the UN Conference on Trade and De-
velopment (UNCTAD) in Geneva, Brazil became a founding member of the Group of 77 (G-77). This coalition, designed to increase the joint negotiating capacity of developing countries on major international economic issues, is still active. Such coalitions are cornerstones of Brazil’s foreign policy.

In 1985, 21 years of military dictatorship in Brazil ended. Under democratically elected civilian leadership, Brazil in the 1990s voluntarily ended its nuclear weapons program, began the process of playing a larger role in world affairs, and stabilized its economy. Abroad, Brazil did not hesitate to assert its interests and to voice its views about how global governance should change. At the same time, “Brazil has turned down a more nationalistic path in recent years. South-South interactions have moved up on its agenda, through membership in Unasur, IBSA, and the BRICS. This direction is a response to new economic realities. However, rhetoric still exceeds concrete gains, and there is a danger of excessive ambition.”

President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003–2010) was a very charismatic president, who remains extremely popular in Brazil. President Lula set three foreign policy goals: to conclude a substantive agreement in the Doha Round of negotiations in the WTO, to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and to consolidate a South American geopolitical space, led by Brazil. In January 2011 however, when power passed to his successor, President Dilma Rousseff, all three objectives “remained unaccomplished.”

Despite these failures, his achievements were extraordinary. Initial fears in the international financial community were allayed as Lula’s administration followed market-oriented economic policies that promoted Brazil’s growth and encouraged foreign investment. Although Brazil had been involved in UN peacekeeping operations in Portuguese-speaking nations for many years, Brazil in 2004 accepted the command of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). “This decision […] signaled that Brazil was ready to accept the responsibilities of leadership on difficult issues before the UN Security Council in a way not seen before.”

Brazil also began a serious outreach effort to Africa and the Middle East, including opening many embassies with the long-term goal of supporting trade, investment, and a seat for Brazil on the UN Security Council. President Lula used “foreign policy as a marketing tool to project Brazil’s growing economic power.” Its presence in the Group of 20 (G-20), a new forum for international economic governance, and its participation in the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change underscored how much Brazil’s international standing had risen.

In his first trip abroad, Lula announced that Brazil was “the region’s ‘natural leader’… ready to assume its greatness.” He rejected the U.S. approach to regional trade integration by blocking further negotiation of the FTAA. Unasur, a Brazilian concept, was launched in 2008 in an illusory attempt to deny United States relevance in the region.

Brazil also joined the Community of Caribbean and Latin American States (CELAC) that was created in February 2010 at the Unity Summit of the Rio Group–Caribbean Community. This grouping includes all the sovereign countries in the
Americas except for the United States and Canada. On December 3, 2011, CELAC was formally launched in Caracas.

In 2009, Brazil objected to an agreement between the United States and Colombia formalizing the use of seven Colombian bases as springboards for interdicting narcotics shipments from South America to Central America, Mexico, the United States, and Europe. Brazil interpreted this agreement as a challenge to Unasur’s aspiration to exclude U.S. influence from South America. As such, it allowed Venezuela’s President Chavez to lead the criticism by exaggerating and misconstruing U.S. intentions toward the region. President Lula did not criticize the Castro and Chavez regimes and was silent about human rights violations in Darfur. Another point of irritation between the United States and Brazil was the constitutional crisis in Honduras, which was precipitated by the coup d’état against President Manuel Zelaya in June 2009.

“The negative reaction by the United States and other major powers to the initiatives taken with Iran by Brazil and Turkey show that global involvement for Brazil is not without costs. Brazilian policy was criticized at home and abroad for overreaching, hubris, and inadequate preparation. U.S. views of Brazil as an unreliable partner unwilling to make the difficult choices necessary to sustain world order suddenly mirrored Brazilian views of the United States as dedicated to military adventurism by flaunting the UN Security Council on Iraq.”

Nevertheless, at home, President Lula’s popularity was not affected by his unsuccessful Iran initiative. Foreign policy has only a limited impact on Brazilian society.

While in office, President Lula’s anti-Americanism was never deeply disguised. In August 2011, the former president headed a trade and investment mission to Colombia. While there, he told Colombia’s newspaper of record that during the twentieth century the U.S. “commercially indoctrinated” South America to believe that Brazil was a danger to the region.

To buttress his point, he repeated an anecdote told to him by Venezuela’s President Chavez about his days at Venezuela’s military academy. Chavez alleged that visiting American lecturers told the Venezuelan cadets: “Watch out for Brazil, the danger in America is Brazil.”

Under President Lula, Brazil has demonstrated leadership at the global level, confronted the United States, and been active in regional affairs. An example of this was the support of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Argentina to halt Washington’s FTAA Initiative.

There has long been an anti-American strand among Brazilian elites. “This strand is likely to be manifest in the foreign policy of any government of an ascendant Brazil.” Matias Spektor, an international relations professor at the Getulio Vargas Foundation, agrees. He notes, “The more powerful countries like Brazil become, the more tensions we’ll see.”

Furthermore, President Lula showed little disposition to settle disputes between neighbors. For example, the Lula administration did not get involved in a dispute between Argentina and Uruguay, both Brazil’s partners in Mercosur, over the operation of a cellulose plant on the Uruguayan side of the Uruguay River.

Similarly, Brazil did little to help reduce tensions and avoid a possible military confrontation between Colombia and Venezuela. When Venezuela broke diplomatic re-
lations with Colombia in August 2010, Lula’s attempt to reduce tension “had little impact and did not alter the mismatch between Brazil’s assertions of leadership at the global level...and its modest interest in assuming the risks of leadership closer to home.”

Several reasons have been offered for this discrepancy. One is that such disputes generate little interest and no political dividends in Brazil. One Brazilian survey suggested that Brazilian elites generally perceive that South America and Latin America are not a suitable platform to project Brazil as a global power. It is too early to tell whether Brazil will be able to act as a global power. James Lockhart Smith of the International Institute for Strategic Studies suggests Brazil is not yet able to implement or bear the costs of regional predominance. “Intervention would not only risk failure but also threaten Brazil’s diplomatic and economic ties with its neighbors.” Some analysts argue Brazil cannot achieve regional leadership but needs regional stability. This allows Brazil’s regional economic influence to grow.

U.S. Expectations about Brazil under President Lula

The United States has neither the willingness nor the capability to provide the level of global leadership it has provided for several decades following World War II. Consequently, other countries are increasingly less willing to follow America’s lead. As American influence has waned in Latin America following the end of the Cold War, some U.S. analysts assumed that Brazil would exert increasing leadership in the region. This assumption was not borne out under President Lula. Brazil has influence in the region, particularly economic, but President Lula was unable, except in the case of blocking the FTAA, to provide leadership beyond suggesting that the United States is irrelevant in the Americas.

Trade Policy

In the 1930s and 1940s, the Great Depression, with its protectionism, and World War II isolated Brazil. Import substitution gained sway because of the lack of foreign investment. In the 1950s, dependency theory, developed at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America headquartered in Chile, became the paradigm throughout Latin America. State intervention was considered superior to market forces. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) provided analysis and financing for agrarian and tax reform in the region. In the 1970s, governments and the private sector borrowed heavily and generated high but unsustainable economic growth, which led to a debt crisis in the 1980s, now known as the “lost decade,” characterized by low growth and hyperinflation. At the end of that decade the Washington Consensus emerged, and the success of some Asian economies debunked the dependency theory. In the 1990s Brazil began privatizations and trade liberalization:

Since 1990, Brazil has improved international integration and opened markets via three routes:

• Unilateral liberalization (it substantially reduced tariff rates unilaterally, from an average of 51 percent to an average of 12 percent);
• multilateral agreements (it participated in the Uruguay Round making substantial commitments to reduce import barriers and bind practically all tariff lines); and
• regional openings (it entered intra- and extra-regional preferential trade agreements).\textsuperscript{17}

**Brazil and the BRICS**

The term BRIC, coined by Goldman Sachs executive Jim O’Neill in 2001, captured the media’s imagination.\textsuperscript{18} Brazil has used the catchy acronym to dramatize the desire and ability of emerging powers to change the way the world organizes itself and makes decisions. The BRIC member countries have little in common, but China seems to be their hub because of its size, global economic influence, and importance in world trade. None ranks high, either in competitiveness or in the ease of doing business. China and Brazil share the goal of taking world economic leadership away from the United States, the EU, and Japan. At the same time, Chinese involvement in Latin America threatens Brazil’s goal of dominating the economies of Latin America.

The March 2013 BRICS summit held in Durban was supposed to mark the emergence of the BRICS group as world class, rivaling developed world groupings. Instead, the summit’s results were modest. The initial luster and buzz of the BRICS began to fade in 2011. By 2012, growth had declined in all five members. Brazil weathered the 2008 world economic crisis well, achieving 7.5 percent growth in 2010. In 2011, however, its growth slowed to 2.7 percent. It shrank to 1.5 percent in 2012 and inflation was growing.

Before analyzing the current state of trade relations between the United States and Brazil, it is instructive to briefly review the history of trade policy initiatives with specific reference to Brazil’s foreign trade policy and the various multilateral and regional initiatives to provide greater openness and organization to trade in the region.

**Mercosur**

Over the last half century, there have been several attempts at economic integration, either encompassing all of Latin America and the Caribbean or focused on specific regions. In 1960, the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC) was formed. Frustration with ALALC led to the formation of several regional economic groupings. In the 1960s, what eventually became the Andean Community was born, as was the Caribbean Common Market (Caricom) and the Central American Common Market (CACM). In 1980, ALALC failed and was replaced by the Latin American Integration Agreement (ALADI), another attempt at integrating all of Latin America. In 1991, Brazil led the creation of a regional common market called Mercosur, which included as full members Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, as well as several associate members. Venezuela asked to join in 2006.\textsuperscript{19} Bolivia and Venezuela were admitted as full members in 2012.

Mercosur’s purpose, as expressed in the 1991 Treaty of Asunción, was to al-
low free trade among member states, with the ultimate goal of full South American integration. Eliana Cardoso notes that Mercosur “has a long history of advances and setbacks caused by diverse political agendas, economic asymmetries and the differing characters of each of these countries as regards external trade partnerships.”

Mercosur is the fourth largest trading bloc in the world after the EU, NAFTA, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Mercosur aims at eliminating all customs barriers and lifting non-tariff restrictions by promoting the free transit of produced goods, services, and factors among member states. Additionally, Mercosur provides for a fixed common external tariff and a common trade policy with nonmember states.

According to Klonsky and Harrison, “Mercosur’s primary interest has been to eliminate obstacles to regional trade….Yet experts say Mercosur has become somewhat paralyzed in recent years, with its members divided over the future of the organization. Some countries, like, Brazil, want to keep Mercosur focused on regional trade. Other countries, like Venezuela …would like to expand the group’s mandate to political affairs. Venezuela’s entrance into Mercosur has caused tension within the trade bloc, since it is philosophically opposed to free trade.” The authors point out that President Chávez insisted, “We need a Mercosur that prioritizes social concerns.”

Richard Lapper, the Latin America editor for the *Financial Times*, argues that Brazil and Argentina were attracted by access to Venezuela’s energy supplies and the idea that they would have a Caribbean Coast. Brazil represents more than 70 percent of the territory of the four founding states, as well as of their population, gross domestic product (GDP), and foreign trade. Not surprisingly, Brazil is seen as its major beneficiary.

Venezuelan President Chávez’s death from cancer on March 5, 2013, prompted Brazil’s government, which had worked closely with Chávez for a decade, to reposition itself concerning the Venezuelan leader’s legacy. Brazilian President Rousseff declared three days of mourning, calling Chávez “a great leader, an irreparable loss and above all a friend of Brazil, a friend of the Brazilian people.” However, she added, “On many occasions, the Brazilian government did not agree” with Chávez’s policies.

One Brazil analyst commented, “Insiders say this was not an extemporaneous remark, but a preplanned statement calibrated for domestic and international consumption….Rousseff’s predecessor, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who accompanied her to Chávez’s state funeral in Caracas, was similarly nuanced in an article on the Venezuelan leader” published in the *New York Times.* In that article, former President Lula celebrated several of Chávez’s social priorities, but he also took pains to emphasize the difference between them. “I must admit I often felt that it would have been more prudent for Mr. Chávez not to have said all that he did.” Lula also observed that “Chávez’s legacy in the realm of ideas will need further work if they are to become a reality.”

Brazil analyst Paulo Sotero explains the Brazilian government’s interest in Venezuela: “With more than $5b in annual business by Brazilian companies at stake in a country facing the uncertainties of *chavismo* without Chávez, Rousseff is certainly interested in broadening Brazil’s connections with Venezuelan society.”
Sotero adds, “According to press reports, in January, President Rousseff reprimanded Marco Aurelio Garcia, her national security adviser and a Chávez sympathizer, for making public statements on how Venezuelans should interpret their own constitution regarding the succession process in Caracas.”

Nevertheless, despite President Rousseff’s concern about appearing to give political advice to Venezuelans, former President Lula made a statement carried on Venezuelan television of April 1, two weeks prior to the Venezuelan presidential elections, endorsing Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’s personal choice to succeed him.

Latin American countries have relatively little trade among themselves. According to IDB data, intraregional trade accounts for only 20 percent of total trade in Latin America compared to 46 percent in Asia and almost 70 percent in Europe. ECLAC compared the intraregional trade of four common markets in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2010 as a percentage of their total trade. The data shows intraregional trade as 26.7 percent for the Central American Common Market; 16.7 percent for Caricom; 15.6 percent for Mercosur; and 8 percent for the Andean Community. ECLAC data confirms that in 2012 intraregional trade continues to represent only a small percentage of trade with the rest of the world.

Mercosur is not a fully developed trade zone, with temporary exceptions to the Common External Tariff (CET) and the automobile sector remaining under a special regime. Mercosur also has no enforcement mechanism for decisions adopted by its members. Brazil has used Mercosur as a mechanism to attract investment and promote its international leadership. However, these are not common goals under Mercosur, and, thus, the initiative has not been completely successful. “Brazil sees Mercosur as a strategic platform to increase its international stature. The long-term political-economic project would be a way of making the country more attractive to foreign investment, a way of not being left out of the international political process, and a way of increasing its bargaining power in negotiations with the United States and the EU. Argentina, on the other hand, is concerned with short-term crises. Without common goals, Mercosur is destined to go nowhere.”

At its initial stages, Mercosur “showed great economic success.” However, progress within Mercosur has been slow and uncertain, and the organization’s lack of a centralized source of enforcement makes it difficult for it to operate effectively. To date, only Argentina and Brazil have fully adopted the competition-friendly policies provided within Mercosur. Inter-Mercosur trade, which increased from $4 billion in 1990 to $20 billion in 1998, fell to $15 billion in 2001. Trade disputes multiplied and protectionist tendencies recurred.

More importantly, Brazil essentially lost interest in Mercosur. The press of two presidential meetings a year become time consuming, and only broad macroeconomic principles, to be implemented in the future, could be agreed upon. Brazil turned its interests to other issues in the region, including resolving the Peru-Ecuadorian border dispute and embracing democratic initiatives in Paraguay.

Unasur

By 2000, Brazil was focusing on broader regional issues, including integration, transportation, and finance. It hosted the first meeting of all South American coun-
tries on August 31, 2001, which eventually led to yet another forum for regional integration, Unasur.

Created in 2008, Unasur aims to propel regional integration on issues such as democracy, education, energy, environment, infrastructure, and security. As noted by one observer, “The Unasur Constitutive Treaty is very ambitious in terms of thematic schedule, but vague as regards trade and economic integration.” It has also been described as “The brainchild of Brazilian diplomacy to counter Washington’s predominance in the region.” The concept of Unasur was conceived with the Cusco Declaration, signed in 2004 to create the South American Community of Nations. Unasur’s members are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Unasur is based on a misreading of European and South American history. Following two World Wars and the loss of millions of its citizens, the EU emerged because the Europeans wanted to live in peace and prosperity. To achieve those benefits they were willing to relinquish some measure of each country’s sovereignty. South America has not experienced anything similar. Unasur ignores two hundred years of history in which each South American nation developed differently. Political differences are significant, and historic boundary issues and resentments remain. Their economic interests differ greatly and the asymmetries between their economies are enormous.

The key question is whether Brazil is “able to reconcile its regional and global interests” as well as “its geopolitical and economic interests.” There is no clear answer. Furthermore, whether Mercosur will encompass all of South America or become engulfed, along with the Andean Community, into Unasur, as part of a continent wide arrangement, is unclear. Brazil’s having joined CELAC to include Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean and South America only adds to the uncertainty.

In August 2011, ECLAC highlighted the lack of “regional value chains” as impediments to intraregional trade in Latin America. A senior IDB official concurred:

Trade policies are not the main impediments to trade anymore. After decades of deep liberalization, Latin American trade is now constrained by microeconomic factors that affect firms’ capacity to compete in global markets, in particular transport costs and other gray-area regulatory barriers, such as lengthy customs procedures. The IDB estimates that the region is trading at only 50 percent of its potential. This integration gap can be bridged with investments in the hardware and software components of a modern trade infrastructure. The former refers to the modernization of transport or broadband networks that contribute to reduce transport cost and deliver goods and services in time. The latter refers to the complex program of regulatory reforms and capacity-building activities that help firms to clear customs in time, comply with stringent sanitary regulations and to integrate modern secured logistic networks. The two components of the agenda are complements, not substitutes.
Unasur, in excluding the United States, provides a natural leadership platform for Brazil. However, it also underscores the dilemma facing Brazil, particularly under the presidency of Dilma Rousseff—global economic superpower versus spokesman for the region:

Tasked with guiding the future evolution of Unasur, which continues to hang in the balance, Rousseff will soon lead a continent in which nothing is for certain. She will have to balance Brazil’s regional and global ambitions with the country’s current limitations, keeping South American integration a priority even as Brazil surpasses its neighbors to become an integral part of the international system.  

Unasur’s goals include economic development, defense policy, and infrastructure cooperation. Specifically, Unasur members would like to see the creation of a Bank of the South in Caracas. Brazil was also successful in convincing each Unasur state to join the South American Defense Council, designed to boost regional cooperation on security policies. Additionally, with regard to infrastructure cooperation, Unasur has planned several projects, including an inter-oceanic highway, an Initiative for Infrastructure Integration of South America (IIRSA), and the so-called South American Energy Ring. To achieve its goals, Unasur must be able to bridge wide political and ideological differences.  

Both Mercosur and Unasur have provided opportunities for Brazil to assert leadership. Nonetheless, it is unclear if Brazil is willing to accept the costs and responsibilities associated with regional leadership. Indeed, given Unasur’s inchoate objectives it is unclear what role falls to Brazil. It is certain that if it is to succeed, Unasur will require a “sizable Brazilian investment in terms of diplomatic, economic and meriting capital, which could temporarily distract Brazil’s regional motivations from its larger global ambitions.  

Brazil’s Foreign Trade Policy

Since the 1990s, when Brazil adopted a favorable approach toward open trade, the country has been involved with various initiatives that have helped define its foreign trade policy. Nevertheless, the country has not emerged as a leader either at the regional or the global level. Below we provide a brief history of these initiatives and explore Brazil’s involvement in each.

Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)

In 1994, during the First Summit of the Americas in Miami, Florida, the FTAA was envisioned as the most far-reaching trade agreement in history (extending also to NAFTA). The initiative aimed to eliminate or reduce the trade barriers among all countries in the Americas, excluding Cuba. The FTAA was introduced to create a new trade powerhouse with new authorities over the Americas.

During the Summit, the United States pushed for a single agreement to reduce trade barriers for goods, while increasing intellectual property protection. Un-
fortunately, many countries opposed this proposal as lacking provisions to alleviate social problems in the region.\textsuperscript{44} The disagreements were such that during the Fourth Summit of the Americas in 2005, the members were unable to restart the negotiations for the creation of the FTAA.\textsuperscript{45}

In retrospect, the FTAA seemed doomed from the start, as the United States and Brazil had markedly different strategies and priorities. Both Brazil and the United States served as co-chairs of the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC). However, the United States’ priorities were to negotiate agreements concerning investment, government procurement, services, and intellectual property, while Brazil restricted its support primarily to market access and would not engage with the United States on the other issues unless the U.S. agreed to discuss agricultural subsidies and trade remedies.\textsuperscript{46} Still enjoying the glow of NAFTA’s completion, the United States saw the FTAA as a logical extension of that initiative, with an even bolder mandate. At the Miami Summit of the Americas in December 1999, President Clinton stated, “For the first time ever, we established an architecture for hemispheric relations from the Arctic Circle in the north to Argentina in the south. We created a work plan from which the democratic governments of the Americas could be judged by their people.” Brazil, for its part preferred to focus on Mercosur and an essential South American Free Trade Area. After a series of inconclusive summits and ministerial meetings, it was clear to the WTO Minister at Cancun Mexico in 2003 that Brazil had chosen to “opt out” of FTAA.\textsuperscript{47}

Despite discussions of an “FTAA light” outcome and subsequent negotiating sessions in Miami; Puebla, Mexico; and Mar del Plata, Argentina, the FTAA was moribund by the end of 2005. By that time, the United States had completely lost interest in the FTAA, while Brazil turned inward, focusing on the presidential election of 2006.\textsuperscript{48}

**World Trade Organization**

The WTO, created in 1995, to supervise and liberalize international trade, succeeded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and provides a framework for negotiating and formalizing trade agreements as well as a dispute resolution process.\textsuperscript{49} Its 153 members are currently consumed with the Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round), a follow-up to the failed Seattle Ministerial Conference of 1999, which was launched in Doha, Qatar, in late 2001. Unfortunately, the Doha Round is currently at a standstill due to disagreements between the members specifically regarding agricultural subsidies.\textsuperscript{50}

Historically, Brazil was not an active negotiator in the various rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. Instead, it largely focused on preserving trade preferences for developing countries, including the concept of “special and differential treatment.”\textsuperscript{51} Trade facilitation is also important for Brazil to improve its basic trade infrastructure. Beginning with the Tokyo Round in the 1970s and continuing through the Uruguay Round in the 1990s, the GATT’s agenda became broader and more complex, and Brazil became more adverse (along with India) in opposing specific initiatives of the United States, the European Union, and Japan.\textsuperscript{52} The tariff cuts of the Uruguay Round are generally viewed as increasing real income for most
developing countries.\textsuperscript{53} Brazil played an important role in the launch of the Doha Round,\textsuperscript{54} but like many other rising economies, it would like to see the Doha Round move forward on agricultural issues, reducing trade-distorting domestic support for agriculture and liberalizing trade to improve the asymmetry that currently favors developed countries.\textsuperscript{55}

Brazil’s influence in the WTO could increase with the emergence of Roberto Azevedo, Brazil’s current ambassador, among the frontrunners for the position of Director-General of the WTO. Ambassador Azevedo has stated that he will continue the stalled Doha talks, noting “We need to stop searching for the ideal and start searching for the possible. We know what issues are stopping the Doha round and what flexibilities countries can offer.”\textsuperscript{56} Ambassador Azevedo asserts that the WTO needs trust, pragmatism, and flexibility in order to further its goals.

In the past, Brazil has made effective use of international dispute resolution mechanisms. In 2010, eight years after Brazil challenged several provisions of the U.S. cotton program, Brazil announced that it intended to impose retaliatory measures against the United States worth $829 million. To avoid such measures, the United States reached an agreement with Brazil to make some short-term changes to its export credit guarantees and provide the Brazil Cotton Institute with $147 million annually for a fund to assist Brazilian cotton farmers with technical assistance, marketing, and market research. In exchange, Brazil agreed to temporarily suspend its retaliation with the intention of reaching a permanent agreement with the United States once Congress is able to agree on a farm bill to adjust the subsidy program. Most recently, in February, Brazil and the United States informally agreed that they will continue to abide by an interim settlement over U.S. cotton subsidies despite a nine-month extension of the 2008 U.S. farm bill. In March 2013, the Brazilian Trade Action Coalition [BRAZTAC] wrote to members of Congress, supporting a “definitive solution” to the U.S.-Brazil WTO cotton subsidy dispute “in the context of the 2013 Farm Bill in order to avoid hundreds of millions of dollars in Brazilian trade retaliation. President Obama’s budget for FY 2014, which was released in April 2013, did not include a provision to make a payment to Brazil in order to avoid retaliatory tariffs.”\textsuperscript{57} Additionally, U.S. Department of Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack noted that President Obama’s FY 2014 budget assumes a new “food, farm, and jobs bill.”

More significantly, on December 31, 2011, the hefty U.S. 54-cent-per-gallon ethanol import tariff and 45-cent-per-gallon tax credit for ethanol blenders expired when the U.S. Congress adjourned without enacting any extending legislation. Thus, for the first time in more than three decades of U.S. government subsidies for the domestic ethanol industry, the U.S. market will be open to imported ethanol. The tariff was primarily aimed at keeping Brazilian ethanol out of the U.S. market. However, some members of Congress are seeking to reinstate the 54-cent-per-gallon tariff in an effort to support Caribbean ethanol producers, who previously benefited from duty-free access to the U.S. market while Brazil did not.

The Financial Times notes that “Recently the Brazilian authorities have been showing support for local ethanol producers. They are preparing to reduce the tax burden on ethanol fuels by almost 80 percent, a cut that will reduce the tax from
Another factor spurring production in Brazil’s ethanol market is the new EU tariff of $83.03 per metric ton of U.S. ethanol.

During the Cancun Ministerial of 2003, Brazil undertook a pivotal role, organizing developing countries into a G-20 bloc that insisted on freer agricultural trade and significant concessions that blew up an agreement between the United States and the EU. The Cancun talks collapsed after only a few days, when members could not agree on a “framework” to continue negotiations. The collapse of Cancun is generally viewed as a victory for the developing countries, with the G-20 sufficiently empowered to reject the U.S.-EU agricultural proposal as not in their interest:

In fact, the G-20 established itself as a response to the agricultural text drawn up jointly by the United States and the EU at Cancun. And, despite public criticisms of the G-20 began to be perceived by public opinion, both in the North and the South as the result of a legitimate effort of developing countries to “push” their interests.

At the subsequent Sixth Ministerial in Hong Kong in 2005, Brazil unsuccessfully tried to bridge differences between the United States and the EU. Indeed, in Hong Kong, Brazil’s voice was prominent in as a member of the latest group of would-be brokers of a Doha Round agreement known as the “Group of Six” (EU, U.S., Japan, Australia, Brazil, and India). By the time of the Geneva negotiations in the summer of 2008, India took a more aggressive position on agricultural trade, losing Brazil’s support in the process, and the developed world was paralyzed by the global economic meltdown. By this point, however, Brazil had already established itself as an emerging force in the WTO. Having viewed the prior Uruguay Round as detrimental to its interests, Brazil has taken an aggressive, almost obstructionist role as the leader of the G-20 bloc.

However, in early 2011 Brazil’s president called for major countries to renew the Doha talks, while WTO Director General Pascal Lamy assisted in the rescue efforts. Brazil also attempted to broaden the scope of the Doha talks by presenting a proposal in May 2011 to include discussion of the relationship between currency exchange rates and global trade patterns.

By mid-2011, attention shifted to reaching a year-end Doha “package” that would be unveiled at the December Ministerial meeting. Once again, Brazil and the U.S. squared off over what constitutes a “balanced approach,” with the U.S. seeking additional concessions from developed countries. For its part, Brazil insisted on a package more responsive to developing countries.

By the fall, with the December deadline approaching, the U.S. floated the idea of WTO members pursuing “plurilateral initiatives,” rather than advancing the entire Doha “single undertaking.” In response, Brazil proposed a “pause” in the market access negotiations through 2012, suggesting a Ministerial in early 2012 to launch a new WTO work program. As the year end approached, there was no consensus on how to proceed in the Doha Round in 2012 or under what terms. However, a draft of Ministerial Chairman’s text contains the possible elements for political guidance “on the multilateral trading system, trade and development, and the Doha Round.”

The eighth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Geneva on December 15–17, 2011. A plenary session and several working sessions took place.
and ministers had a platform for discussing three main themes: “The Importance of the Multilateral Trading System and the WTO,” “Trade and Development,” and “The Doha Development Agenda.”

In the chairman’s concluding statement of the conference, Mr. Olusgun Aganja acknowledged that the “Ministers deeply regret that, despite full engagement and intensified efforts to conclude the Doha Development Agenda single undertaking since the last Ministerial Conference, the negotiations are at an impasse.” Pascal Lamy, speaking at his last regular ministerial in which he served as director general, could only find solace in the minister’s acknowledgement of an “impasse” and urged them to start “exploring different negotiating approaches.” Hardly an auspicious beginning for 2012.

At the end of the day, there was nothing of significance accomplished. Going forward, the United States continues to express interest in a plurilateral services agreement (which is also supported by Australia and could eventually be supported by Japan, Canada, and the European Union), while Brazil remains firmly opposed to this approach. Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister Patriota publicly questioned this approach, since it would not demonstrably promote development in poor countries. The BRICS ministers issued a statement in December 2011 that emphasized the need for any “early outcome” of the Doha Round to deliver meaningful benefits for developing countries.

Efforts to move the Doha Round forward continue. In the spring of 2013 Brazil warned that negotiators trying to assemble some small agreements for the WTO Bali Ministerial Conference scheduled for December faced difficulties. Brazil’s WTO Ambassador Roberto Azevedo stressed that a failure to reach an outcome in Bali would cause “acrimony” among WTO members, “further deteriorating their ability to pursue the conclusion of the Doha Round.” He stressed that reaching a final outcome of the Doha Round is a critical first step that will enable negotiators to consider ways to craft multilateral trading rules in new and emerging issues.

Highlighting Brazil’s growing visibility in world trade negotiations, the WTO announced on May 7 that its members had chosen Roberto Carvalho Azevedo as the organization’s next director general. Mr. Azevedo will take the helm of the WTO in September 2013.

**President Dilma Rousseff**

President Dilma Rousseff assumed office on January 1, 2011. She is the first woman president of Brazil. Following years of intermittent tension and disappointment with President Lula, the U.S. was ready to “reset” relations and so, it seemed, was Brazil’s new president. Her inaugural speech was closely studied and contained some points that U.S. analysts welcomed. Brazilian analysts expected her to concentrate on domestic policy rather than foreign policy:

Our foreign policy will be based on the classic values of Brazilian diplomatic tradition: promoting peace; respect for the principle of non-intervention; defense of Human Rights, and strengthening multilateralism….We will continue deepening our relationship with our South American neighbors….

We will preserve and deepen our relationship with the United States and
the European Union….We shall give ever greater consistency to Mercosur and Unasur.

We shall continue arguing for “reform of the organisms of world governance, especially the United Nations and its Security Council. I reaffirm that I prefer the noise of our free press to the silence of dictatorships…the most complete democracy and…the uncompromising defense of human rights.”

President Rousseff gave a second major address on foreign policy in April 2011, repeating much of what she said in her inaugural address, but adding a pointed reference to the “Arab Spring”:

The most recent events in the Arab countries in North Africa are evidence of a healthy wave of democracy which we supported from the beginning, but they reflect also the complexity of the challenges of the century in which we live. We are dealing with challenges that no longer accept the usual warlike responses.

Brazil’s opposition to western efforts to support democratic change in the Arab world could be ascribed not only to its desire for a seat on the U N Security Council but also to commercial considerations. Brazil’s exports to the Middle East, consisting primarily of commodities and foodstuffs, are rising. Between 2000 and 2010 Brazilian exports to Iran surged to $ 2.12 billion. In August 2011, according to the Association of Brazilian Beef Exporters (ABIEC), Iran became the biggest market for Brazilian beef exports in the world.

Well into President Rousseff’s third year in office, it is clear that former President Lula still has influence over Brazilian foreign policy.

**Brazil’s Place in the Americas**

Today, South America is excited about the opportunities that China, India, and other economies in the Pacific represent. Concerns about sovereignty have been heightened and economic cooperation structures are being reimagined. Sensitivity about hegemony is high. Historic grudges and boundary disputes have not disappeared. Uncertainty and historic differences drain momentum from the regional longing for greater integration, energy cooperation, and infrastructure development. Peru’s new president is a former military officer. Will he kindle historic grudges with Chile? President Chavez’s death may profoundly affect Venezuela’s role within Mercosur. Former President Lula’s illness may alter Brazil’s relations with South America since the expectation has been that he might be elected president again in 2014.

Intraregional trade has been declining over the past several years, both among Mercosur countries and in the Andean Community. Andean Community members are considering what changes they might make to improve the structure and functioning of their common market. The approval of two free trade agreements linking the U.S. with Colombia and Panama has created an unbroken zone of free trade agreements from North America, through Central America and along the west coast of South America, except for Ecuador. The ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
talks will further expand this network. While the United States has taken a visible, leading role in the TPP negotiations, Brazil has not been a participant. All of this uncertainty affects Brazil’s desire for economic influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Concerns about hegemony lie just below the surface in South America. The example of what has happened to the interests of Uruguay and Paraguay within Mercosur is not lost on the region. “For a country that claims its leadership role is benevolent, the fact that Brazil has for years sustained trade surpluses with every South American nation except Bolivia may be seen by neighboring leaders as a sign of political insensitivity, if not thoughtless hypocrisy.”

Brazil used an internal Paraguayan crisis to sidestep Paraguay’s opposition to Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur. In June 2013, the Paraguayan Senate, in a lightning vote, ousted the country’s leftist president. Several governments in the region objected to this haste. Brazil and Argentina then suspended Paraguay from Mercosur and Brazil also orchestrated Paraguay’s suspension from UNASUR. Mercosur then welcomed Venezuela as a full member. Venezuela has seven years to meet the economic conditions for Mercosur membership, but it can participate in all of Mercosur’s political debates and decisions. Recently, Brazil has announced that it will restart its languishing free trade negotiations with the EU. Venezuela’s membership in Mercosur, because its government rejects free market economics, makes success in such negotiations unlikely.

In South America, there is suspicion about Brazil’s “imperialism.” This has intensified as Brazil’s influence increases in the region, demonstrated by the following two examples. In the spring of 2011 on the outskirts of Lima, a Brazilian company, as a good will gesture, installed a large plastic copy of the statue of Christ the Redeemer that dominates Rio de Janeiro’s skyline. The Peruvian press quickly complained about Brazilian imperialism. After months of demonstrations by the inhabitants of a preserve in Bolivia protesting against a road being built through their land to connect Brazil with ports on the Pacific Ocean, Bolivia’s President Morales in October 2011 forbade any highway construction traversing an indigenous preserve. The road was being built by a Brazilian private company and financed by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). Accusations of Brazilian “imperialism” were hurled and President Morales was called a Brazilian “lackey.”

Brazil and China

Throughout recent developments in the Western Hemisphere, the presence of China must be mentioned, particularly given its appetite for raw materials, which helped grow Brazil’s trade with China 18 times between 2000 and 2008, making China the leading trade partner of Brazil by 2009. While China has advanced to near superpower economic status, it remains a country with low economic, social, and institutional development, “and as such shares a series of weaknesses with Latin American countries.” China’s policy on currency valuation has also been a controversial factor in trade policy, although WTO votes have not yet been invoked to address this issue. While the Brazil-China economic relationship is symbiotic largely due to China’s consistent industrial growth and Brazil’s abundance of raw materials,
Frictions are already appearing. The latest manifestation is Brazil’s new policy of a “Bigger Brazil,” which is designed to grow Brazil’s domestic manufacturing sector while increasing enforcement of its trade laws to restrict Chinese imports that are deemed to circumvent existing trade remedies or infringe Brazilian intellectual property. The policy, which also includes subsidized financing for select industries via Brazil’s BNDES, has been criticized as “reminiscent of the import substitution policies that were employed by Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s.”

While many argue that China has the advantage in the Brazil-China relationship, a closer look reveals the crucial connection between good governance and investment in the long run. This link is clearly more favorable to democratic Brazil. Carlos Pereira and João Augusto de Castro Neves from the Brookings Institute believe that “this disparity [between China and Brazil’s way of governing] may suggest a different approach in terms of foreign economic policy.” Both countries are racing to increase their foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad, particularly in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. How Brazil and China will deal with governance indicators in host countries may give rise to an escalated competition between the two countries in developing markets.

The disparities between the two countries may continue to grow due to their differing domestic institutional structures. Brazil’s market-friendly and democratic environment will be more attractive to foreign investors in the future. How these different governing institutions will affect Brazil’s and China’s bilateral differences is debatable. Many believe that these disparities will have a spillover effect on multilateral cooperation.

It is clear that Brazil today is far different from Brazil two decades ago. Brazil has taken great strides in improving its regulatory practices and building its local institutions to be more attractive to foreign investors. However, Brazil has a long way to go in the direction of good governance in order to become a global player capable of attracting FDI in amounts similar to China. “Custo Brasil” refers to the unusually high cost of domestic goods in Brazil. The causes are Brazil’s structural and endemic problems such as poor infrastructure, one of the developing world’s highest tax rates, and expensive labor costs. Undertaking reforms to reduce these costs would attract more investment. However, successive governments have lacked the creativity to carry them out.

Coda: Looking Ahead

The state visit of President Barack Obama to Brazil in March 2011 and President Rousseff’s visit to the U.S. in April 2012 provided opportunities for the two presidents to develop a new bilateral path forward. However, the agreements reached in those meetings were no breakthrough. Reuters has announced that President Rousseff will make her first official state visit to Washington, probably in October 2013. This visit is the first state visit by a Brazilian leader in almost two decades. It could lead to strengthened bilateral relations as well as increased commercial ties and investment. In the 1980s, the U.S. proposed a bilateral treaty to avoid double taxation of Brazilian and U.S. firms. It has languished unaccepted by Brazil for more than a generation.

Brazil’s economy has grown phenomenally since the 1990s. It is now the
seventh largest economy in the world, having overtaken Italy in 2010 and the UK in 2011. Goldman Sachs has predicted it will be the fifth largest by 2050. Brazil plays an active role on environmental issues such as climate change and biodiversity, trade, food security, and in supporting the need for change in the architecture of global governance. It plays a confident and innovative role on public health. It has the credentials to play a more effective role on nuclear nonproliferation. Brazil’s national interest should also encourage greater protection of intellectual property. Interestingly, President Rousseff’s rhetoric gives the impression that Brazil wants to play a more assertive role on human rights and on the strengthening of democracy. More needs to be done in Brazil, however. Human rights violations persist and press freedom is being eroded by judicial and court action.75

Brazil also aspires to a seat on the UN Security Council, but its capacity to play that role has not been universally accepted. Its selective application of the policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries is particularly evident in the Middle East. Furthermore, whether this is the result of hoping to increase Brazilian exports to those countries; encouraging greater support there for Brazil’s aspiration to the Security Council; or the desire to avoid Islamic terrorism in Brazil is not clear. WikiLeaks released an August 2009 cable from the American Embassy in Brasilia which pointed out that “Officially, Brazil does not have terrorism inside its borders.” The cable then states, “In reality, several Islamic groups with known or suspected ties to extremist organizations have branches in Brazil and are suspected of carrying out financing activities.” On November 17, 2011, the Federal Police Chief in Sao Paulo said that terrorists might take advantage of the 2014 World Cup games to attack foreign delegations rather than Brazilian targets. It is unclear, this concern would include the summer Olympics in 2016. The Brazilian government’s position on terrorism is unclear, but suggests it believes that Brazil and Brazilians do not represent a target for terrorism.

For the U.S., strategic engagement with Brazil is crucial, especially concerning trade, global governance, the environment, biofuels, renewable energy, and its interest in reducing U.S. dependence on Middle East oil. The Western Hemisphere already supplies one-fourth of the world’s crude oil, one-third of the world’s natural gas, nearly one-fourth of its coal, over a third of global electricity, and is a leader in renewable energy. In 2011 the U.S. imported nearly half of the oil and petroleum products it used; 49 percent of those imports came from the Western Hemisphere and only 18 percent from the Persian Gulf. According to the Energy Information Administration, roughly 32 percent of U.S. oil imports in 2012 came from the Western Hemisphere and only 12.9 percent from the Persian Gulf. Canada and Mexico are already the top two foreign sources of oil coming into the U.S., and big deposits in Brazil are becoming accessible. Energy expert Daniel Yergin wrote recently that the world’s new oil map is no longer centered on the Middle East, but on the Western Hemisphere. He predicts that by 2020, the Western Hemisphere will import only half as much oil from outside the region as it does today.

Some analysts suggest that China will soon supplant the U.S. in trade with the region. But China’s share of Latin American trade went from 2 percent in 2000 to 10 percent in 2011. Eight percent of Latin America’s exports went to China, but 41 percent went to the U.S. Furthermore, Latin American trade with China is largely lim-
ited to commodities. This prevents countries from diversifying and moving up the production ladder. In reality, 60 percent of Latin America’s exports to the U.S. are manufactured goods, while 87 percent of Latin America’s exports to China are raw materials. The numbers are even starker when it comes to China’s trade with Brazil. It is clear that Latin American economies want to modernize, diversify, and move up the value chain, and the U.S. is likely to be their partner of choice for many years to come. The U.S. and Latin America have broader, healthier, and more balanced relationships. Their economies are more complementary and their ties stronger.

Turning from trade to investment, the U.S. is still the largest investor in Latin America and the Caribbean. In Brazil, the Central Bank recently published data on foreign direct investment (FDI) as of December 31, 2010. The U.S., with $105 billion, was first. This is 13 times greater than the $8 billion of Chinese investment. In fact, China ranked 16th, after Canada and Mexico.

There are many topics that require dialogue between the U.S. and Brazil. The U.S. is engaged in 20 different dialogues with Brazil. Three are at the Presidential level, eight are at the Cabinet or Undersecretary level, and another eight are at the Assistant Secretary level. Most of these dialogues are chaired by the State Department, but the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, and Energy also chair at least one. Another dialogue involves race relations, which also includes nongovernment experts. Several dialogues also involve economic financial and business issues, while others concern the environment, nuclear energy, and consular issues. This degree of intensity and interest by the U.S. signal that the U.S. welcomes Brazil’s economic growth and leadership in the region. But, more fundamentally, it demonstrates that the U.S. seeks collaboration with Brazil whenever possible. Brazil alone defines its own national interest and, hence, its foreign policy. There will be differences on many issues between the two governments, but strategic engagement is crucial.

Brazil is a country of more 200 million with a vast agricultural sector and developed industries that are competitive in the region and internationally. Its global competitiveness is expanding in both engineering and financial services. It is heavily engaged in improving infrastructure in the region. The United States on the other hand, is helping Latin America and the Caribbean to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, judicial systems, and citizen security. The United States also helps to improve the competitiveness of economies, by assisting them to improve education, strengthen supply chains, fight corruption, protect intellectual property, and address all sorts of barriers that prevent economies from realizing their full potential to reduce poverty. But these programs are not hemispheric “one size fits all” ideas like the Alliance for Progress. Instead, they have to be individually designed to fit each country’s reality and conditions, and, of course, require political will from the receiving government.

Brazil continues to act as a leader of the G-20 within the WTO. Members of the G-20 advocate for trade liberalization. Brazil, as one of the largest producers of agriculture products, continues to fight for sanctions against agriculture export subsidies—specifically those provided by developed nations. In 2011, Brazil also advocated for Russia’s membership in the WTO, which [will] provide greater bargaining power to the fast-developing BRICS within the WTO.
Ministerial Conference of the WTO (December 15–17, 2011), the Chairman of the General Council directed the members “to see what is realistically achievable in a pragmatic and realistic spirit.” He also asked members to focus on achieving both deliverables from the Doha Round and to also examine issues outside of the Doha directives. One proposal would increase the punishments for agricultural export subsidies—this proposal is not supported by Brazil, China, India, or the United States. Other topics include Trade for Aid and e-commerce.

Finally, the ongoing impasse in the WTO Doha Round is in large part a reflection of continued tension and conflicting priorities between Brazil and the United States. The most recent reflection of this stand-off is Brazil’s opposition to the U.S. interest in pursuing a plurilateral service agreement, largely on the basis of Brazil’s commitment to promotion of development for poor countries as a first priority. Behind this altruistic stance is a more pragmatic interest of Brazil: protecting its market until meaningful concessions are achieved. Given the meager results of the WTO December Ministerial, the outlook for a bold breakthrough in U.S.-Brazil trade relations is dim. However, “business as usual” is not necessarily a failed result—the U.S. and Brazil will continue to engage as necessary. Both sides publicly put the best face on the current state of play: U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk may have been joking during a December 18, 2011, interview with the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de São Paulo, when he hinted at a free trade agreement with South America.

After President Rousseff’s April 2012 visit to the U.S., bilateral meetings continued (e.g., the U.S.-Brazil Global Partnership Dialogue in October and the U.S.-Brazil CEO Forum in March 2013), although disagreements surfaced among U.S. policymakers on the best way to proceed with Brazil. In January 2013, Commerce Undersecretary Francisco Sanchez defended the administration’s multi-pronged framework for engaging Brazil, specifically mentioning the U.S.-Brazil Commercial Dialogue and the U.S.-Brazil CEO Forum. In contrast, however, the new chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee’s Subcommittee on Trade, Representative Devin Nuñez (R-CA), proposed legislation that would create a U.S.-Brazil Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), designed to consolidate the various venues for U.S.-Brazil negotiations. In March 2013, the American and Brazilian business and government leaders, including the U.S. Department of Commerce Chair and Brazilian Chief of Staff, met in Brazil for the eighth annual CEO Forum to discuss recommendations and best practices learned on trace, tax, and visa reform. During the meeting, both sides were urged to utilize the momentum from the recently approved Tax Information Exchange Act (TIEA) to focus attention on the fact that the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FACTA), which goes into effect in January 2014, will require any foreign financial institution to disclose to the United States any information about Americans’ accounts worth more than $50,000. The approval of the TIEA by both sides is a key step toward ending double taxation. These meetings indicate progress in strengthening the bilateral relationship.

In short, life goes on for both nations. The United States is placing increased emphasis on the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), now referred to as “WTO-Plus,” but in reality a clever replacement for the FTAA, picking off the interested countries in Latin America, uniting them with like-minded Asian partners, and leaving Brazil to fend for itself. All of which might be just fine from Brazil’s perspective, which
for the time being may be happy to focus on its status as the aspiring spokesman for the much-publicized BRICS alliance.

But a more fundamental question must be addressed: Why does Brazil continue to cling to ineffective and outmoded concepts like Unasur and Mercosur? Why does it continue to maintain old import substitution policies (now dressed up as “import substitution industrialization 2.0”) and protectionist local content rules? For whatever reason, Brazil remains, to a large degree, wedded to old policies and failed relationships, often to its own detriment.

Building on the upcoming Obama-Rousseff meetings in the fall of 2013, the best that can be hoped for, which, given the current international political and economic climate, is not necessarily a bad result. It merely reflects current practicalities and the continued conflicted relationship of two great nations. The tentative embrace continues.

Notes


2 Ibid.


4 Ibid.

5 Paulo Sotero, Brazil’s Rising Ambition in a Shifting Global Balance of Power, 3 (S1) Politics 72(2010) [hereinafter Sotero].

6 Einaudi, 6.

7 Luiz Felipe Lampreia, Bloomberg News (September 21, 2011) [hereinafter Lampreia].

8 Sotero, 72 (stating, “Indeed, in the final year of President Lula’s administration, Brazil took an active role in all major negotiations of global issues”).

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10 Einaudi, 9.


12 Sotero, 77.

13 Lampreia, 7.

14 Sotero, 76.

15 Ibid.

16 James Lockhart Smith, Financial Times (June 14, 2011).

17 Eliana Cardoso, A Brief History of Trade Policies of Brazil: From ISI, Export Promotion and Import Liberalization to Multilateral and Regional Agreements, p. 3. This paper was prepared for the Conference on Political Economy of Trade Policy in the BRICS (March 27–28, 2009) [hereinafter Cardoso].

18 Recently South Africa was included and the grouping is now called BRICS.

19 Mercosur’s origins can be traced back to 1985, when Presidents Raul Alfonsin of Argentina and Jose Sarney of Brazil signed the Argentina-Brazil Integration and Economics Cooperation Program (PICE), having been brought together by both countries’
efforts at re-democratization. Both countries were moving away from protectionism and toward trade liberalization. In 1990, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay took the first step toward further integration when they signed the Partial Scope Agreement to eliminate all tariffs and trade restriction by the end of 1994 and establish a common economic policy. A year later in March 1991, the common goals of the 1990 agreement were incorporated in the Treaty of Asuncion. After several years of negotiation, Mercosur was finally created as a result of the Partial Scope Agreement in 1994; “Among the external factors that acted in favor of the formation of Mercosur, the following are worth noting: challenges created by the beginning of the free trade agreement between Canada and the U.S. in 1989, and the perspective of its expansion to other countries in the Hemisphere, the Single European Act of 1986; and the non-conclusion of the Uruguay Round, in December 1990.” Cardoso.

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Brazil’s Border Security Systems Initiative: A Transformative Endeavor in Force Design

Salvador Raza

ABSTRACT

Brazil lives within a regional security context, a “securosphere” that is immensely hard to avoid. Strenuous disagreements among defense and security agencies over approaches to precise methods of identification, measurement, and reactions of living and emerging threats on this securosphere proved their shared ability to be mistaken. This article proposes a national security border system of systems with enough power of discrimination and capacity for integration to address danger or take advantage of changing circumstances across Brazil’s borders, tied to appropriate outcomes of the security agents. I discriminate sensible topological differences to lay out interconnection patterns of the various elements defining three specific border environments, using them to plan a more successful action. I also discriminate between subtle similarities among practical operational concepts of the armed forces and the police forces to provide better-analyzed premises, using them to build wholeness of understanding. From a better understanding of the whole, we can infer system requirements for the parts, providing capacity to conduct a disciplined exercise of planning with politically and financially affordable costs.

Alfred Whitehead wrote: “We habitually observe by the method of difference. Sometimes we see an elephant, and sometimes we do not. The result is that an elephant, when present, is noticed.” It takes an exceptional effort of mind to pay attention to what is always present. This article aims to clarify the foundations of Brazil’s Border Security System. It deals with a newcomer among the many subfields of Force Design that begin with the phrase: “National security is….”

It is worth noting here that technology is so pervasive in modern security that it is almost an inescapable background feature shaping Brazil’s self-conceptions of the meaning and basic expectation of security, the decision arrangements, and the criteria of what is normal and normative in building security capacities.

Critically thinking about such a comprehensive issue is essentially a search for strategy. To do it well requires the sustained application of disciplined minds toward innovation, something that does not always come easily. Even the smallest question that crops up during the design of a system of security capacities rises out and connects back to questions so inclusive that they are extremely difficult to delimit, occasionally ending in unresolved contradictions.
Finding the Elephant in the Securosphere

The nature of this inquiry about Brazil’s border security problem does not ask what (border) security is in general—what common features, if any, it has with all many different sorts of border security. I seek to delimit a finite quantity of capabilities, singling out what counts as the “known” security priorities and separating them from the “unknown” philosophical questions. The request is for a construct of things of high security value under an actionable theory of Brazilian Security Reality.

To be real at all, the Brazilian alternative of border security must be able to be modeled into a prototype to test the concept and implemented in a pilot program to test its scalability. Through this method the metaphysics of security becomes comprehensive in its questions and critical in its methods.

Such a forecast involves risk, since it requires that the present trends shaping social perceptions of the evolving security threat environment provide a stable planning reference until those threats can be transcended. Under this type of correlational assumption, as Marcuse said, any solution cannot possibly be conceived without a base of continued high technological support. The benefits are clear and urgent. Technologies promise security beyond what traditional crafts can provide, creating assurance of a stable environment for the industries and enterprises and creating socioeconomic development.

The answers sought in the design of the codes by which Brazil’s border security can transfer its traits include, among others, the basic value of territorial integrity. First, logical algorithms of the strategic narrative have to be identified and modeled into a construct with the capacity to engineer the production of real “things.” Once the controls of the internal logic of the system are designed, chains of “things” can be linked in mutually compatible border segments under a common principle. This narrows down the proliferation of insecurity possibilities below the threshold of the disabling power the national security system can simultaneously deploy against multidimensional threats, with assured success. Second, the model has to be able to generate metrics capable of forging such long chains of inferences into a comprehensive unity. Lacking these two design requirements, border security runs the risk of becoming a set of guiding principles on how to spend more money to continue doing the same thing, but expecting better results. Albert Einstein framed this as the hallmark of delusion!

Bordering the Problem’s Environment

A national security strategy and the policies used to implement it may not always address the realities of state borders. While a national strategy focuses on the threats and challenges the state faces as a whole (as a unitary actor in realist terms, for instance), the reality of the border demands a different approach, one that is tailored to the specific realities of a sometimes ill-defined territorial space. The mechanisms upon which a national security strategy relies are inherently different from those that should be applied to a border region, taking into account the different interactions that occur there and its unavoidable dual nature: as an integral part of the national territory and as a space that transcends a geographical limit.

The concept of a national security policy for borders should take into account
the specific dichotomies defining the relations between two states. A one-size-fits-all approach might not be appropriate, since no two border areas are alike; yet there are some general principles that should be behind any policy aimed at securing the borders of any state, based on the interactions that are common to any territorial limit around the globe.

Borders in the Western Hemisphere can be analyzed by looking at the different identities they assume: as external boundaries, as boundaries of internal security and the rule of law, as economic spaces affecting transactions, and as imagined communities. This is an effective framework that underscores the difficulty in developing a strategy or policy that will take into account every dimension of the border region, and how it must be distinct from a national security perspective. For instance, it should be evident that the second identity, that of a space that sets a boundary for internal security and the rule of law, requires a different approach—one that does not rely primarily on military force but that uses law enforcement as a leading agent.

The presence of more actors in the geographic space (economic actors, local communities, transnational groups, and states’ governments, to name a few) creates a different dynamic that calls for an approach that is not necessarily based on military strength. The international component of any border region makes it a completely separate element of any national security strategy, one that requires not only clear definitions but coordination and even mutual agreement. While a state can define its internal policies regarding public safety and the mechanisms to enforce its laws, policies aimed at the border will require a more comprehensive approach that will take into account not only the security environment but also the political realities of a bilateral relation.

There are different border imperatives: economic development and police control, international security, and border identity. Therefore, it is difficult to agree on mutual border policies between two states. These realities then require a strategy that goes beyond the establishment of guidelines for national security.

The redefinition of the term national security has been analyzed by authors such as Jessica Tuchman Mathews, who has highlighted the importance of including resource, environmental, and demographic issues to its definition, and David Baldwin, who focused on the conceptualization of the term security and the different dimensions it can have.

Within the construct of national security, a border concept can broadly be defined as a line of separation between states that both defines and constitutes some form of geographic space or territory. As Jaskoski, Sotomayor, and Trinkunas affirm, borders are also places of convergence of four main concerns for states: national security, police security, economic development, and the construction of identity. This implies that any policy developed to deal with security in border regions will need to address not only traditional concerns such as the defense of national sovereignty, but will also need to include the broader implications of an interconnected, even interdependent, region.

Even this definition might be insufficient to truly develop a comprehensive border security policy. Borders are not only important for the construction of a national identity within, but also may be used as an element of power projection. This is more aligned with a neorealist perspective on what a border is: “a strategic line to
be militarily defended or breached” and a potential source of expanded claims over territory or resources.9

The border is the geographic space where the state has the power to enforce a specific decision within its prerogatives, namely national security. This responsibility drives the creation of criteria to operationalize this enforcement, yet these criteria must result from the establishment of a clear strategy. If border policies are not articulated with the broader strategy they become ineffective, and can even become counterproductive.

Traditional distinctions among security and defense coalesce at the borders, with a unifying impact over the expansion of their combined geographic area of influence upon which it impinges a denial-deter type of suasion, which is still neither properly recognized nor understood, and therefore not well theorized.

Border suasion10 merges the concepts of deterrence by retaliation and deterrence by denial, both crafted in response to theorizing requirements for the development of targeting strategies in the nuclear decision environment, and transfers the conceptualized outcomes of denial-deter suasion to design workable capacity-building alternatives addressing threats in a conventional-unconventional decision environment.

Suasion by retaliation within the geographic boundaries of political borders impinges upon a possible conventional (professional soldiers) or unconventional (illegal traffickers) force (both can and will exercise armed violence when threatened) the perception that they will not be able to fully neutralize the probability of an overwhelming counterattack (either from the military or security agents) before they could transfer the marginal benefits of the trespassing phase into a sustained position (fight to win or successfully evade) on the other side of the border. The risk assessment of the perpetrator is therefore primarily shaped by his calculus of the span of operational tempo he has to consolidate gains before the defender can leverage its capacities to prevent his sustained position.

Suasion by denial shapes the perception of the trespasser toward a realization of an unacceptable risk in starting a transgression, or in case the action has already been defragged, to make him realize rationally that it is in his benefit to stop it before crossing the outer limits of the extended borders. The power to prevent or to stop the transgression after its undertaking has begun is provided by the State’s capacity to enforce its will toward peaceful solutions to conflicts (either political among states or socioeconomic among individuals), and by the threat of a preemptive attack from the neighboring state, once the rolling threat goes beyond the threshold of its own risk assessment.

Suasion by denial and suasion by retaliation, completely within the border’s area, are based on the shared assumption that the attacker/perpetrator/trespasser does not have the ability to overcome the border’s surveillance system, empowering the denial-deter suasion before they can deliver a “fait accompli” (deliver drugs, transfer illegal arms, or the “disappearance” of the illegal migrants into the society, etc.), and that, when their intruding or intruding in-being presence is detected, it will be properly classified, providing effective response time to refrain the “momentum” of the attacking force toward the “fait accompli.”

A denial-deter suasion works indifferently toward security and defense be-
cause it deconstructs military threats and unconventional targets (such as a human transporter of drugs in a micro-traffic pattern) into a single common descriptor: the trespasser. A malevolent state-sponsored brigade attacking force, a foreign soldier that incidentally crossed the political border in the rainforest jungle, a drug-trafficker on foot, and an illicit aircraft are all trespassers.

A trespasser is a unit of analysis for designing surveillance complexes centered in “SysC systems.” This is a system providing tools for interagency coordination and international collaboration (2C), impelled by a decision support subsystem of Command and Control (C2) networked and centered in a subsystem of communication and IT processing capacity (C2) of relevant and pertinent intelligence (I) extracted from the border’s multidimensional environment through surveillance and reconnaissance (SR) operational protocols (2C_C4ISR).

The concept of denial-deter suasion can explain why borders can be secured and how to anticipate and overcome insecurity breaches at borders, with a hypothesizing authority over the design of SysC Systems.

Active sensing devices, like radar intelligence gathering through SR, do not respect political borders. It is a technical imposition. Once emitted, electromagnetic waves will spread throughout the environment until reflected back, identifying the reflector. An effective SR, one that provides time-feasible denial response, must detect intruders beyond the political borders. The necessary reaction tempo, constrained by the design of the force, defines the required detection range beyond and within the political border. The length between the forward detection range and the internal strategic reaction space is conceptually defined as an integrative function of: [(reaction speed) / (readiness response x operational tempo)].

It would be a diplomatic “trespassing” to build a SysC Systems, with sensors gathering intelligence inside a neighboring country, without a bilateral collaboration agreement or within a broad multilateral security agreement. And, since the performance measures of a SysC System are based on metrics of deterrence effectiveness, the denial effort should trigger a response before the intruders trespass the political borders—that is, inside the neighboring country, which again implies some type of arrangement where the neighboring country stops the evolving pattern before it configures a transgression of international or national constabulary laws ruling within the extended borders. The caveat is that a country will only comply with the norm if it is connected to its strategic interests.

The denial-deter suasion hypothesis is particularly useful to explain the importance of international collaboration in creating the conditions for effective border security. Unless the denial-deter dimensions of the border’s suasion can build credibility through the affirmative will of the states to act decisively and within the span of the required operational tempo, border security becomes a panacea.

Suasion effectiveness, and therefore border security effectiveness, is highly dependent on an upright set of corresponsive actions addressing the threat environment. Their goal must not be to “defeat the enemy,” but to reconfigure the structure from where security threats emerge. Priority settings have to redirect security programs toward denial-deter—otherwise, defense programs will continue self-justifying force augmentation, breeding opportunities for ravenous weapons dealers.

The internal consistency of security programs can only be sustained though
a comprehensive Force Design blueprint, which is the mechanism used to integrate adaptation, modernization, and transformation requirements into a unified set of strategic priorities irradiated from a SysC System concept.

Force Design assesses all components of the fabric of denial-deter suasion and as a result provides the foundations for an integrated project of border security. Its purpose is the conceptualization, development, and evaluation of alternative security capabilities to attend to policy requirements in response to security demands, ensuring that the proper set of effective and efficient police and military forces are economically identified, developed, organized, fielded, and supported.

Force Design is a comprehensive methodology, not an end in itself. Its results—an integrated project of border security—are the source of guiding principles that contribute to communicate goals and plans, which are reinforced through rules and norms at all levels of security organizations. Such a project ties objectives together and gives meaning and purpose to operational procedures, enabling all parts of the organizations to contribute to the overall effort with consistency—even though they act independently in a rapidly changing environment.

Equally important, it includes an indication of capabilities that need not be developed, retaining an appropriate focus on building essential capabilities. The basic purpose of an integrated border security project is to provide guidance to those whose actions can affect the focus and development of the required SysC System capabilities.

Although it subordinates all operational processes within the border’s space to a common purpose, a SysC System must allow the necessary latitude for leadership and initiatives and serve as an umbrella over the various functional activities developed within the national security establishment, shaping the context within which day-to-day decisions are made and setting the boundaries on strategic options. Furthermore, a SysC System serves as a guide for making trade-offs among competing requirements among border areas for short-term and long-term force allocation priorities. Finally, it provides consistency among programs offering the instance of reference for resource allocation.

These guiding principles are defined as the pattern of decisions that determine the ultimate set of border security capabilities and as being the blueprint for military, constabulary, and police force planning, programming, and budgeting, which underpins all defense-related functions, including procurement and acquisition; intelligence gathering; operational training and evaluation; personnel (civil and military); educational requirements; and technology research. Essentially it is because of the ability of these guiding principles to coordinate border security operational activities with policy requirements ensuring consistency over time that security capabilities development evolves in a directed manner, renewing, augmenting, and contracting its components to reinforce and expand defense possibilities.

Once an integrated project of border security has been defined, it informs the development of subparts related to individual services and security agencies that will converge to produce the required set of security capabilities for suasion effectiveness, ensuring that subunits adhere (over time) to operational patterns set forth by the SysC System.

The SysC System mills technological requirements into the fabric of com-
mand and control with the systemic perspective needed to support decisions as time and circumstance dictate additions or contractions in the security capacity inventory. C4IS constantly tests the forecast demand for security capabilities for the desired level of suasion efficacy, the exploitation of better integration and synergy among component parts of the border security system in order to maximize its efficiency, and the exploitation of economies of scale and scope that compete on the basis of price in order to ensure economy within acceptable levels of risk.

The coordination and collaboration (2C) integers of SysC Systems provide a functional logic for management of the border security system, disciplining the relationships of its component parts, while providing a common taxonomy for discussion, progressively examining and integrating new concepts. These also provide a set of concepts and the articulating logic required to swivel political options into security capability requirements and for cranking these requirements into border security force alternatives, assuring jointness and interoperability.

The development of a new concept of border security for Brazil stems from the need to better understand the implications of a specific challenge the country faces. Specifically, Brazil’s border security should be understood as a specific, self-regulating security dimension within the whole spectrum of national security.

The ambiguity of the National Security concept itself has to be extirpated. Its military-based definition still locked in the Doctrine of National Security, nurtured for the past 60 years by the National War College (ESG), no longer serves the growing national ambitions and interests of Brazil. The use of military force can be neither the only nor the principal dimension; new elements must be constantly redefined and included in the dynamic shaping of Brazil’s national security.

In the case of border security, there is a dichotomy of national and international conditions that play a role in the definition of policies aimed at a specific geographic area, a condition that would set it apart from a pure national security strategy. It is necessary to understand this multidimensionality of security to grasp the importance of a new approach to deal exclusively with Brazil’s national security border policy.

The imperatives of a border’s security as a particular domain of knowledge spill out from an actual demand: a conceptual reference model for the security of the Brazilian borders. This should simultaneously and complementarily take into account its four dimensions of manifested threat: terrestrial, air and space, maritime, and the infosphere. This conceptual reference provides the foundational basis and articulating logic for capacity-building processes as part of the Brazilian government’s priority for enforcing effective control over its extensive borders, ensuring that the national interests are protected in seven axes defined by the Conflict Assessment Framework for Policy and Strategy Formulation (CAF): geostrategic, environmental, technological, socio-human, political-economic, energy, and knowledge.

In addition to a contribution to the Brazilian effort to (re)conceptualize its security sector reform based on the theory of Force Design, the conceptualization of the reference model had to address critical operational hypotheses, both founded on a large number of assumptions. These were structured using a hyperbolic tree structuring concept (with open software support), applied to the results obtained from the application of a simple AHP approach (Hierarchical Analytical Process) to explicit
the axiological preferences used to apply those parameters within each category defined by the security analysis framework.

**Operational Hypothesis**

**Necessity:** An integrated national borders’ strategy centered in a SysC System is the critical element to provide consistent, affordable, and pragmatic levels of security.

- a. Absent this capability, the forces would fragment in isolated services’ efforts with much higher transaction costs. The result would drive larger self-justified defense budget proposals.
- b. The SysC Systems must be operational before the threshold of irreversible insecurity starts deranging the borders’ extended region into levels of conflict and violence beyond the capacity provided by the current design of the Brazilian forces.

**Opportunity:** The border security system can only operate in a collaborative regional environment.

- c. Collaboration should be settled through bilateral border security agreements. Regional political diversity will prevent an overarching multilateral (all neighboring countries) border security initiative, forcing Brazil’s diplomacy to trade specificities for generalities.

**Scope and scale:** the system can properly and effectively address the differences in nature, differences in temporal priorities, and differences in decision cycles and structure among defense and security organizational, institutional, and doctrinaire operational protocols.

- d. There can only be one national SysC System, although it may be composed of several integrated subsystems with proper institutional coordination mechanisms and interoperability.

This framework provided the following analytical parameter to model a reference topology, a Strategic C4ISR for Brazil, with subordinated Service’s system integrating the value chain.

**Modeling the Response**

The long history of rivalries within the services, embodied in institutional culture and perpetuated by doctrine, allowed for limited improvement of security approaches. There is a tendency for Defense to show indifference and also even hostility toward the criticism of its methods. This is understandable, because it threatens the hard-won achievements of the past. There is also a tendency for the police forces to limit their methods to solve pressing practical problems as effectively as possible. This is also understandable, because police work is a continuous life-threatening endeavor.

Border security provides the police with forces which have the ability to gain an abstractly conceived improvement that might otherwise never even have been desired, and provides the Armed Forces with the practical intelligence able to be generalized into new areas of practice, linking them together with enough detail and precision to get the job done in various ways.
This is a far more effective method of correction of failure than the previous all-or-nothing approaches. It represents for the first time in Brazil’s history a method for the systematic pursuit of a whole-of-government approach to security.

This approach is forged over a chain of connected inferences, mapped out in a continuum of border security with four local deformations, as the Field Theory might suggest, transposed into three modular segments. Each segment defines a different operational strategy, each one with dedicated C4ISR subsystems serving to bridge and integrate these strings of operational strategies into a cohesive military strategy serving a comprehensive borders’ security policy: The Yellow Wall, the Gray Wall, the Green Amazon Wall, and the Blue Amazon Wall.

The Yellow, the Gray, and the Green Walls conform the Army SisFROM program, connected with Air Force SisDABRA and the Navy SisGAAZ to the National SysC System. Each one of the service’s subsystem is designed to integrate regionally with local police and constabulary force. This architecture protects the primary defense-oriented mission of each individual service, whereas allowing augmentation force to be delivered to police tasks under specific circumstances defined by law. On the practical level, the SysC System is thus what yearns for improvements over the actual and what tenaciously conserves achieved methods.

**The Yellow Wall**

The yellow wall extends from the southern limit of Brazil to the southern part of the western frontier. The outside boundaries of the border security area must be extended up to the large (light gray) Parana-Paraguay hydrographic basin. The border security individualizing criteria for the Yellow Wall shall consider:

- a historical background of high-intensity regular warfare and historical conflict with Argentina that has had a strong role in the past shaping of Brazil’s military identity;
- highly regulated, relatively effective border crossing points at populated areas with seeming (non–officially recognized) high levels of corruption;
- a dense network of policy, constabulary, and military stations, posts, and bases populated with defense and security career professionals;
- a large and sophisticated communications network linked to robust private satellite uplinks and transition towers and extensive fiber optics grid (reaching the point of minimum return due to increasing deterioration of cables and optical transition performance—they are getting old) supporting intense Internet and telecommunications traffic;
- the border’s porosity to outbound contraband of goods (cars and equipment) and commodities (coffee and soy), smuggled primarily to Paraguay. The total
inbound contraband of “made in China” fake gadgets is very large, but it is meager relative to the outbound (invisible) flow of illegal agricultural commodities to Paraguay, avoiding export taxes, which returns legalized products (a commodity laundry at the base of money laundry) to be exported through Brazilian ports under bilateral Brazil-Paraguay international trade agreements;

• the inbound and outbound gateways of illegal traffic. Intelligence should focus on identifying new patterns, which are constrained by the nature of the illegal traffic of goods;

• intense (legal) occupation of Paraguay and Uruguay (in fewer numbers) bordering agricultural land by an estimated 1.5 million Brazilian farmers (“the Brazilguaios”).

If Paraguay expels Brazilians occupying its territory and Brazil is effective in closing the illegal traffic with Paraguay, Paraguay’s economy runs the risk of collapse. The concept of border is correlated to the extent it can channel the economic flow toward a few checkpoints. The effort, therefore, is on surveillance of limited strings of borders serving institutional police roles, with control of air traffic basically regulated by the civilian aviation rules of traffic control. Satellite effort will be required for human intelligence.

To properly address border security in the Yellow Wall, Brazil’s decision makers will have to recognize the actual problem—which is basically within the institutional areas of responsibility of the Federal Police and Internal Revenue Agency.

The SysC Systems primary function within the Yellow Wall shall be related to the 2C role (coordination and collaboration), pushing capillarity of fusioned intelligence.

**The Gray Wall**

Bordering Brazil’s southwest flank from the upper border with Paraguay to the lower board with Peru, the Gray Wall’s western limits extend into the majestic, gray massifs of the Bolivian Andes.

The border security individualizing criteria for the Gray Wall shall consider:

• aggressive expansion of Brazil’s agribusiness frontiers toward the Amazon rainforest and Bolivia’s lower flat areas;

• intense migration of Bolivian unskilled labor to Brazil’s large metropolitan areas, attacked by a work force gap bloated by constant positive development rates;

• poor communication infrastructure and transportation network over an area with low demographic density;

• foreseeable trends of negative externalities of Bolivia’s social conflicts in
the form of massive immigration, fostering illegal settlements in rural areas focused on basic agricultural, low efficiency self-sustainment, family based-production;

- intense levels of corruption, low esteem, and obsolete weaponry of security agencies covering an extreme large and porous border;
- Inconsistent data on illegal drug traffic flowing through corrupted borders’ checkpoints;
- for crossing large geographical extensions, the massive illegal traffic rerouted from Peru to the EU and the U.S. via Brazil, fostering the need for mechanized transportation support;
- intense illegal, uncontrolled air traffic of low altitude, mainly small airplanes, using a vast network of natural airfields permeating large flat crop areas, and connected to the large internal transportation network;
- a stable, constant supply of Bolivian gas at relatively low prices, which is critical to sustain the development rate of the industrialized south of Brazil.

The border in this segment imposes tax barriers to the outbound flow of economic activities and constabulary barriers to the inbound flow of illegal traffic. Trends of increasing volume of illegal drug trafficking, illegal migration, the negative impact on the environment, and rural conflicts make the Gray Wall a border security priority for Brazil, with precedence higher than the Green Wall of the Amazon Forest.

The SysC Systems primary function within the Gray Wall shall be related to the C2 (communications and computing) capacity-building effort of border security, with a double focus: (1) building a robust, dedicated info structure linking an array of low altitude and ground surveillance sensors to control and coordination centers relaying timely information to rapid reaction, high mobility, semi-autonomous contingents of small security forces; (2) threat analysis and pattern identification, based on strong, factual, reliable data, relayed to the central national security decision centers to support high-level interagency coordination of the national resource strategy for border security.

The Gray Wall is the smallest but most important border area in the current Brazilian security environment. The technological requirements for an effective denial-deter suasion capacity are relatively simple, with many off-the-shelf, low-cost alternatives available in the market. Caution should be employed in designing the system as a modular, scalable, open architecture, with low maintenance requirements, which also does not present any technological challenges. The actual challenges, at the core of the Gray Module of the Brazilian SysC Border Security Systems, are 10 effectiveness requirements driving the concept design:

1. The ability to sustain hostile environment and operational conditions with lower maintenance costs free of systemic, catastrophic failures;
2. Integrated video-based operational, analytical, maintenance, administrative decision support and control system;
3. Embedded intelligence fusion center, with pattern-recognition capacity;
4. Distributed decision platforms (cells) based on redundant databases, ensuring that each operational cell supports at least 80% of the maximum standard data flow;
5. Dynamic integration with national and selected international decision centers and databases through redundant, independent info lanes;
6. Self-monitoring report to oversight and control center located at the National SysC Border Security System, reporting standard metrics of actual performance;
7. Redundant, secure data link with operational security agencies;
8. Reduced infrastructure costs based on modular power transmission-like towers;
9. Strong physical and cyber-security protection;

The Amazon Wall

Whereas the Gray Wall is the most urgent challenge, prompting a short reactive posture, the Amazon Wall is the most important and the most complex, prompting a proactive coordinated posture. Brazil took an innovative approach—by happenstance, not by design—which might help reduce the challenging complexity of providing border security to the extended land and maritime Amazons: the Green Amazon and the Blue Amazon.

Instead of imposing a solution over nature, Brazil shaped nature’s imposing logic into the Green and Blue Barriers within the SysC Subsystem border security workable inter-service strategy. Preserving the Army and the Navy Services’ missions, roles, and decision structure, it simply built a layered border security-defense structure, merging “Security-(Army-Navy)-Defense” into a singular equation.

A major challenge in building the Amazon Wall will be the integration of legacy systems into the SysC Border Security System, including those systems developed by nonmilitary agencies, like the oil giant Petrobras, the environmental agency IBAMA, the Federal Police, and the Internal Revenue System (Receita Federal - SERPRO).

The Green Barrier

Bordering from the West to the North-Northeast of Brazil’s flank, the dense rainforest builds an impassable barrier to intruders, with a few passageways controlled by small Army Garrisons.

Given its extension and its topographic conditions it can be said that the political borderline of the Green Wall is, mostly, a fictional border.

It is virtually impossible to determine the exact
limit between countries, since it is just an extension of the Amazonian jungle. Security border policies are aimed at controlling the rivers and the airfields that service the region, yet this is insufficient to halt the flow of drugs and other illicit activities.

The border security individualizing criteria for the Green Wall should consider:

- The nature of the response to intruders needs to be assertively classified (regular forces, guerrilla, narcotraffickers, “common” smugglers, illegal migrants), since the inclusion in one or another category changes operational protocols and legal operating frameworks. While this is valid for the other segments, the Green Barrier has the additional specificity of bordering countries with severe conditions of irregular warfare;
- The forest is a barrier to both sides: the intruders and the border security agents. The former have the initiative, which provides them a substantive advantage. The latter have to leverage the operational strategy to overcome the intruder’s advantage. Otherwise the intruders will prevail.

**The Blue Barrier**

The Blue Barrier is the extensive Brazilian maritime area of interest, circumscribed between the seashore and the exterior line of the extended Continental Platform, which in some points reaches out 350 nautical miles outbound.

The Brazilian Navy defines the Blue Barrier as the Blue Amazon. The term has a strong marketing appeal, as it metaphorically depicts an overall purpose that justifies the Navy’s role in securing the country’s maritime domain.

It also has an important role in affirming Brazil’s claims 150 miles beyond Brazil’s jurisdictional waters, encircling deep seawater oil reserves and reserves of extremely valuable critical minerals, including polymetallic nodules, also called manganese nodules, zircon, and rare earth minerals. Figure 1, elaborated by the Ministry of Defense of Brazil, presents a projection of the oil and gas reserves within southern area of the Blue Barrier.

Although consistent in justifying the Navy’s mission against a hypothetical threat environment, building criteria to limit the portfolio of possible alternatives, the Blue Amazon’s iconic concept lacks policy guidance explanatory power. Also, since it also runs absent, together with other normative documents, of a comprehensive security strategic narrative (an encompassing operational concept linking the Navy’s mission to the national defense strategy), Navy planners are forced to apply a large number of assumptions in designing the future naval forces to produce an affordable defense.

The Blue Barrier concept provides a direct response to these two liabilities: limited policy guidance coupled with faulty assumptions architecture. The Maritime subsystem of the SysC Border Security Systems, therefore, provides the integrative strategic platform for the SisGAAz, the Navy’s acronym for the Operational C4I & Management System of the Blue Amazon. This is an extremely complex and integrated program, with its many interlocking strings of capabilities arranged in two major segments: the Blue-Brown and the Dark-Blue modules.
The Blue-Brown module is the eastern gatekeeper of northern Brazil’s security, completing with the Green Barrier the encirclement of the extended continental Brazilian Amazon area in a unified strategic concept, even though Army and Navy operate under independent operational control of their assets, in coordination with other national security agencies.

This module defines two interrelated areas of operations for the Navy: one projecting east into deep blue Atlantic waters, the other projecting west into shallow brownish riverine waters. The Blue-Brown waters come together in the Amazon Delta.

The Brazilian Navy has historically operated with high performance in both the north brown Amazon ocean-hydrographic basin and in the south yellow Paraguay-Parana hydrographic basin. That is not yet the case for the blue tropical Atlantic waters of the Amazon extended area of operations. Historically the Brazilian Navy has focused in fleet tactics of sea-control/sea-denial operations in the southern Atlantic, with missions correlated to its role in the U.S.-led Cold War effort.

This orientation has evolved to a national security self-referenced role for the Navy, extensively augmenting the focus toward the Blue-Brown northern area of the Amazon Wall. This focus, clearly justified in a comprehensive security threat analysis, produced an innovative, sophisticated, naval strategy articulating the SisGAAz within the broad SysC Security Systems. The hallmark of this strategy is the layered control of sea-riverine corridors with segmented areas of operational responsibilities based on strategic assets’ tactical performance.

The endurance and strategic mission flexibility of the future Brazilian nuclear submarine will configure the first line of defense and early warning against an ex-
peditionary force–based intruder, aiming to break the eastern, maritime side of the Amazon Wall. This weapon system, integrated into the national SysC Border Security System through the Navy C2 network, has primarily a denial-deter suasion mission. If suasion fails, and the intruder continues its advance, it could with a marginal chance of success move into an attacking mode.

The outside borderline for the denial-deter strategy will necessarily be located in international waters—a great empty space—whereas the inner borderline will be inside a defensive perimeter determined by international law and the law of the armed conflicts. Positioning these lines is a complicated decision structure, with command resting on the national crisis management decision structure, coordinated through the National SysC Border Security Control System and controlled by the Navy tactical control.

Once the intruder force progresses through the first maritime, deep blue Atlantic waters’ barrier, it will face a joint surface and airspace resistance posed from a joint Air-Navy force under Navy Operational Control, exercised with the support of its tactical control system, under the strategic control of the Navy cell within the National SysC Border Security Command System.

Beyond the inner layer of maritime defense, the intruder will have to change its configuration to advance into shallow, treacherous brown waters extending 200 miles out of the Amazon Delta. This is truly an operational planning nightmare for any intruder, who would lack navigational references and would be strongly influenced by right tides—in some places near the coast, varying the equivalent of a two-story building, with strong currents. The shore is long and flat, with large sand and mud islands, with few serviceable roadways able to bear up under heavy and intense military use. There are no depots, no fuel supplies—only small villages: a 300-mile shore desert, in other words.

Advancing into this area, the intruders would face an intense barrage of land-based and air-to-ground missiles, since they must progress though the northern funnel of the Amazon Delta, which provides the only feasible military-scale access to the hinterland.

This is the transition area of responsibility from the Blue-Navy to the Brown-Navy, from seagoing to riverine platforms, where the Brazilian Marines effort also transits to the heavy Army. Developing transition protocols is a major—and costly—doctrine development program. In this regard, the Air Force must reassure that the operational, tactical, and technological requirements for the current procurement program for its advanced fighters are fully aligned with the National SysC Border Security Control System concept. Otherwise, it will be a waste of money, self-justified in missions disconnected from a clear purpose. The wise patience of the Air Force through these many years of delay for the pressing necessity of capacity augmentation is paying off now, as the National SysC Border Security Control System provides the rationale for a mission that justifies its role (and not the other way around, as was a past defective practice, lodged in a flawed force design approach).

Coming from the west side of the Amazon Wall, an intruder will also face two defensive layered barriers. The Green Wall provides the outer layer—bordering neighboring countries, primarily based on an array of fixed small army bases (company level), isolated from each other by hundreds of miles of dense tropical forest.
Their lines of communication are the rivers, extending inward for hundreds of miles. Officers, soldiers, and their families live in these secluded posts for months, with logistics sustained by the Air Force transport fleet, but mostly by a fleet of Army riverine (self-propelled barges) platforms. This Army fleet of self-propelled barges is, numerically, larger than the Riverine Navy.

Those men and women have a truly heroic mission of border security within a larger role of nation building. In remote posts lost in the Amazon, they transform an abstract political line drafted in a large-scale map into an actual border, circumscribing the idea of Brazil as a sovereign entity capable of shaping those inside as citizens of a nation. These so called border platoons are the locus of border security at the external layer of the Green Wall.

The inner layer, bordering Navy outposts, is primarily based on mobile platforms (riverine ships with embarked helicopters), supported by these outposts for administrative and logistic support. The Army and Navy in the Amazon operate with inverted logic.

The Green Wall is porous. Brazil cannot afford the cost to seal it, even if it were possible. The effort would be equivalent to effectively closing double the length of the U.S.-Mexico border, supplying resources continually through a hostile river from a distance of more than 1,000 miles from the logistics depots, and ensuring that all those remote posts operate synchronically; and all this without an electric fence!

Instead, Brazil simply layered a secondary barrier augmenting the denial-deterrence capacity of the security forces, leveraging the imposing logic that the intruders must use the riverine axes of communication. Even if they pass the external Army barrier at the Green Wall, landing a small airplane in an illegal airfield and escaping the radar surveillance system, they must use the rivers to move drugs, arms, or troops, consequently crossing the western borders the Navy builds as part of the Blue-Brown barrier.

This arrangement is not fortuitous. Inside the inner layer the Navy operates with precedence; the space between the outer and the inner layer belongs to the Army. This implicit partition reflects a historical asymmetry in thinking patterns, strategic priorities, and policy preferences among rivals. Also, this model of two concentric borders skillfully denies the premise that jointness is a mandatory solution for maximizing operational efficiency. The Army, Navy, and Air Force resolve it through strategy, not policy, a simple concept that sub-maximizes operational capabilities within each service’s concept of operation, and without extensive transition interface.

This is a simple, feasible arrangement that makes the combined Blue-Green Walls an effective denial-deter strategy against a hypothetical intruder, even if this intruder is based on a mighty battle-group. The Chinese are developing their military power under very similar logic, pouring money into the building of layered capabilities.

This logic, with transition phases built within the layered arrangement, brings another contextual advantage to the Brazilian Defense Services. They do not have to build jointness to be effective. The coordination efficiency that jointness should provide to generate tactical efficacy derives from operational integration within the
National SysC Border Security Control System. The system in itself is conceived to advance each service’s design of its own force, independently—to maximize competencies—ensuring its functional effectiveness once brought to bear as a whole. This is Brazil’s model, and a few gaming and simulations have demonstrated its feasibility, affordability, and efficacy.

The concept works. But it needs the SysC Border Security Control System to overcome many challenges; it is difficult to coordinate tactical actions across such a vast area without reliable satellite-based communications. The forest absorbs even powerful electromagnetic transmissions, creating vast zones of radio silence. Also, the number of police officers with authority to enforce security is a bare minimum, with no resources to operate in such a large, hostile environment. And the military has limited-to-no police power.

Building the Brazilian Security System of Border Security

The National SysC Border Security Control System was designed as a whole, with technical integers aligning two maritime and three land component modules in one single complex under two technical requirements:

- **Open architecture.** Built-in interfaces capable of accommodating evolving technology patterns in a time-horizon of 18 years (which defines the life-cycle of the system based on the life-cycle of the technology driving the design of the strategic assets operationalizing the denial-deter suasion strategy).

- **Dual scalability.** Built-in protocols to integrate strategic, operational, and tactical security and defense capacity-building efforts into a modular approach allowing economy of scale and economy of scope.

- **Economy of scale** is achieved within each subsystem (the Walls), replicating and interlocking self-sufficient, semi-autonomous strings of C4IS. For example, within the Grey Wall, the number-one priority, a string would extend a communication infrastructure from the current station bases of the Army to an array of sensors covering approximately 100 miles of critical parts of the border with Bolivia.

- **Economy of scope** is achieved with a unified concept providing the driving logic of the whole system, ensuring a fractal scalability: each string inside each module of each Wall, and all Walls, replicate the same concept, all integrated within a distributed decision-making process aligned and sustained through the security agencies’ organizational structures.

The current state of the technological advances determines that all tactical, operational, and strategic individual, coordinated, and joint actions within the external and the internal line of defense are fully dependent on reliable, secure satellite communications. It is a sound rationality, that the Navy should not start pouring money into the building of the II Fleet until it has assured satellite communication (relay) capacity. This is in itself more a political than a technological or financial issue, full of turf battles dividing interests in the Defense Industrial Base, fuelled by Service rivalries and politics of technology policy.
Once fully operational, the National SysC Border Security Control System will provide a unified vision of the whole security-defense binomial nature of the denial-deter suasion strategy, allowing all agencies to be seamlessly integrated into the National Security System, while developing autonomous efforts integrated within the whole-of-government logic that drives the SysC structuring concept.

This integration effort must complete itself in the assurance of twofold mandatory programmatic actions. First, Brazil has to develop a SysC doctrine interfacing with the operational and tactical doctrines of the Armed Forces, National Polices, and other agencies integrated into the National Security System. Second, Brazil has to design, develop, and implement mechanisms for the internalization of the technological spill out from the SysC System into the Brazilian Defense Industrial Base.

Although this latter mandatory programmatic action is already determined by the actual National Defense Policy, with the Minister of Defense displaying substantive “technical” efforts in this regard, the necessary effectiveness can only be measured within the grand-strategic rationale of the SysC System, in its core role of connecting security to national development.

This part is easier said than done. However, a competent benchmarking effort with India’s very similar effort will clearly demonstrate a far-reaching change in policies driving the relationship between defense, technology centers, and defense industries to seriously refocus efforts (and resources) to foster the development of regional technological clusters.

More importantly, this effort can only be fully accomplished through a regulatory, independent, defense industrial complex agency. Otherwise, the whole effort of SysC System might become paralyzed in turf battles, eroded by corruption, lost in the intricacies of “invisible” lobbies. This will again result in a few stand-alone benefits within a major disaster, with no responsible actors. We have seen this “movie” before, in programs like the SIVAN/SIPAN, Calha Norte, the “nonexistent” nuclear bombs, the nuclear submarine, and the main battle tank.

**A Price Tag for the SysC System**

For planning purposes, if an economy of scale is ensured, each mile of a string, regardless of the Wall it belongs to, will cost approximately US$1.5 million, projecting the total costs of the land-based National SysC Border Security Control System to US$7.6 billion, with another lump sum equivalent to the Blue Wall, totaling a Force Design project of US$15 billion. The full integration of these fractals will bring the total cost of the National SysC Border Security Control System to US$20 billion.

Once the costs for strategic weapons development (missiles) and platforms are computed, Brazil’s security budget’s grand total will be approximately US$74 billion—which is not much in light of Brazil’s ambition of becoming a regional power.

- National SysC Border Security Control System—US$20 billion
- The Navy nuclear submarine-based system—US$18 billion
- The Army rapid reaction brigades—US$8 billion
- The Air Force Strategic Transport—US$9 billion
• The Air Force Strategic Interceptors Forces—US$7 billion
• The inter-service missile program—US$7 billion
• The Strategic Satellite System—US$4 billion
• SysC System Doctrine development and integration—US$1 billion
• Technology Internalization in the DIB—US$6 billion

Seventy-four billion dollars over 10 years is not much to build security! Brazil can afford it because it needs it. Within these three security walls—the Amazon, the Gray, and the Yellow—Brazil can build itself into its grandeur.

The politicians have not yet funded it properly because they do not know how important it is. They don’t know it because Defense did not explain it properly to them. But Defense could not do it because the military did not know how to design the forces centered in a robust, affordable SysC System. Now they know it, with a Request for Proposals for the Army and the Navy subsystem promised to come soon.14

Shaping the Future

The SysC Border Security System has a truly transformative power over Brazil’s security establishment. It forges a new way of thinking about security and defense concurrently, removing past artificially built limits that only served to justify turf battles nested in obsolescent national security doctrines and sustained by a professional military educational system in urgent need of modernization to cope with the challenges the SysC System brings to bear.

Force Design principles will support the Armed Forces to better quantify their needs, developing the capability to develop budget proposals as a reflection of a unified, comprehensive, national security strategy, instead of a dysfunctional aggregation of wish lists. And the police forces (all of them) as well as other security agents will receive a better support to do what they are supposed to do.

What is Brazil’s border security? One such question now has an answer: It is what the SysC System produces inside the protective walls of rivers, mountains, forests, and seas. A derived and vastly comprehensive question long asked by security analysts, though of controversial standing with others, is “Can it be funded?” There are many sorts of answers. But perhaps the best criteria for answering it can be based on Occam’s Razor principle of simplicity: of two competing theories, the simplest explanation of an entity, with the fewest assumptions, is to be preferred. This translates simply into the two essential design requirements of the SysC System.

One of these requirements is that the decision structures forming part of the system must not cancel each other by irreconcilable conflicts. This is the “bottom line” value of the interagency. To think of border security in a sustained way requires defense and security agencies to deal in some way with conflicting ideas, “but not by merely asserting them on the same level all at once. In that way lies mere confusion and ruined theory.”15 The second of these requirements is the basis for logical coherence. Such coherence allows the consecutiveness of ideas with action. Occam would say again: If designed, security will come!
Notes

4 Ibid., p. 3.
6 Jaskoski et al., p. 4.
7 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
8 Peter Andreas, quoted in Jaskoski et al., p. 5.
10 The traditional methodological approach for determining defense requirements was through procedures commonly named either as force planning, strategic planning, or military planning. These are methodological approaches inherited from the Cold War period, led by the U.S. initiative under the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). This system provided the benchmark for other similar national initiatives, like the Brazilian Navy System for High Level Planning with its associated “Director Plan.”
13 This paper was prepared before the Army RFP for the first module of the SISFROM was issued. Nothing in this paper refers specifically to the content of that (classified) document, which is protected by non-disclosure agreements from the respondents to the proposal.
14 This is called the principle of consistency. See Frederick Ferré, *Philosophy of Technology* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988, p. 5).
References


Estratégia Nacional de Defesa do Brasil: Comentários sobre a Sua Implementação (2008–2011)
Shênia K. de Lima

RESUMO
A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END) foi a primeira estratégia de defesa tornada pública pelo governo brasileiro. Aprovado em 2008, o documento foi um marco no setor, determinando alterações importantes no que concerne aos objetivos enunciados e aos meios—políticos e militares—a serem empregados para alcançá-los. Entretanto, a viabilidade da sua implementação tem sido amplamente questionada, sobretudo no meio acadêmico. Tal se deve tanto a inconsistências da Estratégia per se quanto à incerteza no que se refere à capacidade e/ou disposição do governo para mobilizar os recursos e tomar as medidas indispensáveis à condução da END. Este artigo aborda os principais pontos da END e os principais avanços para implementá-la entre 2008 e 2011, além dos obstáculos à sua implementação.

Introdução
A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END) foi a primeira estratégia de defesa tornada pública pelo governo brasileiro. Aprovado em 2008, o documento foi um marco no setor, determinando alterações importantes no que concerne aos objetivos enunciados e aos meios—políticos e militares—a serem empregados para alcançá-los. Entretanto, a viabilidade da sua implementação tem sido amplamente questionada, sobretudo no meio acadêmico. Tal se deve tanto a inconsistências da Estratégia per se quanto à incerteza no que se refere à capacidade e/ou disposição do governo para mobilizar os recursos e tomar as medidas indispensáveis à condução da END.


O enfoque recairá sobre o segundo eixo estruturante. Não obstante a END trace planos para o longo prazo, a avaliação de sua implementação, ainda que parcial, durante os quase três anos que sucederam a sua aprovação se faz pertinente. Na medida em que se identifique o que tem sido feito e o que deixou de ser feito,
além dos empecilhos que se impõem ao alcance dos objetivos definidos pela END, a análise aqui proposta pode lançar luz sobre as iniciativas a serem tomadas nos próximos anos.

Considerações Iniciais sobre a END

Logo na sua introdução, a END reconhece a inexistência de um “amplio debate sobre os assuntos de defesa” ao longo de toda a história do Brasil. A América do Sul é amplamente considerada uma região pacífica, dada a ausência de conflitos interessatais. Tal crença fomenta a sensação de segurança por parte da população, que, em geral, não demonstra interesse pelas questões de defesa. É justamente este o primeiro ponto positivo da END: não obstante as suas falhas (a serem assinaladas em seção posterior), o simples fato de o documento ter sido elaborado e ter explicitado uma estratégia de defesa, não só indica maior transparência e accountability por parte do Ministério da Defesa, mas também oferece insumos para o debate público.

Outro aspecto importante da END é o reforço da associação do setor de defesa ao desenvolvimento nacional. Tal associação, que segue uma tendência histórica, mas que então passa a receber destacada ênfase, serve, em alguma medida, ao propósito de justificar a massiva modernização das Forças Armadas anunciada pela END, juntamente com os elevados custos que essa modernização (caso seja, efetivamente, levada a cabo) implicará. De acordo com a END, “estratégia nacional de defesa é inseparável de estratégia nacional de desenvolvimento”; ambas se reforçam mutuamente.

A END também apresenta um forte caráter nacionalista e indepenentista, na medida em que defende a capacitação tecnológica autônoma, incluindo o domínio de tecnologias sensíveis. O imperativo nacionalista se reflete em todo o documento e, na prática, tem influência significativa sobre a política de aquisição de equipamentos militares e armamentos pelo governo brasileiro.

A seção sobre reorganização das Forças Armadas explicita que o trinômio monitoramento/controle, mobilidade e presença deve balizar a estratégia de defesa. Nos documentos análogos à END – quais sejam, a Política de Defesa Nacional (PDN) de 1996 e a PDN de 2005 – a presença e o controle são enfatizados como estratégias para proteger o território nacional. O documento de 2008, por sua vez, reconhece as limitações intrínsecas à estratégia de presença em um território de dimensões continentais como o brasileiro. Não só as características físicas do Brasil como também a escassez de recursos tornam impraticável uma presença ostensiva nas áreas fronteiriças, em geral, e, particularmente, na região amazônica. Daí a ênfase da END sobre a mobilidade estratégica, definida como “a aptidão para se chegar rapidamente ao teatro de operações” ou “a capacidade de responder prontamente a qualquer ameaça ou agressão”.

Saliente-se, porém, que a END não preteria da estratégia de presença. Pelo contrário, o documento tem, como uma das suas diretrizes, o adensamento da presença de unidades do Exército, da Marinha e da Força Aérea nas áreas fronteiriças. Outra diretriz importante se refere à reorganização do efetivo militar, concentrado nas regiões sul e sudeste do país, para o centro-norte brasileiro.

No que respeita à reestruturação da indústria de defesa, o documento prevê
que a autonomia tecnológica no setor defesa receberá incentivos fiscais por parte do governo. Outra medida governamental a ser adotada é o estabelecimento de parcerias estratégicas com outros países com vistas a promover o avanço e domínio de tecnologia e a produção nacional. O objetivo é eliminar, paulatinamente, a compra de serviços e produtos importados.

Um elemento inovador da END é a determinação de unificação da Marinha, do Exército e da Aeronáutica “muito além dos limites impostos pelos protocolos de exercícios conjuntos”. Tal integração deverá ser alcançada por meio da criação do Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas, subordinado diretamente ao Ministro da Defesa.

Ao passo que os PDNs anteriores, que se caracterizam por sua imprecisão e por serem mais uma declaração de princípios gerais do que uma estratégia propriamente dita, a END se caracteriza pela objetividade e clareza na definição dos meios militares para se atingirem os fins pretendidos. A END determina um prazo para a elaboração de um Plano de Equipamento e Articulação por cada uma das Forças. O documento conclui com um cronograma de atividades a serem realizadas para dar início à sua implementação.

**Iniciativas Governamentais, Modernização e Indústria de Defesa**

**Indústria de Defesa**

A indústria de defesa no Brasil tem dado, nos últimos meses, claros sinais de consolidação e revitalização, estimulada pela END e as perspectivas de vultosos lucros no setor. As empresas de grande porte do setor têm firmado parcerias estratégicas com empresas estrangeiras e têm se expandido, por meio de aquisições de empresas de pequeno porte. Somente em 2011, a Embraer Defesa e Segurança adquiriu a divisão de radares da Orbisat, empresa especializada em sensoriamento remoto; comprou 50 por cento da Fundação de Aplicações de Tecnologias Críticas (Atech), companhia de tecnologias de monitoramento; e fechou um acordo com a AEL, subsidiária da companhia israelense Elbit Systems, para atuar no setor de Veículos Aéreos Não-Tripulados (VANTs). Já a Odebrecht Defesa e Tecnologia, adquiriu a fabricante de mísseis Mectron, formou uma joint venture com a Cassidian, braço de defesa da europeia EADS, e firmou parceria com a francesa DCNS no Programa Nacional de Desenvolvimento de Submarinos da Marinha do Brasil. Outras empresas que se destacam no setor são a Helibras, a Synergy Defesa e Segurança, a Avibras e a Camargo Corrêa.

Da parte do governo, a principal medida tomada para acelerar a reestruturação do setor nos próximos anos está contida no Programa Brasil Maior. Lançado em agosto de 2011, o Programa constitui uma política industrial tecnológica desenhada com o objetivo de aumentar a competitividade da indústria nacional, estimulando a inovação e a agragação de valor, por meio da concessão de incentivos fiscais a companhias nacionais. Segundo o Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio, o governo prevê uma desoneração tributária de R$ 25 bilhões (US$ 12.5 bilhões) para a indústria nacional nos próximos dois anos.¹

O Programa Brasil Maior dedica especial atenção ao setor de defesa. Em 29 de setembro de 2011, foi aprovada a Medida Provisória 544, que estabelece normas
especiais para as compras, as contratações de produtos, de sistemas de defesa, e desenvolvimento de produtos de sistema de defesa e dispõe sobre regras de incentivo à área estratégica de defesa (MP 544).\(^2\) Oito dias depois foi aprovada a MP 497, que promove desoneração tributária com o intuito de fomentar as atividades de pesquisa tecnológica e desenvolvimento de tecnologia por parte de empresas\(^3\) A Medida cria um Regime Especial Tributário para a Indústria de Defesa, exonerando empresas do setor do pagamento do Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados (IPI), da Contribuição para o Programa de Integração Social e de Formação do Patrimônio do Servidor Público (PIS/Pasep) e da Contribuição para o Financiamento da Seguridade Social (Cofins). Para receberem os benefícios, as empresas têm que cumprir requisitos como ter sede ou unidade industrial no país. A norma também oferece melhores condições para contratação e produção para os mercados interno e externo. Os benefícios serão concedidos pelo período de cinco anos, após a aprovação dos projetos pelo Ministério da Defesa.

De acordo com a Associação Brasileira das Indústrias de Defesa e Segurança (ABIMDE), o setor defesa conta, hoje, com 25.000 empregados e gera 100.000 empregos indiretos. Com a novas regras em vigor, a previsão é de que esses números se dupliquem nos próximos dez anos, quando, estima-se, o setor será responsável pela criação de 23 mil empregos diretos e 90 mil indiretos.\(^4\) A Medida beneficiará 186 empresas produtoras de equipamentos de defesa consideradas “estratégicas”.\(^5\)

**Modernização das Forças Armadas**

A reestruturação da indústria de defesa se associa diretamente com a modernização das Forças Armadas e o desenvolvimento do país, de forma mais ampla. Tal associação, diversas vezes salientada ao longo do texto da END, foi, também, enfatizada pela Presidente Dilma Rousseff no discurso em que anunciou as medidas preconizadas pela MP 544. Nas palavras da Presidente: “Ele [o setor de defesa] incentiva o desenvolvimento de todas as cadeias industriais (...), ele tem efeito sobre as outras cadeias industriais de forma muito efetiva. E, também, seja pelo tamanho do nosso território, pela extensão de nossas fronteiras e pelo fato de o nosso país ter sido abençoado com enormes riquezas, nós precisamos dessa indústria, porque ela é estratégica na nossa soberania.”\(^6\) A Presidente afirma, ainda, que “(...) o nosso Plano Estratégico de Defesa Nacional (...) tem de ter um foco que é avançar na modernização tecnológica de nossas Forças Armadas. E para isso se dar de uma forma integrada e virtuosa, é fundamental o fortalecimento da indústria nacional de defesa.”\(^7\)

Desse modo, além de incentivar o desenvolvimento e o fortalecimento da indústria nacional de defesa, o governo tem investido na compra de armamentos e equipamentos para o Exército, a Marinha e a Aeronáutica.

**Marinha**

O carro-chefe da modernização da Marinha é o Programa de Desenvolvimento de Submarinos (ProSub). Iniciado com o acordo firmado entre o Brasil e a França no final de 2008 e aprovado pela Comissão das Relações Exteriores do Senado em novembro de 2010, o ProSub tem como objetivo construir quatro submarinos con-

A adaptação do modelo convencional do tipo Scorpène pode gerar a nacionalização de aproximadamente 36 mil itens produzidos por mais de 30 empresas brasileiras. A previsão é de que o ProSub gere mais de 9 mil empregos diretos e 27 mil indiretos durante a fase de construção. O custo do Programa aos cofres públicos será da ordem de R$ 6.7 bilhões (US$ 3.3 bilhões).

O ProSuper, por sua vez, é o programa da Marinha para a aquisição de navios de superfície. O Programa visa a atingir um objetivo tido como prioritário no Programa de Articulação e Equipamento da Marinha (PAEMB), qual seja, garantir o financiamento e a transferência de tecnologia para a construção de cinco navios-patrulha oceânicos (OPV) de 1800 toneladas, cinco fragatas de 6 mil toneladas e um navio de apoio logístico. Estimam-se investimentos de cerca de US$ 4 bilhões e US$ 6 bilhões. A intenção da Marinha é que somente a primeira fragata e o primeiro OPV sejam construídos fora do país, com o acompanhamento de técnicos e engenheiros brasileiros. Depois de sofrer um revés, em janeiro de 2011, com o malogro no fechamento de um acordo com consórcio italiano Fincantieri Cantieri Navali que implicou a suspensão temporária do programa, o ProSuper volta à fase de avaliação de propostas por parte de empresas. As principais concorrentes são a inglesa BAE Systems, a francesa DCNS e a Fincantieri, que continua no páreo.

O PAEMB também contempla um projeto de aquisição de dois navios de múltiplos propósitos – chamados supernavios –, capazes de transportar soldados, lanchas, míssil, hospital e um sofisticado centro de inteligência. Cada unidade custa, em média, entre US$ 600 milhões e US$ 750 milhões.

Por fim, a Marinha investe no monitoramento da vasta costa brasileira. Em 7 de julho de 2011, a Marinha assinou um contrato de R$ 31 milhões com a Attech para o delineamento do Sistema de Gerenciamento da Amazônia Azul (SisGAAz). O SisGAAz consiste em um sistema de satélite, radares e equipamentos de sensoriamento submarino para monitorar o mar territorial brasileiro—chamado pela Marinha de Amazônia Azul—that visa a cobrir 4.5 milhões de km², particularmente a área do pré-sal.

Força Aérea

Um dos projetos de maior importância para a Força Aérea Brasileira é o chamado Programa FX-2 através do qual visa a adquirir 36 caças. Em 7 de setembro de 2009, o então presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e o presidente francês Sarcozy assinaram contratos comerciais da ordem de US$ 12 bilhões para a produção de submarinos convencionais e um submarino nuclear, além de 50 helicópteros EC-725. No mesmo dia, Lula anunciou a compra de 36 caças Rafale, da Dassault Aviation.
Pouco tempo depois, foi noticiado que o Programa FX-2, para a compra dos caças, ainda não estava concluído e que outras alternativas seriam avaliadas pelo governo. As principais concorrentes da Dassault são a sueca Saab e a estadunidense Boeing.

A principal preocupação do governo brasileiro, ao menos durante o governo Lula, foi a transferência de tecnologia. Em estudo feito pela Força Aérea, o Gripen sueco foi considerado tecnicamente superior aos seus concorrentes. O F-18 da Boeing é o mais testado em combate, além de ser produzido em larga escala, o que dá a Boeing margem de manobra em relação à definição do preço. Porém, a Dassault e o governo brasileiro se comprometeram com total transferência de tecnologia. Lula, que parecia convencido a adquirir o Rafale, não tomou decisão a respeito dos caças. A presidente Dilma, por sua vez, alegando não dispor de informações suficientes para uma escolha, mantém o processo em aberto. Recentemente, a presidente anunciou que o critério econômico determinará a sua decisão.

Dada a indecisão que tem caracterizado a compra dos caças, o principal projeto de modernização da Força Aérea tem sido o cargueiro KC-390. Desenvolvido pela Embraer, ele visa a substituir o Hercules C-130, da Lockheed Martin, em missões de transporte tático e logístico. Com base no contrato de US$ 1.3 bilhões firmado com a Força Aérea em abril de 2009, 28 KC-390 deverão entrar em serviço no final de 2015 ou início de 2016.13 Em relação ao C-130, as vantagens do KC-390 são o menor tempo usado para cobrir a mesma rota (800 km/h x 610 km/h), menor preço (US$ 50 milhões x US$ 80 milhões) e modernidade do projeto, que conta com sistema de comandos elétricos de voo (fly-by-wire).

**Exército**

A prioridade do Exército tem sido o desenvolvimento do blindado anfíbio VBTP Guarani, em parceria com a Iveco, do grupo Fiat. O projeto envolve investimentos estimados em R$ 120 milhões (US$ 60 milhões). R$ 35 milhões adicionais serão gastos na produção do motor diesel pela também italiana FTP Powertrain.14

Outro projeto de grande importância é o Sistema de Vigilância de Fronteiras (SisFron), planejado para cobrir uma área de 16 mil km2, principalmente na região centro-oeste. O SisFron está sendo desenvolvido pela Atech, que também desenvolveu, na década de 1990, o Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia (SIVAM). O projeto básico do SisFron teve um custo de R$ 17 milhões (US$ 8.5 milhões).

**Breve Análise e Considerações FINais**

A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa foi um marco na política de defesa do Brasil. Pela primeira vez na sua história, o país delineou e sistematizou sua estratégia, cujas diretrizes têm norteado os desenvolvimentos na área de defesa (e da indústria de defesa). A END também tem contribuído para que as Forças Armadas brasileiras, caracterizadas, tradicionalmente, por operarem com completa autonomia umas em relação às outras, atuem com vistas a alcançar objetivos comuns. Entretanto, a despeito da criação do Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas em 2010 – iniciativa também inspirada pela END –, pouco se tem avançado na realização de operações conjuntas. Na verdade, o que as Forças Armadas têm realizado entre si são operações combinadas e não conjuntas. Além disso, não há indícios de que as
Forças estejam realmente empenhadas em abdicar de projetos próprios para priorizar a região amazônica. Por exemplo: a Marinha tem investido na compra e reforma de embarcações de águas azuis, ainda que a sua participação da defesa da região amazônica esteja condicionada a meios de transporte em águas marrons, pois só assim ela poderia atuar nos rios amazônicos.

A priorização da Amazônia como região estratégica cuja proteção se faz fundamental para o Estado Brasileiro é outro elemento de destaque na END. Embora a Amazônia tenha sido oficialmente considerada prioridade do governo brasileiro na PDN de 2005, a END avança ao tratar da questão de como protegê-la – elemento inexistente no PDN de 2005 – e daí o seu caráter verdadeiramente “estratégico”.

Outro elemento a ser salientado diz respeito às relações das Forças Armadas com a sociedade brasileira. A publicização da END é, em si mesmo, um ato de accountability. Não há maneira de estimular o debate em relação à defesa nacional pela população sem que a agência competente (nesse caso, o Ministério da Defesa) ofereça insumos, que são, nesse caso, a própria estratégia e a rationale a ela subjacente, que a justifica. A elaboração do primeiro Livro Branco de Defesa, projeto também contido na estratégia, atua no mesmo sentido, ou seja, aumenta a transparência no que respeita à política de defesa do país.

Tendo sido considerados os principais méritos da END, várias são as falhas ou limitações do documento ou a ela relacionadas.

A END passa ao largo de questões extremamente relevantes que dizem respeito à capacidade do Brasil de se modernizar militarmente de maneira sustentada e autônoma. Embora a aliança estratégica do Brasil com a França tenha, inicialmente, beneficiado o Brasil, ainda não foram definidos os termos da cooperação com os franceses, incluindo a transferência de tecnologia por parte destes. E ainda que haja total transferência de tecnologia, restam dúvidas quanto à capacidade da indústria brasileira de atender às necessidades de modernização e manutenção de equipamentos tão sofisticados e elaborados como submarinos, sejam eles convencionais ou nucleares. Em outras palavras, falta uma visão de longo prazo que extrapole a fase de aquisição de armamentos e considere sua a modernização e desempenho.

Outra questão, associada à anterior, se refere ao tipo de mão de obra necessária para sustentar a modernização dos equipamentos militares brasileiros ao longo do tempo. A indústria de defesa é especializada e requer mão de obra altamente qualificada. Porém, o plano de modernização brasileiro não inclui nenhuma medida para satisfazer essa demanda.

Provavelmente, a maior falha da END está associada ao orçamento. Em nenhuma parte do documento são feitas estimativas de custo da implementação dos programas associados à implementação da END. Por conseguinte, cada Força, em seu Plano de Articulação e Reequipamento, define o tamanho dos investimentos a serem realizados. Como indicado na seção anterior, os valores são bastante elevados. Desse modo, ao prescindir de uma análise que considerasse a limitação do Ministério de Defesa em termos de recursos, o documento é pouco realista.

A END tem um caráter declaratório, não obrigatório. Nesse sentido, ela serve mais como uma orientação, um norte; ela não é uma lei. Entretanto, uma estratégia bem sucedida é aquela que considera os objetivos e os meios empregados para atingi-los simultaneamente. Desse modo, não se trata simplesmente de dizer que
determinados equipamentos e doutrinas são necessários para se defender um país, trata-se de considerar os custos que tamanha reorganização implicará.


Contudo, mais importante do que analisar dados agregados é, no caso do Brasil, analisar a estrutura do orçamento de defesa. Em 2009, 83,75% dos gastos com defesa se destinaram ao pagamento de pessoal e encargos sociais (37,78% referentes ao pessoal ativo e 62,22% referentes a aposentadorias, reformas e pensões). Os investimentos ficaram com a parcela mínima de 5,11%. Dessa forma, pode-se concluir que, apesar do tamanho do orçamento de defesa, este está totalmente engessado devido ao pagamento de pessoal ativo e inativo. Sendo assim, pouco resta para o investimento e a aquisição de armamentos. Enquanto essa estrutura não for reformada, dificilmente o país conseguirá os recursos de que necessita para modernizar, de fato e de maneira sustentada, as suas Forças Armadas, de modo a que estas sejam compatíveis com o status do país no cenário internacional e com os substanciais recursos que ele detém.

Notas

1 http://www.brasilmaior.mdic.gov.br/noticias/industria-de-defesa-recebe-incentivo-para-inovar/.
2 Em 19 de julho de 2010, foi aprovada a MP 495, que altera o regime de licitações de modo a favorecer produtos e serviços de empresas nacionais. A Medida autoriza setores como o têxtil, de softwares, equipamentos de saúde, remédios vacinas e equipamentos de defesa a praticarem preços até 25% maiores que a concorrência nas licitações para os órgãos públicos. Disponível em http://www010.dataprev.gov.br/sislex/paginas/45/2010/495.htm.
4 http://planobrasil.com/2011/09/30/important-governo-lanca-mp-que-cria-incentivos-para-a-industria-nacional-de-defesa/.
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GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Perspectives on Instability: Honduras and Paraguay

Abbott Matthews

ABSTRACT

This article sets out to examine the removal of President Zelaya in Honduras in 2009 and the impeachment of President Lugo in Paraguay in 2012. Many comparisons have been drawn between the Honduran and Paraguayan cases, but a full analysis of the similarities and differences is important to show the differences in the Western Hemisphere of perspectives regarding military involvement in political life and constitutional flexibility and interpretation. This article begins by briefly reviewing the concept of coup d’état and its evolution in order to establish a working framework. Before investigating each case on an individual basis, cultural and historical factors are considered. Although legality, constitutionality, and legitimacy of the processes of presidential removal are indeed a significant portion of this investigation, the importance of perspective remains a prominent facet of the analysis.

The Coup d’état: Evolution

In his article “Making Exceptions: Some Remarks on the Concept of Coup d’état and its History,” Jens Bartelson reviews the long history, definition, and types of the coup d’état (may also be referred to by the abbreviation, coup). The concept of coup d’état has been around since Locke’s Second Treatise, in which popular sovereignty was promoted and dissolution of government was considered a recourse if the government failed to act in the people’s best interests. Locke’s insights founded the classical definition of coup d’état: “Those bold and extraordinary acts that princes are forced to undertake in difficult and hopeless matters, contrary to common law and regardless of any justice, putting the particular interest at stake for the benefit of the general one.” In this classical understanding of a coup, the political institutions and social orders are changed while the “prince” or the head of government stays the same. Through an abrupt, internally initiated change, the classical coup reorganizes the social and political institutions.

The shift toward popular sovereignty led to a new understanding of the concept of coup, now widely accepted as “a stroke of state; a seizure of power by a group using the permanent employees of the state...to capture and paralyze the
The definition of a coup is not to be confused with that of a revolution, which has the ultimate goal of a complete social and political reorganization. The coup evolved as nation-states moved toward popular sovereignty. In this new understanding of coup, the objective is to maintain the same political and social order while replacing one administration with another. The modern coup does not necessitate military-led seizure of power. Coups can be civilian- or military-led; in fact, the concept of a constitutional coup as developed by Wiarda and Collins emphasizes the legality of a presidential removal process, but recognizes that these events are often still marked with illegitimacy or seemingly unconstitutional methods. The different types of coups, even with their distinct characteristics, have essentially derived from the *Encyclopaedia Brittanica*’s definition: “[a] sudden overthrow, often violent, of an existing government by a group of conspirators. … Their success depends on surprise and speed. Coups rarely alter a nation’s fundamental social and economic policies or significantly redistribute power.”

Understanding the evolution of the *coup d’état* is essential to the interpretation of future cases of democratic disruption or of seemingly constitutional institutional change. The *Britannica* definition of coup identifies “conspirators” as the main actors in carrying out a coup, but the definition does not identify any one group (such as the military or the opposition political party) as the conspirators. This current understanding continues adapting as institutional changes have become more unique and less characterized by the modern definition.

In the post–Cold War context, the term *coup d’état* began to encompass any unexpected change in government, regardless of who initiated it. Due to the heightened sensitivity to disruptions in the democratic order during and immediately following the Cold War, even legal and constitutional changes that might have been unexpected have been condemned quickly as coups. The term coup now covers much more than both the classical and modern definition; the recent case of impeachment in Paraguay (2012), explored later in further detail, suggests that the term coup has transformed and extends beyond simply “a forceful method of organizing and changing governments which definitely permits, even encourages, civilian participation.”

The United States has responded to cases of coups, impeachments, and disruptions on an individual basis since the Cold War. As Ambassador (R.) Cresencio Arcos explains in “U.S.-Latin American Security Ties: Episodic Relationships,” the period from 1991 to 2001 “revealed a ‘non-retooling’ of U.S. military capabilities.” This “non-retooling” means that the U.S. has not reexamined its defense policy or its overall foreign policy approach toward Latin America; instead, the U.S. deals with situations on an individual basis. The expulsions from the presidential office of President Zelaya in 2009 in Honduras and of President Lugo in 2012 in Paraguay highlight the variations in U.S. policy toward democratic disruptions in the Western Hemisphere. While democracy promotion is a main aspect of U.S. foreign policy, the assumption that the rest of the Western Hemisphere is a perfect reproduction of the American democratic system or the desire for it to be a reproduction of the system has often come into conflict with the versions of democracy established in other parts of the Americas. This article, while exploring the Paraguayan and Hon-
duran cases, briefly addresses the disconnect between the diversity of interpretations of democracy in the Americas and the U.S. interpretation. This difference in perspectives is especially prevalent when examining military involvement in political affairs. The variety of perspectives of the Western Hemisphere, based on distinct cultural and historical experiences, serves as a foundation to this article upon which the case studies of Paraguay and Honduras will add depth to an understanding of U.S. foreign policy regarding impeachments, coups, and less-definable disruptions to democracy.

**Cultural Foundations**

In the Americas, violence and force traditionally have been intertwined in the fabric of political and cultural formation. The arrival of the Spanish and Portuguese in the Americas in the 15th century launched a history of violence as a viable method to gain and legitimize power. The independence movements throughout the 1800s and into the early 1900s paved the way for the emergence of new political leaders. In the wake of the economic distress, challenges to rule of law, and an increasingly militarized society after independence, *caudillo* regimes emerged in many of newly established nations.\(^1^0\) *Caudillos* were leaders that “wielded political power through charismatic influence or military force at either national or local level[s].”\(^1^1\) Through colonialism, independence, and the emergence of caudillos, “violence seem[ed] to be institutionalized in the organization, maintenance, and changing of governments in Latin America.”\(^1^2\) That violence and military engagement is ingrained in political processes in parts of the Western Hemisphere and, yet, is absent in other parts appears directly related to the region’s history of colonization. With a history of hierarchy and power struggles, “Hispanic culture tends everywhere in Latin America to dominate in the power sense… the institutions of Hispanic culture such as the family, church, army, educational institutions, and economic systems are essentially authoritarian in nature.”\(^1^3\) The Spanish and Portuguese colonies arrived in the Americas with the goal of exploiting the region for the “three G’s:” god, gold, and glory. These objectives led to colonization by conquest and military rule with established hierarchies. In contrast, colonies in North America were settled with the expectations of permanence without the same exploitative desires of the Spanish and Portuguese. The American Revolution eventually freed the colonies from British rule; North American colonies promoted egalitarianism and republicanism that was rooted in the French Revolution’s principles of giving power to the people. The Spanish and Portuguese colonies, while gaining independence throughout the 1800s and 1900s, still found themselves dependent on the emerging, violent caudillo regimes. The two paths of colonization and, then, state formation impressed different cultural understandings of the role of government, the effects of which are still seen today.

Although democracy has been established throughout all of the Western Hemisphere with the exception of Cuba, there are challenges as some nations confront their authoritarian pasts. In nations where the political system is considered democratic, disruptions, impeachments, coups, and uprisings may still occur. These disruptions to the democratic order often are condemned by other democratic na-
tions. Still, few seem to question whether or not “Latin American political culture [may have] developed procedures for measuring and representing opinion different from but as valid as the techniques of election, initiative, referendum, and plebiscite of the Anglo-American and Western European states.”

Frequently, the legality and constitutionality of these events are sidelined; the legitimacy or illegitimacy of coups, impeachments, or other disruptions seems to be more significant to other nations. Instead of focusing on the removal process or constitution of the nation in which an institutional change is occurring, many countries look to their own rules and processes to make a judgment. In the following pages, the cases of the Honduran removal of President Zelaya and the Paraguayan impeachment of President Lugo will be examined, compared, and contrasted to determine their legality and legitimacy based on their respective constitutions, taking into account the perspectives of the international community.

Case Study: Honduras and Paraguay Strike Similar Chords

The June 2012 impeachment of President Fernando Lugo in Paraguay reminded the region of the Honduran crisis in June 2009 that removed President Manuel Zelaya from office. There are certainly similarities between the Honduran crisis and the Paraguayan impeachment, but their differences are just as significant. By comparing these two events, can we determine if either was legal and constitutional? Were they legitimate? Beyond the technical classification as a coup, a legitimate impeachment, or something in between, both situations elicited strong responses from the regional and international community and contributed to tenser relations among the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

Honduras: Institutional Crisis in 2009

President Manuel Zelaya won the Honduran presidential race in 2005 as the center-right Liberal Party candidate. The ruling party at the time, the National Party, lost to the opposition even though “ideologically speaking … [they] are the same; they are positioned on the center-right with supporters ranging from this position to the far right.”

Despite his ideological affiliation, President Zelaya began developing relationships with the not always democratic presidents of ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for Our America) during his presidency. In 2006, Honduras joined PetroCaribe, a regional energy cooperative led by Venezuela, spooking center-right and right-wing Hondurans who were suspicious of an economic alliance with Venezuela because of President Hugo Chávez’s socialist policies and anti-American rhetoric. In February 2009, President Zelaya announced an increase of 60 percent in the minimum wage, further alienating conservatives and the “big business” of Honduras. These increasing tendencies toward leftist policies eventually fractured Zelaya’s Liberal Party. The final action that led the Honduran National Congress to act against the president was his proposed non-binding referendum, “consult[ing] Hondurans about whether the country should convoke a national constituent assembly to amend the constitution.” The referendum did not specifically address which amendments would be considered by the constituent assembly, but the National Congress and Supreme Court “had a deep-rooted fear of President Zelaya’s intentions (specifically
to perpetuate himself in power).” After a lower court ruled the referendum illegal, the president ordered the military and police to support the referendum efforts logistically on June 28, 2009. This provoked the Supreme Court to uphold the lower court rulings and to issue a ruling that prohibited the security forces from supporting the referendum. Moreover, Congress shut down the referendum through legislation to prevent referendums “within 180 days of a general election.” President Zelaya planned to continue with the referendum, but on the morning of the scheduled referendum the military seized all referendum materials and the president himself. After the military removed the president from the palace in the capital of Tegucigalpa, they sent him to exile in Costa Rica. An emergency session of Congress was held the next morning during which a forged letter, supposedly written by President Zelaya submitting his resignation from office, was accepted; Roberto Micheletti was appointed the interim president. The Supreme Court later issued a special press release that outlined the events surrounding the referendum and stated that President Zelaya was responsible for “crimes against the government, national treason, abuse of his authority, and usurpation of his functions” in an attempt to justify the military’s removal of the president.

The United States immediately condemned the removal of President Zelaya, but it “took months [for the State Department] to even recognize that a coup had taken place.” Although the U.S. formally recognized the crisis as a coup, the Obama administration never referred to the event as a military coup, which would have required the cessation of financial assistance and aid to the country and certain sanctions to have been enforced. Regional institutions, such as the ALBA, the Caribbean Community, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) also condemned the coup. The Organization of American States (OAS) took matters a step further and expelled Honduras, emphasizing that only the reinstatement of democracy in the country would allow for its reentry into the organization. Honduras would quietly reenter the organization two years later.

From the time of the crisis in June to the time of the elections in November, negotiations between President Zelaya and the interim government of Micheletti were attempted and mediated by President Arias of Costa Rica, but even the agreements made were not fully implemented. Porfirio Lobo of the National Party was elected in November 2009, facing a weak economy, fragile infrastructure, and serious crime and drug trafficking threats. The resulting instability could create opportunities for more democratic failures in Honduras’s future. The United States ultimately recognized the government of Porfirio Lobo, although many nations decried the elections because they were held under a coup government that many believed to be illegitimate. Following the U.S.’s lead, regional and international actors gradually accepted the Lobo government.

**Paraguay: Impeachment in 2012**

The election of President Fernando Lugo of the center-left Liberal Party in 2005 signaled the end of a six-decade long stint of one-party rule in Paraguay. This significant change promised hope and reform to many previously underrepresented
sectors of Paraguayans. But President Lugo’s term was cut short when he was summarily impeached on June 21, 2012, in the Chamber of Deputies, tried in the Chamber of Senators on June 22, 2012, and removed from office later that same day. A bloody confrontation between landless protestors and Paraguayan police in late June, resulting in nearly 20 casualties, sparked the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment accusation cited the following issues: increasing national insecurity, illicit political activity on a military base, another land dispute, and the signing of Ushuaia II without Paraguayan congressional support. The Chamber of Deputies presented the accusatory statement, Resolution 1431/2012, accusing Lugo of “poor performance of his duties” and then, out of 80 members, voted 76 in favor and 1 against impeachment. The Chamber of Senators subsequently heard the accusatory statement. After passing two resolutions that allowed for the tribunal to try the President on June 21 and 22, 2012, President Lugo was notified. The president responded initially to the accusations: “This President is not going to resign and submits, in full obedience to the Constitution and the law, to undergoing the impeachment with all its consequences.” His request for more time to develop his defense was denied. On Friday, June 22, the Chamber of Senators, out of 45 members, voted 39 in favor and 4 against to impeach President Lugo after a five-hour trial. Vice President Frederico Franco was later sworn in as the new President. After his initial acceptance of the impeachment, President Lugo tried to fight the decision by forming a shadow cabinet and seeking international support that would condemn the impeachment as a coup and illegitimate.

Most regional neighbors condemned the impeachment and have defined it as some variation of a coup (constitutional coup, parliamentary coup, coup-lite). The United States waited for an OAS delegation, led by Secretary General Insulza, to investigate the events in Paraguay before releasing a statement on U.S. official response to the Paraguayan situation. In the meantime, President Franco continued building his cabinet and working toward improving relations with neighbors that remain hesitant of the change. According to the OAS delegation, the response of many nations was “natural” when considering the unstable past of democracy in Paraguay. Currently, Paraguay contends with increasing instability due to drug trafficking, crime, and tense land disputes. These national threats are all compounded by the poor economic performance of the nation.

Mirror Images

The 2009 crisis in Honduras and the recent impeachment of Paraguayan President Lugo are similar in some key areas. U.S. interests are tied to Honduras and Paraguay, both of which are U.S. allies. U.S. collaboration to tackle drug-trafficking and other national crime issues has been a significant aspect of the U.S. relationship in each nation. Even with partnerships to help with drug-trafficking and crime issues, these nations still struggle with issues of corruption, peasant land movements, institutional weakness, high criminal activity, and polarization. Both nations are poverty-stricken and remain among the weakest economies in Central and South America. In Honduras and Paraguay, both presidents were removed very quickly. In Honduras, the military arrived without warning and escorted President Zelaya from
the presidential palace. In Paraguay, the impeachment was carried out within two days, and the trial itself lasted no more than five hours.

Presidents Lugo and Zelaya were both making noted movements toward the “left” along the political ideological spectrum. In Honduras, it was President Zelaya’s attempt to hold a referendum regarding the convocation of a constituent assembly to address the sensitive topics of presidential term limits and reelection that pushed other Honduran political institutions to counter Zelaya. The continued relationships with ALBA leaders further solidified national distrust in President Zelaya’s leadership. In Paraguay, President Lugo’s election from the Liberal Party—a center-left party—marked a break from the 61-year rule by the conservative Colorado Party. While President Zelaya was elected and recognized as a left-wing candidate, his policies on land reform and the agrarian sector once in office did not appeal to the conservative oligarchy that had its roots in the opposition Colorado Party. After landless peasants and police clashed in several land disputes, even members of the center-left and left parties became disillusioned with his leadership.

**Distinctions between the Crises**

**Constitutional and Legal**

The most important distinction between these two cases pertains to the process of removal itself. In the Honduran Constitution, there is no formal procedure set for the impeachment of a president. In contrast, the Paraguayan Constitution sets out in Section VI, Article 225, Procedure the process and requirements for a presidential impeachment. In the case of Paraguay, a president can only be impeached “for poor performance of functions, for crimes committed while in office, or for common crimes.” The accusation must be provided by the Chamber of Deputies, and a public trial must be carried out by the Chamber of Senators. That the Honduran Constitution does not provide for impeachment procedures means that the other political institutions can, and do, interpret the Constitution in a way that will allow them to deal with various situations on an individual basis.

The relevant articles of the Honduran Constitution used as justification for President Manuel Zelaya’s removal included Title VII, Chapter I, Article 229, 304, 306, 313, and 373–374. Article 229 refers to the presidential term limit and the illegality of reelection. Articles 373–374 pertain to the amendment process of the Constitution, stating that only the National Congress can reform the Constitution and that there are specific articles that are not subject to amendment. Two of these articles are the presidential term limit and the ban on presidential reelection. Most importantly, Articles 304, 306, and 313 give the National Congress and the Supreme Court the powers to hold trial for the highest officials and to request to use of the armed forces to carry out any rulings. The Honduran Supreme Court ruled President Manuel Zelaya’s attempt to pose a referendum to the public (although non-binding) as unconstitutional based on the supposed intent of convoking the constituent assembly and invoked the aforementioned constitutional articles as justification for removal. Paraguay’s impeachment procedures do not specify the amount of time the trial must last, but, regardless, impeachment is considered a constitutionally appropriate way to remove a president before his/her term has been completed.
The Involvement of the Armed Forces

The role of the military in the removal of President Zelaya in contrast to the lack of military involvement in the impeachment of President Lugo in Paraguay constitutes a key difference. Paraguayans undoubtedly recognized the international backlash against Honduras for the use of the Honduran armed forces in 2009 to remove President Zelaya. To perhaps avoid similar responses, Paraguay carried out the removal of President Lugo by constitutional means—impeachment. Paraguay, however, continues to be scrutinized for the speed of Lugo’s impeachment. The extension of the definition of a coup to include any unexpected institutional change (even if believed to be constitutional by the country) has made Paraguay a much more difficult case to judge. When considering the unexpected impeachment of President Lugo in Paraguay, the question of whether or not a coup can exist with or without military involvement is of the past. Instead, the focus now is on determining if some impeachments or disruptions to democracy can also be categorized as coups. As Wiarda and Collins describe in “Constitutional Coups? Military Interventions in Latin America,” there are many instances when “coups … take unconstitutional directions but may [still] have a considerable degree of constitutional legitimacy.” In these cases, institutional failure often results in the intervention of the armed forces. While the U.S. generally sees these interventions as an illegal seizure of power, Wiarda and Collins assert that the forces “are not necessarily usurping power, but most often fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities.” A more in-depth analysis on the legality, legitimacy, and constitutionality of these two events will be addressed in the final section of this article.

In Honduras, the armed forces actively supported President Zelaya’s removal by arresting and removing him from Honduras. The Honduran Constitution provides the armed forces with a significant role in political and social life, charging them not only to “defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the republic,” but also “the order and respect of the Constitution, the principle of free vote, and the rotation of the Presidents of the Republic.” Once the Supreme Court ruled the referendum as illegal, the armed forces were no longer required to carry out Zelaya’s orders for the armed forces to logistically support the referendum, as the Constitution allows them the right to refuse any orders that are illegal. Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued the order for Zelaya’s arrest, which was supported by the National Congress. Since the Constitution allows for the Supreme Court to order military forces to carry out its rulings in Article 306, their involvement was not unconstitutional. Although the military acted under orders from a legitimate branch of government, their involvement hinted at the region’s history of military coups. Although not a true military seizure of power, the Micheletti administration that replaced President Zelaya’s administration still lost some legitimacy when the military became a prominent actor in President Zelaya’s removal.

In contrast, the impeachment of President Lugo in Paraguay did not involve the military. The mission of the Paraguayan armed forces set forth by their Constitution is similar to that of Honduras and includes “safeguard[ing] territorial integrity and ‘defend[ing] the legitimately constituted authority.” What constitutes a legitimate authority or when the military should or should not intervene is not clearly
defined. In the impeachment of President Lugo, the military could have justified intervention based on its interpretation of the Constitution, claiming that the legitimate authority of democratically elected President Lugo warranted defense. In fact, there were reports that Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro encouraged the Paraguayan armed forces to rise up and defend Lugo against the impeachment. However, the lack of military intervention highlights the maturity of civilian control of the military.

Regional Responses

The regional responses are especially important with the development of key regional institutions, such as MERCOSUR, the OAS, and UNASUR. After the region experienced different military regimes and authoritarian governments, the members of these organizations established democracy as a basic tenant for membership. This tenant is expressed in the various democracy clauses of the regional organizations, which consider coups, overthrows, or breaks with democracy as grounds for suspension and/or expulsion.

The OAS expelled Honduras after the 2009 crisis and would only consider its reentry to the organization if and when democracy was restored; the nation was reinstated in June of 2011. MERCOSUR and UNASUR strongly condemned Zelaya’s removal as a coup and clearly stated that they would not recognize any illegitimate government. MERCOSUR outright rejected the elections of November 2009, contributing to the sharp divide that emerged in the Western Hemisphere between the side willing to accept the elections as a way out of the institutional crisis and the side that demanded Zelaya’s reinstatement. UNASUR, of which Honduras was a member, did not suspend or expel Honduras. When the regional institutions condemned Honduras in 2009, there was significant pressure on the Micheletti government to enter into negotiations with exiled President Zelaya. President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica mediated negotiations between President Zelaya and the interim Micheletti government, but they were not productive. The negotiations were drawn out until the November 2009 elections were held, effectively ending the negotiations and bringing Porfirio Lobo from the National Party to power.

In Paraguay, there were very similar regional responses to the impeachment of President Lugo. Brazil’s influence in Paraguay (as a border state, MERCOSUR partner, and South American political and economic leader) meant that Brazil’s decision regarding the impeachment would be heavily weighted throughout the rest of the region. The impeachment was quickly condemned by most of the Western Hemisphere. There were few nations that recognized the new government; Canada released a “Statement on [the] Situation in Paraguay,” emphasizing the need for the new administration of Frederico Franco to be protected, and Colombian Foreign Minister Maria Angela Holguín released a statement July 1, 2012, stating that Colombia did not consider President Lugo’s impeachment a coup. MERCOSUR suspended Paraguay from a summit so they could decide what would be done; UNASUR decided to suspend Paraguay from participation in a special meeting in Mendoza, Argentina, until they could make an official decision. At the MERCOSUR summit and at UNASUR’s special meeting, both organizations individually decided
that Paraguay would be suspended from their groups until the April 2013 Paraguay-
an presidential and congressional elections when democracy was restored.\textsuperscript{65} There will not be any punitive measures such as economic sanctions, but the suspension of Paraguay has opened up the way for Venezuela’s entrance into MERCOSUR.\textsuperscript{66} The inclusion of Venezuela in the economic regional group has given the group a new dynamic that Paraguay will be faced with once it is allowed back into MERCOSUR after the 2013 elections. Although Paraguay petitioned the Permanent Court of MERCOSUR to lift the temporary suspension, the request was denied. Paraguay also attempted to “prevent the admission of Venezuela as a full member of MERCOSUR,” but the Permanent Court also rejected this request.\textsuperscript{67} The OAS sent a delegation to Paraguay during the first week of July 2012 to investigate the events of June 2012. The organization’s response is further examined in the section titled “U.S. Response,” as it is directly linked to the reaction of the U.S. administration.

\textbf{European Response}

The European Union (EU) issued a statement on June 29, 2009, strongly condemning the removal of President Zelaya in Honduras and declaring the military actions a violation of the constitutional order.\textsuperscript{68} Due to the human rights abuses and political violence during the interim administration of Micheletti, the EU released a statement on December 21, 2009, in Brussels officially denouncing these actions.\textsuperscript{69} Once Porfirio Lobo was determined the winner of the 2009 elections, the EU released another statement that encouraged support and progress for the new administration, following the lead of U.S. support for the electoral outcome.\textsuperscript{70}

In the case of Paraguay, the European Union quickly issued a statement expressing concern for the impeachment process while still supporting for the Paraguayan people during the transition.\textsuperscript{71} No official position denouncing or approving the new Franco administration was declared in this statement. After several weeks, the EU decided to send a delegation to the country to investigate the events in Paraguay. In a CNN article titled “EU Commission investigates Paraguayan Impeachment,” the EU “is Paraguay’s fourth most important trading partner after Brazil, Argentina, and the United States,” an obvious reason for their interest in regional political stability.\textsuperscript{72} In a press release issued on July 18, 2012, the delegation recognized the strain that the impeachment had caused on regional relations, but the overall EU position remained one supportive of Frederico Franco’s interim administration and of the upcoming elections in April 2013.\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{U.S. Response}

In response to the Honduran case, the U.S. quickly condemned the removal of a democratically elected president. Later, the U.S. Department of State officially referred to the event as a coup. The United States never addressed the coup as a military coup in order to avoid terminating assistance programs to the nation.\textsuperscript{74} The immedaiacy of the U.S. response and the continued condemnation of the event as a coup showed that the Obama administration supported President Zelaya’s reinstatement. There were never any meetings between President Obama and President Zelaya during the months of the Micheletti administration, but the United States contin-
ued condemning the illegitimate removal of President Zelaya. When the Honduran elections were held in November 2009 and Porfirio Lobo of the National Party won, the United States did not impose sanctions or intervene to restore President Zelaya. The U.S. response can be seen as hesitancy to become more deeply involved militarily in yet another place while the nation was already in the midst of other international conflicts. There were also domestic political issues at play that should be considered. Senator Jim DeMint of South Carolina blocked several diplomatic appointments in efforts to force President Obama to support the coup government.

The quick reaction from the United States to the crisis eventually gave way to a more neutral position that indicated the U.S. would support the government elected in the November 2009 elections. In November 2009, the U.S. supported the signing of the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord, which set out a “step-by-step process for Honduras to re-establish democratic and constitutional order and move toward national elections with the support of the international community.” After this accord was signed, the U.S. State Department officially announced their support of the planned November 2009 elections, considering them “another critical step in the restoration of the democratic and constitutional order in Honduras.”

The U.S. response to the impeachment of President Lugo in Paraguay has been relatively quiet in comparison to the quick condemnation of the Honduras situation as a coup. The U.S. decided to wait until the OAS had investigated the situation and had reconvened before making its own statement about Paraguay. When the delegation returned and presented the findings, it maintained that the impeachment procedures were carried out constitutionally and that the military was neither involved nor attempted to become involved in the process. Although the delegation recognized concerns stemming from a history of democratic instability, according to the press release from the organization, Paraguayan authorities conveyed a clear desire to follow through with the elections in April 2013 by the rules established by the Higher Court of Electoral Justice. These assurances indicated that Paraguay would hold the planned elections in a free and open environment. The delegation did address the speed of the impeachment, saying that such speed “was highly unfortunate and created an aura of illegitimacy surrounding the process, whatever the text of the Constitution might say,” but did not warrant Paraguay’s suspension.

Although the Supreme Court of Paraguay ruled the impeachment constitutional after President Lugo’s lawyers challenged the impeachment’s constitutionality, the OAS delegation did recommend that the case go before the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human Rights to consider the lack of due process. In the meantime, support for the Franco administration until the 2013 elections could be crucial to ensuring stability and democracy in the country post-elections.

**Timing of Responses**

The responses of the various regional organizations, neighboring nations, and the United States should be viewed in terms of a post–Cold War context. During the Cold War, the U.S. maintained a clear policy toward the Americas; anti-communist efforts in the region were of utmost importance. With the focus on anti-communism, many coups and illegitimate governments came to power and were not condemned
because they supported the cause of anti-communism. Once the Cold War ended, the United States did not clarify its position on the Western Hemisphere, and it still has not put forward a definite strategy toward the region beyond the mentions of “strategic partnerships” and “unique relationships” (mainly with Mexico).

In 2001, the OAS wrote the Inter-American Democratic Charter, strengthening existing instruments that the organization relied on to protect democratic institutions in the region. The concept of the democratic charter was then considered and replicated by the regional organizations of MERCOSUR and UNASUR. In 2009, the Honduran crisis was only the second disruption to democracy in the area since the establishment of the Democratic Charter in 2001, preceded by Venezuela’s crisis in 2002. Due to the timing of the event in relation to the establishment of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the member states of OAS condemned the removal of Zelaya as a coup and rapidly suspended Honduras by invoking a strict reading of the Charter.

Even after the 2009 crisis in Honduras, the United States did not address its policy on democratic disruptions or coups. In the most recent National Security Strategy of May 2010, Central and South America are mentioned very little, and Mexico is only mentioned three times. There is some focus on the emerging power of Brazil, but there is neither a tangible strategy on how to cope with the lack of infrastructure and institutional capacity in the rest of the hemisphere nor a framework for responding to coups and other disruptions to the state order. This ambiguity of expectations from the United States has meant that the U.S. has retained the flexibility to address each situation on an individual basis.

As seen in the case of President Lugo’s impeachment in Paraguay, the United States did not follow any specified response or policy and instead dealt with the situation as it progressed. The OAS did not react so hastily to Paraguay and instead sent a delegation to investigate the events of June 2012 before making a decision. Many of the nations in the Americas are unsure of U.S. policy toward them in the event of institutional change. The invocation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in response to Honduras in 2009 was in part due to its timing. Paraguay, in contrast, benefited from a more experienced, analytical OAS that waited to assess the situation before making a decision based solely on the Charter.

Conclusion: Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionality

First, the broader question should be posed: what is legitimacy? Who has the power to grant legitimacy to a newly installed government? Does the power lie with the people or is legitimacy bestowed by the international community? For example, in Panama a coup by General Omar Torrijos in 1968 established a dictatorship. Nevertheless, Torrijos was able to appeal to the masses with expanded social and welfare programs. By addressing the needs of the people, can it be determined that Torrijos gained legitimacy through his policies? These questions are significant to examining the very base of legitimacy, although they go beyond the scope of this article.

This section turns to the legality, legitimacy, and constitutionality of the newly installed governments of Porfirio Lobo in Honduras and Frederico Franco in Paraguay. In a region where democratization has been difficult, the institutional
crises in Honduras and Paraguay in 2009 and 2012, respectively, suggest that democratic institutions have been weakened in the region. Moreover, the differences in these cases highlight the fact that nations may be finding new ways to disrupt the democratic order—ways that might not exactly fit the modern coup d’état mold.

President Zelaya was removed for his attempt to convocate a constituent assembly and amend the Honduran Constitution. The popular perception was that President Zelaya intended to amend the presidential term limit and reelection articles. President Zelaya’s opposition, composed of right-wing conservatives who disliked the president’s deepening relationships with ALBA members, exploited this perception to encourage support for his removal. The elections held in November 2009 produced winner Porfirio Lobo of the National Party. While it was said that these elections were held under a democratic environment, Honduras at the time was struggling to provide citizen security and protect human rights. During the interim period of Roberto Micheletti and even into the beginning of the Lobo government, many human rights organizations “documented the repression of peaceful protesters with weapons of war, tear gas, and police batons; the selective elimination of opposition voices, …” executions, and forms of intimidation.88 Human Rights Watch released their “World Report 2012” in January 2012, which commented on the severe violations of human rights in post-coup Honduras. Although a truth commission was put together in July 2011 that cited “cases of 20 people, 12 of whom they concluded had been killed due to excessive police or army force, and eight of whom had died in selective killings by government agents,” the perpetrators of these crimes have still not been brought to justice.89 The U.S. State Department published their “2009 Human Rights Report: Honduras” in March 2010, commenting on the recent events in the country. While the State Department maintained that the November 2009 elections were overall free and fair, the report did reveal that there were abuses such as executions, arbitrary detentions, violations of press freedoms, and the implementation of curfews.90 These abuses and violations impacted the legitimacy of the coup government as well as the legitimacy of President Lobo’s elected administration that followed.

In Honduras, President Zelaya’s removal was a coup in the sense that the president was forcefully removed by the military and the nation’s leadership was reorganized. Although the official article for impeachment in the Honduran Constitution was repealed in 2003, there are still articles that allow the Honduran National Congress to interpret the Constitution, that permit the authority of the Supreme Court to “hear a case against the highest officers of the State,” and that authorize the Supreme Court to “request the assistance of the public forces to obtain enforcement of their rulings.”91 The military intervened legally on the basis that the Supreme Court requested that they remove President Zelaya for his illegal actions. The military’s actions in this case fall within the framework of the Honduran Constitution. While the Supreme Court appeared to have acted legally through Articles 304, 306, and 313 of the Constitution, sending President Zelaya into exile is strictly illegal based on the Constitution under Article 102 that stipulates that “no Honduran shall be expatriated or given over to another nation by the authorities.”92 The legitimacy of the new government has been challenged for the following reasons: the involvement of the military to remove President Zelaya in the first place (instead of em-
ploying the police forces) even with the support of the Supreme Court and National Congress, forcing the president into exile in Costa Rica; and the documented human rights abuses after the coup, through the 2009 elections, and during the first part of Lobo’s presidency. As shown by the U.S. decision to recognize the newly elected administration, however, President Lobo has been able to acquire legitimacy over time after the 2009 elections.

In Paraguay, the impeachment of President Lugo is much harder to define as illegal or illegitimate because the actual mechanism exists in Paraguay to impeach and remove a president before his/her term expires for specific reasons, and these procedures do not dictate the time limit of the trial. While the impeachment in Paraguay was carried out by legal and constitutional means, the swift manner in which Lugo was impeached and removed questions the legitimacy of the new government. As the OAS stated in the “Report by the Mission of the OAS Secretary General and Delegation to the Republic of Paraguay,” the velocity with which the process was carried out provoked suspicions of illegitimacy and human rights abuses by not allowing for due process and constitutional guarantees. In the Paraguayan Constitution, impeachments are outlined in Article 225, but the process does not take the form of a normal judicial trial. In an impeachment, or as the translation more fittingly describes, a political trial, the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Senators are the ones judging the official. The purpose of impeachment is to determine whether or not the official shall be separated from his or her official duties; it is not a trial of guilt or innocence. Although the trial is political, judicial process guarantees may still be applied, partially with the objective of guaranteeing due process and the right to defense for the accused. Nevertheless, impeachments are handled differently from criminal trials because of their political nature. In Paraguay, the concern rests on whether or not Lugo was afforded sufficient time to guarantee due process and the right to defense. The Paraguayan Constitution does not define the time limit for these guarantees, which led the OAS delegation to recommend that the case be brought before the Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights for further investigation.

After analyzing the events in Honduras and Paraguay, it is clear that both removals followed constitutional procedure up to a certain point. Returning to Wiarda and Collins’s concept of a constitutional coup, it seems that the Honduran coup and the Paraguayan impeachment fit better within this framework of maintaining a relative amount of constitutional legitimacy while sometimes veering off onto unconstitutional paths. In Honduras, the process of removing Zelaya started when the National Congress and Supreme Court applied constitutional articles 304, 306, 313, and 373–374. These articles, as described before, gave the other institutions the capacity to remove Zelaya and invoke the armed forces to enforce the ruling. However, when the process was carried out within such a short time period and resulted in Zelaya’s illegal exile, it was clear that the procedures had swerved into unconstitutional territory. Similarly, Paraguay resorted to Article 225 of the national Constitution to impeach its president. All seemed to be following a clearly legal process until the impeachment trial was carried out in a few short hours, suggesting that due process was not afforded and that the impeachment was not fully constitutional.

In both Honduras and Paraguay, the presidents were removed incredibly
close to planned elections. In the case of Honduras, the next elections took place in November 2009; in Paraguay, the elections were to be held in April 2013. By removing presidents so close to the next elections, Latin American and Caribbean nations begin to see that there is a precedent for removing presidents under a wide umbrella of the “poor performance” of presidential duties even if leaders are democratically elected. In an article titled “Impeachment, Paraguayan-Style,” *The Economist* suggested that the type of express impeachment seen in Paraguay “marks a dangerous precedent in a region where democracy is still being consolidated, and where presidents often find themselves unpopular and lacking a majority in congress.”

The evolution of the term *coup* from a violent, forceful change of government to a wider interpretation that includes those changes classified as constitutional coups has made it difficult to clearly denounce institutional change and difficult to clearly judge a new administration’s legitimacy. In addition to the increasingly blurry lines made possible by the evolving definition of the *coup d’état*, the difficulty in reconciling the diversity of perspectives in the nations of the Western Hemisphere continues to be a recurrent theme. The differences in each country’s national constitution are a large part of the reason that the Western Hemisphere finds several versions of democracy that are not always aligned perfectly with the expectations of the American version. The ways in which different nations of the Americas allow for military involvement in political and social life or grant greater congressional interpretation of their respective constitutions show the greater division between the democracy that the U.S. promotes abroad and the reality of the state of democracy in other nations of the Western Hemisphere.

By examining the Honduran and Paraguayan cases, it is now clearer that the Western Hemisphere is not dealing so much with patterns of instability but rather with perspectives on instability. Changing centers of power, increasingly influential regional organizations, and the rise of Brazil as a key player in the Western Hemisphere means that the differences in perspective regarding military involvement in politics and society and the interpretation and flexibility of constitutional powers could come into conflict. Unstable, changing, and sometimes incompatible, these different perspectives have facilitated the expansion of the definition and interpretation of *coup d’état*. The cases of Honduras and Paraguay suggest that a redefinition of the types of coups, impeachments, and other disruptions to democracy is in order to set out clear definitions and expectations for future cases.

**Notes**

4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
11 Ibid, 682.
13 Ibid, 467.
14 Ibid, 467-68.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid, 18.
30 Main, *A New Chapter of Engagement*. The negotiations initially resulted in a “seven point plan stipulating not only that Zelaya be reinstated as president but also that a power-sharing government of ‘reconciliation’ be created.” General amnesty was requested for all involved in the coup. Micheletti’s administration eventually presented a counter-proposal that did not call for Zelaya’s reinstatement. The conflict between these two plans was not resolved before the elections. The coup government stopped negotiations altogether, and the elections took place as planned.
34 MERCOSUR, *Protocolo de Montevideo*, 2011; MERCOSUR, *Protocolo de Ushuaia,*

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1998. The Protocol of Ushuaia was signed by the members of MERCOSUR in 1998. In 2011, Ushuaia II was signed by the members of MERCOSUR as an addition to the original Protocol of Ushuaia. Ushuaia II extended the democracy clause of the original Protocol of Ushuaia and allowed for certain steps to be taken by MERCOSUR in the event that the democratic order is disrupted in any one of the member states.

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 OAS, Report by the Mission.
39 Ibid.
42 Victoria Nuland, Daily Press Briefings (Washington, DC, June 2012); see “U.S. Response” section to see more on the OAS delegation report.
43 Romero, “Senate’s Vote.”
44 OAS, Report by the Mission.
47 Constitución de la República de Paraguay, Sec. VI, Art. 225 [“por mal desempeño de sus funciones, por delitos cometidos en el ejercicio de sus cargos o por delitos comunes”].
48 Constitución de la República de Honduras, Título VII, cap. I, art. 373-374.
49 La Corte Suprema de la Justicia de Honduras, Comunicado Especial.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 195.
60 Fasquelle, The 2009 Coup, 18; Main, A New Chapter of Engagement, 20.
61 Main, A New Chapter of Engagement, 18-21.


Mary O’Grady, “Imperialists Gang Up on Paraguay,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 2, 2012. Venezuela’s entrance into MERCOSUR was held up by the Paraguayan Congress. Although President Lugo supported Hugo Chavez’s interests in MERCOSUR, the opposition-led Congress blocked Venezuela’s entrance into the group. Paraguay’s suspension from the organization has allowed MERCOSUR to move on with voting while Paraguay sits out.


Ibid.; Main, *A New Chapter of Engagement*, 16.

Ibid. 21.


Ibid.

Nuland, *Daily Press Briefings*.

OAS, *Report by the Mission*.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Stephen Rabe, *The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). During the Cold War, the United States pursued containment policy in Latin America. The U.S. signed the Rio Treaty and pursued the Organization of American States in efforts to further consolidate the alliances between the U.S. and its southern neighbors. Due to the pressure of eradicating all communist beliefs and actors, several dictatorships prospered in Latin and South America and the Caribbean. These dictatorships were found in Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic, but they were not considered communist threats. As a result, the U.S. did not actively condemn these administrations or try to remove their leaders.
86 Ibid.
92 Constitución de la Republica de Honduras, art. 102 [“Ningún hondureño podrá ser expatriado ni entregado por las autoridades a un Estado extranjero.”]
93 OAS, Report by the Mission.
Bibliography


Constitución de la Republica de Honduras, as amended. The amended Constitution can be found at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Honduras/vigente.html.

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Civil-Military Relations in Latin America:  
Selected Bibliography  

Brian Loveman

Introduction

Before the wave of military coups and military governments from the early 1960s until 1990, the social science and history literature on civil-military relations in Latin America was notably thin and virtually devoid of serious empirical research. In response to the surge in military governments in the region, this literature burgeoned. In preparing this bibliography, I have given priority to landmark theoretical treatments, comparative research, and selected country studies with extensive bibliographical materials. Forced to choose among literally hundreds of studies and edited volumes, I will inevitably have omitted the “favorite” books and articles of some researchers. I have tried to include key works illustrating diverse theoretical, empirical, and normative approaches to civil-military relations.

In the very broadest sense, “civil-military relations” refers to the numerous contact points, formal and informal, of the armed forces with civilians and civilian policymakers, as well as civilian perceptions of armed forces’ and military perceptions of civilian and government institutions. (The United States Army War College published an online selected bibliography on civil-military relations, including a brief selection on Latin America, in May 2011 at: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibs/CivilMilitary11.pdf).

Such contact points may include, among many others, military participation in various government agencies and policymaking councils; legislative oversight of military budgets; approval of promotions of high-ranking officers; appointments to military academies; definitions of the curriculum in military schools and academies; collaboration on formation of defense and national security policy; and connections of military officers to political parties, voluntary associations, religious institutions, and other arenas in which civilian and military contacts occur. Media access to, and coverage of, the armed forces may also be an important aspect of civil-military relations. Most of these contact points between civilians and the armed forces (and the unique institutional and professional concerns of the different armed forces) are not well covered in the general literature on civil-military relations in Latin America, nor in research on individual countries. Nevertheless, I have made an effort to identify existing sources on these topics, thus going beyond the usual concern for the central topics in the literature: military coups, “civilian control” or “civilian supremacy,” and “consolidation of democracy.”

After first identifying the “pioneers” in the study of civil-military relations in Latin America, the next three sections of this bibliography focus on studies of the constitutional missions of the Latin American armed forces and their statutory authority, from internal policing to developing numerous economic enterprises, public works, and providing disaster relief. A subsequent section considers the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians both in normal times (for example, enforcing na-
tional security legislation) and under regimes of exception and emergency authority (state of siege, state of assembly, state of internal commotion, and other temporary suspension of constitutional rights and liberties included in almost all Latin American constitutions).

Following the sections on formal and institutional treatments of civil-military relations, the bibliography turns to key works in the vast literature on the causes of military coups in Latin America, comparative and case studies of civil-military relations from 1961 to 1990—what Frederick Nunn (1992) calls “the time of the generals”—to the transitions back to civilian government, to discussions of “civilian control” or “civilian supremacy” over military institutions, and to the most recent literature on civil-military relations in the region.

I have not included in this bibliography work focused on the impact of U.S. military assistance and training on civil-military relations—an extensive literature on its own—or works centering exclusively on the policies of military governments in the region from 1959 to 1990. (See Brian Loveman, “Military Governments in Latin America, 1959–1990.” In Oxford Bibliographies Online: Latin American Studies. Vinson, Ben, ed. New York: Oxford University Press.) I have also not included work from the vast literature on state terrorism and human rights violations by military governments, though some of the items annotated for the sections below on the “time of the generals” address these topics.

Pioneer Studies on Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: General Treatments

Before the 1960s, social science and history literature in English on civil-military relations in Latin America was virtually nonexistent. Alba 1959 anticipated the rise of military populist nationalism in the next decade. The Cuban Revolution (1959) and Nunn’s aforementioned “time of generals” (1961–1990) generated research funding and extensive publication on topics related to the armed forces in Latin America. A pioneer in the field, Edwin Lieuwen (1960) noted that “on the general subject of militarism in Latin America, no important books have yet appeared.” He suggested that prior to World War I, two Ecuadorians touched on the subject of militarism, and that the topic of military coups and dictatorships in the region had been discussed in a number of pre–World War II studies, but not the general topic of civil-military relations per se.

Studies did exist, however, on the role of the armed forces in particular countries. Johnson (1964) focused more particularly on the Latin American officer corps, its training, professionalization, and role in public policy, both when it was in direct control of government as well as when it was not. Johnson refers to Lieuwen’s (1960) volume as “the first in English to treat the Latin American armed forces in general terms.” Wyckoff (1960) published assessments of the extent, and under what socioeconomic conditions, the armed forces intervene in politics. McAlister (1961, 1965, 1966) provided the first surveys of the professional academic literature on civil-military relations. Social and political “causes” of military intervention in politics were early themes, exemplified by Germani and Silvert (1961) and Nun (1961). Nonexternal defense roles, including civic action and policing by the mili-
tary were considered by Glick (1964). Horowitz (1967) was a benchmark for early sociological theory focused on the armed forces. A four-case comparative study by historians McAlister, Anthony Maingot, and Potash (1970), carried out from 1963 to 1966, assessed the political role of the armed forces in Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. The authors of this study prefaced their work by saying that “there are almost no empirical studies in depth of particular national situations which might provide the bases for comparison and sophisticated generalization [regarding the role of the military in Latin America]” (p. 2). Grigulevich (1982) is important as a seminal treatment of civil-military relations in Latin America by Soviet academics.


Analysis of the attitudes and psychology of Latin American officers; classification of the major groups within officer corps as militares de cuartel (barracks officers), militares de escuela (military academy graduates), and militares de laboratorio (more recent graduates) were influenced by U.S. rather than European military traditions. A precursor of the literature on reformist versus traditionalist officers and the potential “modernizing” role of the armed forces. A subsequent study (“El ascenso del militarismo tecnocrático” in 1963) anticipated the rise of military populists and nationalists (“Nasserists”) in the region.


Among the first studies to call for comparative study of Latin American coups and similar events in Asia and Africa. Focuses especially on underlying social conditions and lack of legitimate political institutions rather than only the immediate precipitating conditions for coups. A benchmark in the literature on civil-military relations.


Edited collection of nine studies on the participation of the armed forces in socioeconomic and political processes in Latin America viewed within a “Marxist-Leninist conception of history.” Incorporates a survey of work by pioneering Soviet social scientists (from the early 1960s) writing on the historical role of the Latin American armed forces, the contemporary (1960s–1980s) crisis, and installation of military dictatorships. Also includes case studies on Brazil, Peru, Ecuador. Bibliography of Soviet scholars’ work on the political role of the Latin American military, with citations in Russian
and Spanish.


Synthesis of a path-breaking sociologist’s early theorizing on civil-military relations in Latin America. Emphasizes the armed forces’ internal missions, their role as political arbiters, their relative autonomy, their potential role in the modernization of the economy and the state, and the connection between military elites and the United States. Notes are virtually a bibliography on civil-military relations, politics, and society in Latin America in 1967.


Historical treatment of the role of the military in Latin America since independence by one of the three leading scholars on this topic in mid-1960s. Pays special attention to the soldier as citizen and bureaucrat, military views on national issues, and public perception of the armed forces. Features two chapters on Brazil. Concludes that armed forces will not withdraw from politics until civilians can provide stable, responsible leadership.


American historian and mentor to a generation of scholars dedicated to civil-military relations discusses the origins of Latin American militarism and *caudillismo* and historical evolution from 1914 to 1959. Includes brief case descriptions for twelve countries and consideration of changing military roles and growth of professionalism. Extensively discusses the military aspects of U.S. policy toward Latin America.


Argues that the major factor predisposing Latin American militaries to intervene in politics after 1959 was their institutional self-interest and constitutional mission to protect their nations, which was challenged by Castroism in the Western Hemisphere. Updated for congressional testimony: “The Latin American Military (A study for the Sub-committee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.” Washington D.C., 1967.


Seminal article in the literature on civil-military relations in Latin America and in the debate between “traditionalists” and “revisionist” regarding the role of the armed forces in the region’s politics. Argues that the armed forces are part of Latin America society and government; thus, the term *intervention* into politics is misleading. Seeks to put civil-military relations in Latin America into global comparative perspective and suggests an agenda for future research.


Nunn, Frederick M. *The Time of the Generals: Latin American Professional Militarism in World Perspective*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992. *Generals* is an invaluable resource on “military lore,” military professionalization, and professional militarism in comparative perspective. The author pioneered in the comparative study of military journals in Europe and Latin America). Focuses especially on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, but puts these cases in regional and global perspective. Includes extensive bibliographical notes. (Earlier publications by this author focus on late nineteenth-century influence of German and French military missions [*Yesterday’s Soldiers*, 1983] and the Chilean case [*The Military in Chilean History*, 1976]).


Wyckoff, Theodore. “The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics.” *Western Political Quarterly* 13(3) (Sep., 1960): 745-763. Among the first efforts to assess the military political role and career patterns for all of Latin America. Former member of the U.S. military mission to Brazil presents typology of countries in which militaries “never,” “occasionally,” and “always” are involved in politics and execute coups. Concludes that social, economic, and political conditions in each country determine role of military.
Pioneer Studies: Country Case Studies and Comparative Monographs

After publication of Lieuwen’s 1960 volume, historians (some of Lieuwen’s students) and some social scientists began to research and publish studies on the armed forces and civil-military relations in individual countries. These early studies varied greatly in their research methods and the extent to which they framed country-studies with the more general literature on civil-military relations. Lieuwen (1968), despite his own seminal contributions, mostly concentrated on the uniqueness of the Mexican case. Few researchers obtained good access to defense ministries, military officers themselves, or military archives. Exceptions included Wiarda (1965), Potash (1969), Fitch (1977) and Nunn (1970). Boils (1978) framed the Mexican case with a more general neo-Marxist critique of the civil-military relations literature developing in the United States. Much more research was published in this period on Mexico and South America than for the Caribbean and Central America.

Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico

Civil-military relations after the Mexican federal army’s transformation during the 1910 revolution gained the attention of many scholars, but systematic studies were few. Lieuwen (1968) and Boils (1975) took very different approaches to the Mexican military, the first more historical and the latter framed by class analysis. Few early studies focused on the armed forces in Central America and the Caribbean. In part, this dearth of studies responded to the very late development of professional armed forces (other than the U.S.-created constabularies) from the early 1900s to mid-century. Wiarda (1965) combined historical and institutional analysis in his study of the Dominican Republic. Goldwert (1962) examined the role and legacy of U.S. interventions and the creation of constabularies (the only national armed forces) in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. Atkins (1981) supplemented Wiarda’s work to assess post-1965 civil-military relations. Pérez remains the best treatment of Cuban civil-military relations before 1959. Holden (2004), despite the date of publication, is a pioneer study on the armed forces in Central America.


Political scientist offers the first monograph focused on Dominican civil-military relations after 1965 U.S. intervention. Notes inapplicability of recent literature on civil-military relations to Dominican case due to lack of professional armed forces. Insightfully addresses the issues of corruption and personalism in Dominican civil-military relations.


Mexican sociologist provides theoretical, historical, and contemporary treatment of the role of the armed forces in politics. Framed in class analysis, Boils argues that social and economic crisis undermined the legitimacy of the regime, provoking military intervention, whether for maintenance of status quo or reform. Alliance of armed forces with U.S. imperial interests shapes current prospects. Represents a useful neo-Marxist critique of U.S. literature on civil-military rela-

Holden crafts the first systematic historical analysis of state formation, civil-military relations, and the role of the United States in Central America from independence until the Cuban Revolution. Includes insightful theoretical and comparative frameworks, extensive archival research, and incisive case studies: a very useful bibliography.


Leading researcher on civil-military relations in 1960s (supervising many doctoral dissertations on the topic) surveys the historical role of the Mexican army in politics from late nineteenth century, to the impact of the 1917 constitution, and gradual professionalization into the 1940s. Controversial interpretations on the Mexican Revolution and national politics provoked much academic and political debate in Mexico and the U.S. Extensive use of archival and special collection materials.


Foremost expert on Cuban history and civil-military relations traces the institutional evolution of Cuban army under U.S. tutelage from early 1900s to 1959. Best source on Cuban armed forces and politics before 1959; excellent treatment of collapse of the army under Batista. Very extensive notes and bibliography.


Examines the historical origins of the U.S. role in creating constabulary (1916–1924), years of Trujillo dictatorship, as well as relations between the armed forces and Trujillo regime, military budgets, arms industries. Notes endemic cronyism, corruption, and nepotism under Trujillo, and role of armed forces in immediate post-Trujillo years. “Politics” is the best short source on Dominican civil-military relations in this period. Notes include key sources on Dominican politics.

**South America**

Much of the early research on civil-military relations in South America was done by historians, supplemented by sociologists and a small number of political scientists. De Imaz (1964) was a path-breaking and much cited source on Argentine civil-military relations. Traditional historical research, such as Potash (1969), Burggraaff (1972), Gilmore (1964), and Pérez (1976) were important first steps for individual countries, but mostly avoided regional generalizations or comparative analysis. North (1966) is an early comparative look at post-1959 civil-military relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru; Maullin (1971) examines the effects of counterinsurgency on civil-military relations in Colombia. Joxe (1970) provides a novel sociological analysis of the role of the military in Chile (contrast with Nunn, also on Chile, with...
extensive use of military journals and some interview material), while Villanueva (1971) (and subsequent work) offers the insights of a former officer into changing officer perceptions, attitudes, and civil-military relations in Peru. Stepan (1971) is an important case study on Brazil, and also a foundational theoretical contribution on civil-military relations in Latin America.


Offers a narrative account of army involvement in politics and the emergence of key officers as political leaders under successive governments before 1959. Discusses motivations for military involvement in politics. An original contribution on the Venezuelan case; almost no linkage to comparative literature in the social sciences on civil-military relations.


Takes a long-term view of caudillistic anarchy before creation of professional officer corps and centralization of political power. Period covered in narrative precedes the creation of modern military institutions in Venezuela. Caudillism is the first serious historical treatment distinguishing era of “men on horseback” (*caudillos*) from modern militarism. Extensive notes and bibliography.


De Imaz analyzes recruitment procedures and patterns, social and regional origins, education and military socialization, and career experiences of army generals, naval admirals, and air force brigadiers, officers who held their ranks at five-year intervals from 1936 to 1961. First data-based study of the social composition and educational backgrounds of Argentine officers.


French sociologist analyzes the structure of the military, its economic importance, and its function in contemporary Chilean society within the system of hegemonic U.S. imperialism. Critiques literature on civil-military relations (*Lieuwen 1960, Johnson, 1964, North 1966, and Nun 1967*). Argues that the apparent “apolitical” of the Chilean military disguises a “latent and permanent participation” in politics, with direct intervention every 30–40 years. The book is an important work on Chile, published in July 1970 before the inauguration of Salvador Allende as president.


Examines changes in military political roles and professional perceptions as a result of prolonged counterinsurgency operations, as well as the impact of U.S. military assistance and civic action programs. Examines the military’s “developmentalist” orientation, new national security doctrines, and connections to partisan politics. Footnotes review application of general and Latin American-focused literature on civil-military relations.

Often cited, this short overview of the varied development of civil-military relations in three countries speculates on the role of “developmentalist” orientations on the future; “the ideology of development, and its justification for professional intervention, may be a genuine new factor in the future role of the military.” Early effort to link historical development of professional military to events following the Cuban Revolution of 1959.


Leading expert on Chilean civil-military relations provides historical analysis of the role of the armed forces, especially the army, in Chilean politics. Focuses on organization, training, socialization, professionalization, and contacts of military officers with civilian political and government elites from independence to the coup of 1973. Includes extensive bibliographical notes.


Analyzes long-term conditions that influence patterns of civil-military relations. Focuses on institutional, political, and immediate socioeconomic conditions affecting role of armed forces in society and politics. Special attention to 1945–1968 period. Comparatively analyzes five coups and emergence of military rule after 1964. Includes an excellent select bibliography.


**Constitutional and Statutory Missions of the Armed Forces**

Almost all Latin American constitutions establish permanent armed forces (sometimes including police) and broadly specify their missions, which usually include both external defense and maintaining internal order, along with other responsibilities. Latin American constitutions thus make the armed forces equivalent in con-
stitutional status to the other branches (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). This feature of Latin American constitutional history and political practice makes it essential to understand the varying constitutional and statutory missions, authority, and sometimes even the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians, as a framework for civil-military relations. In the nineteenth century, more than 80 percent of Latin American constitutions established armed forces and defined their missions, much in the same way as they defined the authority of presidents, legislatures, and the judicial branch. The same held true for constitutional status for the separate jurisdiction (fuero) of military courts, often extending to civilians for certain crimes or during times of “crisis” defined by regimes of exception, such as state of siege or “internal commotion.”

Provisions for regimes of exception in Latin American constitutions (for example, state of siege, state of assembly, internal commotion, state of emergency) frequently entail militarization of internal administration or even martial law. Supplementing the constitutional status of the armed forces are legislative enactments with semi-constitutional status (leyes orgánicas) or ordinary legislation detailing the armed forces modus operandi; codes of military justice define the operation of this special military jurisdiction, applied to varying extents to civilians. National security legislation, gun control laws, anti-terrorist laws, and other more specialized legislation also provide for military participation in a range of “nondefense” activities. These provisions are the constitutional and legal framework for civil-military relations; they are often overlooked and generally under researched in most treatments of the Latin American armed forces. Santa-Pinter (1965) insists that such constitutional missions are legitimate foundations for armed forces’ participation in politics and society. López Ramón (1987) provides a comparative framework for assessing the constitutional role of the armed forces. Loveman (1993) is the only detailed historical study of these constitutional and legal foundations for all of Spanish America in English. Rial (1992) offers a short overview of such provisions for South America after 1960. Díaz Cardona (1988) notes that military constitutional missions are an impediment to civilian control; Stepan 1988 expands the discussion to “military prerogatives,” including constitutional missions, while Wiarda and Collins (2011) provide a brief current survey for all Latin America on this topic. Valadés (1974) and Clusellas (1987) discuss “state of siege” and “constitutional dictatorship” provisions in comparative, historical perspective. García Sayan, ed. (1987) provides a comparative survey and case studies on regimes of exception and human rights violations under military governments. Basombrío Iglesias considers changes in constitutional missions after transition to civilian government in the 1990s.


Clusellas, Gregorini. Estado de Sitio y la armonía en la relación individuo-estado.

Excellent comparative analysis of changes in the constitutional and legal status of the armed forces during and after transition to civilian government. Provides valuable notes and bibliography on civil-military relations for this period.
Includes comparative studies on various emergency regimes, including state of siege, suspension of constitutional rights, state of assembly, martial law, and concession of “special powers” (facultades extraordinarias) to the Executive branch. Compares Latin American cases to constitutional provisions in Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Premier study of regimes of exception with extensive useful footnotes on legal sources and cases.

Leading legal experts and social scientists examine the impact of regimes of exception during military rule and authoritarian government, with emphasis on human rights violations. Offers case studies for Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Insightfully discusses the application of military law to civilians. Footnotes provide valuable sources on civil-military relations and human rights.

Key source for comparative historical and theoretical treatment of the constitutional and political role of armed forces in Europe and Spain. Addresses the problem of “military autonomy” and its constitutional foundations. Comprehensively discusses European and U.S. literature on civil-military relations. Extensive notes and bibliography. Framework directly applicable to Latin America.

Historical treatment of the evolution and use of regimes of exception in Spanish America, detailed by country from independence until the twentieth century. Analyzes the evolving constitutional missions of the armed forces for Mexico, Central America, and South America, with attention to the relationship between constitutional missions and civil-military relations. Includes an extensive bibliography.

Short work by Uruguayan expert on civil-military relations that examines liberal constitutionalism and evolution of professional and institutional autonomy by the Latin American armed forces. Reviews constitutional provisions on the armed forces in post-1960 constitutions for 10 South American nations, including, among others, those regarding defense ministries, officer appointment, budgets, relations with the Executive and Legislative branches, and participation in elections.

Detailed analysis of the many constitutional missions of the armed forces in Latin America. Includes discussion of appointment of officers, jurisdiction of military justice, and legislative-military relations. Emphasizes that their participation in national life is not “arbitrary”: (“Nadie podrá afirmar que las Fuerzas
Armadas tienen una situación arbitraria en dichos países. No, porque las propias Constituciones les establecen el marco dentro de los cuales se desempeñarán.


An essential source for elaboration of the concept of “military prerogatives” ingrained in constitutions, legislation, and political practice. Author applies these concepts to civil-military relations after transition from military to civilian government in the 1980s. A benchmark book in the study of Latin American civil-military relations frequently cited and its concepts applied by other researchers.


Valadés details the historical development and use of regimes of exception, such as state of siege and other periods in which constitutional rights and liberties (*garantías*) may be suspended. Includes textual citations from the constitutions of many Latin American nations and analyzes historical uses of emergency powers, with a very useful chart on the legal implications of regimes of exception throughout the region. Good bibliography of specialized materials on the topic.


A short article that surveys constitutional missions of the armed forces in all Latin American nations in June 2011. Wiarda and Collins identify three distinct arrangements: countries with no official armed forces (relying on national guards or police); countries whose armed forces have no or extremely limited constitutional role; and (the majority) countries with armed forces featured prominently in their constitutions and whose constitutional roles include the maintenance of internal order. Authors conclude that “coups may take unconstitutional directions but may have a considerable degree of constitutional legitimacy,” when the armed forces are called upon to maintain internal order or uphold the constitution against perceptions of illegal government behavior.

**Military Justice and Civil-Military Relations**

An often-overlooked aspect of civil-military relations is the routine jurisdiction of military courts over civilians and expanded jurisdiction in times of political crisis, internal war, or declaration of regimes of exception such as state of siege, state of assembly, “internal commotion,” or other “emergency” periods. Such jurisdiction has varied greatly within the region from the nineteenth century to the present. Where it is extensive, application of military law and loss of constitutional *garantías* (rights and liberties) may have very significant impact on internal politics, the operation of civilian courts, and the relationships between civilian political parties, interest groups, and the armed forces. Frühling (1984) is an early analysis of the implications of military law under military governments with special focus on the Chilean

Archbishopric of Santiago documents the court martials (consejos de Guerra) involving opponents of the military regime after 1973. Summary of circumstances, charges, judges of first and second instance, and sentences. Preface by Bishop Sergio Valech, who would chair a commission on torture victims during the dictatorship more than 30 years later. Essential source of primary materials for the Chilean case.

Excellent short overview of the structure, jurisdiction, and procedures of military justice in Latin America (before 2000) as applied to civilians. Cites legal texts from most countries of the region. Attributes lack of independence of military tribunals and serious study of the topic in the region to military hierarchy.

Volume edited by professor of constitutional law and expert on military justice. Chapters provide constitutional and legal analysis of military law in comparative perspective. Includes overview of Latin America and separate chapters on Brazil, Mexico, and Peru. Valuable notes on topic in several chapters. See also La reforma de la justicia militar: estudios críticos de la experiencia peruana y comparada. Lima, Perú: Jurista Editores, 2004.

Outstanding social scientist and legal scholar analyzes and documents the lack of recourse by civilian prosecuted by military courts during the military regime. Valuable for notes and references.

Provides short history of military justice system, its status in international law, and special attention to Chile after 1973. Notes that most “crimes” for which civilians were tried were political crimes.

Website with extensive links for sources on general military justice topics in Latin America and for 10 individual countries.

Premier collection of articles on the topic of military justice and civil-military relations in Latin America, with comparative material on Europe. Theoretical, legal, political, and human rights issues addressed in comparative perspective. Also case studies. Footnotes and bibliography a treasure trove on this topic.


Military Coups: From the Early Literature to the 1980s
As much of Latin America experienced military coups and military government in the 1960s, an expanding literature developed on the origins and causes of military intervention in politics, ousters of incumbent governments, and installation of military rule. Contending interpretations from Fossum (1967), Putnum (1967), and Soláín and Quinn (1975) focused on numerous underlying and “triggering” causes of coups, including internal political conditions, institutional interests of the armed forces (Lieuwen 1961, Baker 1967, Needler 1966, 1975, Fitch 1977), economic crises (Dean 1970), personal ambitions of military officers, class conflict, threats of popular mobilization and social movements (Nun 1966, 1967), international conditions, especially the influence of the Cold War in Latin America, and U.S. encouragement of coups to impede “communism” or to overthrow antagonistic governments. Few studies in this period focused on military government policies after
taking power. An exception is Dickson (1972).


Argues that threats to institutional self-interest ("status deprivation," defined as "the desire for self-preservation, service integrity, autonomy, and corporate privilege") was a critical factor in precipitating military coups.


Editor rejects liberal normative approach to civil-military relations, insisting that the armed forces have a crucial role to play in national development and policy-making, like the Church, labor, business, and intellectuals. Frames country studies with general literature on civil-military relations in Europe and the U.S. Chapters cover Bolivia, Cuba, Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Brazil, and Uruguay.


One of the first studies to analyze the relationship between political instability, military coups, and economic activity (foreign trade) in Latin America from independence until the mid-twentieth century. Represents a precedent for further research on economic conditions and military coups.


Calls for more research on economic policies and outcomes after military coups. Notes the internal divisions of military coup-makers, lack of developed plans for policy, and dearth of empirical research on civil-military relations. Valuable for notes and bibliography, which lists most existing (1972) studies on civil-military relations in the region.


First systematic analysis of four coups in Ecuador, based on interview material with officers usually not available to researchers in this period. Identifies institutional, attitudinal, and precipitating factors most important in motivating officers to overturn incumbent governments. Demonstrates that coups are a "normal" part of Ecuadorian politics. Key source on politics and armed forces in Ecuador.


Examines variations among countries and conditions leading to successful coups (105) from 1907 to 1966. Considers background conditions, situational variables (especially deteriorating economic conditions and electoral periods), and contagion effects (other coups in the region). Appendix with list of coups and sources. Among the first efforts to put Latin American cases within the general literature on coups in third world.

Chapter by one of best known European experts working on Latin America in this period, followed by comments of other specialists and rejoinders by Lambert. Lists the nature and political rationale of military coups from 1930 to 1962; discusses origins and evolution of Latin American armies, social origins of officers, new tendencies of anti-populist and anti-communist coups in the 1960s, and factionalism in the armed forces.

Leading scholar on civil-military relations assesses (and lists) 56 successful coups from 1935 to 1964 and asks three main questions: (1) have coups become more or less frequent? (2) what changes have occurred in the function of the coup in relation to social change? and (3) what are the effects of changes in the Latin American military on the form, structure, and timing of coups and what political significance do these effects have? Concludes that coups are most likely under deteriorating economic conditions, most frequent in pre-electoral or pre-inauguration periods.

American political scientist updates a previous article (“Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America,” American Political Science Review, 60(3), 1966:616-626. Concludes that “military intervention may thus serve class interests, or an abstract public interest, but the movement to seize power becomes effective only as it engages the military’s concern for the defense of their own interests.” Lists a range of institutional interests that might provoke a coup. Excellent state-of-the-art (1978) bibliography of general works, country studies, and studies of individual coups; insightful footnotes.

A path-breaking and controversial sociological analysis that notes the connection of the armed forces to a fragmented Latin American middle class. Argues that the “armed forces assumed the responsibility of protecting the middle class against the dangers of lower class mobilization and social revolution. Inspired other researchers to delve into the socioeconomic complexity underlying the military coups and governments of the 1960s.

An early “correlational analysis” (29 variables) to understand propensities for military coups in Latin America. Examines aspects of socioeconomic develop-
ment, political development, characteristics of the military establishment itself, and foreign influences. More valuable now as a snapshot on the state of the discipline in the 1960s than for its conclusions.


Comparative study of the causes of coups in Latin America from World War II until 1967. Uses 30 cases to “test” 11 alternative explanations, ranging from “low levels of military professionalism” to “government ineffectiveness and illegitimacy,” strength of political party system, and increased interclass conflict (60% of cases). Good state-of-the-art (1967) bibliography on civil-military relations and comparative politics.


Much of the literature on the armed forces in Latin America during the last five decades focuses on the historical causes of political instability and military coups, policies of military governments, and the transition in many countries, since the 1980s, back to civilian government. However, “civil-military relations” is a much broader topic and some researchers linked the Latin American cases to global and comparative research on the topic. Before the initial transitions back from military to civilian rule in Ecuador (1979) and Peru (1980), approximately 80 percent of South Americans lived under military governments; even where military governments were not formally in power (such as Colombia, Venezuela, and El Salvador) regimes of exception, such as state of siege, extended the range of military authority and participation in governance. After 1964, a growing literature focused on the rationale for military government, a “modernizing” and “developmentalist” mentality among a new generation of officers, and the expanded roles and missions of the armed forces (Lozada 1967, Hyman, 1972, Sepulveda 1972, O’Donnell 1973, Pasquino 1974). Rouquie (1987) and Loveman (1999) took a long-term view on civil-military relations and the onset of an era of military governments after 1959. Biglaiser (2002) and Remmer (1989) focused more on varying policies of the military regimes and civil-military coalitions, while Dix noted the development of “hybrid regimes” with significant constraints on civilian policy makers even with changes in government in the 1980s. Stepan (1988) became an often-cited reference point in discussions of tempering or eliminating “military prerogatives” in the region after transition to civilian rule. (A separate annotated bibliography on the military governments from 1959 to 1990 covers individual countries. See Brian Loveman, “Military Governments in Latin America 1959–1990” OBO).


Focuses on economic policies of military governments. Discusses policy choices, appointments to government posts of economists favoring neoliberal policies, policy formulation, privatization, and the role of ideas and ideology under mili-
Miliary governments in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Also includes some comparative material on Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico.


Focusing on cases from the 1980s, the author concludes that while coups and military rule declined in the 1980s and early 1990s, what emerged may be a more institutionalized form of military participation in politics and policymaking, creating hybrid regimes with military constraints on civilian rulers.


Survey and critique of recent (1964–1972) writing on civil-military relations. Argues that the early work misread history, overrated external influences, misinterpreted the character of the military institution in Latin America, and failed to identify characteristics of the armed forces that affect their political action. Rejects the thesis of Nun (1967). Applauds the increasing number of country studies that demonstrate “the widely varying style, behavior, and governing coalitions of the military when it becomes active in politics and involved with civilian forces. Emphasizes that the military has to be seen as a force within the Latin American political universe that is highly interrelated with civilian political forces.


Political scientist and historian presents a history of the role of the armed forces in Latin American politics. Chapters 6–9 focus on the policies and ideology of military governments from 1960 to 1990; also transition to civilian government and constraints on democratic consolidation. Treats national security doctrine and human rights violations by military regimes. Features an extensive bibliography.


Argentine social scientist and law professor addresses the involvement (ingerencia) of the armed forces in politics, their constitutional missions, military coups, influence and pressure on government and civil society by the armed forces, and the lack of legitimacy and efficacy of the region’s political elites and institutions that “provoke” military pressure and coup-making. Considers civil-military relations from historical, philosophical, and legal perspectives, emphasizing the anomalies of these relations in Latin America. Unique and thought-provoking treatment of the topic.


Argentine political scientist’s formulation of the concept “bureaucratic authoritarian” regimes, which became widely applied to Latin American military governments, but also the subject of extensive theoretical debate—and then reconsideration by O’Donnell himself. Argentine case important for inspiration of the concept, but applied by many authors to other military governments.
Prominent Italian political scientist and politician provides a comparative perspective on the military, socioeconomic development, and political power in Latin America. Focuses especially on Argentina, Peru, Chile, and Brazil. Unique typology for characterizing civil-military relations. Appendix summarizes main theoretical points. Footnotes reference most U.S. and Latin American sources on military in politics to 1974 and general literature on civil-military relations.


Political scientist analyzes the origins and political and economic consequences of military rule; compares and contrasts with policies of civilian regimes. Creates a typology of military regimes often cited in the literature. Part two of the book focuses on the Chilean case.

Unique speculative and comparative analysis of the future of military developmentalist governments. Provides insight into the uncertainty regarding prospects for military regimes in early 1970s. Discusses changes in military organization, training, and curriculum in military academies since 1959, as well as the effects of U.S. military assistance. Considers possibilities for military-civilian technocratic alliances and questions the durability of the military regimes.

Comparative analysis by leading theorist on civil-military relations and military government of military prerogatives and transition toward civilian government in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile. Focuses especially on Brazilian case, relative autonomy of military institutions, and the system of military intelligence.

**The Time of the Generals: Edited Volumes**
The predominance of military regimes in much of Latin America generated numerous research projects, conferences, and edited collections of articles on civil-military relations in the region. Wesson (1982) is a survey by country experts of military governments and dilemmas of military rule, especially in the Southern Cone. By the early 1980s, with transition to civilian government in Ecuador (1979) and Peru (1980), the prospect for return to civilian government and the conditions that would make that possible became a focus of much research. Bustamante (1988) and
Handelman and Sanders (1981) reflect this trend. Goodman et. al (1990) further investigates the trend, from a comparative perspective, with the end of the Cold War. Lowenthal and Fitch (1986) updates Lowenthal (1974) and reviews developments in the literature on the military regimes, while Loveman and Davies (1997) is the third edition of a work first published in 1978 to take into account policy consequences of military rule and also the ongoing constraints on democratization. Varas (1988) brings together theorists and country experts to explore the continuing, but varying, relative autonomy of military institutions after transition to elected government (except in Chile).

Regional and country studies on prospects for democratization and changes in civil-military relations. Former presidents, policymakers, military officers, and academics analyze extent of “military autonomy” and changing conditions for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Useful for diversity of views and state of civil-military relations in South America just before end of Cold War.

Articles by leading experts on civil-military relations frame transitions to democratic government in terms of global trends (end of Cold War), with general theoretical treatments on civil-military relations, regional studies, and chapters on Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Very useful as insight into “mindset” of main line scholars on the problem of changing civil-military relations. Chapters by Michael Desch and Louis Goodman treat changing military missions and implications for civil-military relations.

Investigates politics and military rule in Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile during late 1970s, with attention to internal opposition and prospects for return to civilian rule. Focused on completed transitions from military governments and potential for return to civilian rule in Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile.

Regional and country experts consider the historical background to the military regimes after 1959, the origins of the military governments, motivations for establishing military governments, and the consequences of military rule. Includes translations of military speeches and proclamations in a section called “The Military Speaks for Itself.” Case material on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Earlier editions (1978, 1985) include speeches and articles on Bolivia.

& Meier, 1976.
Theoretical consideration on the military in Latin America and case studies (Chile, Argentina, Brazil). Also treats civil-military relations in Mexico and the Dominican Republic. Essays written by well-known theorists and country experts. One of the first edited collections to consider the military governments of this period.

Collection of theoretical and empirical treatments of the military in Latin America, including Lowenthal’s review of the literature to 1974 from the first edition (above), and Fitch’s first chapter “Armies and Politics in Latin America: 1975–1985,” which frames discussion of changes in the role of military in the region from 1975 to 1985. Useful for source citations and case studies.

Comparative studies of institutional autonomy and civil-military relations after the era of military dictatorships. Theoretical considerations and case studies for most of South America, Central America, Mexico, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. (See also in English: Varas, Augusto, ed. Democracy under Siege: New Military Power in Latin America. New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1989).

Case studies of military government in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and role of the military in Colombia and Venezuela. Essays by Edwin Lieuwen on the problem of military government; Wesson, on populism and military coups; and Martin Needler on problems facing military governments.

With a growing number of military regimes in Latin America, more research inspired periodic efforts to review existing knowledge, research frameworks and methodologies, and avenues for future research. Lowenthal (1974) and Rankin (1974) provide different approaches to this task 10 years after the Brazilian coup of 1964. Ames (1988) and Slatta (1987) undertake a similar task just before the end of the Cold War. Pion-Berlin (1995), Ruhl (1998), and Sigmund (1993) review studies focused on transitions to civilian government and efforts to consolidate democratic regimes after 1990.

Political scientist reviews 10 books devoted to research on the Latin American military in the leading Latin American studies journal. Emphasizes the importance of also analyzing nonmilitary political actors to understand the role of the military in particular cases.

Lowenthal, Abraham F. “Armies and Politics in Latin America.” World Politics,


Survey and review of research published since McAlister (1966). Excellent summary of the theoretical debates on civil-military relations at time of publication. Notes provide current bibliography of work on Latin American armed forces and extensive discussion of the literature.


Slatta, Richard W. “Recent Literature on the Latin American Military.” *Military Affairs* 51(2) (Apr., 1987): 75-78. Excellent short review essay with extensive bibliography on general and comparative treatments, country studies, Central American regional studies, motivations for coups, impacts of military rule, and the U.S. and the Latin American military. Written in during the low point of the 1980s debt crisis, the author concludes that “it remains an open question whether recently installed civilian
administrations can cope with huge foreign debts, economic stagnation, and intense political conflict” bequeathed by the military governments.


There are many monographs analyzing the emergence and performance of military regimes in the post-1959 period. Listed below are “top choices” (among many others that could be listed) on individual countries that provide special insight into civil-military relations, including divisions within the military governments, contacts with political parties, interest groups, and social movements, and efforts to restructure political institutions. Works listed have extensive notes and bibliographies referring readers to the still-growing literature on the military regimes in these countries. Except for Mexico and Colombia, the cases below all experienced long-term military governments after 1964. Cases covered are Argentina (Pedano and Palermo 2003); Bolivia (Malloy and Gamarra 1988); Brazil (Skidmore 1988); Chile (Huneeus 2000); Ecuador (Isaacs, 1993); Mexico (Camp 1992, Ibarrola 2003); and Uruguay (Astori 1996). Leal Buitrago (1994) is the best single source on civil-military relations in Colombia during this period.


Excellent summary of the economic policies of the military regime from 1973 to 1985. Raises questions regarding the linkage between neoliberal policies and authoritarian politics. Also considers the role of civilian politicians, administrators, and economists in the military government.


Framed by general theories of civil-military relations, a leading expert on Mexican politics investigates social composition, experiences, military education, promotion policies, “non-military” functions of Mexican armed forces, and officer connections to civilian elites. Speculates on future of civil-military relations as civilian elites become more dependent on the military to maintain internal order. Valuable interview material and extensive notes and sources.


Arguably the single best overview of the military regime in Chile from 1973 to 1990 by a leading Christian Democratic intellectual and former Chilean ambassador to Germany. Insightful material on social and political support for the junta, civilian advisors, policymakers, and collaborators with military government. Includes an extensive bibliography.


Detailed inside journalism on civil-military relations under each Mexican president since 1940s. Offers rare insights into role of Mexican armed forces in poli-
tics and policymaking. Covers national security doctrine, military education, changing missions, corruption, and the drug war. Foresees increasing role for military as economic and security situation worsens.


Political scientist reviews the literature on civil-military relations in Latin America and then considers the Ecuadorian military in detail, including the military governments, civilian opposition, and the transition back to civilian rule. Essential source on the military governments in Ecuador during this period. Useful bibliography on Ecuadorian politics.


Outstanding work on national security and civil-military relations in Colombia from 1958 to early 1990s. Includes research on national police, effects of insurgency, war on drugs, and the militarization of politics and internal administration. Extensive comparative materials, notes, and bibliography.


Analysis of the alternatives available to Bolivian policymakers (16 different governments) and political constraints on development from the Barrientos government (1964) until 1985. Excellent source on the Banzer government (1971–1978). Discusses the particularities and policies of varying military governments over 20 years. Useful references on Bolivian politics and armed forces.


Analyzes the conditions leading to military dictatorship, characteristics of the military regime and its political project, internal factionalism, factors that led to the war in 1982 against Great Britain over the Malvinas (Falklands Islands), and the withdrawal of the military from control of the state. Compares and contrasts the Argentine case to military governments in the rest of the Southern Cone and the transition to the civilian government of Raúl Alfonsin.


Written by one of the most prominent Brazilianists in the United States, this work details the origins of the 1964 coup, policies and internal dilemmas of military governments in Brazil, and constraints on the democratization process. Arguably the best single source on Brazilian civil-military relations and public policy in this period.
Civil-Military Relations post-1990: General Treatments and Regional Overviews

There emerged a writing boom in the late 1980s and into the 1990s on transitions to civilian government, constraints on, and challenges to, efforts to consolidate democracy, and the changes occurring in civil-military relations in the increasingly “globalized” post–Cold War international system. Academics and policymakers debated the extent to which civilians could and had established “control” over military institutions through constitutional, legislative, and political innovation; new roles for the armed forces in the 1990s and beyond; and the future of civil-military relations in the region. While the number of articles and books published per year dedicated to civil-military relations has declined since 2000, in many ways the quality and precision of work published has improved. Most of the work, such as Zagorkski (1992), Agüero (1998), Bruneau (2005), Fitch 1998, Arceneaux (2001), Pion-Berlin (2005), Ruhl (2004), and Varas (2011), reflects the continued research of established experts in the field. Sotomayor Velázquez (2008) represents the work of a more recent (Ph.D. 2004) entry into this field; he is currently serving as an assistant professor at the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterrey, CA.

Agüero, Felipe. “Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America.” *Mershon International Studies Review* 42(2) (Nov., 1998): 383-404. (Also: Felipe Agüero, “Towards Civilian Supremacy in South America.” In Diamond, Larry, Marc E. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien. *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Themes and Perspectives.* The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997). Excellent five-country comparison of the legacies of the period of transition by focusing on the prerogatives of the military (the military’s “acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance and even to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society”). Comparative analysis of relative success of military regimes in institutionalizing political change, circumstances of transition, and outcomes. Useful bibliography on transition to civilian rule.

Arceneaux, Craig L. *Bounded Missions: Military Regimes and Democratization in the Southern Cone and Brazil.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. Comparative institutional approach to military regimes, regime breakdown or replacement, and transitions to civilian government with chapters on Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay. Systematic analysis of institutional constraints and changes during transition and the challenges of democratization. Extensive notes and bibliography on theoretical aspects of civil-military relations and research on Latin America.

Bruneau, Thomas. “Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited.” *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad* Año 19(1) 2005: 111-131. Important contribution to debate over the nature of civil-military relations post-1990 in the region, arguing that beyond civilian “control” there is a need for institutionalized (ministry of defense, legislatures, interagency process, intelli-

Reviews literature on civil-military relations, asking how they have changed since transition to democracy. Analyzes persistence of national security doctrines and varied policies adopted in the region toward armed forces during post-military government period. Generally optimistic about reducing political role of armed forces. Valuable original interview material with Argentine and Ecuadorian officers on attitudes toward the role of the armed forces in politics and society. Informative notes.

Argues that in the last decade the balance of power has shifted in favor of civilians governments with military downsizing, loss of prerogatives, and increased civilian control over definition of military missions (with some exceptions, such as Venezuela and Ecuador). Suggests the need to redefine “civilian control” in ways more appropriate for Latin America rather than imposing a North American model. Asserts that “…civilians do not have to worry about investing the necessary time to understanding defense, strategy, tactics, preparation, budgeting, deployment, doctrine, or training,” in order to establish improved political control over armed forces. See Bruneau (2005) for opposing assessment.


Very useful regional overview (from Mexico to the Southern Cone) of the literature on civil-military relations and changes (or lack thereof) in civilian con-
trol. Considers oversight through defense ministries, legislative budget review, changes in military missions (internal order, overseas peacekeeping), and civilian knowledge and expertise in defense policy. Notes reference most-recent literature.


Insightful short synthesis of civil-military relations in 2011. Analyzes the challenges of establishing civilian control over the military with transition to civilian government from military regimes. Notes successes and impediments. Concludes that the Latin American experience demonstrates that the success of those seeking to enforce a democratization agenda on military institutions depends on a variety of factors.


Focused on changing patterns of civil-military relations during and after transition to civilian rule. Chapter four (“Patterns and Strategies of Civil-Military Relations) especially useful for alternatives available for civilian control and analysis of experience in Peru, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile. Notes that state of civil-military relations are still in flux, but deficiencies exist (to 1992) in establishing civilian credibility and competence in defense and security policy and reformulating military missions.

Civil-Military Relations post-1990: Edited Collections

As civilian governments replaced military regimes in Latin America from the 1980s into the 1990s, attention shifted among scholars to changes in civil-military relations, legacies of the military governments (including accountability for human rights violations), and possibilities of consolidating democracy in the region. Also of interest were the new missions for the armed forces, from participation in international peacekeeping to the drug war and domestic tasks such as environmental protection. Listed below are edited collections with varying approaches to the challenges of post–Cold War civil-military relations in Latin America. Agüero and Stark (1998) and Diamint (1999) include excellent theoretical discussions of the challenges facing civilian governments after transition from military rule. Casas-Zamora (1997) frames a unique volume with Central American cases with concepts from Agüero 1995. Millett and Gold-Biss (1996) and Pion-Berlin (2001) offer varying views on challenges to hemispheric security and civil-military relations after the Cold War; the former includes chapters by U.S. Army (retired and active duty) area specialists. Olmeda Gómez (2005) is almost encyclopedic in coverage, while Mares (1998) compares the Latin American experiences with civil-military relations in Asia and Central Europe after the Cold War.


Addresses a broad range of issues confronting post-transition elected govern-
ments ranging from redesign of institutions for representation, accountability, and political participation to judicial reform and civil-military relations (three chapters from different theoretical and empirical perspectives by Wendy Hunter, Michael C. Desch, and Fernando Bustamante). Excellent introduction by Agüero and bibliographical references at the end of each chapter.


Unique collection of comparative case studies by country specialists (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Chile, Uruguay) on mechanisms for, and limitations on, civilian control of military and limitations in Central America. Framed by concepts in Agüero (1995), and two theoretical chapters on civil-military relations in democracies and two chapters on comparative civil-military relations in Central America. Editor is former vice-president of Costa Rica. See also: Casas, Kevin & Brenes, Arnoldo, eds. (1998), Soldiers as Businessmen: The Economic Activities of Central America’s Militaries. San José, Costa Rica. Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress.


Leading experts on civil-military relations in Latin America provide new theoretical thinking on the role of the armed forces and military professional education and discourse in regional politics after transition from military rule; case studies for Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Mexico, and Central America. Extensive notes and bibliography for individual chapters.


Useful theoretical contribution on “conceptions of civil-military relations” by the editor, putting the Latin American experience in comparative perspective. Latin American cases such as Venezuela, Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil are compared with the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Thailand. Emphasizes normative and institutional aspects of civil-military relations; deemphasizes concern with “civilian supremacy” as usually understood.


Focuses on important changes and continuities in military institutions and civil-military relations with the end of the Cold War, persistence of old threats (narcotics, insurgencies, terrorism), and the emergence of the neoliberal economic model in the region. Valuable country studies framed by discussions of dilemmas of hemispheric security. Includes chapters by academic country specialists and U.S. military officers on Cuba, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, and Peru.
Massive (800+ pages) collection of historical and theoretical considerations of civil-military relations in Latin America, followed by country and regional case studies. Authors include some of most well-known American, European, and Latin American experts on topic. Includes consideration of transitions, role of defense ministries, legislative oversight. Extensive notes and bibliography. Access at Dialnet (registration required), http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/libro?codigo=7249.

Leading scholars on civil-military relations examine the historical foundations, new trends, and new frameworks for analysis of civil-military relations since the transition from military to civilian governments. General treatments and country studies consider military attitudes toward democracy, objective and subjective civilian control of the armed forces, and the varying characters of the transitions to civilian rule. Editor emphasizes that the book brings together “alternative approaches under one editorial roof.” Includes an excellent, relatively new (2001) bibliography.

**Civil-Military Relations post-1990: Country Studies and Comparative Cases**
The studies listed below are key studies on post-military government civil-military relations, emphasizing research that provides comparative analysis. Published at different moments after the transition, the literature reflects changing perceptions (and “snapshots”) of the extent to which civilian control was established over military institutions and also changing conceptualizations of the nature and range of civil-military relations. Most of the studies focus on the extent to which civilian control has been established over military institutions, usually with some comparative material. Áviles (2010), Bruneau (2006), Fuentes (2006), Hunter (1997), McSherry (1997), Pion-Berlin (1997), Trikunas (2005), and Weeks (2003) offer differing, if somewhat overlapping, frameworks for conceptualizing civil-military relations in addition to valuable case studies. Agüero (1995) and Zaverucha (1994) provide excellent comparative material on Spain and southern European transitions. Williams and Walter (1997) is still the outstanding work on El Salvador.

Premier comparative research on South American transitions and post-Franco Spain. Focused on Spain, but provides insightful analysis of the varied institutional impediments and opportunities for changing civil-military relations in Greece, Portugal, and South America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay). Theoretical discussion very useful; notes (60 pages) provide extensive bibliographical references.

Comparative case studies for the Andean region that links neoliberal globalization with greater civilian control of the military and rise of neopopulist, anti-neoliberal governments with expanding prerogatives and participation of armed forces in a range of functions. Original and provocative study with excellent up-to-date (2010) bibliography.


Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, provides best available short treatment of impediments to consolidation of democracy and history of civil-military relations in Ecuador from 1979, when country made transition to civilian government, to 2006. Notes lack of legislative oversight and general inability of civilians to exert influence over the armed forces except in the “last instance.” Worth noting: the study was published before the Correa administration.


Chilean expert on armed forces and police emphasizes that new political contexts, changing coalitions, economic conditions, enhanced roles for the judiciary, development of civilian skills, and knowledge in the area of defense and security policy have contributed to changes in civil-military relations. Discusses military budgets, and the institutional and human rights’ violations legacy of the military regime.


Political scientist frames study with rational choice approach, arguing that contrary to expectations, civilians were able to significantly erode military prerogatives after transition to civilian government. Hunter asserts that “electoral competition creates incentives for politicians to reduce the interference of a politically powerful and active military, and that broad popular support enhances their capacity to do so.” Includes significant archival research and interviews with politicians and military officers. This view of post-military Brazil is contested by institutionalists and several country specialists (For contrasting interpretations on Brazil, Argentina, and Spain, see Zaverucha 1994, McSherry 1997.)


Political scientist reviews conditions leading to military governments before 1976, the 1976–1983 dictatorship, and the transition to civilian government. Emphasizes the continuation of national security ideology, institutions, “dirty war” practices, and rebellions until the Menem administration. Assesses definitions and control of military missions, doctrine, education, promotions, accountability to legislature and other civilian institutions, scope of military justice system, constitutional and legal foundations of military role, and scope of military participation in government and economy. Extensive bibliography.

Political scientist evaluates the transition to civilian government (1983–1995) in Argentina with focus on successes and failures of policies rather than narrow lens on “civilian control.” Emphasis on institutions that frame civil-military relations. Comparative analysis on Uruguay and Chile. Notes and bibliography integrate case study into general literature on civil-military relations.


Best available source in English on civil-military relations in Venezuela to 2005, with a focus on shifting civil-military jurisdictional boundaries. Extensive bibliography on comparative civil-military relations and the Venezuelan case. Valuable interview material with officers and civilians. Theoretical discussion of democracy and civilian control of the armed forces precedes chronological analysis of the Venezuelan case.


Political scientist reviews literature on civil-military relations in Latin America. Suggests new framework for assessing range of potential civil-military conflicts (pp. 15-16). Offers history of the challenges of civil-military relations in Chile from 1988 to 2003 and analysis of changes in constitutional legal, political, semi-formal, and informal contact points between armed forces and civilian elites. Offers useful notes and extensive bibliography.


Best history of civil-military relations in El Salvador. Brief survey of civil-military relations literature; notes lack of empirical studies on El Salvador and Central America. Last two chapters and conclusions deal with democratization and transition since the 1980s. Predicts slow progress in establishing civilian control. Up-to-date (1997) bibliography.


Expert on civil-military limitations in Brazil compares transitions from military to civilian government in Brazil, Argentina, and Spain. Contrasts successful implementation of civil control in Spain to the limited successes in Argentina (to 1994) and the feeble efforts to control the military in Brazil. Useful institutional and political history for each case and photos; bibliography includes Latin American and European cases.
THE DRUG POLICY DEBATE:
A SELECTION OF BRIEF ESSAYS REPRESENTING THE DIVERSITY OF OPINION
Introduction
Howard J. Wiarda

When I started teaching American foreign policy, some twenty-five years ago, there was a widespread consensus on drug policy: drugs were bad, we should campaign against their use, and legalization was out. In those days only 5 percent of the public favored legalization. As a political scientist, when I see a proposal that has only 5 percent support, I say that such a proposal will not go anywhere.

But now the wheel has turned:

• Drug use, after falling for nearly three decades, is up again.
• Public support for legalization is up to 30–35 percent.
• Several Latin American leaders have come out in favor of a change in U.S. policy.
• There is broad sentiment that the so-called “war on drugs” is not working.
• Sentiment in favor of the medical use of marijuana is increasing.
• Some states and municipalities have already moved to legalize some drugs.

We therefore determined to take a fresh look at the policy. And we have here a star-studded panel to present the arguments from diverse perspectives. This panel grew out of CHDS’s series of programs, titled Hemispheric Forums, where the hottest current issues are discussed. All panelists, after their oral presentations, were invited to submit written statements. Although they were not all able to do so, we do have the edited transcripts of several speakers’ remarks to accompany the several written statements we do have.

The panel included:

• Amb. Adam Blackwell of the OAS, who tells us what the Organization of American States is doing on drug policy.
• President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue Peter Hakim and Program Associate Kimberly Covington of the Inter-American Dialogue, who provide a balanced perspective, while also arguing for changes in U.S. policy.
• Deputy Director for Supply Reduction Marilyn Quagliotti of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, who outlines U.S. policy accomplishments as well as the tasks ahead.
• Dr. Craig A. Deare, Interim Dean of Academic Affairs and Dean of Administration at the College of International Security Affairs at National Defense University, who examines the causal factors, including drugs, driving the cur-

Dr. Howard Wiarda is Professor Emeritus of National Security Affairs at the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and also moderated the May 11, 2012, Hemispheric Forum at which these commentaries were presented.
rent levels of insecurity and violence in Mexico.

- Timothy Lynch of the Cato Institute, who outlines four drug policy options, including legalization.
- General and former “Drug Czar” Barry McCaffrey, who responds to Lynch while also arguing for the continuation and success of a 30-year-long policy.

It is a lively and provocative discussion; we hope you will read it in its entirety.

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Mandate to the OAS Regarding Policy Alternatives

Ambassador Adam Blackwell


Transcript of remarks given on 5/11/2012.

At the Sixth Summit of the Americas held in Cartagena, Colombia, the presidents and prime ministers present provided two mandates to the OAS General Secretariat. The first concerns the need to undertake a detailed, candid, and evidence-based analysis of the drug problem in the Americas. This comprehensive, transparent, and inclusive report will both analyze existing policies and strategies as well as explore different alternatives, at national and regional levels, to make these responses more efficient and effective. Secondly, the member states requested that the OAS create a specialist unit that coordinates regional cooperation and develops specific activities against Transnational Organized Crime (TOC).

At the outset, I would like to emphasize that we are entering this activity without any preconceived ideas or conclusions. The report will be highly technical, nonpartisan, and entirely evidence-based. As such, we will not offer specific recommendations but, instead, will present various different opportunities and scenarios that the leaders of member states can examine. I am pleased to announce that we will shortly create a specialized Technical Secretariat within the OAS General Secretariat dedicated to coordinating the preparation of this report.

The report will substantially draw upon the expertise and experience of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, but will also very much involve other areas of my Secretariat, the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security. Solutions to this very complex problem must be broad and all-encompassing, and, as such, it is important that our approach is open and multifaceted. Therefore, we have invited other areas of the General Secretariat to join us in this initiative and, in this way, truly foster an “OAS-wide approach.”

We will also be very pleased to receive the input and expertise provided by other Hemispheric partners such as the Pan-American Health Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Latin American Development Bank.
A group of high-level advisors and experts from throughout the Americas with recognized experience in the subject area will also be invited to provide their input. At this early stage, we envisage that the report may be subdivided into five different themes, which I will now detail. Nevertheless, we are conscious that as discussions progress, different considerations and necessities may be developed, and, as such, we are very open to the development of new areas and subthemes.

The first subtheme refers to the relationship between the drug problem and public health. This section will focus on demand for drugs and examine preventative strategies and treatment for addictions. Last year, tens of thousands of individuals in the Americas received treatment for drug addictions. We are interested in evaluating the best strategies to prevent consumption and the most appropriate ways to treat dependency. In this way we hope to improve the health and well-being of drug users as well as prevent criminality.

The second subtheme will relate to the relationship between drugs and economic and social development. As President Obama mentioned at the summit, the causes and effects of drug problems have a different impact upon distinct social groups in any given society. As part of our multidimensional approach to the drug problem, we understand that cultivation, trafficking, and consumption is very much related to socioeconomic considerations such as poverty, lack of education and training, jobs, and opportunities. Unfortunately, evidence shows that the drug problem disproportionately affects poor, urban groups and other minorities. Based upon the analysis provided in the report, distinct strategies and interventions should be targeted toward these different populations.

Thirdly, the report will consider different legal and regulatory frameworks, for instance, alternatives to incarceration. One such example relates to drug treatment courts that have been developed for nonviolent offenders charged with possession of drugs. These offenders are given the opportunity to receive treatment for their addiction instead of a jail sentence. In these courts, a judge oversees each case from the beginning to the end and traces each participant’s progression through random drug testing and regular court attendance. In the United States alone, approximately 120,000 individuals were treated in these courts last year; this is just one example of an initiative that could reduce demand for drugs in other member states.

The fourth subsection will address security systems and the need to take comprehensive action against transnational organized crime. This approach does not only focus on drug consumption and smuggling but also looks at a range of related factors that form part of what I call the “transnational criminal enterprise.” These activities often include, but are not limited to, such enterprises as money laundering, human smuggling and trafficking, and trafficking in illicit goods such as firearms. In all of the aforementioned and many more areas, it is important to recognize that the OAS is already active and possesses robust mechanisms to handle these issues at the Hemispheric level. I would like to cite as one example the “Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other-Related Materials,” commonly referred to as the CIFTA Convention and agreed to by all active OAS member states in 1997. This convention provides the legal framework and blueprint for a variety of activities to prevent firearms trafficking, such as marking and registering legally possessed firearms, confiscation...
tion and decommissioning of apprehended weapons, and mechanisms to permit the exchange of information and intelligence between member states in this area.

The final likely area of exploration relates to the production of drugs, pharmaceuticals, precursors, and chemicals. Consumption of “traditional” illegal drugs appears to be declining in the United States and some other countries in the Hemisphere. The latest statistics from the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy show that consumption of cocaine and related substances is down 40 percent, and methamphetamine, 50 percent. At the same time, data show that demand for legally available medications—whether they are “available over-the-counter” or only dispensed with medical prescription—is increasing. The report will acknowledge these recent trends and suggest alternatives to address these problems.

As I have stated, this is just an outline of the initial themes that we believe the report will discuss; I emphasize that these are not set in stone, and during the report’s development additional areas may be developed. The report will be prepared openly and transparently through thorough consultations with various actors including member states’ governments, other experts from member states, various international agencies and organizations, representatives from civil society, and think tanks that possess specialist knowledge on the issues.

I am pleased to report that we have already commenced dialogue with various actors. I have just come from the 51st Regular Session of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission at OAS Headquarters in Washington. We are also very much looking forward to engaging on these issues during the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Specialized Agencies on the World Drug Problem, which will meet in Lima on June 25–26. Another important opportunity will be afforded by the 42nd Regular Session of the OAS General Assembly, which will also be held in Cochabamba, Bolivia, on June 5–7.

At this stage we plan to deliver this report for the consideration of the presidents and the prime ministers in 2013. This is particularly significant since 2013 marks the ten-year anniversary of the Declaration on Security in the Americas, in which the member states developed the multidimensional approach to improve citizen security in the Hemisphere and created the Secretariat of Multidimensional Security. As such, it creates an important and appropriate juncture to reflect upon the progress made to date and to focus on the development of evidence-based strategies to address the drug problem and the impact it has upon the daily life and well-being on many individuals throughout the Hemisphere.

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Latin America’s War on Drug Policy

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Latin America’s growing leadership on the sensitive issue of international drug policy has been on full view on the world stage. At the September 2012 UN General Assembly meeting in New York, three of the region’s presidents—Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia, Otto Pérez Molina of Guatemala, and Felipe Calderón of Mexico—urged the world organization to acknowledge the glaring shortcomings of prevailing approaches to drug control and initiate a far-reaching review of options that could be more effective. The region’s leadership was also displayed at last April’s Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia. In the face of initial U.S. opposition, Summit host Santos and other Latin American heads of state put drug policy at the center of their discussions—and subsequently charged the Organization of American States (OAS) with the task of conducting a comprehensive study, recently published, of alternative approaches to the Hemisphere’s drug problems.

Three highly regarded former presidents—Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, Cesar Gaviria of Colombia, and Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico—provided the conceptual underpinnings for the Latin America’s rising profile on drug policy matters. They jointly chaired the Latin American Commission on Drug Policy and Democracy, which published an influential report in 2009 that concluded that anti-drug strategies had failed either to reduce drug production and consumption or to effectively deal with the region’s pandemic of criminal violence. While recognizing the urgent need for governments to control organized crime and protect their citizens’ security, the report urged a revised, health-based approach to drug problems that would shift emphasis from prohibition and law enforcement to prevention and treatment. The report also called on governments to consider legalizing (and regulating) marijuana and perhaps other illicit drugs as well. Although prepared to indulge in conversation about alternative drug strategies, Washington has made crystal clear its opposition to legalization as a possible response to Latin America’s surge of violence, drug trafficking, and other crimes.

In the United States, drug policy issues have been largely absent from national debates. Drug policy was hardly mentioned in the last year’s presidential campaign, and no proposals emerged from either of the major candidates. With the sharp decline in drug-related crime and violence across the U.S. in the past 15 years or so, the problem has faded from the national agenda—although increasingly vigorous debates about marijuana policies in many states and localities might well lead to a national discourse on the issues. Despite continuing resistance from the federal government, 18 states plus the District of Columbia now allow easy access to marijuana for medical purposes. A majority of voters in Washington State and Colorado voted for ballot initiatives to legalize the production, sale, and recreational use of marijuana on November 6, 2012. These initiatives, now in the process of being implemented, would create the first fully legal marijuana markets in the world. They clearly represent a severe challenge to Washington’s drug policies, which year by year have been losing support in the U.S.

The Costs of Success

Even though no one has clearly defined what the goal is, the U.S. can—at least at home—claim some progress in its battle against drugs. Although questions persist
about the reliability of the statistics, U.S. consumption of cocaine has declined considerably, probably by half or more, from its peak in the late 1980s. (Although the data are less clear, heroin use may have fallen by a similar amount.)\(^1\) In the past five years, surveys suggest cocaine use has declined by another 40 percent—though marijuana consumption and illegal consumption of prescription drugs is increasing. In addition, violent crime associated with illicit drugs has also fallen sharply in the U.S. over the past 15 years, particularly with the declining use of crack cocaine.

Still, U.S. advances have come at a very high cost. In dollar terms, the federal government spends about $25 billion a year on anti-drug efforts, while state and local governments spend an even larger sum. One clear consequence is that the U.S. arrests far more people than any other country in the world. On a per capita basis, the U.S. holds 25 percent more of its citizens behind bars than Russia, and some five times as many as either Britain or China. And drug offenses are responsible for a sizeable fraction of all convictions. In 2009, more than half—yes, half—of all federal prisoners and some 20 percent of state prisoners and local inmates were incarcerated on drug charges.

The racial imbalance is appalling. More than half of all those jailed for drug offenses are black or Hispanic (which together make up little more than a quarter of the U.S. population). In addition, U.S. courts, state, federal, and local, are all clogged with drug cases, and narcotics enforcement is a huge burden on police forces everywhere in the U.S. The battle against drugs has damaged and distorted judicial systems and law enforcement across the country—and no relief is in sight. Many federal judges are in virtual revolt against the harsh sentences they are required to impose on even minor drug offenders.

With the decline in the consumption of the most dangerous and addictive drugs, coupled with the relatively low rates of narcotics-related violence, the nightmare of drugs may be over for most Americans (aside, of course, from those who are incarcerated or have friends or family in jail). That could explain, at least in part, the increasing tolerance for marijuana use—including its legalization. With cannabis no longer viewed as a “gateway drug” to vicious addiction, Americans today may be more concerned about their children acquiring a police record than they are about them using marijuana. Even though the U.S. government has insistently sought to discourage states from legalizing marijuana, users and dealers alike are rarely prosecuted in federal courts, except when violence or large amounts of money are involved. The rise of prescription drug abuse, with its high rate of overdoses, presents a new public health problem, though it has little impact on U.S.–Latin America relations.

The Even Higher Price of Failure

No country in Latin America can be complacent about drugs or about the crime and violence associated with them. Colombia is perhaps the only country in the region that can be cited as a relative success story, for both the Colombian government and U.S. drug policy. With a substantial rise in domestic spending on security coupled with massive U.S. support of some $8 billion over a decade, the Colombian government managed to wrest control over the vast majority of its territory from guerillas, paramilitary forces, and drug lords, and decisively reduce armed violence against its
citizens. The security advances in Colombia are clear—although many problems, including an outsized homicide rate, a huge displaced population, and vast numbers of unresolved and unpunished crimes still plague the country. And there are continuing questions about whether much progress has been made in disrupting the drug trade—an issue on which the U.S. and the UN statistics diverge. The undisputed fact is that Colombia remains the major source of processed cocaine for the world’s two largest drug markets, the U.S. and Europe. Moreover, whatever success has been achieved in Colombia, it has occurred within an expanding sea of failure across Latin America, where criminal violence and drug trafficking has risen dramatically in recent years.

Today, virtually everywhere in the Americas, an upsurge of delinquency, violence, and corruption is fueled by illegal drugs. In country after country, ordinary citizens point to exploding criminality and street violence as their nation’s single most serious problem. Homicide rates throughout Latin America are among the highest in the world, rivaling those of war-torn countries in Africa. Many Latin American nations are now major consumers of drugs, albeit still at far lower rates than the U.S. and Europe.

In some countries, the rule of law, democratic stability, and governmental authority are imperiled by vicious drug gangs. With a limited capacity to resist and weak institutions to begin with, the smaller nations of Central America and the Caribbean are most at risk of being overwhelmed. Some of them are already besieged. But Latin America’s two largest nations are also in danger. Mexico’s murder rate has more than doubled in the past five years, and with inadequate police protection, a corrupt and brutal prison system, and ineffectual courts, solutions still seem some way off. Brazil appears to be making some headway, but its murder rate is higher than that of Mexico and it has similar failings in its policing, courts, and prisons. Its cocaine consumption is second only to the U.S., and consumption of crack cocaine is rapidly becoming a major public health issue.

U.S. Drug Policy in Action

Most Latin American governments welcome U.S. cooperation to battle the crime and violence linked to the drug trade. However, they are increasingly skeptical about what they can expect from Washington, questioning whether U.S. and regional priorities are aligned and whether the U.S. can offer meaningful levels of material support. They have come more and more to resent Washington’s inflexible approach to fighting drugs. They are confounded and frustrated by Washington’s unwillingness to consider alternative policies, despite the mounting evidence that U.S. anti-drug programs have been largely ineffective in Latin America and, in some situations, counterproductive. That the first fully legal markets for marijuana in the world may now be established within the United States should also give Washington pause.

Although President Obama has called for new approaches and has indicated a willingness to discuss the issues, U.S. drug policy in the region remains stale and lackluster. The U.S. fights the drug war in much the same way it did two decades ago—although Latin America has changed dramatically and the problems today are of a new order of magnitude.
The two pillars of the U.S. anti-drug efforts in Latin America and elsewhere—eradication of crops in the field and interdiction of narcotics shipments—have done little to curtail drug cultivation or production, or to reduce the amount of drugs headed for the U.S. and other international markets. From time to time, individual countries report some significant declines in drug cultivation, production, or transit, but these invariably are offset by increases elsewhere. This is the so-called balloon effect, where squelching drug trafficking and organized crime in one area merely causes it to move to another. Diminished coca leaf production in Peru and Bolivia in the 1980s led directly to expanded cultivation in Colombia. In response to government spraying, coca production shifted to other parts of Colombia. When the U.S. closed Caribbean drug routes in the 1990s, cocaine shipments were redirected to Mexico. It is not yet fully clear, but the evidence suggests that much of Mexico’s drug-fueled violence can be traced to the destruction of Colombia’s powerful drug cartels. And Central America and the Caribbean’s growing trauma appears linked to Mexico’s assault on its own cartels.

Questions are being raised about whether U.S. policy has been useful, even when it achieves a sought-after outcome. For example, what is the practical significance of capturing X or Y tons of marijuana or Z kilos of cocaine? The absolute numbers have meaning only if their effect on consumption in the U.S. or on the profits of drug gangs can be measured or at least estimated. The best available models, which are admittedly crude, indicate that high rates of interdiction or crop eradication have small impact on the retail price of cocaine, etc., in the U.S. The strategy of capturing or killing kingpins faces the same problem. What does the loss of top leaders mean to a drug gang? Is it crippling or merely inconvenient? Is the impact different in Mexico than it was in Colombia? Recent actions of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Honduras, reminiscent of its strategies in Peru and Bolivia 20 years ago, raise questions that are not being adequately addressed. Has the DEA contributed to stability or the rule of law in that country? How are DEA actions affecting neighboring countries? What effect are they likely to have on the flow of cocaine into the U.S.?

Besides its inability and unwillingness to assess its own drug policies and make needed adjustments, U.S. financial support for the region’s struggle against crime and violence is only a small fraction of what it was in the past and far less than most governments in the region think is needed. This is disappointing, but it is no surprise to Latin Americans, who are well aware of the difficult economic circumstances confronting the U.S. What appears most to trouble the region’s governments is the incapacity of Washington to do more to stem the flow of money and arms to Latin America’s criminal gangs—and to further reduce drug consumption, which remains among the highest in the world despite sizable declines in cocaine and heroin usage in recent years. The Obama administration has pledged to do more on all these fronts, but has made only modest policy changes.

Under the circumstances, it is no wonder that Latin American governments have, year by year, become more disparaging of U.S. policy—and are calling more loudly for changes. Drug policy is an area in which the U.S. appears to have become passive and disengaged, largely pursuing ineffectual policies, while crime and violence mount across much of Latin America.
So, What about Legalization?

Latin Americans have noted that what has most aroused Washington’s attention with regard to illicit drugs have been the recent proposals by several Latin American leaders to actively consider legalization as a means for dealing with the region’s public security problems. The reaction was particularly swift when this past February President Pérez Molina, after a month in office, declared he was ready to consider schemes to legalize the use and transport of drugs in Guatemala—and turned to fellow Central American presidents for support. U.S. diplomats immediately made clear the U.S.’s unwavering opposition to legalizing drugs. Within a month, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and Vice President Joe Biden traveled to Central America to clarify and reinforce the message. No one was left in doubt that the U.S. was paying attention. Washington was clearly taken aback by the rising interest in legalization in the region.

U.S. officials in Washington should not be surprised or alarmed that many in Latin America are beginning to contemplate strategies that include legalization of some illicit drugs—particularly now that two U.S. states have voted to make recreational use of marijuana legal, and are in the process of implementing legislation that sharply distinguishes it from cocaine and putting it, more or less, in the same category as alcohol and cigarettes. Latin Americans see legalization as a means both to reduce the violence associated with the transport and sale of drugs and to deprive criminal gangs of a major source of income, thus rendering them less dangerous. Governments also see legalization as a potential source of revenue for themselves, as do state governments in the U.S.

Washington should understand that Latin American support for legalization comes with numerous conditions and restrictions. It does not apply to all drugs, and production and sales would be heavily regulated. Marijuana legalization proposals in Uruguay, for instance, would create a state-run legal market with more stringent rules than those contemplated by the two U.S. states. Support for legalization should certainly not be viewed as an expression of anti-U.S. feeling or a reduced concern about lawlessness. To start with, every one of the former presidents responsible for the 2009 Latin American Drug Commission report, which gave new legitimacy to arguments for legalization, had close ties to the U.S. over many years.

And the sitting presidents most critical of U.S. drug policy have a history of aggressively battling drugs and crime. Moreover, they are all allies—not detractors or adversaries—of the U.S. Presidents Santos and Calderon have been at the forefront of the struggle and have regularly cooperated with Washington on many issues. Guatemala’s new president, Otto Pérez Molina, who has most directly advocated legalization, campaigned for office as a mano duro candidate and heads the Central American nation that receives the most U.S. anti-drug assistance. Uruguay’s President José Mujica has supported the legalization proposal in his country, but maintains a solid relationship with Washington, easily the best among the five Mercosur nations (which include Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and Paraguay).

The U.S. government and governments in Latin America should view the legalization initiatives in Colorado and Washington as an opportunity to open a genuine dialogue about drug policy in the Hemisphere. Latin Americans need to
resist the temptation to point fingers, while the United States should emerge from a period of denial about its mostly failed drug strategy. Now that the United States has become the first place where marijuana has actually been legalized in the region, both the United States and the countries of Latin America should have a common interest in systematically and scientifically examining marijuana legalization; assessing the range of consequences for use, addiction, and trafficking; studying the implications for the consumption of alcohol, cocaine, and other more harmful drugs; analyzing the impact on criminal profits and behavior; and exploring how best to regulate marijuana production and consumption. It is time for a long overdue, serious conversation between the United States and Latin America on drugs and what to do about them. The OAS, as mandated by the Hemisphere’s heads of state, is already hard at work studying alternatives to current drug policies and should be able to make an important contribution to the dialogue.

The conversation must be broader than legalization—which is not the most important issue in debates about public security or drug policy. It has gathered traction because the region’s appeals for flexibility and change in U.S. drug policy have, year after year, largely fallen on deaf ears—at a time when criminal violence has become more and more threatening. Calls for legalization, in contrast, have drawn Washington’s attention.

Legalized marijuana or other drugs is not the objective of Latin American leaders. It is seen as one measure among many to address what has become the region’s most destructive, and so far largely unresolved, complex of problems. There are broader policy questions at stake. The fundamental issue for Latin American leaders is what can and should be done to confront the relentless waves of criminal violence that imperil their citizens and institutions.

On that score, there is a growing regional consensus that the U.S. has not been as engaged or helpful as it could in dealing with the havoc that drugs and violence are producing in Latin American nations. Indeed, many in the region believe the U.S. bears most responsibility for the problem—because of its still massive (although declining) consumption of drugs and its unproductive counter-narcotic policies. It is hard for Latin Americans to understand why Washington is so reluctant to consider developing and implementing new drug policies when most Americans are convinced that current approaches are failing and pressures for legalization are building in many parts of the U.S. In the absence of U.S. initiative, Latin Americans are taking the lead in rethinking and reshaping hemispheric and global drug policy. They should have an ally in the United States.

Note

1 The case of heroin use is more complicated. Using the most recent published figures for 2006, there has been a re-estimation that makes it hard to compare quantity consumed with that of earlier eras. Data suggests that prices have fallen considerably, so it is possible that addicted users consume more per year today than previously. Initiation of heroin use appears to have leveled off, but not decreased significantly.
The Obama administration recently released the 2012 National Drug Control Strategy, which seeks to reduce drug use and its consequences in the United States. The Strategy marks an historic shift toward an evidence-based approach to break the cycle of drug use, crime, and incarceration. There is a new commitment by our public health and public safety officials to work together to direct drug users to the services or programs they need to recover, and we are working hard domestically to build on the progress that has been achieved since the release of the administration’s inaugural Strategy in 2010.

I am pleased to report that we have made significant steps forward with regard to reducing drug use in the United States. American drug use has declined by roughly one-third since its peak in the late 1970s. This progress is particularly evident with regard to cocaine. According to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, cocaine use in the United States has declined by nearly 40 percent during the past five years. This unprecedented reduction in overall cocaine use has been accompanied by lower rates of cocaine use among young people; significant declines in the number of adults testing positive for cocaine in many U.S. cities; and historic reductions in the rates of adults testing positive for cocaine in the workplace. These reductions in use translate into decreased harm to our citizens from cocaine. In fact, new data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention show that there has been a 41 percent reduction in the number of cocaine overdoses in the United States since 2006. In addition, the use of methamphetamine is also down by more than 50 percent during the past five years.

Although we have made progress, the United States currently faces significant challenges with prescription drug misuse and is facing an emerging threat with synthetic drug abuse. ONDCP and our interagency colleagues are working hard, both on a national level and with our state and local colleagues, to address these problems.

We also face significant challenges as a Hemisphere. Even with sharply declining U.S. cocaine consumption, there is still a large and lucrative market for cocaine. The 2011 World Drug Report found the amount of cocaine consumed in Europe has doubled in the last decade. Thus, transnational organized crime groups operating in the Hemisphere are still profiting greatly from the cocaine trade.

Every country in our Hemisphere is challenged by drug use and drug trafficking. As all of you know from your own experiences, despite claims made by some, there is no “silver bullet” solution to the world drug problem. But that does not mean we should not all be working hard to carefully assess our efforts to date and to identify areas in which improvements can be made. For this reason the administration is very pleased to participate in an intensified hemispheric conversation about all aspects of the drug prob-
lem. As all of you know, this subject was raised during the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena last year. President Santos said something very instructive about drugs during the Summit. He said: “We have the obligation to see if we’re doing the best that we can do, or are there other alternatives that can be much more efficient? ...One side can be all the consumers go to jail. On the other extreme is legalization. On the middle ground, we may have more practical policies.”

We could not agree more with this “Third Way,” or middle-ground, approach to drug policy in the Americas. In the Obama administration, we understand it is important to make a clear distinction between criminals who are driven by an underlying substance-use disorder—even if they are involved in drug sales—and hardened, professional criminals. To break the cycle of drug use and crime, it is our policy that the first group be directed into supervised treatment so the underlying health disorder can be addressed. Each year, in fact, we divert about 120,000 people into treatment instead of incarceration through drug courts in the United States.

We have also worked to further programs like Screening, Brief Intervention, and Referral to Treatment, which enable health care professionals to recognize the signs and symptoms of drug addiction early—to get help to those in need of drug treatment before the problem becomes chronic.

We are also looking toward the future of drug policy reform by supporting new and innovative programs that show promise in reducing drug use and crime. For example, the HOPE probation program in Hawaii combined close supervision with drug testing and swift, certain, but brief sanctions for violations to achieve an 86 percent reduction in positive drug tests among probationers. It has been proven effective in reducing incarceration rates, and, as part of the National Drug Control Strategy, we are now working to expand this model to communities across the United States.

The United States is eager to expand cooperation on demand reduction and criminal justice policies with partners in the Hemisphere through exchanges of best practices, technical assistance programs, professional meetings, and direct assistance for demand reduction. As we work to emphasize public health solutions for those with a substance-use disorder, we recognize that we must continue to bring to justice those who threaten public safety and our democratic institutions. Transnational criminal organizations pose a significant challenge—they prey on our citizens not only through drug distribution, but also through human trafficking, contraband smuggling, financial fraud, and extortion wherever they operate.

The United States takes very seriously our responsibility to disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking groups operating within our borders. Last year, U.S. law enforcement agencies disrupted or dismantled 612 drug trafficking organizations linked to the Attorney General’s Consolidated Priority Organization Target list, which focuses on the major drug trafficking and violent criminal organizations operating within the United States.

We have task forces operating in every part of our country to identify and disrupt major drug distribution networks within the United States. We welcome a dialogue on the best tactics to address the threat posed by transnational criminal organizations. We recognize that it is appropriate to examine what works best. But we also recognize that transnational criminal networks would not disappear if drugs were made legal.

Why? Because transnational criminal organizations do not derive all their revenue from drugs. And they would not disband if drugs were legalized. They are diversified businesses, profiting from human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, intellectual
property theft, and other crime. Any potential tax revenue from legalization would never come close to offsetting the costs to society imposed by the increases in drug use that would result. Our experiences with legal substances are instructive in this regard. For example, U.S. Federal excise taxes collected on alcohol in 2007 totaled around $9 billion, and states collected around $5.6 billion. Taken together, this is less than 10 percent of the more than $185 billion in alcohol-related social costs such as healthcare, lost productivity, and criminal justice system expenses.

There is, unfortunately, no simple solution here. But there is a path forward. The details of this path should be debated, discussed, and evaluated. The United States will be an active partner in this discussion. But as we move forward, there are some core priorities that are important to my government:

• Criminal justice institutions must be strengthened. This includes not just police, but prosecutors, the judiciary, prisons, and probation services.
• The tools of information collection, analysis, protection, and exchange—including the use of informants and wiretaps—are vital for successful investigations, prosecutions, and disruptions.
• Extradition can help relieve the short-term difficulties in managing cases against major drug kingpins.
• The seizure of illicit assets, control of chemical precursors, alternative development programs, eradication, and interdiction can help weaken criminal groups and reduce drug availability.
• There must be shared responsibility to partner with countries affected by drugs to provide relevant technical expertise, training, and assistance.
• We should examine our successes and failures honestly, and we should adjust our approach as necessary. The United States is committed to a close partnership with all of our partners throughout the Hemisphere. We recognize that we are all in this together and that the only way forward is to improve our cooperation.

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Increased Violence in Mexico: Understanding the Causes

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The increased levels of drug related violence which took place during the Calderon sexenio are significant, raising serious questions for officials in both the U.S. and Mexico. This paper attempts to explain the context within which these changes are occurring, and to identify the causal components of the increase in violence. Figure 1 provides visual substance to the ongoing concern:
Analysis conducted by the Justice in Mexico Project demonstrates that homicide rates declined rather steadily over the course of the twentieth century. Yet there has been a sharp reversal of this trend in recent years; all available sources of data illustrate a steep increase in violence, particularly after the start of 2008.¹ If it is accurate to state that the homicide rates in Mexico were relatively stable from 1990 to 2008—averaging approximately 1,000 per year—why did they begin to escalate after that time? What explains this dramatic and fundamental change?

Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso conveys the essence of the argument, “These [war on drugs] policies have had dire consequences—corruption of the police forces and judiciary and traffic-related violence—for the economic development and political security of the producer countries.”² This paper analyzes the range of actions that may contribute to improving security and reducing the violence associated with the production, trafficking, and consumption of drugs. I focus on the issue of violence associated with drug trafficking based on a concern that left untreated, these growing levels of violence will continue, putting ever greater pressures on law enforcement and defense forces to deal with stronger, more diverse, more ubiquitous, more violent, and more lethal drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The effects of growing instability and insecurity for Mexico are

Figure 1. Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis through 2010, Viridiana Ríos and David Shirk, Justice in Mexico Project, 2011, p. 5.
sobering, both for Mexico as well as for the U.S. The latest set of statistics available in mid-2011 regarding the costs associated with the status quo are sobering as well. Consider a few of the highlights from the 2010 Department of Justice National Drug Threat Assessment:

Overall, the availability of illicit drugs in the United States is increasing…Although drug use remained relatively stable from 2007 through 2008, more than 25 million individuals 12 years of age and older reported using an illicit drug or using a controlled prescription drug (CPD) nonmedically in 2008….These and other consequences of drug abuse, including lost productivity associated with abuse, the impact on the criminal justice system, and the environmental impact that results from the production of illicit drugs, are estimated at nearly $215 billion annually.³

A $215 billion price tag for an effective program is one matter; for the situation described above is quite another. More disturbing is the dramatic increase in violence in Mexico, where more than 50,000 have died as a direct result of the efforts of the effort to combat the Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) in that country. The current drug trafficking–related levels of violence in Mexico, which began to increase gradually in 2000 and dramatically so in 2008, continued through 2011. Profit levels, less easily assessed with full accuracy due to the illegality of the trade, also continue to serve as an extremely lucrative driver in the drug trafficking equation. This is so despite the stepped up efforts of both the U.S. and Mexican authorities to wage the war on drugs more effectively. This work does not define the problem to be solved as simply violence related to illegal drug trafficking nor does it define the problem as one of simply consumption. There are a number of highly interdependent variables at play in this complex equation of drug production, trafficking, and consumption, any one of which can be isolated and assessed in relation to the others. Within this highly complex model in which correlation and causality are exceedingly difficult to determine, the intent is to identify explanatory factors related to growing insecurity and violence.

The increasing levels of violence are the direct result of these increased efforts undertaken pursuant to U.S. and Mexican anti-drug policies and strategies, in particular Mexican government policies. Many of these particular costs result not from drug consumption per se but from the policies related to attempting to halt the trafficking and trade of substances deemed to be illegal by governmental bodies around the world. The paradox is that by “securitizing” this particular issue, sovereign governments are undermining their authority, credibility, and legitimacy with the very populations they purport to serve and protect by their policies.

A Brief Review of Mexico’s Current Insecurity

Although Mexico has long endured myriad threats to its security, the current situation it faces is unique. The primary challenges confronting the majority of nations of the Hemisphere stem from developmental and institutional weaknesses. The institu-
national frailty of its democracy, the myriad challenges confronting its society, the uneven character of its economic programs, and the predicament of its system of justice and irregular application of rule of law are the fundamental issues that confront the country. These internal challenges, and successive governments’ deficiencies in addressing them, have led to the exacerbation of the aforementioned internal—and increasingly transnational—security threats. Organized crime, gang violence, and trafficking of drugs, contraband, persons, and small arms are able to develop and thrive in an environment characterized by weak and ineffective institutions.

These realities are nothing new in Mexico; they have existed in some form or fashion throughout the nation’s history. Given this reality, what explains the recent changes in security in the country? The demand for drugs in the U.S. has been relatively constant for the past 40 to 50 years. Somewhat more debatable is the level of Mexican governmental effort to eradicate domestic opium and marijuana cultivation, as well as the success rate of interdicting the flow of cocaine from South America through the country. But if we assume that both demand and supply have not shifted dramatically—certainly not in the past five years—then some other factor must obtain. What explains the recent erosion of security, the explosion of violence, and dramatic rise in the murder rate? In an equation in which the variables are the same, which variable accounts for the shift?

The literature on the subject of increasing violence in Mexico is growing and offers a host of hypotheses to explain this rise. The first case argues that the significant shifts in trafficking patterns post-1980s away from the model in which Colombian cartels moved drugs from the Andes to the U.S. via the Caribbean, to one where Mexican cartels moved drugs overland through Mexico, is the dominant reason. The second case suggests that the new tendency for Mexican cartels to pay and get paid in drugs generated new drug markets in Mexico itself, and the creation of these new markets led to competition between the DTOs for dominance over those markets explains the rise in violence. The third case offers that the breakdown of the old post-revolutionary PRI-dominated political monopoly led to a disruption of established patron-client relationships and uncertainty about control over territory, which in turn led to intense competition between cartels/gangs. I acknowledge the relevance of each of the cases, and yet I contend they each represent necessary but insufficient explanatory power for the current situation.

As is well known, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional governed in a corporatist-bureaucratic-authoritarian fashion for more than 70 years. Vicente Fox’s presidential victory in 2000 as a Partido Acción Nacional candidate marked a watershed in Mexican politics. It also upset the equilibrium that had evolved over those 70 years, with winners and losers adjusting to the changes in the system. Among the changes in the system was the end of the “Gran Pacto” (the Grand Pact), in place for many years. According to Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez,

During the period of the dominant party, the government and organized crime maintained a symbiotic relationship based on a non-aggression pact. The pact was possible due to the political centralization which existed in that period, in which the federal government or the governors could guarantee the fulfillment of deals made with criminal enterprises.
What is readily apparent is that the preexisting underlying limitations of the state in Mexico, visible in a variety of areas, contributed significantly to the ability of organized crime to grow and thrive. These underlying conditions contributed to an environment in which the Gran Pacto could take root. These challenges, and the previous administrations’ deficiencies in addressing them, exacerbated the aforementioned internal security threats.

The growth of organized crime, gang violence, and trafficking of drugs, persons, and small arms are an associated effect of the institutional weaknesses of the Mexican state. These issues are not resolved by military means, although the armed forces can and do play an important role in dealing with the associated security effects and violence of the developmental problems. In fact, because of the institutional weaknesses of many governments, the military is all too often called on to perform missions not traditionally within the scope of the armed forces. This was particularly so in Mexico, given the perennial weakness of law enforcement.

It is this reality that left President Calderón with precious few options available to address the issue of drug trafficking–related woes. In practical terms, President Calderón had two basic choices: a continuation of President Fox’s policies, or greater confrontation. It could be argued that it was somewhat surprising for President Calderón’s strategy to directly confront the DTOs kinetically, suggesting a failure to recognize the state’s limited capability to address this particular kind of problem. By focusing on one of the symptoms of the problem, rather than many of the underlying causes of the problem, Calderón essentially exacerbated the challenges facing the country. Now, in addition to the necessity of addressing the range of institutional weaknesses, he has that added degree of difficulty of having to do so in a compromised security environment. That said, there is a case to be made that the Calderón administration had no other option but to resort to the military. Peter Reuter captures the challenge of attempting to reduce the violence:

Precisely because high drug-market violence is restricted in time and space, it has not been the subject of much policy analysis either. However, the variety of sources and, in the case of Mexico, of victims, suggests that this violence is not easy to suppress once it starts. The failure of the massive crackdown by the Mexican government is indicative of that difficulty. Indeed, for a variety of reasons described above, the crackdown itself is probably one of the principal causes of the upsurge of violence. For both policy and intellectual reasons, the subject is worth further exploration.  

Alternative Policy Options

What, then, are the policy options available to decision makers on both sides of the border? There will be variations and modifications, but in my view there are five distinct courses of action from which to choose: continue to muddle through, addressing both the demand side and supply side and interdicting the transit zone; an Afghan-like option, which is to say, dramatically increase the efforts on the security side of the equation with a “surge” strategy; a Japanese-like option, or an
increased emphasis on the demand side of the ledger, in such fashion attempting to greatly reduce the flow of money and weapons to the DTOs; a “re-pactar” option, which is an acceptance of the DTO’s dominant role and a cognizant surrender by the government of Mexico; and finally, a legalization option, one that accepts that demand is a relative constant and attempts to deal with that fact of life. Recognizing that improved development in the political, socioeconomic, and judicial sectors will ultimately have a major impact on the Mexico’s stability, this scenario will take a generation or two to evolve, and for that reason I do not address it here.

With regard to the first option, that is to say, the status quo, the evidence would suggest that the likelihood that such a course of action would be successful is slim. Without minimizing the positive effects produced by a combination of the Mérida Initiative and the government of Mexico’s efforts—and they are considerable—the fact remains that drug production is Mexico is increasing; trafficking of cocaine through Mexico is increasing; drug demand in the U.S. is not decreasing; and the current approach is generating unprecedented levels of violence. Clearly, simply doing more of the same is arguably not likely to improve the results, and therefore is not the best option.

And what of a “surge” option, which could range from a moderate approach of increasing at the margin what is currently being done to a major commitment by both countries to significantly increase the numbers of assets dedicated to the fight? Let us imagine that the Peña Nieto administration could persuade the Mexican Congress to increase spending and grow not only the law enforcement agencies (at the federal level) but also the armed forces and provide them with much greater capabilities. In addition, let us also assume that state governors and municipal leaders had the resources and the political will to also increase state and local police forces (notwithstanding their legendary levels of corruption). Let us also assume that the government of Mexico would permit greater presence of U.S. intelligence, police, and military assets into Mexico to go beyond training and advising to participate in operations. Let us further assume that these forces would operate in a highly cooperative and effective joint, interagency, multilateral fashion. In a best-case scenario, it is conceivable that such an option could be capable of having a direct and measurable impact on the DTOs—both the major players and the growing numbers of smaller regional and local organizations—perhaps even crippling them (in the short run), and dramatically reduce the current levels of violence. However, the likelihood that such a situation could develop—given the political and economic realities in both countries—is arguably even more far-fetched than a drug legalization regime—with the key difference that the former would not eliminate the demand for drugs, and for that reason would likely be but a temporary halt in the violence. Absent a significant reduction in the demand for those substances, new organizations would likely emerge, growing to eventually return to a variation of the current reality. The other negative result of a surge option would be an exacerbation of the “balloon-effect” of displacing the DTOs and their associated violence to either Central America or the Caribbean, where institutions capable of dealing with these effects are even weaker than in Mexico.

The third option is the “Japanese” strategy, which is to suggest that the U.S. should implement laws and regulations so draconian that they significantly reduce
demand. The argument here is that raising the costs for drug consumption creates disincentives sufficiently severe to significantly reduce U.S. levels of demand. While it is true that Japan’s “zero tolerance” policy imposes stiff penalties for consumption or possession, and even more draconian consequences for smuggling or trafficking, the U.S. has already gone down that road. The reality with regard to “tougher” enforcement is what has occurred in the U.S. subsequent to the mandatory minimum sentencing rates enacted during the Reagan administration, with drug arrests increasing by 300 percent since 1980. In 2005, 1,846,351 individuals were arrested for drug law violations, 81.7 percent for possession. The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world, with 506 per 100,000; 53 percent of federally sentenced prisoners were in jail for drug law violations. One would be hard pressed to argue for greater efforts in this regard.

As for the re-pactar option, perhaps the most direct argument for this option is made by Dr. Jorge Castañeda, former Mexican Foreign Minister during the Fox sexenio:

There are things Mexico can do, although they are controversial even in Mexico. First, we need to go back to the modus vivendi that the government, society, and the cartels had over the past 50 years. There was no explicit deal or negotiation, but there was an understanding, and those tacit rules were followed by all sides. They were not ideal rules, and every now and then there were screw-ups: we would have to hand somebody over to the United States as a scapegoat, or we would have a problem with the United States that we had to fix. This could be shocking to many who might wonder how a democratic government could reach an understanding with criminals. Well, Mexico would not be the first country in which this happened.

From a Mexican perspective, perceiving (in my view, correctly) that U.S. demand for drugs is likely to continue for the indefinite future, this option may appear to make the most sense given the high price in lives lost over the past six years.

The fifth and final option, that of drug legalization, is without doubt a politically difficult proposition, not universally popular and lacking bipartisan political support. Beyond the politics, a cogent argument that captures the challenges of changing the status quo comes from Professor Mark Kleiman at UCLA:

The conventional alternative to this conventional wisdom holds that the problem is not drugs but drug laws, and that the solution is therefore legal availability. Since prohibition creates illicit markets, the argument goes, only some form of regulated availability can eliminate the illicit market and the resulting problems. Even under legal availability, say the anti-prohibitionists, prevention and treatment efforts can limit the extent of drug abuse and the damage it causes… But the established understanding and the established alternative share an undue faith in the power of prevention and treatment; the established view also embraces an overoptimistic assessment of the power of enforcement.

Kleiman’s policy recommendation of developing a “surgical strike” approach has legitimate merit for tactical-level actions, and deserves serious consideration.
That said, there does exist the reality that it embraces an overoptimistic assessment of the power of enforcement.

**A Way Forward**

The focus of this paper has been to understand the causal factors driving the levels of insecurity and growing violence in Mexico. I part from a position that what has been done for the past 40 to 50 years simply hasn’t worked, and more of the same is unlikely to improve that record.

To the question of how to move forward and actually begin to implement changes in policy to ultimately legalize most drugs, I acknowledge that such a task is daunting indeed. It will confront resistance from a range of actors, including those who simply oppose the move from the moral perspective, to another extreme with those who actually benefit and profit from the status quo. I also recognize that the process involved will be highly complex, will take years, and will not be cost-free.

With that said, I believe that if done well this move could have tremendously positive effects in a number of areas beyond the obvious of not having to arrest and incarcerate individuals for personal lifestyle choices. There is a strong case to be made that a bilateral effort involving the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. and Mexico, and eventually others in the region (and beyond), could significantly enhance the trust and confidence between our nations as we strive to protect our citizens from insecurity and violence; improve public and individual health; promote human rights; reduce discrimination; save the public treasure from ineffective use of law enforcement and military resources; eliminate a major income source for organized crime; and ultimately enhance international development and security by reducing conflict.

The myriad policies, processes, and measures to be taken are the subject of another work. An excellent source of well-thought out ideas and recommendations is to be found in a study published by Transform Drug Policy Foundation, “After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation.” It is replete with recommendations for regulating drug supply as a means of moving away from the current drug prohibitionist regime.

I conclude by suggesting a few key points. First, this must be a bilateral effort between U.S. and Mexico, with offers to Central America and the Caribbean to join. We must recognize at the outset that the move from the current prohibitionist regime to a legalized regime must be done over time in a phased approach. We must also make clear that current criminal organizations and others involved with the illegal trade will continue to be prosecuted, particularly for crimes unrelated to the cultivation and production of the drugs (murder, extortion, kidnapping, etc.). The project should begin with the most readily acceptable drug first—marijuana—and integrate it with a licensed sales model. Regulatory agencies on both sides of the border reach out to reputable firms to offer licenses for the cultivation, production, and distribution of the product. As the project moves forward, we proceed cautiously with other drug types to minimize harm to public health while protecting individual choice and liberty.

Finally, in addition to the compelling national security concerns that require
attention to this crisis, there is a moral component to this argument. It is the height of irresponsibility and hubris for the U.S. government to accept that the demand of U.S. consumers for these drugs be the oxygen that fuels the consuming fire of violence south of her border. It represents yet the latest example that supports the classic line—“Poor Mexico, so far from God, and so close to the United States.” Full recognition and acceptance of this reality, accompanied by a concerted effort to rectify this tragic situation, would go far to begin to soothe the deep and longstanding wounds perceived by our southern neighbors.

Notes

6 Japan has five broad anti-drug laws: the Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Law; the Opium Law; the Cannabis Control Law; the Stimulants Control Law; and the Law Concerning Special Provisions for the Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Law, etc., and Other Matters for the Prevention of Activities Encouraging Illicit Conduct or Involving Controlled Substances through International Cooperation.
7 For individual possession, an offender can be imprisoned for a maximum of 10 years, and may include interment in a mental hospital. For smugglers and traffickers, the minimum sentence is for three years up to an indefinite prison stay.
10 Jorge Castañeda, CATO Institute Economic Development Bulletin no. 13 (May 6, 2010).
Four Drug Policy Options

Timothy Lynch

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For a long time the drug policy debate in Washington, D.C., revolved around two simple questions. The first question was: How much more money should we put into the drug war effort next year? And the second question was: Where should we put the new money? The treatment side or the enforcement side of the budget? And that has been the way the debate unfolded.

I want to thank the National Defense University for organizing this timely discussion where the parameters are going to be broadened to address other questions and perspectives, such as whether or not the drug war effort is working, and, if not, what other policy options are available? In my view, there are four policy options to choose from. The first one is escalation of the drug war policy. The second one is to basically maintain the status quo. The third option is decriminalization. And the fourth option is legalization. I will briefly address each of these policy options.

The first option, escalation, has been the policy response of Washington, D.C., for about the past 40 years. It centers on the idea of putting even more money into the war effort, ever-expanding budget appropriations for more police agents, prosecutors, and prisons. During the 1990s, we were building, on average, one prison per week. And as soon as those prisons were built, they were immediately filled with prisoners. Senator Jim Webb (D-VA) has brought a lot of attention to the incarceration rates in the United States in the past three or four years. Webb has pointed out that America has about 5 percent of the world’s population, but fully 25 percent of the world’s prisoners. So against that background, no one can say that our government has not been trying hard. We’ve put a lot of money into the drug war, and we’ve built a lot of prisons, locking a lot of people up. So the next question is, what has been the result of all of this effort?

Well, the prison expansion has not had an impact on the supply of drugs. Drugs are readily available in American cities. In fact, here in Washington, D.C., the Washington Post will occasionally publish an article about open-air drug markets. Right here in the city! The Post will have an inset that identifies which street corners in the city are operated as open-air drug markets. And this is the city where the DEA and the Drug Czar are headquartered! Our drug officials are trying hard, and they can point to certain narrow areas where drug production has decreased (for example, maybe a 10 percent reduction in countries like Bolivia), but the bottom line is that the war policies haven’t seriously impacted drug supplies on American streets.

What about drug use? Has the war stopped people from using drugs? No. Tens of millions of people in the U.S. continue to use drugs. There was a recent article in Washingtonian magazine about a booming marijuana market here in the capital. So the black market continues to thrive here and elsewhere.
So much money and effort going into this war policy hasn’t stopped drugs from coming into this country, it hasn’t stopped people from using drugs, and it hasn’t kept drugs away from our schools. High school students continually report that it’s easier for them to obtain marijuana and other illegal drugs than it is to obtain some of the legal drugs, such as alcohol.

Consider the actual results of the war policy. We’ve got a lot of crime, corruption, and curtailment of our civil and constitutional rights. With regard to this policy option of escalation, I’m afraid there is no room for any more of it. We’ve “maxed out,” as I’ve mentioned, with the incarceration figures. Last year, the Supreme Court had to order the state of California to reduce its prison population. That was an extraordinary ruling because the judiciary typically says that issues like that are for the executive branch, the prison administrators, to deal with. But the prison situation had gotten so bad that when the conditions of California prisons were presented to the Supreme Court, the majority said that ample time and opportunity had already been given to correct those problems. The Court ordered California policymakers to reduce the prison population over a period of three years. Thus, between the prison overpopulation and budgetary crisis, I conclude that escalation is no longer a viable policy option in the United States.

Moving on to the next option, what about the status quo? Can we muddle along with what we’ve been doing previously? I don’t think this is going to be a viable policy option either. For the longest time, the drug policy of Washington, D.C., has been the drug policy of the world. We’ve been able to offer financial aid packages to other countries, especially in Latin America. And Washington has been able to pressure other countries that were thinking about alternative reform efforts. The idea has been that this is a worldwide problem and therefore we need a unified, international approach to combat the black market. For a long time we were able to maintain that policy, but it’s not viable anymore. It’s breaking down here at home and it’s also breaking down abroad.

Here on the home front, states are beginning to liberalize their drug laws. Despite the lobbying efforts of federal officials who do not want to see this policy change take place, lawmakers and voter initiatives at the local and state level are moving toward liberalization in certain areas.

Decriminalization is the third option to be considered. Other countries are already breaking away from the hard-line American approach to drug policy. Portugal, unlike Amsterdam and the Netherlands, where law enforcement tends to look the other way, decriminalized all drugs in 2000. It is the most liberalized country with respect to drugs. Many people said if they decriminalized drugs, they would have problems: a big spike in drug use, a public health crisis, and drug tourists (people will flock to that country for no other reason than to use drugs). Nine years after decriminalization, Cato published a paper that examined the effects of decriminalization in Portugal. Turns out, the fears did not materialize: no drug tourism, and drug use did not spike. Use actually declined. Compared with other European countries, Portugal is doing well. Policymakers across the political spectrum reached a consensus to maintain the decriminalization policy in Portugal. And now other countries are considering that policy option.

Legalization is the last policy option. I advocate this policy because I think
it makes the most sense. We have an American historical precedent. In the 1920s, we thought we could tackle the problems associated with alcoholism by using the criminal law approach. People went into the prohibition policy in good faith, hoping to solve alcohol-related problems in our society. Of course, what we discovered was that that policy actually created more problems than it solved. There was an explosion of crime, corruption, and curtailment of our civil and constitutional rights. When we decided that policy was not working, we reversed course.

True, alcohol prohibition isn’t the most perfect analogy. However, I think it is one that fits reasonably well because we have tried to use the criminal law approach for drug addiction, and this policy is also creating more problems than it is solving. We should treat substances like marijuana, cocaine, and heroin basically the way we treat liquor. There should be age restrictions, and a criminal law that would target those driving under the influence of drugs. In general, however, adults should be allowed to use narcotics, but the law should hold users responsible for the consequences of their actions.

As I look over current political trends, I believe legalization is where the world is going. In 10 years, marijuana is going to be legal in the United States. We have an excellent precedent making news right now with the gay marriage issue. Whether you agree with it or not, when people years ago were asked if they thought gay marriage would be legal, they said “no way.” Just a few years ago, the concept seemed too far out and a timeframe for change was difficult to project. Over time, public opinion polls keep telling us that marijuana should be legalized in the United States.

While I believe legalization is the direction in which we are heading, I would not suggest to you that all of our problems will just go away. Organized crime won’t go away, but it will definitely take a huge hit, because right now we are sending a river of money into the coffers of the mob. That would stop in the same way that moving away from alcohol prohibition rerouted money that had been going to the mob into the coffers of legitimate wine and beer companies.

Drug abuse is going to remain a problem for those involved in it and for their friends and family. Still, we should treat addiction as a health problem rather than an issue for the police department. The policy ground is shifting and I think it is shifting for good and valid reasons. Years ago, advocates of drug legalization were often pilloried as people who wanted to use drugs and just didn’t want to be arrested. Those types of attacks on legalization advocates just don’t fly anymore.

The Global Drug Commission, for example, is headed by esteemed and serious individuals, including Paul Volker, George Schultz, and heads of state from Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. Recently, in a New York Times column, a former policy official from Poland wrote about how he had previously favored the hard-line approach but has since shifted his view to legalization and consideration of drug abuse as a health problem. Ultimately, the ground is shifting both domestically and internationally in favor of legalization, and I think that shift is the proper course for both America and other countries around the world.
Let me thank Richard Downie, Howard Wiarda, and NDU for putting together this forum on drug policy. This is the fifth one I’ve done in the last two months. When I left office as the Drug Czar, I vowed that I would no longer speak on this subject, but it remains a hot issue and I continue to be called upon to comment. My views on this subject have not changed since then; I remain as opposed to a liberalization of drug laws as I was before.

However, let me say that Tim Lynch made an excellent presentation. His is a clear, coherent, honest presentation of an alternative policy. I especially applaud his honesty because so many who speak on this subject are not straightforward. He has laid out the options for us to consider and has teed up the issues quite nicely.

To understand my position, you need to keep in mind my background. My attitudes are like those of a lot of people of my generation. I came out of West Point in 1964. At that stage I’d never seen an illegal drug in my life. But in the following 10 years I saw the degeneration of the American armed forces because of drug use, and I saw the impact of drug use on American society in general. To me, this was appalling. And we’ve seen this history before with regard to drugs. Somebody says we need to legalize drugs and then we huff and puff over this for a while, and then people get outraged and we organize ourselves against drug policy liberalization. Usually it’s mothers, teachers, employers, and army first sergeants who organize the opposition. They know above all others what it’s like to have to deal with drug use. And that’s a pretty tough coalition to overcome.

There are three elements to a successful drug policy. These are, first of all, prevention education; second, treatment; and three, law enforcement. Hands down, the one I am most interested in is prevention education. The problem here is not people 25 and older, it’s fifth and sixth graders and on through junior high and high school. We’ve found through our studies that if you can reduce or delay drug use at an early age, then 10 years later you have less of a problem with crime and other abuses than if you don’t control it. So preventive education has to occupy a central place in any society’s efforts on drug policy. I believe we’ve done that pretty effectively.

Let me turn to the second aspect of the policy, treatment. Since I left public life, the hardest thing I’ve had to deal with, bar none, is chronic addiction, chronic substance abuse, and habitual users. You all know that the most addictive drug in America is alcohol, followed by the others. Depending on the study you look at, there may be anywhere between 10 and 23 million Americans who have a chronic addiction problem. It goes without saying that there are 300 million Americans who don’t use drugs, don’t abuse alcohol, and don’t smoke cigarettes. But the chronic
users are a malignancy in their own communities. You may know that to counter this abuse I’m on the CRC Health Board group, I’ve been involved with Phoenix House, and I’m on the Board of Directors of the National Institute of Drug Courts. We have around 3,000 drug courts now, with an unbelievably positive effect on abusive drug use. Because you all know that if you’re an eighth grader and you start using drugs, you’re going to like it. And pretty soon you’ve advanced to pot, booze, ecstasy, and other heavy drugs. And a very large percentage of these young users will end up as chronic addicts.

There are other factors involved for which we don’t yet have definitive information. Some of these are genetic, others are situational. For example, we know that if both parents are alcoholics and/or abuse drugs, there is a 50 percent likelihood that their children will also become addicts. So we need desperately to reduce the number who are chronically addicted. And to do that, you must do two things. The first, again, is preventive education. We have to have those mothers, sergeants, teachers, ministers, and other role models step up and say that in this house/organization/school/outfit we don’t use illegal drugs. And we don’t abuse alcohol either, particularly under the age of 21. So if you do a lot of these things, the problem goes down. However, we also know that it never quite goes away. Nevertheless, if you do nothing or wink your eye at it, usage goes up again and the abuse that goes with it. We need constant vigilance and no relaxation of the policies we have in place.

Three years in a row, now, drug use has gone up in America. I believe we are again on the front end of another stupid disaster. Not enough voices are raised against this, and the politicians are often intimidated or overwhelmed by the other side. Some very clever arguments have been advanced on the other side of this issue. People say, “Oh, it’s not all that big a deal.” But it is a big deal. And we are at risk of losing a whole generation of kids and young people to the drug scourge. We need to continue and step up our preventive education programs.

There is also much we can do about the chronically addicted. We spend $800 million dollars per year on the National Institute of Drug Abuse. We have protocols in place that are dedicated to relapse prevention. Those programs produce better results than do current oncology therapies. If you talk to a minister, a teacher, or a military officer, these people can guide you toward an effective treatment program. On the other hand, we should not lose sight of the huge dimension of this problem: of the more than 12 million persons in this country who are chronically addicted, only about 25 percent of them have access to treatment facilities. That is a major shortcoming of U.S. drug policy.

I know that some of you cite the examples of the Netherlands and Portugal as having successful drug legalization policies. First of all, I want to insist that legalization is bad policy and not the way to go. Second, it’s already become clear that in the Netherlands the policy has not been successful and has given rise to a host of other problems—rising crime, runaway children, a pathway to even more dangerous drugs, addiction at younger and younger ages, etc. The Portuguese case is too recent to evaluate; remember also that Lisbon, unlike Amsterdam, is a long way from the core or central area of Europe, where most of the problems are. And third, both these countries are very different from the United States—less diverse, less pluralistic, more homogeneous, etc. We cannot use them as models for anything regarding our own drug policy.
And that brings me back to the United States. If you want to understand the drug problem here, go to the emergency room of a big-city hospital, go to a municipal judge, go to a police officer with 10 or more years on the job, or visit a seasoned social worker. They’ll all tell you that they know the names and histories of just about every drug addict in every U.S. city. They are arrested up to 20 or 30 times per year, they often test positive for HIV, they frequently have tuberculosis-like sores, and everyone has given up on them. Everyone, that is except, their mothers. But if we can get them into the drug court system, then we can get them treatment, we can mandate drug testing, and we can help them. If we get a hold of them early enough, we can cure up to 80 percent of them. And a year later we see them as responsible family members and responsible citizens.

What would happen if we legalized drugs? To begin with, we should clarify that we are not fighting a “war” on drugs. We’re looking to educate people, to provide treatment, and to strengthen law enforcement. And even if you call it a “war,” it’s not a war we’re losing. In fact, we’ve come a long way over the years.

Let me talk for a moment about the earlier period, before we had the programs we have now. In 1979 around 13 percent of Americans were using drugs on at least a monthly basis, and for many of us in the military or civilian life it was a nightmare. In Germany in the late-1970s on the U.S. military bases, the problems had gotten completely out of hand. Drug use and addiction were widespread. But today, most U.S. industries are drug-free, or close to it, and so by and large are the armed forces, including National Guard and reserve units. I’d say we have been quite successful over the intervening 30 years.

There are many things, let us admit it, that the United States has not done. The number of people behind bars, 2.1 million, is outrageous. But it’s misleading to say that those number are only or even mainly for drug use. It is the case that 80 percent of the chronic prison population have alcohol or chronic and usually multi-drug abuse problems. But they’re not there just because of drug use. They are often dealers or criminals. The reason they’re in jail is not because they have a joint or two in their pocket but because they broke into a house, stuck up a store, used violence, or committed an armed robbery. The numbers used by legalization advocates in this regard are often highly misleading.

Finally, let me turn to the international community. I know that ex-President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and other international leaders are calling for a rethinking and reorientation of drug policy. And we do need to listen carefully to these other leaders. But let us also be thankful for Presidents Álvaro Uribe in Colombia and Felipe Calderón in Mexico. Let us also be thankful for the Colombian national police, who, with integrity and courage, have become one of the most effective police forces in the world. And let us also be thankful for the Mexican army and marine corps without whom Mexico would be in far greater trouble. The political leaderships of Uribe, Calderón, and now Santos in Colombia have turned the drug situation around from what it was 15 years ago.

It goes without saying that I don’t think we should legalize drugs. We have a problem in this country, but if you’re a mother or a military officer you know the situation has been greatly turned around from two or more decades ago. Today the percentage who test positive for drugs in the armed forces is under 2 percent. Us-
age in the factory and in other institutions is way down as well. Flash back to the 1970s and look at those institutions then: quite a number of them were on the verge of collapse.

There is a new conversation going on in this country about drugs, and perhaps we need to have that. But we need to guard against it moving in the wrong direction. I believe that some in our political leadership have been intimidated. And if you ask the American people, many say, “Yeah, well, maybe pot isn’t so bad, and then on top of that we should have heroin to deal with chronic pain.” Most of these arguments are balderdash. You don’t smoke marijuana because you have prostate cancer, nor do you grow marijuana because you’re saving America’s forests! Some Hollywood celebrities, noted agronomists like Woody Harrelson, have proposed just that. But we all know that this is just plain nonsense—even while it has its advocates.

Pain management in the United States is a big problem. We all know that. But that is not the issue before us. Did you know that the biggest drug problem in America today is not marijuana or even heroin but the diversion of otherwise legal opiates like Percocet, Percodan, and OxyContin? These are truly terrible drugs and their use is skyrocketing. Why would you rely on some poor Bolivian coca growers for a 15-minute high when some idiot with a high school degree or less can make methamphetamines for a high that last six hours? And, by the way, it also burns out your nose and destroys brain cells in the process, leaving you permanently impaired. Remember those ads, very effective, of a generation ago that showed an egg cooking on a hot, boiling sidewalk with the voiceover that says, “This is your brain destroying itself on drugs.” These were effective ads!

Put me down as a friend of those Latin American regimes in Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere, who have dealt effectively with drugs. To a considerable extent, which we should applaud, these governments have turned a bad situation around. The problem is no longer so much U.S. consumption; in fact, we’ve also turned the situation around. But Mexican consumption, Brazilian consumption, and Venezuelan consumption have all gone way up. And so has consumption in Pakistan, Russia, Europe, and other places.

So for me, the discussion of legalization is off base. Legalization would be very harmful and would set back all the successes of recent decades. On the other hand, if you want to see the argument for an alternative, look at Tim Lynch’s contribution in this forum. At least his, in contrast to too many others, is an honest, coherent, and viable presentation—even while I myself do not swallow it.
Many recent examinations of irregular warfare and asymmetrical conflict have attempted to identify and trace ubiquitous factors that have influenced these strategies in both the past and present. The ability to make such identifications, and subsequently successfully conduct “low-intensity” operations in response to such unconventional threats has become an important component in the toolkit of the contemporary warfighter and policymaker. In *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*, Max Boot seeks to analyze central tenets of irregular conflict—and how such maxims can dictate success or failure for the insurgent or terrorist—in an thorough and refreshing manner that not only emphasizes several underdeveloped topics in the asymmetrical conflict discourse, but also challenges the reader’s very notions of “conventional” versus “unconventional” warfare.

Intended for the general public—but detailed enough for the professional practitioner—*Invisible Armies* follows the evolution of guerrilla warfare from its inception in the ancient world, to its diversification and modification in the liberal revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the World Wars, and the Cold War, to its current amorphous form in the contemporary conflicts being waged in Iraq and Afghanistan. With such a far-reaching scope, *Invisible Armies* has the potential to unfold more like a well-researched reference volume than an evolutionary historical analysis, but Boot’s well-arranged subdivisions create books and chapters that function much like vignettes or case studies, allowing the reader to readily track the development of cardinal principles of guerrilla warfare throughout history. In particular, Boot does an excellent job of distinguishing which components of guerrilla warfare were merely products of the political and military constraints of their time, and which ones managed to transcend history, geography, and culture.

*Invisible Armies* excels, however, is in its ability to challenge preconceived notions and definitions of guerrilla warfare and those who use it as a military and political tool. Boot effectively manages to differentiate between “guerrilla” and “terrorist” in his analysis, generating useful, apt comparisons that are often overlooked in other similar studies. More fascinating is his view that, when examined over the total course of human conflict, guerrilla warfare has been far more common and “conventional” than the varieties of warfare that are now usually deemed as “traditional” or “regular.” The notion that guerrilla warfare has always played an important role not only in human conflict but in shaping history as well is a central theme that Boot argues cogently throughout *Invisible Armies*, especially in his closing chapter,
in which he provides a list of “lessons” pertaining to guerrilla warfare that can be learned from its study over the course of history.

While several books and chapters throughout Invisible Armies perhaps deserve individual mention, Boot’s sections pertaining to current guerrilla conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Latin America will prove very pertinent and informative to those interested in contemporary case studies of irregular conflict and “low-intensity” responses. Here Boot does an admirable job of demonstrating the effects political and religious ideology can have on generating momentum for guerrilla efforts, and, conversely, how securing the “hearts and minds” of the populace both actively and passively has become vital in successful modern counterinsurgency operations and strategy.

Despite several unique perspectives and innovative interpretations of older ideas, Boot’s analysis is not without flaws. In many ways, the greatest strength of Invisible Armies is its most noticeable weakness: the scope perhaps is too broad and exhaustive. At times, certain vignettes are so enthralling that they leave the reader with a desire for more detail on the featured historic event instead of additional exposition on the event’s influence on guerrilla warfare. Finally, in some chapters it is difficult to accept that reasons governing the implementation and use of guerrilla warfare can so easily cover the time in the manner that Boot suggests; while Rome’s suppression of guerrilla bands in Judea in 70AD may have similarities to counterinsurgency efforts in modern Afghanistan, certainly motivations and interpretations that influenced such actions cannot be viewed entirely through the same lens.

Although perhaps slightly too broad in scope and guilty of minor elements of “mirror-imaging,” Invisible Armies is an excellent study of the evolution of guerrilla warfare that not only forces the reexamination of traditional notions and ideas of irregular warfare, but also introduces fresh and inventive concepts into the study of asymmetrical conflict.

More about Invisible Armies
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Killing with Kindness: Haiti, International Aid, and NGOs

By Mark Schuller

Reviewed by Emily Bushman
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Mark Schuller, assistant professor of anthropology and NGO leadership development at Northern Illinois University, tackles the deeply entrenched and protracted issues involving international aid and NGOs in developing nations in his new book *Killing with Kindness: Haiti, International Aid, and NGOs*. His work compiles years of fieldwork, interviews, and research on the ground in Haiti throughout the political turmoil of the late 1990s and early 2000s, as well as the disastrous earthquake. Schuller focuses on studying and analyzing the impacts of NGOs and includes two detailed case studies of Haitian-organized and female-operated NGOs especially concerned with HIV/AIDS work, Sove Lavi and Fanm Tèt Ansanm.

Schuller divides *Killing with Kindness* into five sections, and includes a conclusion as well as an afterword with policy suggestions. The first of these sections covers the simultaneously richly unique and undeniably complicated history of Haiti, essential knowledge for the reader moving forward in the book. Without the critical background information on the country in which the two NGO case studies operate, the rest of the research would be senseless and out of context. Schuller details well the political turmoil of Haiti during the Aristide regime, and provides a much-needed context as he delves into the different case studies throughout the rest of the work.

The bulk of Schuller’s work compares and contrasts the structures and means of operations for the Sove Lavi and Fanm Tèt Ansanm NGOs. Schuller discusses the ways grassroots organizations participate in the groups, the relationships individuals have with each other and with the NGOs, and the relationships the NGOs have with donor groups and governments. The main difference between the two groups, according to Schuller, is that Sove Lavi is much more donor-dependent than Fanm Tèt Ansanm.

In the more hierarchical Sove Lavi, employees in the higher positions often go entire days without interacting with employees in lower positions. By contrast, Fanm Tèt Ansanm has a collaborative and more interdependent structure. While still hierarchical, it is common for employees of Fanm Tèt Ansamn to work together and discuss the issues and reports they are working on. Sove Lavi relies on one or two large public American donor groups, which causes them to struggle with autonomy and control of their agendas. If donors disagree with strategy or programs Sove Lavi proposes, they will remove funding, so donors exercise control over the policy agendas of Sove Lavi.

Fanm Tèt Ansanm, however, pulls from around five private European donor
groups. These European NGOs consider themselves partners rather than strictly donors, and offer flexibility that allows Fanm Tèt Ansanm to control its policy agenda more effectively. If one donor group disagrees with and defunds a program, there are several other groups to appeal to for funding.

The relationships within the groups as well as with donors provide critical insight into the functionality and impact of NGOs on a developing nation. The next section of the book considers the political environment of the United States and the role of USAID, specifically. This portion of the book offers specific research and insight into the relationships between the NGOs and USAID. It also emphasizes the NGOs’ struggles with maintaining their autonomy in terms of programming while seeking funding.

In the conclusion and afterword, Schuller offers recommendations, suggesting avenues to move forward not only for NGOs in general, but also for governments, donor groups, and the nations’ general populations. Schuller recommends that NGOs maintain greater autonomy of their programming and share information with one another, allowing them to apply their on-the-ground experience effectively.

Schuller stresses the need for NGOs to increase participation with the grassroots groups in the population in order to effectively enact their agendas. He urges the government to “steer, not row” in their relationships with the NGOs and encourages USAID and other donors to “accompany, not dictate to” the NGOs. For the general population, Schuller urges people to “occupy government,” insisting that all the work of the NGOs, donors, and government “will go nowhere without active citizen pressure.”

Schuller does not set a timeline or an outline dictating how the people of Haiti or any developing nation ought to go about enacting changes. He also does not presume that one solution will apply to all nations. Instead, he offers recommendations for ways in which nations, NGOs, and the people to work toward goals effectively. Indeed, Schuller’s parting comments urge everyone to “Kenbe fem,” or “hold strong,” in order to work toward healthier, more prosperous, and safer living environments.

More about *Killing with Kindness*
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By Gastón Fornés and Alan Butt Philip

Reviewed by Philip Cofone
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The China–Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and the Future of Globalisation details the burgeoning relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the Latin America–Caribbean region, relying on various global perspectives including those of policymakers, multinational companies and economic players. The authors, Dr. Gastón Fornés and UK academic Alan Butt Philip, provide the reader with a comprehensive economic analysis of this evolving relationship in the context of emerging markets as the new center for foreign investment and international trade. This concise book, approximately 200 pages with several useful tables and appendices, is particularly relevant given the economic slowdown in the developed world and the ways in which globalization is establishing a more equal international economic playing field.

The first half of The China–Latin America Axis serves as a crash course in the key principles and actors driving the development of this economic orientation. Its numerous graphs, charts, and tables display the rising percentage of foreign trade and investments emanating from and entering emerging markets. The major characteristics of emerging markets (economic competitiveness, institutional traits, and domestic company profiles) provide context to the China–Latin America relationship. It is from this context that the China–Latin America axis is examined in great detail, highlighting the nature of the economic rapport and its transition to its present state. This segment of the book ends with the chapter titled “China–Latin America Axis: The Emerging Markets Axis” that concisely describes from a microeconomic viewpoint the major national players, the flows of investment, and the sectors of the economy most integral in developing this axis of trade that now rivals that of the U.S.-EU-Japan Triad. While the evidence used by the authors to stress these points is useful, the intensive use of graphs, charts, tables, and citations makes it a slow read and more along the lines of an IMF report than an insightful narrative on the multifaceted relationship between China and the many countries of Latin America.

From here, the book posits some rationale that could be behind China’s engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean and vice versa. While Chinese interests emphasize trade and investment, particularly resource procurement, the Latin American rationale has been less outlined owing to each nation’s maintaining its own positions with no multinational institutions aligning the region’s interests absolutely. Furthermore, the lack of knowledge of the Chinese system and the unbalanced nature of the economic relationship has created mistrust in Latin America regarding China’s true intentions. “Chinese Dragons” and “Multilatinas,”
as the multinational enterprises (MNEs) from those countries have been dubbed, are detailed in great depth by the authors, who examine their respective evolutions, characteristics, cultural mentality, and their prospects in international markets.

Unfortunately, granted that this is not the principal goal of the publication, the book fails to bring the same level of detail and analysis to the significant geopolitical ramifications of the China–Latin America relationship. The strategic interest of the Peoples Republic of China in Latin America thus far has been the acquisition of energy and mineral resources to feed the input demands of the ‘world’s factory,’ with a secondary objective of selling manufactured goods in the region, which differs from other Chinese South-South partnerships (i.e., China-Africa). While “the main objective of the Chinese was to create Red Flag or Revolutionary Communist Parties” during the height of the Cold War, this has been abandoned for economic interests since the reforms of Den Xiaoping, China’s pragmatic approach surely has geopolitical affects unmentioned in this book.

The development of Latin American democracy and strengthened human rights standards are no doubt being negatively impacted by China’s apolitical stance. The Chinese MNEs, largely supported by the government, seem to be solely interested in resource extraction through financing the development of infrastructure to extract mineral and energy resources. This apolitical approach doesn’t apply the same pressure on foreign governments to enact internal reforms, highlighting China’s own focus on sovereignty. This to an extent provides an outlet to these outlier regimes to subsist independent from the EU and American circle, in particular the member states of the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas. When living standards eventually reach a certain social tipping point in Latin America, internal pressure can occur similar to the Arab Spring movement.

Overall, *The China–Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and the Future of Globalisation* will provide the reader with a concise, yet detailed investigation into the China–Latin American engagement as a rising alignment of global trade. China’s voracious commodities demands and Latin America’s demand for low-value manufactured goods has driven the relationship to its current state of more than $100 billion in bilateral trade per annum. While the Marxist revolutionary fervor of the PRC during the Cold War has long since abated, some question the long-term apolitical position of China as its economic interests are threatened by a desire for transparent democracy, environmental protection, and universal human rights. Regardless, the rise of this trading partnership as a new fixture in the global economy provides sustenance to a new paradigm of a greater international balance of power.

More about *The China–Latin America Axis*
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Comandante: Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela

By Rory Carroll

Reviewed by Cole Gibson

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Rory Carroll, an Irish journalist, husband to a Venezuelan wife, and former chief of the Latin American bureau of the UK’s Guardian, renders a keen picture of Venezuela’s infamous and charismatic leader, Hugo Chávez in his new book. After coming to power in 1999, Chávez passed away this March, leaving the country in political uncertainty. Carroll’s timely account describes Chávez’s creation of an authoritarian democracy. This unique boligarchy—“the term fused ‘Bolivar’ and ‘oligarchs’ to underline the new elite’s political allegiance”—writes Carroll, shaped Venezuela’s identity.

Comandante: Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela chronicles, with new dimension, the life of Venezuela’s citizen, soldier, media mogul, and president, Hugo Chávez. Carroll traces Chávez’s life with chapters titled “Throne,” “Palace,” and “Kingdom.” As each chapter of his life evolves, the country seems to decay. Increasingly, the apparent utopia is deconstructed, and Carroll unravels the myths of Chávez’s upbringing, social agenda, economic policies, and media coverage. Each story is told with vignettes of prominent actors inside the Chavista regime and out. Those who fell from power and those who speak with ease in the aftermath of Chávez’s death paint a very different picture of Venezuelan life from the government’s standard history. Chávez’s history recounts successful economic ventures and unanimously supportive crowds, when really the environment was tumultuous, and the economy was on the rocks.

Carroll lived in Caracas while he covered Latin America, and his subsequent reporting and interviews, including a personal interview with the man himself, give focus to the story of Chávez’s life. He was present at the palace of Miraflores through years of cheers and boos, including a 2002 coup attempt against Chávez. Carroll amends the version of Chávez’s family history that was “reordered to fit the new official truth” of destitute poverty instead of Chávez’s actual government-subsidized living, and tracks the rise of the ideologue.

Carroll recounts how young Hugo’s dreams of becoming a baseball star led him to the army’s baseball league as a young cadet, but it was his 1992 military coup that would set the stage for his legacy, an event which became known as “a rebellion that changed the destiny of the republic” during his presidency. Carroll does stress that, eventually, Chávez was democratically elected as president. From there, Carroll shows his ability to stay on top is indeed revolutionary, yet perhaps not shocking, due to the frequent onslaught of propaganda circulated at new levels.

For Venezuela, it was also a revelation. “It is Bolivar coming back to life,” Carroll quotes a Chavista. Under the holy trinity of the revolution—“Christ, Bolivar, and Karl Marx”—that turned into the repeated mantra of, “fatherland, socialism, or death,” fervor for Chávez swept the country. Media was centralized, oil was central-
ized, and, above all, the government was centralized. Ties with Fidel Castro in Cuba were tightened, and a new brand of governance claimed to be neither capitalism nor communism. What seemed to be a utopia was squandered. Carroll digs into the real faults of the man who charmed a nation on the news program, “Hello, President,” but isolated millions when his grandiose ideas did not come to fruition. Dissenters lost jobs and, ultimately, livelihoods.

Carroll offers a more sympathetic view than most, however, insisting that Chávez was not alone in designing and implementing these grand failures. His rise was orchestrated with the help of other like-minded ideologues. Their support propelled Chávez forward, even as some fellow travelers fell away. “We have become a dictatorship with the façade of democracy,” an old ally and former Minister of Defense, Raúl Baduel, says of Venezuela.

With Chávez now gone, Carroll wisely does not attempt to predict what comes next for the country. Instead, he asks the reader to think about the opportunities wasted. Carroll shows that Chávez had had enormous scope as a politician with compassion for the poor and a chance to shape a model society. Instead, we can reflect on this story as a “fiasco,” as Carroll calls it—a moment in time lost, with a comandante who led Venezuela with a promise he did not keep.

Hugo Chávez used his voice for the poor to script his version of a worker’s paradise. Carroll strips that varnished version, showing how Chávez’s failed economic policies divided and conquered the people he purported to speak for. Instead of creating a new form of governance, Chávez conquered Venezuela’s hope for change. Boligarch and Comandante, Chávez was, in fact, another conquistador.

More about Comandante
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Two Nations Indivisible: 
Mexico, The United States, and the Road Ahead

By Shannon K. O’Neil

Reviewed by Patrick Hernández

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The publication of Two Nations Indivisible by Shannon K. O’Neil, a senior fellow for Latin America studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, could scarcely have come at a more critical juncture for Mexico. With the recent passage of education and telecommunications reforms and the implementation of a new security strategy, it is clear that the United States’s relationship with a dynamic and growing Mexico, as Ms. O’Neil convincingly argues, has been and will continue to be of vital importance for both nations.

The author’s prior work as an equity analyst and a fellow at Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs lends her the ability to write about U.S.-Mexican relations from a position of intellectual authority and personal experience. She frames the book around one central idea: Mexico and the United States have historically misunderstood one another, and neither country can afford to continue formulating policy on the basis of flawed assumptions. Two Nations Indivisible is intended to function as a historical primer that corrects these assumptions and articulates a path forward.

The book devotes a chapter each to five main issues: diplomatic relations, immigration, democratization, economic growth, and security. O’Neil explains the impact of critical changes in these areas, including the collapse of the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s dictatorship, the signing of NAFTA, and the beginnings of the current drug war. A final chapter, “Deciding Our Mutual Future,” proposes policy changes.

Woven throughout the book is O’Neil’s argument for the increasing importance of Mexico’s middle class. Indeed, nearly every chapter contains an anecdote that describes how a given issue has affected a middle class family and, in turn, how its experiences affect those of its counterparts across the border. The author is careful to note that more than 10 million Mexicans—roughly 10 percent of the population—still live in extreme poverty. Nevertheless, she portrays the middle class as the key to understanding the future of Mexico itself, and of the bilateral relationship. O’Neil draws a historical comparison with Franco-era Spain, in which rapid economic growth led to the creation of a middle class that transformed the country from the sick man of mid-century Europe into a stable, wealthy democracy. The titular road ahead, O’Neil suggests, will be defined by whether Mexican and U.S. policymakers aid in Mexico’s ascent to becoming the “Spain of the Western Hemisphere,” or whether they abdicate their responsibility and lose this historic opportunity.

The strengths of Two Nations Indivisible rest in the author’s comprehensive
overview of modern Mexican history, and in her largely successful attempt to link Mexico’s trajectory to that of its northern neighbor. O’Neil’s descriptions of Mexico’s changing relationship with the United States merge political and economic explanations for key events into the fabric of U.S.-Mexican relations writ large. Her arguments in favor of the mutual benefits of healthy U.S.-Mexican relations are exceptionally persuasive.

Regrettably, there is relatively little here for those familiar with the contours of U.S.-Mexican relations and modern Mexican history. There is neither groundbreaking historical analysis nor particularly detailed contemporary research. Moreover, O’Neil’s repeated exhortations for both countries to overcome their history of frosty relations seem somewhat futile. One need only refer to the 2008 comments of Mexico’s then-president of the National Human Rights Commission, José Luis Soberanes, who argued that human rights conditions placed on the disbursal of U.S. security assistance funds were a violation of Mexican sovereignty, or statements by U.S. media outlets and military planners who suggest that Mexico could become a failed state. O’Neil is correct that these and other misunderstandings weaken the bilateral relationship, but her proposed solutions are generally vague or reliant on an overly sunny prognosis of domestic political realities in both countries.

There is, however, one particularly salient theme in Two Nations Indivisible that augurs well for the future of the U.S.-Mexican relationship. The author paints a compelling picture of two countries, whose citizens have always reached beyond policymakers’ misunderstandings and created a mutually beneficial and valuable relationship. The flow of goods, people, and ideas across both sides of the border has never stopped. This, more than any other factor, offers hope for a continually improving relationship in the years to come.

Two Nations Indivisible is a valuable introduction for those unfamiliar with Mexican history or the evolution of U.S.-Mexican relations. Although it contributes little to the existing literature and never quite achieves its lofty goal of offering a realistic roadmap for improved relations, it is an engaging and worthwhile volume that should be required reading for Mexican and U.S. policymakers.
Contratapa

(Contratapa offers the abstracts found in this volume in a second language)

China, Los Estados Unidos, y Latinoamérica: Desafíos y Oportunidades

(China, United States, and Latin America: Challenges and Opportunities)

Michael Kryzanek

RESUMEN

Este trabajo provee un análisis comparativo del papel emergente de China en las relaciones internacionales y sus nexos con los EE.UU. y Latinoamérica, así como el impacto futuro de China en el hemisferio occidental. El autor explica los desafíos y las oportunidades inherentes a la relación actual entre China y los EE.UU., tales como el dinero, las fuerzas armadas, la propiedad intelectual, la seguridad cibernética, y las tensiones de los derechos humanos, así como el impacto que esos factores tendrán en el futuro de la relación. La búsqueda de China de nexos más cercanos con los países de Latinoamérica, que estaban considerados por mucho tiempo bajo la “esfera de influencia” de los EE.UU., representa un desafío mayor para la relación entre China y los EE.UU.
Una Perspectiva de la Investigación de Vanguardia para Políticas y Programas de Prevención del Delito y Seguridad en el Caribe

(A Perspective on Cutting Edge Research for Crime and Security Policies and Programs in the Caribbean)

Hilton McDavid and Noel M. Cowell

RESUMEN

Si la sociedad jamaiquina se liberara de sus cuatro décadas de malestar económico, la tendencia de 40 años de aumento de los delitos violentos e inseguridad se pueden invertir. Sin embargo, esto es posible solo con unos diagnósticos correctos y adecuados de las causas, y la formulación de políticas y soluciones apropiadas. Jamaica y el resto del Caribe tiene que adoptar (y adaptar) estrategias pertinentes para combatir todo tipo de crímenes y violencia. Los autores argumentan que esto sólo es alcanzable mediante estrategias coordinadas y de formulación de políticas basadas en evidencia respaldada por un programa integrado de investigación de vanguardia. Mediante la identificación de los mejores indicadores de evaluación de programas y el ajuste de las políticas inadecuadas, un país como Jamaica puede cambiar el curso de las organizaciones criminales que tienen secuestradas la economía formal y las instituciones jurídicas. A través de un análisis cuidadoso de otros programas y perspectivas de la región, es posible que Jamaica pueda encontrar modelos viables a seguir.
El Aumento de la Industria de la Seguridad Privada en Barbados: Un Estudio de Caso

(The Growth of the Private Security Industry in Barbados: A Case Study)

Tyrone James

RESUMEN

El crecimiento y la participación de las empresas privadas de seguridad en lo que hasta entonces estaba bajo el control de los estados ha sido de interés actual, llamando la atención de los académicos y profesionales por igual. El propósito de este trabajo es realizar un estudio de caso de la industria de la seguridad privada en Barbados, con el fin de entender la estructura, las razones para su crecimiento, y su relación con la fuerza policial. Yo sostengo que el crecimiento de las empresas privadas de seguridad en Barbados va a ser una extensión de las agencias estatales de las fuerzas del orden, y puede contribuir significativamente en el fomento de un ambiente estable y seguro.
Una Interpretación Geopolítica de las Preocupaciones de Seguridad dentro de las Relaciones entre los Estados Unidos y Latinoamérica

(A Geopolitical Interpretation of Security Concerns within United States–Latin America Relations)

Phil Kelly

RESUMEN

En este artículo, el Dr. Philip Kelly aborda la geopolítica de las preocupaciones de seguridad entre los Estados Unidos y Latinoamérica. El Dr. Kelly define las varias escuelas de geopolítica, y posteriormente, las características de la geopolítica tradicional. Al separar el hemisferio occidental en tres partes—América del Norte, América del Central, y América del Sur—el artículo sirve para evaluar y discutir cada región y sus características geopolíticas únicas. En conclusión, el Dr. Kelly sugiere que América del Sur sigue siendo básicamente un tema de baja prioridad en las preocupaciones sobre seguridad estratégica de América del Norte, y anima a América del Norte a buscar una Latinoamérica unificada y próspera, aislada de los nexos con la Eurasia.
Un Abrazo Indefinido: Las Relaciones Exteriores y el Comercio entre Brasil y los Estados Unidos

(A Tentative Embrace: Brazil’s Foreign and Trade Relations with the United States)

Myles Frechette and Frank Samolis

RESUMEN

El desempeño económico, la estabilidad política, y la búsqueda de la grandeza de Brasil aseguran que Brasil jugará un papel importante en muchos asuntos globales y fortalecerá la cooperación económica regional. Las relaciones entre los Estados Unidos y Brasil han evolucionado a partir de una alianza durante y después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial en un compromiso cuidadoso pero crucial hoy en día. La reunión de los presidentes Dilma Rousseff y Barack Obama en abril de 2012 profundizó la cooperación en los intereses comunes. La política exterior de Brasil se ajusta por factores económicos más que la ideología, y Brasil quiere avanzar sus intereses fundamentales. Los EE.UU. busca fomentar en ascenso de Brasil. Sin embargo, las diferencias los EE.UU. y Brasil sobre el comercio y otras cuestiones no serán fáciles de superar. Este artículo examina cómo el cambiante equilibrio de poder en el mundo se ha ampliado los ámbitos de actuación de Brasil, mientras que los conceptos obsoletos como los bloques comerciales formales impiden Brasil de alcanzar los objetivos que se había marcado más estrechos por sí mismo.
La Iniciativa de Sistemas de Seguridad de las Fronteras en Brasil: Un esfuerzo de transformación en el diseño de fuerza

(Brazil’s Border Security Systems Initiative: A Transformative Endeavor in Force Design)

Salvador Raza

RESUMEN

Este artículo propone un sistema de seguridad en la frontera nacional con suficiente poder de diferenciación y capacidad de integración para abordar los peligros o sacar provecho de las circunstancias cambiantes a lo largo de las fronteras de Brasil, ligado a resultados apropiados de los agentes de seguridad. El Dr. Raza distingue las diferencias topológicas sensatas para exponer los patrones de interconexión de los elementos variados que definen tres ambientes específicos de la frontera, utilizandolos para planificar una acción más exitosa. El Dr. Raza también identifica las sutilezas entre los conceptos operacionales prácticos de las fuerzas armadas y las fuerzas policiales para proporcionar instalaciones mejor analizadas, utilizándolas para diseñar un sistema rentable y más completo.
Brazil’s National Defense Strategy

(Estratégia Nacional de Defesa do Brasil)

Shenia de Lima

ABSTRACT

The National Defense Strategy (END) was the first defense strategy ever published by the Brazilian government. Approved in 2008, the document was a landmark in the defense sector, as it determined major changes in the relation between the objectives established and the political and military means to achieve them. However, the feasibility of its implementation has been widely questioned, mainly by academics. This is due to inconsistencies in the strategy per se and uncertainty regarding the government ability and willingness to mobilize the necessary resources and take the necessary measures to implement the END. This article examines the main tenets of END and the major advances in its implementation from 2008-2011, as well as the main obstacles to its implementation.
Perspectivas sobre la Inestabilidad: Honduras y Paraguay

(Perspectives on Instability: Honduras and Paraguay)

Abbott Matthews

RESUMEN

Este artículo se dispone a examinar la destitución del Presidente Zelaya en Honduras en el 2009 y el juicio político del Presidente Lugo en Paraguay en el 2012. Muchas comparaciones se han establecido entre los casos de Honduras y Paraguay, pero es importante mostrar un análisis completo de las similitudes y diferencias donde se muestre la diferencia de las perspectivas del hemisferio occidental con respecto a la participación militar en la vida política y la flexibilidad constitucional y la interpretación. Este artículo empieza con un breve resumen del concepto de golpe de estado (coup d’état) y su evolución para establecer una estructura de trabajo. Antes de investigar cada caso individualmente, hay que tener en consideración los factores culturales e históricos. A pesar de que la legalidad, la constitucionalidad, y la legitimidad de los procesos de destitución presidencial constituyen una parte significativa de esta investigación, la importancia de la perspectiva sigue siendo un aspecto importante del análisis.
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